





M^{rs} CATHARINE COCKBURN.



M^{rs} CATHARINE COCKBURN.

3 Sh

5

THE
WORKS
OF
Trainer, after
Mrs. Catharine Cockburn,
THEOLOGICAL, MORAL,
DRAMATIC, and POETICAL,

Several of them now first printed,

Revised and published,

With an ACCOUNT of the
LIFE of the AUTHOR,

By THOMAS BIRCH, M.A. F.R.S.
*Rector of the United Parishes of St. Margaret Pattens,
and St. Gabriel Fenchurch.*

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON,

Printed for J. and P. KNAPTON, in *Ludgate-street,*

MDCCLI.

5

THE WORKS

Mrs. Catherine Cook
THEOLOGICAL
DRAWING



With a portrait of the
LIFE OF THOMAS

BY THOMAS STUART M.A. F.R.S.
LONDON: Printed by J. Johnson, in Pall-mall.

THE NEW OXFORD

VOL. I

LONDON: Printed by J. Johnson, in Pall-mall.

MDCCLXXIII.

SUBSCRIBERS

TO

Mrs. COCKBURN'S Works.

A.

RIGHT Hon. Earl of Ashburnham, Large Paper.

Right Hon. Countess of Albemarle, L. P.

Right Hon. Countess of Ancram, L. P.

Right Hon. Lady Anson, L. P.

Hon. R. Arundell, Esq; L. P.

Sir Robert Abercromby, Bart.

Ralph Allen of Bath, Esq; 2 Copies, L. P.

Miss Molly Allen.

Rev. Mr. Allen, M. A. St. John's College, Cambridge.

Mrs. Allgood of Hexham in Northumberland.

Mrs. Airey of Newcastle, 4 Copies.

Mr. Alexander Arbuthnot of Edinburgh.

Mrs. Andrews of Rotterdam.

John Austin, Esq;

Capt. Acourt, L. P.

Mr. Stephen Austin.

B.

Her Grace the Duchess of Bedford.

Her Grace the Duchess of Bolton.

Right Hon. Earl of Brook, L. P.

Right Hon. the Earl of Bath, L. P.

Subscribers Names.

Right Hon. Lady Viscountess Dowager Bateman,
L. P.

Right Hon. Lord Burleigh, 2 Copies.

Right Hon. Lord Brudenell, L. P.

Hon. Mrs. Brudenell, L. P.

Hon. James Brudenell, L. P.

G. Bridges Brudenell, Esq; L. P.

The Right Hon. Lord Chief Baron Bowes, L. P.

Sir Edmund Bacon, Bart.

Mrs. Bacon of Earham.

Sir Walter Blacket, Bart. L. P.

Lady Blacket, 2 Copies, L. P.

Lady Blacket of Hexham.

Mrs. Blacket of Rippon.

Rev. Mr. Balguy, A. M. of St. John's College,
Cambridge.

Rev. Dr. Baker.

Hodgkinson Banks, Esq; L. P.

Rev. Dr. Barton.

Rev. Mr. Cutts Barton, Rector of St. Andrews,
Holborn.

Rev. Mr. Montague Barton.

Rev. Mr. Ball, 3 Copies.

Mr. Patrick Barron of Aberdeen.

Thomas Beach, Esq; of Keovil, Wilts.

M. Beadon, B. A. Fellow of St. John's College,
Cambridge.

Dr. Bedford of Durham.

Mr. Paul Bertrand of Bath.

Rev. Dr. Bland, Prebendary of Durham.

Rev. Mr. Bouchery, M. A. of Swaffham in Norfolk.

Mrs. Bowerbank of Bath.

Mrs. Elizabeth Rowes of Durham.

Archibald Bower, Esq; L. P.

James Bolton, Esq; of Berwick-upon Tweed.

Rev. Mr. William Brent.

John Bridges, Esq.

Miss Margaretta Bridges.

George

Subscribers Names.

George Bridgman, Esq; Fellow Commoner of
Queen's College, Cambridge.

Mr. William Bromfield.

Mrs. Bromfield.

Mrs. Elizabeth Brown.

Mrs. Brown of Whitridge.

Mr. George Bryant, L. P.

Mr. Martin Bryson, Bookseller at Newcastle.

Miss Buck.

Rev. Dr. Bullock, Dean of Norwich.

James Burrough, Esq; Fellow of Corpus Christi
College, Cambridge.

Rev. Mr. Burrel, Vicar of Chatton, Northum-
berland.

William Burton, Esq; L. P.

Mrs. Burton, L. P.

Rev. Mr. John Burton, L. P.

Barton Burton, Esq; L. P.

Mrs. Byne of Pont Eland, L. P.

C

His Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury,
L. P.

Right Hon. the Lord Charles Cavendish.

Right Hon. Countess of Chesterfield.

Right Hon. Earl of Carlisle, L. P.

Right Hon. Earl of Cardigan, L. P.

Right Hon. Countess of Cardigan, L. P.

Right Hon. Countess of Coningsby, L. P.

Right Hon. Earl Cowper, L. P.

Right Hon. the Countess Cowper, L. P.

Charles Churchill, Esq; L. P.

Right Hon. Lady Mary Churchill, L. P.

Right Hon. Lady Carpenter, L. P.

Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Carlisle.

Right Rev. John Lord Bishop of Bristol.

Hon. and Rev. Spencer Cowper, Dean of Durham.

Hon. Mrs. Cowper.

Sir John Cust, Bart.

Pryse Campbell, Esq; L. P.

A

Hon.

Subscribers Names.

Hon. Mrs. Mary Campbell, L. P.
Ralph Carr of Dunstan, Esq.
Thomas Clark of Lincoln's Inn, Esq; one of his
Majesty's Council.
Rev. Dr. Chapman, Master of Magdalene College,
Cambridge, and Prebendary of Durham.
Archibald Cockran, Esq; Fellow Commoner of
St. Peter's College, Cambridge.
Joseph Clerk, Esq.
Rev. Mr. Clarke.
Mrs. Catharine Clarke.
Rev. Dr. Clarke, Dean of Sarum.
Miss Carter of Deal.
Mr. Edward Cave.
Rev. Mr. George Campbell.
Robert Chapman, LL. D.
Rev. Mr. Cholwell, Rector of Stevenage.
Rev. Mr. Nath. Clayton.
Mr. John Collier.
Capt. James Cruikshanks of Aberdeen.
Rev. Mr. Cremer of Wyndham in Norfolk.
Mr. John Cole.
Rev. Mr. Arthur Cohair of Barnes.
Rev. Mr. Chambers, Rector of Aychurch, Nor-
thamptonshire.

D

His Grace the Duke of Dorset, L. P.
Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Durham, L. P.
Durham Library.
Rev. Mr. Davy, M. A. Fellow of Caius College,
Cambridge.
Rev. Mr. Dawney, M. A. Fellow of Caius Col-
lege, Cambridge.
Davy Durrant, Esq; Fellow of Corpus Christi
College, Cambridge.
Mrs. Elizabeth Davison of Durham.
Mrs. Ann Davison of ditto.
Mr. Dearling of Chichester,
Miss Ann Dalben of Durham College.
Rev.

Subscribers Names.

Rev. Mr. Dockwray.
Rev. Mr. Doughty, Minister of St. James's Cler-
kenwell.
William Duncombe, Esq.
Mrs. Elizabeth Dyer.

E

Right Hon. Lord Edgcumb, L. P.
Right Hon. Lady Charlotte Edwin, L. P.
Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Exeter.
Lady Eden (Dowager) of Durham.
Lady Eden of Windleston, Durham.
William Rawlinson Earle, Esq; L. P.
Erasmus Earle, Esq; Fellow of St. Peter's Col-
lege, Cambridge.
Mrs. Earle, L. P.
Earle, L. P.
Miss Earle.
Rev. Mr. Ellifson.
Mr. John Entick Printer.
Miss Jane Entick.
Rev. Mr. Etough, 1 L. P. and 3 S. P.
Evans, Esq; of Bury St. Edmunds.
Rev. Mr. Venn Eyre, Rector of Stambourn.

F

Lady Cecilia Isabella Finch, L. P.
Right Hon. Countess of Fitzwalter, L. P.
Right Hon. Countess of Fitzwilliams, L. P.
Right Hon. Lord Viscount Falmouth, L. P.
Right Hon. the Lady Folkestone, L. P.
Lady Fawkener, L. P.
Rev. Mr. Geo. Farquhar of Aberdeen.
Francis Farquharson of Haughton, Esq.
Mrs. Farquharson of Haughton.
Rev. Mr. Featherstonhaugh.
Miss Fisher of Newcastle.
William Fleming Esq; of Norwich.
Martin Folkes, Esq; President of the Royal So-
ciety.
Rev. Dr. James Foster, L. P.

Subscribers Names.

Rev. Mr. Henry Fothergil, Rector of Cheriton
Bishop, Devonshire.

Edward Fowke, Esq.

Mrs. Fowle.

Rev. Mr. Foulkes, Vicar of Steeple Ashton, Wilts.

Mr. Frederick of Bath, Bookseller, 2 Copies.

Rev. Mr. Freeman of Norwich.

G

Her Grace the Duchess of Gordon, L. P.

Most Hon. Marchioness Grey, L. P.

Most Hon. Marchioness of Granby, L. P.

Right Hon. Earl of Grantham, L. P.

Right Hon. Lady Betty Germain, L. P.

Right Hon. Lady Guernsey, L. P.

Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Gloucester, 2 Copies,
L. P.

Sir Archibald Grant, Bart.

Sir Henry Grey of Norwich.

John Grey Esq; of ditto.

Miss Grey of ditto.

George Grey, Esq; of Newcastle.

John Grey, Esq; 2 Copies L. P.

Rev. Dr. Green, Master of Bennet College, and
Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge.

Rev. Mr. Archdeacon Goodall, Fellow of Corpus
Christi College, Cambridge.

Rev. Mr. Goodrick, M. A. Fellow of Caius Col-
lege, Cambridge.

Thomas Gilbert, Esq.

Thomas Gatehouse of Lower Wallop, Hants.

Arthur Gordon of Wardhouse, Esq.

Rev. J. Garnet, B. D. Fellow of Sidney College,
Cambridge.

Rev. Mr. Gisborne, Prebendary of Durham.

William Gery, Esq; L. P.

Mr. Gordon of Argyle Buildings, L. P.

Mrs. Gordon of ditto, L. P.

Mr. Andrew Garrioch, Merchant of Aberdeen.

Miss Elizabeth Charlotte Gretton.

Subscribers Names.

H

Right Hon. Marquis of Hartington.
 Right Hon. Earl of Holderness, L. P.
 Right Hon. Countess of Holderness.
 Right Hon. Lord Harvey, L. P.
 Right Hon. Lady Hardwicke.
 Right Hon. Lady Gertrude Hotham, L. P.
 Hon. Frederick Hervey of Bennet College, 2 Co-
 pies.
 Hon. Mrs. Heathcote.
 Sir Edward Hulse, Bart. L. P.
 Rev. Mr. Hubbard, Fellow of Emmanuel College,
 Cambridge.
 J. Heathcote, Esq; of Queen's College, Cambridge.
 Edward Harvey, Esq; L. P.
 Samuel Hetherington, Esq.
 John Hill, Esq; L. P.
 Thomas Hill, Esq; Secretary to the Board of
 Trade, L. P.
 David Hookester, Esq; L. P.
 William Heberdine, M. D.
 Rev. Mr. William Herring.
 Rev. Mr. Thomas Herring.
 Rev. Mr. Heaton, B. D. Fellow of Bennet Col-
 lege, Cambridge.
 Rev. Mr. Hughes, B. D. Fellow of Queen's Col-
 lege, Cambridge.
 Rev. Mr. Hurd, A. M. Fellow of Emmanuel Col-
 lege, Cambridge.
 Rev. Mr. John Hill.
 Mrs. Harbord.
 Mr. Thomas Hanson, L. P.
 Mrs. Sarah Harris.
 Alderman Harris of Gloucester.
 Mr. James Hestline of Durham.
 Mr. Jonadab Hinchliffe.
 Rev. Mr. Thomas Hinton.
 I
 His Grace the Lord Primate of Ireland, 2 Copies,
 L. P.

Subscribers Names.

Sir William Irby.
 James Irvine, Esq; of Hampstead.
 Ambrose Isted, Esq; L. P.
 Rev. Mr. Jackson.
 Rev. Mr. Jaques, Prebendary of Wells.
 Rev. Mr. Inman of Berrington, Somersetshire.
 Rev. Mr. Jones of Metrow in Norfolk.
 Mrs. James.
 Mr. Jarvis of Trowbridge, Wilts.
 His Excellency Benjamin Keene, Esq; L. P.
 Rev. Mr. Edm. Keene, D. D. Vice-Chancellor of
 Cambridge.
 Mrs. Knatchbull of Durham College.
 Mrs. Kynaston, L. P.
 Mrs. Keir of Edinburgh.
 Miss Kirk.
 Rev. Mr. Knappe of Bath.
 L
 Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Litchfield and Coven-
 try, L. P.
 Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Llandaff.
 Hon. James Lumley, Esq; L. P.
 Lady Lorraine, L. P.
 James Lambe, Esq;
 Rev. Dr. Lynch, Dean of Canterbury.
 Christopher Lethieullier, Esq;
 Mrs. Liddell (Dowager) of Newton.
 Mrs. Liddel of Newton.
 Rev. Dr. Law, Archdeacon of Carlisle.
 Daniel Lock, Esq;
 Rev. Mr. Lawry, Prebendary of Rochester.
 Rev. Mr. Lamb, Rector of Gateshead, Durham.
 Rev. Mr. Langhorn, A. M. Fellow of St. John's
 College, Cambridge.
 Rev. Mr. James Lawrie.
 Rev. Mr. William Lever, M. A. Chaplain to the
 Earl of Cardigan.
 Mr. John Lewis, B. A. Fellow of Queen's Col-
 lege, Cambridge. Mr.

Subscribers Names.

Mr. Thomas Lees, L. P.
 Miss Lovett.
 James Ledgerwood of Aberdeen.
 M
 His Grace the Duke of Montrose.
 Her Grace the Duchess of Montague, 2 Copies.
 Right Hon. Lady Elizabeth Murray, L. P.
 Wortley Montague, Esq; L. P.
 Major Borgard Michelson of the Artillery.
 Rev. Mr. Masters, Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.
 Rev. Dr. Milles.
 ——— Morris, Esq; L. P.
 John Mason, Esq; L. P.
 Rev. Mr. Maddison.
 Mrs. Mason, L. P.
 Mr. Mason, A. M. Fellow of Pembroke Hall, Cambridge.
 Rev. Mr. Manning, Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge.
 Rev. Mr. Michell, B. A. Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge.
 Rev. Mr. Joseph Milner, Rector of Barton in Nottinghamshire.
 Mrs. Middleton of Twickenham, L. P.
 Miss Michell.
 Mr. John Man.
 Miss Marham.
 Mr. Nicholas Mercator.
 Mr. Thomas Moore.
 Mrs. G. Myddleton of Durham College.
 N
 His Grace the Duke of Newcastle, L. P.
 Right Hon. the Countess of Northumberland, L. P.
 Right Hon. Lord North, L. P.
 Robert Nugent, Esq; L. P.
 Mrs. Nugent, L. P.
 Rev. Dr. Newcome, Dean of Rochester, Master of St. John's College, Cambridge, 2 Copies.

Subscribers Names.

Mrs. Newcome, 2 Copies.
Mr. P. Newcome of Hackney, F. R. S.
Rev. Mr. Neville, B. D. Fellow of Emanuel College, Cambridge.
Mrs. Neale of Cross on the Tees.
Mr. Thomas Nuthall.
Newcastle Library.

O

Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Oxford, L. P.
George Onslow, Esq; Fellow Commoner of St. Peter's College, Cambridge.
James Ogilvie of Aberdeen, Esq;
John Orlebar, Esq; L. P.
William Offley of Norwich, M. D.
Mrs. Ord of Berwick on Tweed.
Mrs. Mary Oliver of Worcester.
Capt. Osborn, 8 Copies.
Mrs. Elizabeth Oxley.
Miss Jane Oxley.
Rev. Mr. Owen of Rochdale.

P

Her Grace the Duchess of Portland, L. P.
Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Peterborough.
Right Hon. Henry Pelham, Esq; L. P.
John Pelham, Esq.
Henry Pelham, Esq; Fellow Commoner of Bennet's College, Cambridge.
Lady Poole.
John Pitt, Esq; Commissioner of Trade, L. P.
Mrs. Pitt, L. P.
Col. Pattison of the Artillery, 2 Copies.
William Purcas, Esq; one of the six Clerks in Chancery.
John Plumtree, Esq; L. P.
Fitzwilliam Plumtree, Esq.
Rev. Charles Plumtree, B. D. Prebendary of Norwich.
Rev. Septimius Plumtree, A. M. Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge.

Rev.

Subscribers Names.

Rev. Robert Plumtree, M. A. Fellow of Queen's
College, Cambridge.
George Proctor, Esq; L. P.
Dr. Pelling.
William Pye of Durham, Esq.
Mrs. Prowse of Aixbridge, Somersetshire.
Rev. Mr. Powell, B. D. Fellow of St. John's Col-
lege, Cambridge.
Rev. Mr. Purr.
Mr. Richard Parrot of Hawkbury, Warwick-
shire.
Mr. Peacock of Aberdeen.
Rev. Mr. Primar of Norwich.
Mr. Jer. Pierce, Surgeon at Bath.
Q
Queen's College Library.
R
Her Grace the Duchess of Richmond, L. P.
Most Hon. Marquis of Rockingham, L. P.
Right Hon. Countess of Rockingham, L. P.
Right Hon. Lord Ravensworth, 4 Copies L. P.
Right Hon. Lady Ravensworth.
Sir Thomas Robinson, Bart.
R. Reynolds, Esq.
Richard Roderic, Esq; L. P.
Mrs. Raynsford of Durham.
Mrs. Robinson.
Atkinson Robinson, Esq.
Mrs. Rooke.
Mrs. Ruding.
Miss Rudd of Durham.
Mrs. Roberts of Hexham.
Rev. T. Robinson, D. D. 4 Copies.
Miss Ridley of Newcastle.
Rev. Dr. Rooke, Master of Christ's College,
Cambridge.
Mr. Theophilus Rowe.
Mr. James Royston.

Subscribers Names.

Her Grace Charlotte Duchess Dowager of Somerset, L. P.
 Her Grace Frances Duchess Dowager of Somerset, L. P.
 Right Hon. the Countess Stanhope.
 Right Hon. Countess of Sunderland, deceased.
 Right Hon. Lord Salton.
 Right Rev. John Lord Bishop of Salisbury, L. P.
 Lady Seabright.
 Sir George Savil, Bart. 2 Copies.
 Right Hon. Edward Southwell, Esq.
 J. Shelley, Esq.
 John Shelley, Esq, of Peter's College, L. P.
 Seb. Smith, Esq.
 Francis Sitwell, Esq.
 P. Southcott, Esq, L. P.
 John Selwyn, sen. Esq, L. P.
 Thomas Stisted, Esq, Fellow of Caius College, Cambridge.
 Robert Simpson, Esq, Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge.
 Rev. Dr. Sharp, Archdeacon of Northumberland.
 Dr. Smith, Provost of Queen's College, Oxford.
 Major Sneyd of South-Audley-Street.
 Mrs. Sherlock, L. P.
 Mrs. Snee, L. P.
 Mrs. Stuart, 2 Copies, L. P.
 Mrs. Sharp of Durham College.
 Miss Squire.
 Rev. Dr. Salter.
 Rev. Mr. Dan. Salkeld of Rothbury.
 Rev. Dr. Stonehouse, Rector of Houghton le Spring.
 Robert Spearman, Esq, of Durham.
 Rev. Mr. Jo. Sharp, Vicar of Hartburn.
 Rev. Mr. St. Clair of Systead in Norfolk.
 Rev. Mr. Stuart, A. M. Fellow of Peter's College, Cambridge.
 Rev. Mr. Swinburn.

Rev.

Subscribers Names.

Rev. Mr. Sparrow of Bath.
 Alexander Sutherland, M. D. of Bath, & 2 Copies
 Mrs. Boothby Schrymsher, L. P.
 Mr. Thomas Simpson.
 Mr. John Stevens, Stationer.
 St. John's College, Cambridge.
 Hon. Charles Townsend, one of the Commissioners
 of Trade.
 Hon. John Talbot, Esq; L. P.
 Mrs. Talbot.
 Miss Talbot.
 Rev. Mr. Talbot, Rector of Lacock Wilts, L. P.
 Lady Turner.
 Sir Peter Thompson, Knt.
 Rev. Dr. Terrick, Residentiary of St. Paul's.
 Rev. Dr. Trevigar of Hortonmonceux in Suffolk.
 Thomas Taylor, Esq.
 William Tighe, Esq; L. P.
 John Thornough, Esq; L. P.
 James Thornton, Esq; of Nether Winton.
 Rev. Mr. Thompson.
 Rev. Nicholas Tindal, Rector of Alverstoke, L. P.
 Rev. Mr. Tough, Rector of St. Paul's Covent
 Garden.
 Rev. William Trent, M. A. Rector of Andover.
 Rev. Mr. Topps of Norwich.
 Rev. Mr. Turner.
 Robert Taylor, M. D. & L. P. and 2 Copies
 Mr. Robert Taylor.
 Mrs. Trafford.
 Mrs. Mary Turner, L. P.
 Mrs. Mary Trevor, L. P.
 Mr. Tovey of Alnwick in Northumberland.
 Mr. Stracy Till.
 Mr. Andrew Tate of Aberdeen.
 Right Hon. Henry Vane, son, Esq.
 Mrs. Unett of Wolverhampton.

Subscribers Names.

Miss Underdown of Deal.

W

Right Hon. Lady Frances Hanbury Williams,
L. P.

Right Hon. Lord Willoughby of Parham.

Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Winchester, L. P.

Right Rev. Lord Bishop of Worcester.

Right Hon. Horatio Walpole, Esq.

Lady Williams.

Daniel Wray, Esq.

Thomas Waters, Esq.

Rev. Dr. Wilton, Prebendary of Westminster.

Rev. Mr. Warburton.

Mrs. Warburton, L. P.

Rev. Dr. Waugh, Chancellor of Carlisle.

Rev. Mr. Wallis.

Rev. Mr. Watson of Pont Eland.

Rev. Mr. Wastell, Rector of Simonburn in Northumberland.

Rev. Mr. Werge, late Vicar of Heartburn.

Rev. Mr. Granville Wheler of Otterden Place,
Northumberland, 2 Copies.

Rev. Mr. Wigley, Fellow of Christ's College,
Cambridge.

Rev. Mr. Sherlock Willis, Prebendary of St. Paul's.

Rev. Dr. Henry Waterland, Rector of Wriington,
Somersetshire, and Prebendary of Bristol.

Rev. Mr. Wainhouse of Bath.

Rev. Mr. Williams, Rector of Little Icy.

Braemes Wheler, Proctor of Durham.

Mrs. Lucy Woodcock.

Mr. Walkinshaw.

Mr. James Wild of Ludlow.

Y

Hon. Philip Yorke, Esq.

Hon. Charles Yorke, Esq; L. P.

Hon. John Yorke, Esq.

Hon. James Yorke, Esq.

C O N-

CONTENTS

OF THE

FIRST VOLUME.

- T**HE Life of Mrs. Cockburn, by Thomas Birch, M. A. F. R. S. — page i
- A Discourse concerning a Guide in Controversies, First published in 1707, with a Preface by Bishop Burnet.* — — — — — 11
- A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding. First published in 1702.* — — — — — 43
- A Letter to Dr. Holdsworth: occasioned by his sermon preached before the University of Oxford, on Easter Monday, concerning the Resurrection of the same Body. First published in 1726.* — — — — — 113
- A Vindication of Mr. Locke's Christian Principles, from the injurious Imputations of Dr. Holdsworth. Now first printed.* — — — — — 155
- Remarks upon some Writers in the Controversy concerning the Foundation of Moral Virtues and Moral Obligation. With some thoughts concerning Necessary Existence; the Reality and Infinity of Space; the Extension and Place of Spirits; and on Dr. Watts's Notion of Substance. First published in 1743.* — — — — — 379

Hon. Philip Yorke, Esq.
Hon. Charles Yorke, Esq.
Hon. James Yorke, Esq.
Hon. James Yorke, Esq.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LIBRARY

OF THE

CHICAGO

UNIVERSITY

OF THE

CHICAGO

UNIVERSITY

OF THE

CHICAGO

UNIVERSITY

OF THE

CHICAGO

UNIVERSITY

OF THE

CHICAGO

UNIVERSITY

OF THE

CHICAGO

UNIVERSITY

OF THE

CHICAGO

UNIVERSITY

OF THE

CHICAGO

UNIVERSITY

OF THE

CHICAGO

THE
L I F E
O F
Mrs. CATHARINE COCKBURN.

By THOMAS BIRCH, M. A. F. R. S.

THERE is observable in mankind a natural and almost universal curiosity, concerning the persons of those, from whose writings they have received entertainment or instruction. And the gratification of this desire is attended with a very considerable use, as the history and characters of the writers generally tend to cast a light upon their works, and heighten our relish for them. It is therefore a justice due to the public, as well as to the memory of our author, to premise some account of so extraordinary a person. Posterity at least will be solicitous to know, to whom they will owe the most demonstrative and perspicuous reasonings, upon subjects of eternal importance; and her own sex is intitled to the fullest information about one, who has done such honour to them, and raised our ideas

VOL. I.

a

of

ii *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

of their intellectual powers, by an example of the greatest extent of understanding and correctness of judgment, united to all the vivacity of imagination. Antiquity indeed boasted of its *female philosophers*, whose merits have been drawn forth in an elaborate treatise of *Ménage*. But our own age and country may, without injustice or vanity, oppose to those illustrious ladies the defender of *Locke* and *Clarke*, who, with a genius equal to the most eminent of them, had the superior advantage of cultivating it in the only effectual method of improvement, the study of a real philosophy, and a theology truly worthy of human nature, and its all-perfect author.

SHE was the daughter of Captain *David Trotter*, a Scots gentleman, and commander in the royal navy, in the reign of *Charles II.*, and of Mrs. *Sarah Ballenden*, who had the honour of being nearly related to the noble Lord of that name, and to the illustrious families of *Maitland*, Duke of *Lauderdale*, and *Drummond*, earl of *Perth*.

Her father was highly in favour with king *Charles II.* and his brother the duke of *York*; and his known probity and integrity gained him an universal esteem, being generally distinguished by the epithet of *honest David*; and *James* earl of *Perth*, Lord High Chancellor of *Scotland* in the latter end of that king's reign and the following one, in a very pathetic let-

* *Historia Mulierum philosopharum*; printed at Lyons in 1690.
In 8vo.

The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN. III

ter, which he wrote to his widow upon his death, styles him an ornament to his country. He served the crown from his youth, with great gallantry and fidelity, both by land and sea; and during the *Dutch* war took, besides other prizes, one, which was sold by the government for thirty thousand pounds. He attended lord *Dartmouth* as commodore in the demolition of *Tangier*, in the latter end of the year 1683, and soon after was sent by his majesty, with a view of making his fortune, to convoy the fleet of the *Turkey* company; but being seized by the Plague, then raging at *Scanderoon*, died there. His death was an irreparable loss to his family, who were defrauded of all his effects on board his ship, which were very considerable, and of all the money, which he had advanced to the seamen, during a long voyage, by the dishonesty of the purser and others; the chief officers of the ship being likewise dead of the same distemper, which had proved so fatal to the captain. And, to add to the misfortune of his widow, the goldsmith, in whose hands the greatest part of his money was lodged, became soon after a bankrupt. These accumulated circumstances of distress excited the compassion of king *Charles II.* which concurring with his regard for the memory of an old and faithful servant, induced his majesty to give a favourable reference to the Admiralty for a pension to the widow, which ended with that king's life; nor had she any consideration

••• The probate of his will in the register of the prerogative court of *Canterbury*, is dated the 9th of *February* 1683-4.

in *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN*,
for her losses in the two succeeding reigns.
But Queen *Anne*, upon her accession to the
throne, granted her an annual pension of twenty
pounds, which was constantly paid by the
duchess of *Marlborough* into the hands of *Dr.*
Burnet, bishop of *Salisbury*, till the removal of
her grace from court; when, upon the widow's
renewing her application, her majesty continu-
ed it as before.

Captain *Trotter*, at his death, left only two
daughters, the elder of whom being after-
wards married to *Dr. Inglis*, late physician ge-
neral to the army, had by him two sons, one
of whom died vicar of *Lewisham* in *Kent*, and
the other was chaplain to *Mr. Trelawney*, gover-
nor of *Jamaica*, in which island he had a con-
siderable benefice, where he died a few years
ago.

The younger daughter, *Catharine*, author of
the excellent works in this collection, was born
at *London*, on the 16th of *August* 1679. She
gave very early marks of her genius, and was
not passed her childhood, when she surprized
a company of her relations and friends with ex-
temporary verses on an incident, which had fallen
under her observation in the street; her uncle,
a commander in the navy, who was present,
taking notice of this forwardness of her wit,
and what satisfaction it would have given her
father, if he had been living, as he had a pe-
culiar taste and love for poetry. She both learn-
ed to write, and made herself mistress of the
French language, by her own application and
diligence, without any instructor. But she had
some

The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN. ♥

Some assistance in the study of the *Latin* grammar and *Logic*, of which latter she drew up an abstract for her own use. The most serious and important subjects, and especially those of religion, soon engaged her attention. But, notwithstanding her education in the protestant religion, her intimacy with several families of distinction of the *Romish* persuasion exposed her, while very young, to impressions in favour of that church, which not being removed by her conferences with some eminent and learned members of the church of *England*, she followed the dictates of a misguided conscience, and embraced the *Romish* communion, in which she continued till the year 1707.

She was but fourteen years of age, when she wrote, in 1693, a copy of verses upon Mr. *Bevil Higgon's* sickness and recovery from the small-pox, and sent them to that gentleman, greatly esteemed at that time for his wit and poetical talents, though his tragedy, intitled *The generous Conqueror*, is at present much less known, than his historical writings of a later date, written with spirit and vivacity, but more strongly tinged with the political prejudices of the writer, than is consistent with the impartiality of an historian.

Her next production was a tragedy, called, *Agnes de Castro*, which was acted at the theatre royal in 1695, when she was only in her seventeenth year, and printed in 1696 in 4to without her name, but with a dedication to the earl of *Dorset* and *Middlesex*, in which she observed, that "this little offspring of her early

vi *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

" Muse had been first submitted to his lord-
 " ship's judgment, whether it should be stiled
 " in the birth, or preserved to try its fortune in
 " the world." It is formed upon a *French*
 novel of the same title, printed at *Paris* in
 1688; of which *Mrs. Behn* has given an *En-*
glish translation.

The reputation of this performance, and the
 verses, which she addressed to *Mr. Congreve*
 upon his *Mourning Bride* in 1697, were prob-
 ably the foundation of her acquaintance with
 that admirable writer, who, upon the receipt
 of these verses, returned her the following
 letter.

" I can never enough acknowledge the ho-
 " nour you have done me, nor enough regret
 " the negligence of those, to whom you de-
 " livered your valuable Letter. It is the first
 " thing, that ever happened to me, upon
 " which I should make it my choice to be
 " vain. And yet such is the mortification,
 " that attends even the most allowable vanity,
 " that at the same instant I am robb'd of the
 " means, when I am possessed with the incli-
 " nation. It is but this moment, that I received
 " your verses; and had scarce been transported
 " with the reading them, when they brought
 " me the play from the press printed off. I
 " hope you will do me the justice to believe,
 " that I was not so insensible, as not to be
 " heartily vexed; and all the satisfaction, that

Bibliothèque des Romans, par M. le C. Gordon de Perlet,
Vol. II. p. 108. edit. Amsterdam, 1734.

" I can

"I can take, and all the sacrifice that I make
to you, is only to stifle some verses on the
same barren subject, which were printed
with it, and now, I assure you, shall never
appear, whatever apology I am forced to
make to the authors. And since I am de-
prived of the recommendation you designed
me, I will be obliged to no other, till I
have some future opportunity of preferring
yours to every body's else. In the mean
time, give me leave to value myself upon
the favour you have done me; and to assure
you, it was not wanting to make me more
ready, than I have been, in my inclinations
of waiting on all your commands: and if
Mr. Betterton's business does not very speedi-
ly disengage him, I will not wait for his be-
ing a witness of my professing myself your

"admirer,

"and obliged humble servant,

"W. CONGREVE,

"I know not what time the princess will
give me leave to present her with the play,
it being dedicated to her; but as soon as
that form is over, I will make bold to send
you one."

Her first tragedy was attended with such
success upon the stage, that she was induced
to write another, intitled *Fatal Friendship*,

viii *The Life of Mrs. Cockburn.*

which was acted in 1698, at the new theatre in *Lincoln's-Inn-Fields*, and printed the same year in 4to. with a dedication to the princess *Anne of Denmark*. This tragedy met with great applause, and is still thought the most perfect of all her dramatic performances. Among other copies of verses sent to her upon occasion of it, and prefixed to it, was one from an unknown hand, which afterwards appeared to be from the elegant pen of *John Hughes, Esq;* author of the *Siege of Damascus*. Mr. *Higgon*s likewise sent another, which came too late to be inserted among the rest, but is printed in the present edition. And Mr. *George Farquhar* was so highly pleased with this tragedy, that he soon after took the opportunity of sending to her his first comedy, called *Love and a Bottle*, acted the same year 1698, with a letter, in which, after complaining, that his play "had been scandalously aspersed for affronting the ladies," he observed, that "as an argument of its innocence, he sent it to stand its tryal before one of the fairest of the sex, and the best judge. Besides, Madam, added he, it is an offering due to the favour and honour shewed me, in your appearance on my third night; and a stranger cannot be denied the privilege of shewing his gratitude. But humbly to confess the greatest motive, my passions were wrought so high by representation of *Fatal Friendship*, and since raised so high by a sight of the beautiful author, that I gladly caught this opportunity of

The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN ix

is of owning myself, your most faithful and
humble servant."

The death of Mr. Dryden, on the 1st of May
1700, engaged her to join with several other
ladies, in paying a just tribute to the memory
of that great improver of the strength, fulness
and harmony of *English* verse; and their per-
formances were published together in *Septem-
ber* that year, under the title of, *The nine
Muses; or, Poems written by so many ladies
upon the death of the late famous John Dryden,
Esq.*

Her dramatic talents not being confined to
tragedy, she brought upon the stage in 1701,
at the theatre royal, a comedy called, *Love at
a Loss; or most Votes carry it*, published in
May that year in 4to. But her absence from
London, during the impression, occasioned many
errors in the edition, some things marked in
her copy to be left out, being inserted, and
others absolutely necessary to the sense, omit-
ted; the whole being by this means so altered
and disguised, that she would gladly, if pos-
sible, have called in and suppressed the edition.

This induced her many years after, to revise
that comedy, in which she made great altera-
tions, and had some thoughts of bringing it
again on the stage, under the title of *The Ho-
nourable Deceivers; or All right at the last.*

In a correct copy of her dedication to lady
Piers, in her own hand writing (for the print-
ed one is so extremely faulty, as to be unintel-
ligible in some places) she says, "that she had
never thought of making any pretence to a

"talent

x *The Life of Mrs. Cockburn.*

“ talent for comedy, but wrote that, when the
 “ town had been so much used to a mixture
 “ of comedy, interwoven with the deepest tra-
 “ gedies, that it was the declared opinion of
 “ some, that an intire tragedy, without such
 “ mixture, would never succeed upon an *En-*
 “ *glish* stage. But that since this odd taste
 “ was mended, the tragedy appeared alone,
 “ with which part of that comedy was at first
 “ designed to be mingled, and it lay by her for
 “ a considerable time, till some leisure hours
 “ inclined her to amuse herself in piecing it
 “ up, with little care or concern for the suc-
 “ cess, not intending to establish her fame up-
 “ on a work of this kind.”

Lady *Piers*, to whom this comedy was dedi-
 cated, was wife of Sir *George Piers*, a gentle-
 man of *Kent*, and an officer of considerable
 rank under the duke of *Marlborough*. She had
 contracted a very early esteem for, and most
 intimate and unreserved friendship with our
 author, who had an equal regard for the ami-
 able qualities of that lady, and chose her for
 her patroness, on account of her *taste in Poetry*,
 and *delight in the muses*, as well as her can-
 dour and indulgence to every well-meant at-
 tempt. “ This, madam, *says she*, is a quality
 “ peculiarly yours. Such an universal com-
 “ plaisance of temper I never met with in a
 “ person of so distinguishing a genius as your
 “ ladyship; and have often observed with won-
 “ der, that a lady, who knows how to relish
 “ the noblest things, and has the finest enter-
 “ tainment in herself, can appear delighted
 “ with

"with the most trivial amusement, in conde-
"scension to the capacity or inclination of
"others. It is this has made you the darling
"of all your acquaintance, even those, who
"cannot taste your agreeable wit in your
"lightest conversation, and the solid judg-
"ment of your serious reflections. It is this
"has secured you from that malice and envy,
"which usually pursue those of a distinguish-
"ed merit."

In the same year 1701, she gave the public her third tragedy, intitled, *The Unhappy Penitent*, acted at the theatre royal in *Drury-Lane*, and published in *August* that year in 4to. In the dedication to *Charles lord Halifax*, she draws the characters of several of the most eminent of her predecessors in tragic poetry with great judgment and precision. She observes, that *Shakespeare* had all the images of nature present to him, studied her thoroughly, and boldly copied all her various features; And that tho' he chiefly exerted himself on the more masculine passions, it was the choice of his judgment, not the restraint of his genius; and that he seems to have designed those few tender moving scenes, which he has given us, as a proof, that he could be every way equally admirable. She allows *Dryden* to have been the most universal genius, which this nation ever bred, but thinks, that he did not excell in every part, for tho' he is distinguished in most of his writings, by greatness and elevation of thought, and sublime, yet at the same time that he commands our admiration of himself, he little moves

moves our concern for those, whom he represents, not being formed for touching the softer passions. On the other hand, *Otway*, besides his judicious choice of the fable, had a peculiar art to move compassion, which, as it is one of the chief ends of tragedy, he found most adapted to his genius; and never venturing where that did not lead him, excelled in the pathetic. And had *Lee*, as she remarks, consulted his strength as well, he might have given us more perfect pieces; but aiming at the sublime, instead of being *great*, he is *extravagant*; his style too swelling; and if we pursue him in his flight, he often carries us out of nature. Had he restrained that vain ambition, and intirely applied himself to describe the softest of the passions (for love, of all the rest, he seems best to have understood, if that be allowed a proper subject for tragedy) he had certainly had fewer defects. She then proceeds to speak with great modesty of her own tragedy, as defective in the plot, the distress not being great enough, since the subject of it is only the misfortune of lovers; which she partly designed, in compliance with the effeminate taste of the age. Notwithstanding which, and the right of possession, which it has long held on the modern stage, she ventures to propose a doubt, whether love be a proper subject for tragedy; as it seemed to her not noble nor sublime enough for that species of writing. But she had a much greater objection to it, at least as it is generally represented, which the best of the

The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.

xiii

the French Poets had made before her, and gives as a rule, that

*— l'Amour souvent de Remors combatus
Paroisse une foiblesse, & non une vertu.*

The most, that can, in her opinion, be allowed that passion is to be the noblest frailty of the mind; but it is a frailty, and becomes a vice, when cherished as an exalted virtue: A passion, which contracts the mind, by fixing it intirely on one object, and sets all our happiness at stake on so great a hazard, as the caprice or the fidelity of another; which, if there were no greater, is surely sufficient reason, not to arm it with more power than its own insinuating nature; yet this is made the shining virtue of our heroes. We are to rejoice in their success, or pity their disappointments; as noble lovers, patterns for our imitation, not as instances of human frailty. "And I fear," adds she, that this has not been so constantly done without ill consequence. Not but "love will maintain his dominion in the world, "how much soever opposed. But if we resign him the heart, let us not give him up "the judgment too." On these reflections she composed this tragedy, in which the principal characters are indeed doting lovers, but hurried by their passions into a fault, of which their immediate punishment makes them conscious, and at once deserve their sufferings and our pity. And "this, concludes she, tho' given by

⁴ Boileau, *Art poetique*, Chant iii. § 101, 102.

" our

xiv *The Life of Mrs. Cockburn.*

“ our great master, as an invariable law in this
“ sort of poem, is yet observed by few; with-
“ out which, tho’ they may give delight, they
“ can rarely attain that end, to which the
“ other should only be subservient, of forming
“ an instructive moral.” To this tragedy her
friend lady *Piers* prefixed a poem, inscribed
To the excellent Mrs. Catharine Trotter; which
concludes with the following lines:

“ Myrtle and Bays about thy temples twine,
“ Plac’d by *Apollo* and the sacred nine;
“ And ev’ry grace and every virtue’s thine,
“ By thy judicious rules the hero learns
“ To vanquish fate, and wield his conqu’ring
“ arms;
“ The bashfull virgin to defend her heart;
“ The prudent wife to scorn dishonest art;
“ The friend sincerity; temp’rance the youth;
“ The lover chastity, and statesman truth.
“ Within thy bosom all these treasures dwell,
“ Nor can we judge, in which you most excel.
“ So perfect, even envy you controul;
“ *Minerva* and *Diana* guard your soul.”

But poetry and dramatic writing did not so
far engross the thoughts of our author, but that
she sometimes turned them to subjects of a
very different nature; and at an age, when few
of the other sex were capable of understand-
ing *The Essay of Human Understanding*, and most
of them prejudiced against the novelty of its
principles; and tho’ she was at that time en-
gaged in the profession of a religion, not very
favourable to so rational a philosophy as that
of

The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN. xv

of Mr. *Locke*; yet she had read that incomparable book, with so clear a comprehension, and so unbiassed a judgment, that her own conviction of the truth and importance of the notions contained in it led her to endeavour that of others, by removing some of the objections urged against them. She drew up therefore a *Defence* of the *Essay* against some *Remarks*, which had been published against it in 1697 in 4to. The author of these *Remarks* was never known to Mr. *Locke*, who animadverted upon them, with some marks of chagrin, at the end of his *Reply* to bishop *Stillingfleet* in 1697. But after the death of the ingenious Dr. *Thomas Burnet*, Master of the *Charter-house*, it appeared from his papers, that the *Remarks* were the production of his pen. They were soon followed by *second Remarks*, printed the same year in 4to. in vindication of the *first* against Mr. *Locke's* answer to them, and in 1699 by *third Remarks*, addressed likewise to Mr. *Locke*. Mrs. *Trotter's Defence* of the *Essay* of human *Understanding* against all these *Remarks*, was finished as early as the beginning of *December* 1701, when she was but twenty two years old. But being more apprehensive of appearing before the great writer, whom she defended, than of the public censure, and conscious, that the name of a woman would be a prejudice against a work of that nature, she resolved to conceal herself with the utmost

* See her letter to G. *Burnet*, of *Kemnay*. *Elq*; dated from *Salisbury*, *December* 9, 1701, Vol. III. p. 153; and another letter of *February* 2, 1703-4, p. 166, 167.

xvi *The Life of Mrs. Cockburn.*

care. Having therefore taken all possible precautions for that purpose, she got the piece conveyed to the press; and it was accordingly published in May 1702. But her title to the reputation of this piece did not continue long a secret to the world. For Mrs. Burnet, the last wife of Dr. Burnet, bishop of Salisbury, a lady of uncommon degrees of knowledge, and whose *Method of Devotion*, which passed thro' several editions, is a proof of her exemplary piety, and who, as well as that prelate, honoured our author with a particular friendship, notwithstanding the difference of her religion, being informed, that she was engaged in writing, and that it was not poetry, was desirous to know the subject. This Mrs. Trotter could not deny to a lady of her merit, in whom she might safely confide, and who, upon being acquainted with it, shewed an equal solicitude, that the author might not be known. But afterwards finding the performance highly approved of by the bishop her husband, Mr. Norris of Bemerton, and Mr. Locke himself, she thought the reasons of secrecy ceased, and discovered the writer, and on the 10th of June 1702, returned her thanks to

This excellent person, who was as amiable, on account of her virtues, and especially her unbounded charity, as admired for her intellectual abilities, was daughter of Sir Richard Blais of Hampshire, Knight. She was born November 9, 1666, and when she was but a little more than seventeen years of age, married to Robert Bechly of Spockley, in the county of Worcester, Esq; Grandson to Sir Robert Bechly, one of the Judges in the reign of King Charles I. After the death of her husband in 1693, she continued a widow seven years, and then married bishop Burnet, by whom she had two children, and died Feb. 3, 1708-9.

Mrs.

Mrs. Trotter, then in *London*, for her present of the book, in the following letter; which does as much honour to her own understanding, principles, and temper, as to her friend, to whom she addressed it.

Madam,

“ I F I have not more hastily returned.
“ my thanks for the valuable present.
“ you sent me, it has been, in part, out of a
“ desire to send you better judgments than my
“ own for its approbation and praise. The
“ Bishop, Mr. *Norris*, and some others, no
“ ill judges of such a performance, have, with
“ great readiness, professed themselves ex-
“ tremely pleased: and it is not without dif-
“ ficulty some can believe, that any one, not
“ bred to science, and logic in particular, could
“ be capable of so close and clear reasoning.
“ I am no fit judge of this, nor of the cer-
“ tainty of all the proofs, which are things so
“ nice, as to make me suspect my capacity to
“ determine about them; so can only say, I
“ am satisfied and pleased. But that can be
“ no confirmation, were you doubtful; but
“ what I cannot but observe and commend;
“ is, that the whole is written short and clear,
“ without affectation of wit or eloquence,
“ needless reflections on your adversary, or
“ making him more in the wrong than he is;
“ rather bringing him nearer, than driving
“ him farther from truth; taking his words
“ in as good a sense, as they would bear,
“ in which I heartily wish the searchers after
“ truth would imitate you. If they did, I
“ am persuaded, there would be both more
Vol. I. b “ light

xviii *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

“ light, as well as more charity in the world,
“ than at present, while such destructive me-
“ thods to both are taken, can be expected.
“ I confess I cannot but repeat what I ever
“ think, and have generally found, so sure a
“ mark of a good judgment, modesty, and free-
“ dom from affectation, which is alone a beauty,
“ but when accompanied with other excellen-
“ cies, makes them much more valuable, and
“ the want of them makes wit and knowledge
“ itself disagreeable. I heartily wish you may
“ improve to the best uses such excellent ta-
“ lents, that nothing may obscure their lustre,
“ but that you may be delivered from every
“ error. I should be glad to be in any ways
“ serviceable to these good ends, or in any
“ other respect express my readiness to be

Your faithful humble servant,

E. BURNET.

June 19, 1702.

“ To shew I will find fault, I think a few
“ lines in the *dedication* below the rest of the
“ book.”

Mr. Locke likewise was so highly satisfied with the *Defence* (which was perhaps the only piece, that had appeared in favour of his *Essay*, except one by Mr. Samuel Bold, Rector of Steeple in Dorsetshire, in 1699^e;) that being in London, he desired his cousin Mr. King, after-

^e Intituled, *Some Considerations on the principal Objections and Arguments, which have been published against Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding.*

The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN. xix

wards Lord High Chancellor, to make Mrs. Trotter a visit, and a present of books; and when she had owned herself, he wrote to her the following letter.

Oates, 30 Dec. 1702.

Madam,

THERE was nothing more public, than the obligation I received from you, nor any thing more concealed, than the person I was obliged to. This is a generosity above the strain of this groveling age, and like that of superior spirits, who assist without shewing themselves. I used my best endeavours to draw from you, by your Bookseller, the confession of your name, the want whereof made me, that I could, whilst you kept yourself under that reserve, no more address myself directly to you with good manners, than I could without rudeness have pulled off your mask by force, in a place where you were resolved to conceal yourself. Had not this been so, the bearer hereof had not the first time have come to you, without a letter from me, to acknowledge the favour you had done me. You not affording me an opportunity for that, I designed to make you some small acknowledgement, in a way, that chance had opened to me, without your consent. But this gentleman transgressed my order in two main points of it. The one was, in delaying it so long: The other was, in naming me to you, and talking of matters, which he had no commission from me to mention. What he deserves from you for it, must be left

xx *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

to your mercy. For I cannot in earnest be angry with him for procuring me, without any guilt of mine, an opportunity to own you for my protectress, which is the greatest honour my Essay could have procured me. Give me leave therefore to assure you, that as the rest of the world take notice of the strength and clearness of your reasoning, so I cannot but be extremely sensible, that it was employed in my defence. You have herein not only vanquished my adversary, but reduced me also absolutely under your power, and left no desires more strong in me, than those of meeting with some opportunity, to assure you, with what respect and submission I am,

Madam,

Your most humble,

and most obedient servant,

J. LOCKE.

But while our author shewed the world so deep a penetration into subjects of the most difficult and abstract kind, she was still incapable of extricating herself from those subtilties, and perplexities of argument, which retained her in the church of Rome^h. And the sincerity of her attachment to it, in all its outward severities, obliged her to so strict an observance of its fasts, as proved extremely injurious to her

^h See her Letter to Mr. Burnet, of December 19. 1701. Vol. II. p. 153.

health

health. Upon which account Dr. *Denton Nicholas*, a very ingenious and learned physician of her acquaintance, advised her by a letter on the 19th of *October* 1703, to abate of those rigours of abstinence, as insupportable to a constitution naturally infirm; and desired her to shew his letter to her friends and confessor for their satisfaction. To this gentleman she wrote, in the beginning of the year following, a letter upon the Truth of the *Christian* religion, which, it is to be regretted, is not recoverable, since in his answer¹ he observes, that she had proved *unanswerably* what she had undertaken, and had done it *more clearly and effectually in half a sheet, than Grotius in a whole volume*; tho' he differed with her in one point, where, from her prejudices in favour of popery, she lessened the authority, of the scriptures, which, he remarked, would necessarily make way for oral tradition, and too great an authority in the church.

She returned to the exercise of her dramatic genius in 1703, and having fixed upon the *Revolution of Sweden under Gustavus Erickson* (which has been related in prose with so much force and beauty, by the *Abbé Vertot*) for the subject of a tragedy, sent the first draught of it from *Salisbury* (where she had resided with her brother-in-law Mr. *Inglis*, since *May* that year) to Mr. *Congreve*, who returned her an answer, which, on account of the just remarks upon the conduct of the drama, deserves a place here.

¹ Dated 17 January 1703-4. See Vol. II. p. 208.

Madam,

I Had sooner acknowledged the favour of your letter, together with the agreeable entertainment of the scheme you were pleased to send with it, if I had not been unavoidably engaged in business. But at this time I can hardly complain of a great cold, which has confined me, and given me an opportunity to obey your commands. I think the design in general very great and noble; the conduct of it very artful, if not too full of business, which may either run into length or obscurity; but both those, as you write, you have skill enough to avoid. You are the best judge, whether those of your own sex will approve as much of the heroic virtue of *Constantia* and *Christina*, as if they had been engaged in some *belle passion*: for my part, I like them better as they are. In the second act, I would have that noise, which generally attends so much fighting on the stage, provided against; for those frequent alarms and excursions do too much disturb an audience. The difficulty in the third act is as well solved by you as possible; and certainly you can never be too careful not to offend probability, in supposing a man not to discover his own wife.

In the fourth act, it does not seem to me to be clear enough, how *Constantia* comes to be made free, and to return to *Gustavus*; the third act intimating so strongly, why we might expect to have her continued in the viceroy's power. This act is full of business; and intricacy

tricity, in the fourth act, must by all means be avoided.

The last act will have many harangues in it, which are dangerous in a catastrophe, if long, and not of the last importance. To conclude, I approve extremely of your killing *Fredage* and *Beron*. Poetical justice requires him; and for her you may easily drop a word, to intimate her delivering of *Gustavus* to have proceeded from some spark of love, which afterwards she may repent of, and her character remain as perfect as nature need require. One thing would have a very beautiful effect in the catastrophe, if it were possible to manage it thro' the play; and that is to have the audience kept in ignorance, as long as the husband (which sure they may as well be) who *Fredage* really is, till her death.

You see, Madam, I am as free as you command me to be; and yet my objections are none but such, as you may provide against, even while you are writing the dialogue.

I wish you the success, which you can wish, and that, I think, will hardly be so much as you deserve, in whatever you undertake. I am, with all acknowledgments for your too favourable opinion of me,

Madam,

Your most obedient

bumble servant,

London, Nov. 2, 1703.

W. CONGREVE.

This tragedy employed her thoughts during the winter of that year, and till the beginning of *February 1703-4*, as she informs her friend *George Burnet* of *Kemnay* near *Aberdeen* in *Scotland*, esq. then at *Geneva*, and her letter to him of the second of that month^{*} shews, that she began now to entertain more moderate notions of religion, and to abate of her zeal for the church of *Rome*. She owns, that “ she had of late almost forgot all distinction
 “ of churches; for having had, *says she*, some
 “ occasion of observing, more than before, the
 “ great growth of infidelity; that there are
 “ many, who disbelieve, and more, who doubt,
 “ that there ever was any divine revelation; I
 “ I have employed myself much in consider-
 “ ing the proofs, and defending the truth of
 “ the *Christian* religion; which has so intirely
 “ engaged my concern, that when I am with
 “ those, who sincerely submit to the authority
 “ of *Jesus Christ*, what sense soever they un-
 “ derstand him in, I am satisfied, and really
 “ think myself with one of my own commu-
 “ nion.” And she hopes, that “ the sincere
 “ love, which she had for truth, and charity
 “ for those, who differed from her, would at-
 “ tone for the errors of her understanding.”

Mr. Burnet, who kept a correspondence with her during his travels, upon his arrival at the court of *Berlin*, where he was received with great marks of respect by *Sophia Charlotta*, queen of *Prussia*, daughter to the princess *Sophia*, took an opportunity of writing to that

princess in such advantageous terms of Mrs. Trotter, that her royal highness, in her answer to him from *Hanover*, on the 29th of July 1704, declared herself " charmed with " the agreeable picture, which he had drawn " of the new *Scots Sappho*, who seemed to " deserve all the great things, which he had " said of her," *Je suis charmée du portrait avantageux, que vous me faites de la nouvelle Sappho Ecoissoise, qui semble meriter les eloges, que vous luy donnez.* That gentleman having likewise expressed his desire of making her known to Monsieur *Liebnitz*, with whom Mr. Burnet had held a correspondence several years before¹, and who was highly esteemed for his genius and extensive learning at the court of *Hanover*, where he resided, she returned her thanks to Mr. Burnet for that favour, in a letter of the 8th of August 1704 from *London*, where she continued the rest of the summer, and the following winter, for the sake of prosecuting her studies at more leisure, than she enjoyed among her relations and friends at *Salisbury*, and in particular for the completing of her tragedy. In this letter she speaks upon the subject of religion, with a spirit of moderation unusual in the communion, of which she still professed herself; and this charitableness and latitude of sentiments seems to have increased from the farther examination, which she was then probably making into the state

¹ See Mr. *Locke's* letter to Mr. *Molyneux*, from *Oates*, 10 April, 1697. Familiar letters between Mr. *Locke* and his friends, p. 193, Edit. 1708.

xxvi. *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

of the controversy, between the church of Rome and the Protestants. " I wish, *says she* ^m,
 " there was no distinction of Churches; and
 " then, I doubt not, there would be much more
 " real religion, the name and notion of which
 " I am sorry to observe confined to the be-
 " ing of some particular community; and the
 " whole of it, I am afraid, placed by most
 " in a zeal for those points, which make the
 " differences between them; from which mis-
 " taken zeal, no doubt, have proceeded all the
 " massacres, persecutions, and hatred of their
 " fellow *Christians*, which all churches have
 " been inclined to, when in power. And I
 " believe it is generally true, that those, who
 " are most bigotted to a sect, or most rigid and
 " precise in their forms and outward discipline,
 " are most negligent of the moral duties, which
 " certainly are the main end of religion. I
 " have observed this so often, both in private
 " persons and public societies, that I am apt
 " to suspect it every where."

The victory at *Blenheim*, which exercised the pens of Mr. *Addison* and Mr. *John Philips*, whose poems on that occasion divided the admiration of the public, according to the different parties of the writers^a, tempted Mrs. *Trotter* to write a copy of verses to the duke of *Marlborough*, upon his return from his glorious campaign in *Germany*, in *December 1704*.

^a Vol. II. p. 176, 177.

^a See Mrs. *Trotter's* letter to Mr. *Burnet* of 19 February 1704-5. Vol. II. p. 190.

But

But being doubtful with respect to the publication of them, she sent them in manuscript to his grace; and received for answer, that the duke, and duchess, and the lord treasurer *Godolphin*, with several others, to whom they were shewn, were greatly pleased with them; and that good judges of poetry had declared, that there were some lines in them superior to any, which had been written on the subject. Upon this encouragement she sent the poem to press; but it was not published till a month after it was written ^o.

The high degree of favour, with which she was honoured by these illustrious persons, gave her, about this time, hopes of some establishment of her fortune, which had hitherto been extremely narrow and precarious. But tho' she failed of such an establishment, she succeeded in 1705, in another point, which was a temporary relief to her ^p.

Reflexion and inquiry into the nature of true religion were attended with their natural and usual effects, in opening and enlarging her notions beyond the contracted pale of her own church. For in her letter of the 7th of July 1705 from *London*^q, to Mr. *Burnet* at *Hanover*, she professes, that she “ cannot think
“ herself at a great distance from the commu-
“ nion of any *Christian*, esteeming an agree-
“ ment in the duties of practice, in the wor-
“ ship of one God, and faith in *Christ*, the on-

^o *Ibid.*
Vol. II. p. 186.

^p *Ibid.* and letter of the 7th of July 1705.
^q Vol. II. p. 187.

ly essentials sufficient to establish an union in
 “ friendship, tho’ our worship is not perform-
 “ ed in the same place, or in the same man-
 “ ner; which, as the world is divided, must
 “ be confined to some one. Indeed the only
 “ point I am zealous to have you agree with
 “ me in, is this one article, that all good
 “ *Christians* are of the same religion; a senti-
 “ ment, which I sincerely confess, how little
 “ soever it is countenanced by the generality of
 “ the church of *Rome*.”

The year following, 1706, her tragedy call-
 ed, *The Revolution of Sweden*, was acted at
 the Queen’s Theatre in the *Hay-Market*, and
 printed at *London* in 4°. In the dedication of
 it, to the lady *Harriot Gadolphin*, eldest daugh-
 ter to the duke of *Marlborough*, she observes,
 that “ there are so great difficulties, and such
 “ general discouragements to those of her sex,
 “ who would improve their minds, and em-
 “ ploy their time in any science or useful art,
 “ that there cannot be a more distinguishing
 “ mark of a free and beneficent spirit, than
 “ openly to condemn that ill-grounded custom,
 “ by giving countenance and protection to
 “ those, who have attempted against it. Which,
 “ *adds she*, as it can most effectually be done
 “ by persons of the highest rank and most emi-
 “ nent virtue, I am happy in being an occa-
 “ sion of giving the world so rare an example
 “ of, at first in the honour publicly done me
 “ by the duchess of *Marlborough* and all her
 “ beauteous family; and now by your lady-
 “ ship’s permitting this address from one, whose
 “ greatest

“ greatest merit is her good intention, and her
“ only pretence to this honour the favours al-
“ ready received.” She then remarks, that
poetry is not unworthy the protection of the
wise and good, but had been cherished as an
instrument of virtue in the politest and best
governed commonwealths, and as such called
a divine art; “ a character, *continues she*, it
“ might still pretend to, if rescued from the
“ trifling, or ill ends, to which it has been
“ debased. At least, it must be owned very
“ advantageous in a nation, where public di-
“ versions are allowed and frequented, to con-
“ trive, that our pleasures should be useful to
“ our morals, serve to correct our vices, and
“ animate the mind to virtue; a design, which
“ is the only merit, that can recommend this
“ play, and the particular virtue it tends to
“ incite, a disinterested and resolute care of the
“ public good.”

Nor was this dedication the only acknow-
ledgment, which she made that year, to the
family of *Churchill*, for the honour of their
patronage; for after the battle of *Ramellies*,
in *May 1706*; she wrote a second poem to the
duke of *Marlborough*, upon that important
event.

In the latter end of that year, or the be-
ginning of the following, her doubts about
the *Romish* religion, which she had so many
years professed, having led her to a thorough
examination of the grounds of it, by consult-
ing the best books on both sides of the quest-
ion, and advising with men of the best judg-
ment,

xxx *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

ment, the result of it was a conviction of the falseness of the pretensions of that church, and a return to that of *England*, to which she adhered during the rest of her life. In the course of this inquiry, the great and leading question concerning a *Guide in Controversy* was particularly discussed by her; and the two letters, which she wrote upon it, the first to Mr. Bennet, a *Romish* priest, and the second to Mr. H—— who had procured an answer to that letter from a stranger, Mr. Bennet's indisposition preventing him from returning one, were thought so valuable, on account of the strength and perspicuity of reasoning, as well as their conciseness, that she consented to the importunity of her friends, for their publication in June 1707, under the following title, *A discourse concerning a guide in Controversies; in two Letters: Written to one of the church of Rome, by a person lately converted from that communion*; a later edition of them being since printed at *Edinburgh* in 1728 in 8^{vo}. Bishop Burnet wrote the preface to them, tho' without his name to it; and he observes, that they might be of use to such of the *Roman* catholics, as are persuaded, that those, who deny the infallibility of their church, take away all certainty of the *Christian* religion, or of the authority of the scriptures. This is the main topic of those two letters, and the point was considered by our author, as of such importance, that she procured her friend Mrs. Burnet, to consult Mr. (afterwards Dr.) Clarke upon it, and to shew him a paper, which had been put in-

to her hands, urging the difficulties on that article on the side of the papists. The sentiments of that great man upon such a subject are too considerable to be lost, and perhaps have not been much injured by the representation of Mrs. Burnet, tho' the following letter of hers was written in great haste.

I could not call on you last night. I shewed the paper to Mr. Clarke. He said, there was nothing material in it. That supposing he could prove, that the tradition, that conveyed to us the books of scripture, and assured us what were canonical, was as hard to be proved, and liable to the same objections, as that of infallibility is; all, that would follow from it, was, then our belief of them would be as uncertain, but would not make his proofs of the church's infallibility a jot more convincing. But he says, the fact is false; for, besides that tradition can much more assuredly convey down a book, than any unwritten doctrine, how concerning soever, as is plain by the early corruption of that great and fundamental article of the belief of one God, which while men lived to see the third and fourth generation, was yet corrupted and lost in the idolatry of the greatest part of the world: besides this probability, it is certain in fact, there never was so clear, so uninterrupted a tradition for any thing, as that, which conveys to us the scriptures. On the other side, there is not any tradition at all, that will support the infallibility, as now taught in the *Romish* church. The reason he said, *as now taught*, was, because they falsely wrest some antient

xxxii *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

antient passages of fathers to the point disputed; for that was only meant, that *Christ* should always have a church on earth, men professing *Christian* doctrines; and that all those powers, that then let themselves to persecute and destroy it, should not be able to do it.

Pray, if you find any blunders or obscurity, take it for mine. I am sure it was not his. But I can very seldom carry away or express well another's words.

He has at present some business; so can appoint no time.

Whoever keeps close to what is plain in scripture, cannot err greatly. And that general declaration of all protestants to submit all to scripture, may, I think, remove all nice scruples, as to any particular expressions, since no communicant in prayers, &c. is supposed to join with her [the church] in any particular, where in she departs from that rule. This is only my own thought. Pray read this letter to nobody, for I write it in great haste, and will not answer for its being right, especially the last paragraph.

Just before the publication of those letters, she went into *Surrey*, with a lady of her acquaintance, and spent the rest of the summer at *Ockham-Mills* near *Ripley* in that county. During her retirement there, Mr. *Fenn*, a young clergyman of an excellent character, who was accidentally in the neighbourhood in a visit to his relations, received such impressions from her conversation, as inspired him with a passion for her, which he soon after discovered to her by

by a letter *. But she had before this engaged in a friendship and correspondence by letters with Mr. Cockburn; and their friendship terminated in a marriage in the beginning of the year 1708. Several advantageous offers of that kind had indeed been made to her before; but being exempt from ambition, and finding too general a libertinism amongst the men, she thought the best security of her happiness in the conjugal state would be the choice of a clergyman *. And as piety was the ground of their mutual affection, so their chief view in their union was the improvement of themselves in that great principle of all religious and moral excellence, and the assistance of each other in the duties flowing from it †.

The father of Mr. Cockburn was Dr. Cockburn, an eminent and learned divine of Scotland, at first attached to the court of St. Germain's, but obliged to quit it, on account of his inflexible adherence to the protestant religion; then for some time minister of the episcopal church at Amsterdam, and at last collated to the rectory of Northaw in Middlesex, by Dr. Robinson bishop of London, at the recommendation of queen Anne, who intended him for one of the bishops of our American plantations, if the scheme of establishing them had been executed. Mr. Cockburn, his son, soon after his marriage with our author, had the donative of Nayland in Suffolk, where he settled

* Vol. II. p. 235.

* Letter to Mr. Fenn, Vol. II.

p. 249.

† Letter of Mrs. Cockburn to Mr. Burnet, of the 10th of September, 1708, Vol. II. p. 206.

* View of the Court of St. Germain's, edit. 1694, and Memoirs of the secret Services of John Mutchy, Esq. p. 42, 43, edit. London, 1733.

xxxiv *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

in the same year, 1708: But returned afterwards from thence to *London*, to be curate of *St. Dunstan's* in *Fleetstreet*, where he continued till the accession of his late majesty to the throne, when falling into a scruple about the oath of abjuration, tho' he always prayed for the king and royal family by name, he was obliged to quit that station, and for ten or twelve years following, was reduced to great difficulties in the support of his family; during which time, he instructed the youth of the academy in *Chancery-lane*, in the *Latin* tongue. At last, in 1726, by consulting the lord chancellor *King* and his own father, upon the sense and intent of that oath, and by reading some papers put into his hands, with relation to it, he was reconciled to the taking of it. In consequence of this, being the year following invited to be minister of the episcopal congregation at *Aberdeen*, in *Scotland*, he qualified himself conformably to the law, and on the day of his present majesty's accession, preached there a sermon on the duty and benefit of praying for the government. This sermon being printed and animadverted upon, he published a reply to the remarks on it, with some papers relating to the oath of abjuration, which have been much esteemed. Soon after his settlement at *Aberdeen*, the lord chancellor *King* presented him to the living of *Long-Horsey*, near *Morpeth*, in *Northumberland*, as a means of enabling him to support and educate his family; for which purpose, he was allowed to continue his function at *Aberdeen*, till the negligence and ill behaviour of the curates, whom he

he employed at *Long-Horseley*, occasioned Dr. *Chandler*, the late bishop of *Durham*, to call him to residence on that living in 1737; by which means he was forced to quit his station at *Aberdeen*, to the no small diminution of his income. He was a man of considerable learning; and besides his sermon abovementioned, and the vindication of it, he published, in the *Weekly Miscellany*, a defence of prime ministers, in the character of *Joseph*; and a treatise on the *Mosaic deluge*, published since his death.

Mrs. *Cockburn*, after her marriage, was intirely diverted from her studies for many years, by attending upon the duties of a wife and a mother, and by the ordinary cares of an increasing family, and the additional ones arising from the reduced circumstances of her husband. However, her zeal for Mr. *Locke's* character and writings drew her again into the public light in 1726, upon this occasion.

Dr. *Winch Holdsworth*, fellow of St. *John's* college in *Oxford*, had preached on *Easter Monday*, 1719-20, before that University, a sermon, on *John v. 28, 29*, which he published in 1720, in 8vo. professing in his title page to examine and answer the cavils, false reasonings, and false interpretations of scripture, of Mr. *Locke* and others, against the resurrection of the same body. This sermon did not reach Mrs. *Cockburn's* hands, till some years after; when the perusal of it forced from her some animadversions, which she threw together in the form of a *Letter* to the doctor, and sent to him in *May*, 1724, with a design of suppressing it intirely, if it should have the desired ef-

fect upon him. After nine months the doctor informed her, that he had drawn up a large and particular answer to it, but was unwilling to trust her with his manuscript, till she should publish her own. However, after a long time, and much difficulty, she at last obtained the perusal of his answer; but not meeting with that conviction from it, which would have made her give up her cause, she was prevailed on to let the world judge between them, and accordingly published her *Letter to Dr. Holdsworth*, in January, 1726-7, without her name, but said in the title page to be by the author of *A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay of human Understanding*. The doctor, whose answer to it was already finished, was very expeditious in the publication of it, in June 1727, in an 8vo. volume, under the title of, *A Defence of the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the same Body*, in two parts. In the first of which, the character, writings, and religious principles of Mr. Locke, are distinctly considered; and in the second, the *Doctrine of the Resurrection of the same Body* is at large explained and defended, against the notions and principles of that gentleman.

Mrs. Cockburn wrote a very particular reply to this, and intitled it, *A Vindication of Mr. Locke's Christian Principles, from the injurious imputations of Dr. Holdsworth*. But tho' it is an admirable performance, and she was extremely desirous of doing justice to Mr. Locke and herself, yet not meeting with any bookseller willing to undertake, nor herself being able to support, the expence of the impression, it

The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN. XXXVII

it continued in manuscript, and was reserved to enrich the present collection.

While she resided at *Aberdeen*, she had a design of revising the four tragedies, which she had written, as she actually did her comedy, with a view not only of correcting them, but likewise of improving the versification, and raising the diction; being sensible, that from a just distaste of the bombast and false sublime of many of the writers of tragedy in the last age, she had sunk too much into the contrary extreme of too great a simplicity of style, unequal to the dignity of that species of poetry. Nor had the decline of age, and the growing infirmities attending it, disqualified her for such a task; since we find her muse in full vigour in *August*, 1732, when she wrote the *Verses occasioned by the busts in the queen's hermitage*. This poem was intended to have been presented, with her *Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay*, to her late majesty; but the lord chancellor *King* declining that office, and the duchess of *Hamilton*, who then undertook it, being prevented by sickness, and the death of lady *Orkney* her sister-in-law, it probably never came to the sight of the queen. It was afterwards printed in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, for *May* 1737, though with some alterations, which she thought to its disadvantage; but it is now restored, in this collection, to the exactness of the original, except in a few of the alterations, which she admitted.

Soon after her removal from *Aberdeen* to her

^v *Mrs. Cockburn's* letter to her niece of *June* 8, 1735. Vol. II. p. 271. ¹ P. 308.

xxxviii *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

husband's living at *Long-Horsley*, in 1737, she wrote an answer to a question proposed in the *Gentleman's Magazine*, for May 7, concerning the jurisdiction of the magistrate over the life of the subject; and an inforcement of that answer.

Her *Remarks upon some Writers in the Controversy concerning the Foundation of moral Duty and moral Obligation* were begun during the winter of the year 1739, and finished in the following one; for the weakness of her eyes, which had been a complaint of many years standing, not permitting her to use, by candle-light, her needle, which so fully employed her in the summer season, that she read little; and wrote less; she amused herself, during the long winter evenings, in digesting her thoughts upon the most abstruse subjects in morality and metaphysics. They continued in manuscript till 1743, for want of a bookseller inclined to accept the publication of them; and were introduced to the world in August that year, in *The History of the Works of the Learned*. Her name was not prefixed or subjoined to them, but they were inscribed with the utmost deference to *Alexander Pope Esq;* by an admirer of his moral character; for which she shews a remarkable zeal in her letters, whenever she has occasion to mention him. And her high opinion of him in that respect, founded chiefly on his writings, and especially his letters, as well as her admiration

Letter to her niece of Sept. 19, 1740.
P. 260.
Vol. II. of

The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN. xxxix

of his genius, inspired her with a strong desire of being known to him; for which purpose she drew up the following letter to him, about the year 1738; but it was never sent.

SIR,

YOU should no more be surprized to receive a letter from a stranger at this distance, than a prince to receive addresses from people he never heard of, at the remotest corner of his dominions. The public are interested in you, and all, who have a just sense of what their country owes to one, who, is an honour to it, with an indignation of the vile faction set up against you, have a right to offer you, instead of lives and fortunes, the zeal of their friendship and best wishes, and to expect some share of your favour and good will in return.

I might lay some claim to you as a brother poet; but it would be a very empty one, since I can plead no affinity with your excellent talents that way; and an indifferent poet is a very scurvy character. However, I happen to be strangely pleased (though without much vanity) at my situation in my poetical capacity, with respect to you. 'Twas my good fortune, that most of my performances were as well received, as I thought they deserved. They gained me some friends among the great and the good; and, what is perhaps a better proof of their merit, they even raised me some enemies. This places me above envying the universal applause you have met with; and I am too far below you to repine at it, or hate you as a rival. So I find, that, happily for me, by being in the middle

21 *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

class of writers, I can rejoice in your triumphs, and be fond of your virtues: In short there is nothing left for me, but to admire and love you. You need not be alarmed at the expression, though from a woman, when I tell you, I am about the borders of threescore. I cannot indeed but regret, that you did not come sooner into the world, or I later; for I flatter myself, I should then have had the pleasure of your acquaintance by the means of one or other, who have had a share in your friendship, to whom I was not unknown, Mr. *Wycherly*, *Congreve*, &c. But they are all gone before me, though I was in a manner dead long before them. You had but just begun to dawn upon the world, when I retired from it. Being married in 1708, I bid adieu to the muses, and so wholly gave myself up to the cares of a family, and the education of my children, that I scarce knew, whether there was any such thing as books, plays, or poems stirring in Great Britain. However after some years, your *Essay on Criticism*, and *Rape of the Lock*, broke in upon me. I rejoiced, that so bright a genius was rising on our isle; but thought no more about you, till my young family was grown up to have less need of my assistance; and beginning to have some taste of polite literature, my inclination revived with my leisure, to enquire after what had been most celebrated in that kind. I then read your *Homer*, and I was charmed with the humanity of your remarks on some instances of shocking cruelty and revenge. This made the first impression upon me of the goodness of your nature, and you

have

The Life of Mrs. COCKSURN. 211

have ever since been growing by degrees in my esteem. Your *Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot*, and *Essay on Man*, gave me some idea of your morals. But when I read your private letters, where, as you express it, you *throw yourself out upon paper*, I thought I saw your heart open and undisguised. I was charmed with the sincere ingenuous unsuspecting friend, the unwilling enemy, the benevolent mind, extending to all parties, all religions, all mankind; the filial piety, the tender concern for a mother's approaching death, at an age, when most men would have considered theirs only as a useless burden. In short, I saw so many amiable qualities opening on every different occasion, that I began as much to admire the valuable man, as the great genius, and to wish for some share in so desirable a friendship and correspondence. You will perhaps think, that at this rate, the greatest part of the world may have the same pretensions. But give me leave to assure you, Sir, that though all persons of taste, who are not blinded by envy, agree in admiring the productions of your wit, there are few, unless such as have the happiness of your personal acquaintance, who delight in those of your heart. At least I have met with none, who consider you in the light I do; nay, many are more inclined to take your picture from the coarse daubings of your enemies, than the fine colouring of your friends, or the natural strokes of your own hand, which so much affect me; and I am often obliged to engage in a warm defence of your character. This persuades me, that there must be something corresponding

responding in my own heart, that disposes me to see the probity of yours; and if it serves to give you the same persuasion, you will then find an excuse for my talking so much of you to yourself. 'Tis natural, as a candidate for your esteem and good will, to insinuate my own commendation as modestly as I can; and I know nothing I can say better of myself, or with a better grace, than that I have sense and honesty enough to perceive the reality of your merit, and goodness enough to set a just value on it. If you allow this to give me any title to some returns from you, though a stranger, and at so great a distance, it will the more confirm my opinion of your candour and good nature, and give me inexpressible satisfaction. Whilst I am thus ardently soliciting a friendship so abstracted from sense, which must be chiefly exercised on my part in the pleasing contemplation of having some share in the favour and esteem of a person, beloved and valued for the most exalted worth, I fancy I am qualifying myself for the happiness of a future state, which, I imagine, must consist in something of that kind; raised in proportion to the enlargement of our faculties, and the excellence of the objects; for I cannot agree with a notion you express in a letter to Mr. Blount, that *the happiness of minds can be nothing but knowledge.* The delight we take in discovering truth seems rather to be in the pursuit, than the acquisition; like that of sports-men, when the game is caught, the pleasure is over; whereas in the union of minds, the consciousness of mutual love and esteem between persons of true worth gives

The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN. 211

gives the highest gratification we are capable of: the soul acquiesces in it, as the utmost of its desires here. So that, if we may guess at the nature of souls in another life, by what we find of them here, I should imagine the pleasures, which, as you say, may not unlikely proceed from the discoveries each shall communicate to another of God and of nature, to be, as if it were, the recreation of beatified spirits. And perhaps that may serve to heighten those sentiments of love, of admiration, and delight in the supreme goodness, which I suppose to be the perfection of felicity; and in order to which, I am indulging myself in lower degrees of it here.

Now I have dipped into your letters, Sir, I cannot forbear taking notice of some reflections I find in them, which much alarm me, as what I apprehend may tend both to your own and to the public loss, if such a train of thinking be pursued. You frequently talk of the finest performances of wit and genius, as mere trifles, of no service at all to a man's real happiness here or hereafter, and what one would be ashamed to be employed about to the last. And this indeed must be allowed to be true, when works of genius are considered merely as such, without regard to the ends, for which they may be employed. But I can by no means think, that when you was writing the *Essay on Man*, or even translating *Homer*, you was trifling all the while, and doing nothing towards your own future happiness. I am rather persuaded, that God, in giving you a genius, so peculiarly fitted to see the noblest things in

in

xliv *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

in the most beautiful light, has pointed out to you the way, in which he would be served by you; and I wish you would consider it as the ten talents committed to your trust, which you are not at liberty to keep idly by you. And whilst you are employing them in the cause of virtue, and to the honour of the giver; whilst you go on to *moralize your song*; if you should be found, even in your latest moments, *measuring syllables, and coupling rhymes*, for such excellent purposes, I believe you need not doubt to meet with a *Well done, thou good and faithful servant, &c."*

The strength, clearness, and vivacity shewn in her *Remarks* upon the most abstract and perplexed questions, immediately raised the curiosity of all good judges about the concealed writer; and their admiration was greatly increased, when her sex and advanced age were known. And the worthy and learned Dr. Sharp archdeacon of *Northumberland*, who had read these *Remarks* in manuscript, and encouraged the publication of them, being convinced by them, that no person was better qualified for a thorough examination of the grounds of morality, entered into a correspondence with her upon that subject. But her ill state of health at last interrupted her prosecution of it; a circumstance to be regretted, since a discussion carried on with so much sagacity and candor on both sides would, in all probability, have left little difficulty remaining on the question.

Dr. Rutherford's Essay, on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue, published in May, 1744, soon engaged her thoughts; and notwithstanding

ing the asthmatic disorder, which had seized her many years before, and now left her small intervals of ease, she applied herself to the confutation of that elaborate discourse, and having finished it with a spirit, elegance, and perspicuity equal, if not superior, to all her former writings, transmitted her manuscript to Mr. Warburton, who published it in 8vo. with a preface of his own, in April 1747, under the title of, *Remarks upon the Principles and Reasonings of Dr. Rutherford's Essay on the Nature and Obligations of Virtue, in Vindication of the contrary Principles and Reasonings, inforced in the Writings of the late Dr. Samuel Clarke.*

The extensive reputation, which this and her former writings had gained her, induced her friends to propose to her the collecting and publishing them in a body. And upon her consenting to the scheme, which was to be executed by subscription, in order to secure to her the full benefit of the edition, it met with a ready encouragement from all persons of true taste; at the head of whom appeared a lady, no less distinguished by her accomplishments of mind, than her birth and quality, who set an example of equal zeal for the interests of the excellent writer, as for the spreading and perpetuating her works. But Mrs. Cockburn did not live to discharge herself the office of editor, now devolved to an hand less equal in many respects to the task; though the public will receive one acquittal by her death, of a valuable series of her letters, which her own modesty would have restrained her from per-

The right honourable the lady *Isabella Finch*

mitting

mitting to see the light. And it were to be wished, that these two volumes, conditioned for by the terms of subscription, could have contained all her dramatic writings, of which only one is here published. But as that was found impossible, the preference was, upon the maturest deliberation, given to those in prose, as superior in their kind to the most perfect of her poetical, and of more general and lasting use to the world.

The loss of her husband, on the 4th of *January*, 1742, in the 71st year of his age, was a severe shock to her; and she did not long survive him, dying on the 11th of *May*, 1749, in her 71st year; after having long supported a painful disorder, with a resignation to the divine will, which had been the governing principle of her whole life, and her support under the various trials of it. Her memory and understanding continued unimpaired, till within a few days of her death. She was interred near her husband and youngest daughter, at *Long-Horseley*, with this short sentence on their tomb: *Let their works praise them in the gates.* Prov. xxxi. 31. They left one son, who is Clerk of the Cheque at *Exchequer*, and two daughters.

Mrs. Cockburn was no less celebrated for her beauty in her younger days, than for her genius and accomplishments. She was indeed small of stature, but had a remarkable liveliness in her eye, and delicacy of complexion, which continued to her death. Her private character rendered her extremely amiable to those, who intimately knew her. Her conversation was always innocent, useful, and agreeable, without
the

the least affectation of being thought a wit, and attended with a remarkable modesty and diffidence of herself, and a constant endeavour to adapt her discourse to her company. She was happy in an uncommon evenness and cheerfulness of temper. Her disposition was generous and benevolent; and ready upon all occasions to forgive injuries, and bear them, as well as misfortunes, without interrupting her own ease, or that of others, with complaints or reproaches. The pressures of a very contracted fortune were supported by her with calmness and in silence; nor did she ever attempt to improve it among those great personages, to whom she was known, by importunities, to which the best minds are most averse, and which her approved merit and established reputation should have rendered unnecessary.

Yet unexceptionable as her character was in all respects, from a conduct throughout life strictly conformable to those principles of morality and religion, of which she had the fullest and most rational conviction; it could not secure her from the malignity of a writer of her own sex, in that comprehensive body of scandalous history, intitled *The Atalantis*, and in *The Adventures of Rivella, or the History of the Author of the Atalantis*, who in this latter piece represents her own character with almost as much freedom, as she had in the former treated those of others. But such a pen as Mrs. Manley's can injure no reputation but her own; and the occasion of her resentment does honour to Mrs. Cockburn, as the only provocation to it was

xlvi *The Life of Mrs. COCKBURN.*

the withdrawing herself from the slight acquaintance, which she once had with Mrs. Manley, on account of the licentiousness both of her writings and conduct. And indeed the libeller herself was so conscious of the injustice and enormity of her calumnies, that, upon a remonstrance to her upon that account, she promised to make the proper acknowledgments in person to Mrs. Cockburn for her offence; but failed of her engagement in that respect, from an excusable reluctance to see one, whom she had so highly injured.

The collection now exhibited to the world is so incontestable a proof of the superiority of our author's genius, as in a manner supercedes every thing, that can be said upon that head. But her abilities as a writer, and the merit of her works, will not have full justice done them, without a due attention to the peculiar circumstances, in which they were produced; her early youth, when she wrote some; her very advanced age, and ill state of health, when she drew up others; the uneasy situation of her fortune, during the whole course of her life; and an interval of near twenty years, in the vigor of it, spent in the cares of a family, without the least leisure for reading or contemplation: After which, with a mind so long diverted and encumbered, resuming her studies, she instantly recovered its intire powers, and in the hours of relaxation from her domestic employments pursued, to their utmost limits, some of the deepest inquiries, of which the human mind is capable.

A
DISCOURSE

Concerning a

Guide in Controversies,

I N

Two LETTERS,

Written to

One of the Church of Rome.

First printed in 1707.

VOL. I.

A

THE FIRST

DISCOURSE

PREACHED AT THE

CHURCH OF ST. MARY

ON SUNDAY

THE 11TH OF

SEPTEMBER

1741

BY

JOHN

P R E F A C E.

TH E ingenious author of these papers being not easily prevailed with to permit the publication of them, I am not at liberty to inform the reader any farther, than that they were writ by one, who had been many years of the church of *Rome*, but having been for some time dissatisfied with several doctrines and practices in that church, had resolv'd to examine, with great care, the grounds of that authority, on which they were received, by consulting the best books on that subject on both sides, and by advising with men of the best judgments of both communions: And that these papers were the result of those free and impartial enquiries, designed only to impart the Author's thoughts to a friend, without any intention of making them public.

But falling into the hands of some very good judges, as well divines as others, the publishing of them was very much desired, both for the strength and clearness of the reasoning, and for the shortness of them; many readers being encouraged to seek for information in pieces of this size, who have neither the mind nor the leisure to go through large volumes.

They are, I think, writ with that judgment, and withal with that plainness, that they may be at all times useful to those of our own communion, that want to be fortified against the bold pretences to

infallibility to the church of *Rome*; and will, I hope, help to open the eyes of such of the *Romish Communion*, as are persuaded, that those, who deny that infallibility, take away all certainty of the Christian religion, or of the authority of the Scriptures; the grounds of those pretences being the chief subject of these letters.

It might have been expected, that the answer, writ by one of the *Romish persuasion* to the first letter, should have been printed, with the reply; and indeed I wish that could have been done, for preventing all cavils and exceptions; but it seems it was return'd (after the reply was writ) upon the request of the gentleman, that brought it, before any copy was taken of it. But, however, there is the less need of it, since I am persuaded the full force of the arguments is plainly and fairly set down in the reply.

I need say no more concerning the author, or the performance. I pray God it may have the good effect, to excite all sorts of persons, of what persuasion soever, seriously and impartially to enquire into the grounds and reasons of their religion, as this author has done: for it is not only the most rational method for finding out truth, but what is indispensably required of us by revelation; where we are enjoined *to prove all things*, in order to the *holding fast that which is good*.

T W O

LETTERS

Concerning a

Guide in Controversies.

The First LETTER.

To Mr. B——t a Romish Priest.

S I R,

I Thank you for the favour of your books, which I return, having read that concerning the *Guide in Controversies* twice, with all the attention I am capable of, and with all the impartiality I could, under so strong a bias, as all naturally have for that side, which they have deliberately and publickly made their free choice. I was not indeed inclined to resolve against doubting, though told it is a *mortal sin*; for I am persuaded nothing can be so, that is out of our power, as not to doubt of a thing, which we see great reason to doubt of, surely is. However, that *Maxim* gives great prejudice against those, who hold it, as the best security of error, and the most effectual bar against the discovery of truth; for which a very different disposition is requisite, *viz.* A readiness to submit to the evidence of truth,

how opposite soever to all our present persuasions. And in this disposition I have endeavoured to keep myself on that important enquiry, Whether the proofs of an infallible guide are sufficiently full and clear to satisfy an unprejudiced mind; as I heartily wish to find them. In order to judge the better of my thoughts on this subject, give me leave, Sir, to represent to you freely, what I think is the sum of your author's arguments; what defect I observe in them; and what seems to me the only ground, on which the belief of an *infallible guide* can be establish'd. I begin the last, by laying down this position:

That there can be no reason to ascribe infallibility to any man, or assembly of men, but an express divine promise; and that those, to whom such a grant is made, can neither limit, or extend, transfer or dispose it, in any manner, or to any persons; but it must be fixed in those only, who are expressly separated and distinguished by that promise. This being laid down, which I believe will be granted me, we are next to consider with your author, what is the importance of those places in Scripture, in which that promise is said to be contained, and to whom they must be applied. "Our Saviour's promises, he says, (all or most of them) are made to the guides of the church, and therefore to the church as a guide;" a consequence, which shall be farther considered by and by. But here I must observe, That several of them seem evidently limited to the apostles, as those, in which are joined the promise of *guiding them into all truth*, and that of *showing them things to come*^b: From which I see no more reason to infer a succession of infallibility, than a succession of prophecy; but both seem equally to belong to that extraordinary inspiration, which was

^a Page 4.

^b John xvi. 13.

necessary for the first promulgators of the Gospel. If it is thought necessary to extend those other promises farther, of our Saviour's being with them to the *end of the world*^c, and of the spirit's abiding with them *for ever*, (tho' these expressions are frequently used in Scripture, when they cannot be taken in their full extent, as no doubt you know; but) to whom soever they may be extended, they are far from importing Infallibility, as may be seen in several places, where they are used for those ordinary assistances, and protections, which God has promised to all his people; every good Christian may hope and pray that God will be with them for ever. As for that injunction, *Tell the church*^d, &c. I cannot but wonder to find it always urged on this subject, for I think nothing can be plainer, than that it does not at all belong to it, when the whole scope of the discourse is taken together from the 15th verse, *If thy brother trespass against thee*, &c. Our Saviour is plainly speaking of private differences among Christians, which he would have them first endeavour to make up between themselves; then to try the interposition of friends; and lastly, to refer the matter to the whole body; and if any one was not to be gained by such amicable methods, he might be looked on, or used, as a heathen, *i. e.* prosecuted in temporal courts. From which discourse if any authority of the church is to be inferred, it must be to decide civil controversies, and private quarrels. The only text, I think, that contains an express promise to the church is this, *On this rock will I build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it*^e; which seems not necessarily to import more, than that no power should ever be able to *destroy* Christ's church; the word rendered *prevail*, signifying (as I am told) an entire victory.

^c Matt. xxviii. 20. John xiv. 16. ^d Matt. xviii. 17.

^e Matt. xvi. 18.

But supposing that text to mean, that the church should never fall into any error, (which sure is very darkly expressed in it) since this cannot be universally extended, as is owned by all, but that great numbers may and have erred; I am still to search for some direction, whom in any division of the church I may adhere to as a *guide* infallible; and for this Christ has certainly given us a rule, if your author's conclusion is true, that most of the promises being made to the *guides* of the church'; therefore to the church as a *guide*; for without such a rule, this can be no rule to us, when those guides are divided among themselves.

And on this occasion, he says, "It seems also evident, that Christians, in such dissenting of governors, may not safely follow, which they please, or judge to be in their doctrine the rightest; for so they judge of their judges. But that some rule there is, to whom in such case they are to adhere; it being as necessary for the same divine providence to leave some means, by which to know our guide, as to give us one." Thus he. And this indeed is evidently necessary, if the other part is true, That *Christians* may not judge for themselves in such *dissentions among governors*. But where is this rule to be found? This is what we are in search of; but of this the Scriptures are entirely silent, give not the least hint of any person, or number of persons, whom, in case of divisions, all Christians are obliged to follow: but your author tells us, "That this rule by tradition has been, and, in reason, can be no other, but this, that in judges ecclesiastical subordinate (whether persons or councils) dissenting, men ought to adhere to the superior; in judges equal dissenting, to adhere to major, not to the minor part.^h"

Allowing this to have been by tradition the only

^f Page 21.

^g Page 100.

^h Ibid.

rule,

rule, as I doubt not that it may in *reason* be the best, that any body of men can fix on for the maintaining of peace and order ; yet if this is not a divine institution, what reason can assure me, that in all dissensions of the church, the superior in dignity or number must be in the right ? which is far from being true of any other body of men. But that this rule is of divine institution, I find no appearance of a proof, and methinks that assertion of your author seems to suppose the contrary, *viz. That in reason there can be no other.* Could he have shewn us, that in fact this rule was given us by God, no body would have doubted the reasonableness of it ; but by this he cannot mean, that God could not in reason have given us any other : For who can deny, that if he had been pleased to distinguish any determined succession of men, how few, or of what dignity soever, by a promise of infallibility, it would have been a very good rule for us to adhere to him or them, even against the whole world : What then can he mean, but that this is the only rule, that *human reason* can fix on ; an argument, which can amount to no more than a fitness or necessity of submitting to superiors, or the majority of a council, for the security of order and union (which are indeed very valuable things, and not lightly to be thrown off :) But a submission to them can be no infallible security from error ; and therefore we cannot be absolutely in all things obliged to such submission, without an express divine promise, that those pastors, who are superior in dignity, or the majority of those, who shall happen to be assembled in a council, shall never err. But to such a divine promise I find no pretence, nor to any direction from Christ or his apostles, whom to follow as a guide in case of divisions. The promises in Scripture are by no side carried farther than to collect from them, that the whole church, or all the guides of the church, shall never fall into error :
But

But since those, who shall not err, are not distinguished, to us, from those, who may, should we not conclude, contrary to your author, that therefore those promises to the guides of the church are not meant to the church as a guide? For methinks, his conclusion [That they are so meant,] is very well confuted by himself, where he says, "He that appoints us to follow a guide — and then leaves us no way (when our guide consists of many persons — and when two parties of them contradict one another) — to know which of them is to be our guide, it is all one, as if he left us no guideⁱ." From which this reasoning closely follows; but God has given us no direction how to know our guide; *ergo*, he has (or it is all one as if he had) given us no guide. Nor does your author here, or elsewhere, offer to shew, that God has given us any rule, by which to know this guide; but here from a concession of some *Protestants*, that there shall be always some pastors of the church unerring, he argues, *That these (unless allowed to be the superior or major part) can be of no use as a guide to the whole*; which no *Protestants* maintain them to be; all affirm, that there is no infallible guide but the Scripture. Yet, as if it were granted, that those unerring pastors were to be a known appointed guide, he concludes, that his must be the rule by which to know this guide; but gives us no better proof, that this is our rule, than in the other place, sends us to human reason and probabilities; for it is more likely, says he, "That a particular person should err than a synod; and a smaller synod than a more general; and so too of persons subordinate, that those elected and advanced to higher places of judicature, should be both persons of greater knowledge and merit; and, according to the necessity of their place, divinely more assisted^k." Not to urge, that this has been far

ⁱ Page 18.^k Page 19.

otherwise in fact, (as it is too sure, that several of those advanced to the highest rank in the church have been very ill, and very ignorant men) let it be as *likely* as he pleases, how far does this fall short of that security, which we look for in a guide infallible, by an express divine promise?

But “ why else (continues he) such a subordination and appeal from lower to higher courts, unless these be of the two the less liable to error, both from human and divine help?” To which I answer, That nobody denies, that the church might *cast itself* into such a model for very good ends, relating to order and discipline; but how infallibility can be inferred from thence, I do not see: For first, I cannot find, that those subordinations, upon which such appeals are founded, are so much as pretended to be of divine or apostolical institution (as that of inferior clergy to their bishop is;) but for those other, of bishops to their metropolitan, and of metropolitans to patriarchs, they seem distinctions merely flowing from the former disposition of the *Roman* empire, and the temporal dignity of cities; as new privileges were given to the bishop of *Constantinople*, upon that city’s being made the seat of the empire. But secondly, if these subordinations were all of divine institution, and allowing the higher of the two the less liable to error, how does that, or the constant practice in the church, of appealing accordingly from lower to higher courts, any more prove the majority of a general council infallible (without an express promise for it) than the like constitution of other bodies proves the highest court of them to be infallible, or than it proves every metropolitan, or every bishop, to be so, because all under their respective jurisdictions are obliged to obey them? But your author had told us before, “ That this being the traditive rule of obedience, which has been always observed in the church, if our Saviour’s promises of assistance import only (as
“ some

“ some Protestants affirm) That there shall be al-
 “ ways some clergy unerring, but how few, or of
 “ what dignity they may be is uncertain ; then the
 “ people in following the superior and the major
 “ part (the traditive rule) will thus be tied some-
 “ times to obey those of the clergy, to whom Christ
 “ denies such assistance, and to disobey those, who
 “ have it^m. Which is the sum of his argument
 in that page. But therefore (say all Protestants)
 the people are not tied to this rule of obedience *in*
all cases: 'tis a human constitution ; and whenever
 any of those, (tho' otherwise their lawful superiors)
 depart from their sole infallible rule, the Scrip-
 tures, the people are not obliged to follow them ;
 for they must obey God rather than man. If he
 means, that the people are tied to this rule of obe-
 dience in all cases by divine authority, it is that, of
 which we want a proof : if not, his conclusion will
 amount to no more, than that such superiors re-
 quiring an universal and absolute submission to
 their decrees, will thus sometimes tie the people to
 submit to error ; which his adversaries will easily
 grant him.

The only argument I find in your author for
 the divine authority of a general council, is this,
 “ That the church governors, when ever assem-
 “ bled in council, do act by the self same autho-
 “ rity (received from our Lord, and by their
 “ divine institution) by which they act singly, in
 “ their several charges : — What authority then,
 “ and whence they had it singly, they have
 “ united.” — And so much I believe not only Dr.
Hammond, whom he quotes, but all of the church
 of *England* will own : but is this authority abso-
 lute and unlimited, in matters of faith, or is it
 not ? If it be, then every one will be obliged to
 obey their several bishops, how much soever they
 differ from one another : if it be not unlimited,

as sure it is not, since every single bishop may err (as is confess'd by all) and in such case the people cannot be bound to obey; then neither is it so, when they are united, for they act by the *self-same authority, when assembled, by which they act singly*. But how high soever the authority of bishops may be, this is not the institution we look for, nor will it help us in our search whom to follow, when they are divided among themselves. The divine authority we are enquiring for, is that of a primate over many inferior bishops, or of a majority of them over a lesser number, with a promise that such shall not err; and in case the greater number of inferior bishops should dissent from their superiors in dignity, on which side the infallibility should rest, or to whom the people must adhere. But of such a divine authority, promise, or direction, I do not find, that any proof is offered.

Nor does your author mention this last case at all, of a majority dissenting from their superiors, though this not only may, but has happened. And if it is not determined which of them, in such case, is the infallible guide, the people will be left uncertain whom to follow, or, according to their different opinions about it, may have a very different rule of faith.

And is it to be thought, that a living *infallible guide* was designed us, and yet, that neither our Saviour, or his apostles should say one word of any rule, how to know this guide in case of dissensions, nor give the least direction how that body should be constituted, which was to have so great a privilege as infallibility; either of what persons it should consist, or what number of votes, or what acceptation should be necessary to make its decrees obligatory? About all which so many obvious doubts may be raised, and these not the cavils of a captious enemy; for several councils are rejected even

even by the church of *Rome*; and how can we certainly know, that they had not a title to infallibility, and a right to be obeyed, or that those others may not as well be rejected, without some stated rules of what is sufficient to give a council the authority of a general one, since none of them have been strictly such.

But no direction being left us by Christ, or his apostles, about this so important a matter, is it not reasonable to conclude, that their writings are the only rule they designed us, by which we are to (*try the spirits*) examine all doctrines, and as they agree or not to that rule, accordingly to receive, or reject them; which if it resolve at last into every man's private judgment, is it not vain to urge absurdities or inconveniences from that? For without proving, that God has given us another *determined* guide, this is only arguing, that he should have done something, which he has not done.

But why is it thought so necessary for us to be more infallibly secured from *Error*, than from *Sin*? which seems more opposite to the purity of God, and more prejudicial to mankind; what absurdity is there in thinking, that God has left our understanding as free as our will? and if men had done so too, what inconvenience would have followed from it? Those divisions, that are now among Christians, seem not the necessary consequence of a diversity in opinions, but of mens having made the terms of communion straiter than God has made the terms of salvation. Otherwise all Christians, who agree in those important truths, which are essentials of the covenant of grace, might have been of one heart, and of one communion, notwithstanding their differences about other things; as we see the *Dominicans* and *Jesuits* are, though the matter in dispute between them seems of much greater consequence, than many of those things, for which churches are unhappily divided from one another.

From

From which may I not conclude, that those disorders (for the prevention of which, an infallible determiner of all controversies is urged as necessary) are so far from being the effects of mens judging for themselves, that they manifestly proceed from their not being left at liberty to do so, as the *Dominicans* and *Jesuits* are, in the contest between them; and that therefore if God has not required, that all controvertible matters should be determined, he has left us a more effectual way to peace and union, *viz.* By bearing with one another in such things; than he had done by appointing such an undetermined judge of them, as about whom the greatest controversy may be raised.

If it is urged, that thus many errors will get into the church, which is contrary to our Saviour's promises; I ask, how it can be proved more inconsistent with the promise, that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the church, that some errors should be in it, or that the greatest part of it should err; than that many sins should so widely prevail in it, as we see they do? Or, how can it be said, that the gates of hell prevail against the church, whilst it retains all truths *necessary to salvation*? For though with them there should be a mixture even of dangerous errors, whilst faith in Christ, and repentance for the remission of sins, are maintained, they will prove as it were antidotes against the malignity of them. For if men sincerely endeavour to know the truth, and ask pardon for all their involuntary mistakes; what reason is there to doubt, that *David's* prayer will be accepted for such errors, as well as for the sins, which without our own fault we are ignorant of? (*Ob cleanse thou me from all my secret sins.*)

This, Sir, seems to me no irrational scheme of religion: but whatever objections may be urged against it, they can be of no force, if God has

given us no other. If men will abuse their liberty of searching in the Scriptures whether these things are so, every one must account for himself at his own peril. But what greater safety can they have by submitting to the decrees of a council, though seeming to them contrary to the word of God, when they have no command from him for such a submission, than they have in following some few pastors, who, they think, adhere more closely to their confessed rule, the Scriptures?

Much rather, indeed most gladly would I submit to an infallible interpreter of God's appointing, if such a one I could find; but I must conclude with my first position, which is the ground I have all along proceeded on, That there can be no reason to ascribe infallibility to any man or assembly of men, but an *express divine promise*, &c. If, Sir, you can shew me either, that this position is false, or admitting it true, can prove, that our Saviour has given us any promise or direction where that infallibility, which is said to be in the diffusive body of the church, shall be found in case of divisions; it will extremely rejoice me to see it plainly done: but I have found nothing like it in your author. 'Tis true, I have not in this paper examined every particular in his book, or gone through it methodically, being loth to give you so tedious a trouble; nor was it needful to my purpose, which is not to answer him. But I have, to the best of my understanding, taken the strength of all his direct arguments for an infallible guide, and am much mistaken, if any of his arguments amount to more than a fitness, or such a necessity of submitting to superiors, as respects order; or, on the other hand, absurdities, or rather inconveniencies in mens being left to judge for themselves: both which I have considered in these *lines*. And as I am induced to this search by the same unprejudiced love
of

of truth, that brought me first to you, I hope you will receive and answer this with the same condescension and charity you then had for me, who am, and ever shall be, with respect,

S I R,

Your most humble Servant.

The Second Letter,

To Mr. H——, who had procured an Answer to the foregoing Letter from a Stranger to the Author.

S I R,

I Am sorry Mr. B——'s indisposition hindered him from answering my letter, and thank you for the pains you were at in getting another to do it. The whole force of the arguments, urged in the answer you brought me, which are enlarged on in several paragraphs, and frequently resumed, may be reduced to two propositions; by which my reply to them will be the less tedious, and the more clear.

The first, That my objections against a living infallible guide, equally overthrow the infallibility of Scripture itself: which is the subject of the sections marked 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.

The second, "That Protestants (the church of England in particular) receiving not only the uncontroverted, but the controverted books of Scripture, on the infallible authority of the
VOL. I. B " church;

“ church; and the decisions of the four first general
 “ ral councils, as the decisions of the Holy Ghost :
 “ they must own, that there was a living infallible
 “ guide after the decease of the apostles. And if
 “ there was such a guide for five hundred years, there
 “ is no imaginable ground to affirm, that it was not
 “ to continue for ever; nor any reason, whilst they
 “ own that the church is infallible in her decisions
 “ concerning Scripture, to deny, that she is so in
 “ other things.” Part of which is urged in the
 section marked 7; and the whole is variously in-
 sisted on in several other places.

Now to all, that is said on this last head, I need only give this short answer; that it proceeds upon a wrong supposition, and therefore the argument built on it falls to the ground, having no foundation. But the gentleman observes, that I was aware of that inference, viz. *That there is as good reason to believe succeeding councils infallible as the four first;* and therefore, he says, I urged, *that no council yet has been strictly a general one.* What this (which was said on a very different occasion, which he takes no notice of) could have been to the purpose of avoiding his inference, I cannot imagine; but he may be assured I was not aware of an inference, which I knew he had no ground for. *Protestants* do not receive the *Scriptures* from the church as an infallible authority, nor the decisions of the four first councils, as the decisions of the *Holy Ghost*: they reverence those councils, for the sake of their doctrine, which they find deducible from the *Scriptures*; but do not believe the doctrine, on the authority of the councils, according to what the church of England declares in her 21st Article, “ That general councils may and have erred in things pertaining to God; and that things ordained by them as necessary to salvation, have neither strength nor authority, unless it may be declared, that they are taken from the *Scriptures*.” And

as for the Scriptures, they are believed to be written by inspired men, on the *testimony* of the church, not as a body extraordinarily assisted by the *Holy Ghost*, but as they are vast companies of men, who in a continued succession of many ages have handed them down to us, as books written by those whose names they bear; it being morally impossible, that those, to whom they were at first delivered, could have received and believed them, if they had not known the great matters of fact contained and appealed to in them to be true; which facts sufficiently proved their authors to be inspired: And as little is it possible, that their successors could have corrupted those books, which were read, copied, translated, and dispersed into so many hands, in all ages of Christianity.

As for the controverted books, neither are they received on the authority of any judgment or sentence passed on them, but on the same moral arguments, on which the councils judged them to be *canonical*; as their being mentioned for such by the earliest Christian writers (which the book of *Revelations* in particular is) the number of hands, in which they were; and the conformity of their doctrine with those books, which had never been questioned, but were constantly quoted and appealed to on both sides, in all the disputes, that happened among Christians about other things.

On these grounds Protestants think they are *sufficiently*, if not infallibly, *certain* of the infallible authority of the Scriptures.

And that they may thus be sufficiently certain, that they ought to submit to an authority as infallible, the *gentleman* must grant, whether he will have the Scriptures believed on the authority of the *church* as infallible, or the church on the authority of the *Scriptures*; for one of them must be received on a moral certainty, unless he will argue in a circle, proving both by each other, which he knows

will prove neither. This then, I doubt not, he will grant me, that the grounds, on which Protestants believe the Scriptures, may give a sufficient certainty, that we ought to submit to an authority as infallible.

And now I suppose the *gentleman* will think he has me at great advantage, and that, to be consistent with myself, I must retract my position, *viz.* That there can be no reason to ascribe infallibility to any *man, or assembly of men*, but an express divine promise, &c. The question then is, whether the cases are alike; which leads me to examine his first proposition, *viz.* *That my objections against a living infallible guide, equally overthrow the authority of Scripture itself:* A proposition, which if he had made good, I should be extremely sorry for it, because there is this unhappiness in it, that instead of proving the authority of the church, it would only prove, that the authority of church and Scripture are equally uncertain; a sort of arguments, which *I wish* none would make use of, but those who *design* to overthrow Christianity itself; which I would by no means suppose to be the gentleman's aim, notwithstanding his hard insinuations of me. But let any one judge, whether his reasoning or mine *tends* most to that consequence.

In examining the arguments for a living *infallible guide* (a point denied by the greater number of Christians) I all along supposed the authority of the Scriptures as a common principle agreed on by them all; thinking that agreement a sufficient foundation for the Christian religion, whatever become of the point in dispute. On the other hand, the gentleman being to maintain that disputed point, the authority of the church, as an infallible guide, turns my objections against it, against the authority of the Scriptures; and then, instead of shewing the weakness of those objections, he only hopes I will grant they prove too much, but is so far from shewing

shewing that they do so, that all the rest of his discourse is founded on a supposition, that those arguments *are good against the Scriptures*, that their authority must *be dubious*, unless they are believed on the infallible authority of the church: And if so, will not the authority of the church (which is denied by the greater part of Christians) be at least as dubious as that of the Scriptures, far want of another infallible authority to support our belief of it? And so adieu both the church of *Rome's*, and the Christian rule of faith. Yet do I not uncharitably censure him of designing this consequence, obvious as it is; but there was no way to avoid it, but one of these two, either by shewing, that my arguments, as retorted by him, were not good against the Scriptures, but that we might have sufficient certainty of their authority, though the church, were not infallible; which had been too dangerous a concession (though from thence he had urged, that we might be equally certain of the church's infallibility on the same grounds) for this would have wholly taken off the force of his main argument, for our receiving all the decisions of the church as infallible, *viz.* because we must receive her decisions of Scripture as such. But, what is worse, if he could not have produced a tradition equally clear and universal, for a *living infallible guide*, as for the inspiration of Scripture, the authority of this guide would again have been referred to a trial by Scripture; and so we had been where we were, and all my arguments might still have been strong enough against such a guide, however weak (as indeed they are) against the Scriptures. If therefore he would not make this concession, that we may have a sufficient certainty of the divine authority of the Scriptures, without believing the church infallible, the only other means he had to avoid the consequence of taking away all certainty, both of church and Scripture, was to give a

plain reason, why the doctrine of an *infallible guide* was more capable of certainty, and of being conveyed through a course of many ages clearly and unalterably, than the books of Scripture; or to affirm, that in fact it had been so; a proposition, which he would have found very difficult to maintain. But on that supposition his whole discourse must be founded; for since he plainly denies, that we can be certain of the divine authority of the Scriptures, unless the church is infallible (accusing me of having made their authority dubious by attacking her *infallibility*) he must then suppose, that we may be more certain, by tradition of the divine authority of the church, than we can be of the Scriptures; unless, as I said, he will take away all certainty of either, and so overthrow Christianity itself.

This then is the right state of the question between us, *Whether the infallibility of the church, as now taught by the church of Rome, or the divine authority of the books of Scripture, has been conveyed to us by the most clear and universal tradition?* And, on the resolution of this, must stand or fall the truth of my position, and arguments against an infallible guide, or of his objection, *viz.* That they equally overthrow the authority of *Scripture*. For if the Scriptures have come down to us by so clear and uninterrupted a tradition, as is sufficient to give us a certainty of their authority, then my arguments cannot be turned against them: but if, on the other hand, the doctrine of the infallibility of the church, as a *guide*, was not capable of being, or has not been, conveyed to us, by such a tradition, as can give us a certainty, then there is all reason to require a plain proof of it from the written infallible word of God; and so my arguments will stand good against a living guide, though not against the Scriptures, unless it must follow, that if we cannot be certain of some one thing with-
out

out a divine revelation, that therefore we cannot be certain of another, or of any thing without revelation; which, I suppose, the gentleman would not have me take for a good conclusion; and, I assure him, I did not take it for a principle.

But the ground, on which I went, was indeed that, in which, he says, the cavil lies, *viz. That Tradition is no express proof of the infallibility of the church, i. e. of that part, which stood to the successor of the chief of the apostles; or rather that we have no sufficient tradition of it; and therefore I expected, that after he had turned my arguments against Scripture, and, as I observed, supposed them good, so applied, he would have shewn them to be groundless cavils against a living guide, by producing a better, or, if that were too hard a task, as good a tradition, for the infallibility of that part of the church, which adheres to St. Peter's successor, as we have for the authority of the Scriptures.* But instead of that, he only urges the established subordinations in the church, the constant exercise of authority by church guides, and the submission of the faithful to them; all which I had obviated, by enquiring, how such subordinations (even supposing them of divine institution) and such exercise of authority accordingly, would any more prove the superior in number or dignity infallible, than the like constitution of other bodies proves them to be so: Of which he takes no notice, and only says, *now that all this should be granted of divine institution (though by the way, I only supposed, by no means granted it) this obligation of subordination and submission, laid upon all by God's express order; if it do not infer, that those, who conform to it, shall not be misled by it into error, I am to learn what can.* And if this is a good answer, I have learned what I did not know before, *viz. That all sovereign princes, nay, that all parents are infallible; for there is an obligation of subordi-*

nation and submission to them, laid upon all children and subjects, by God's express order. But if this do not infer, that those, who conform to it, shall not be misled by it into error, yet am I not to learn what can: A plain promise from God, that such superiors shall be infallible in all their commands, would infallibly bear that inference; but till he is pleased to give us such a promise, they must (for ought I see) be contented, that we pay them absolute obedience in all things, that fall under their jurisdiction. But if they will go beyond that, by commanding any thing contrary to the word or will of God, in that we must not obey them; and consequently we must have a liberty of *judging for ourselves*, whether they do so or not. Now if this is true, with relation to our natural and civil governors (as I believe every body will allow that it is) why is not the same limitation as consistent with our obligation of obeying spiritual governors? No doubt, this liberty of judging for ourselves may be abused in all those relations: wicked children and rebels, as well as *Hereticks*, may make this a pretence for throwing off their duty; but that does not make the rule less true, or hinder those from being justified by it, who act sincerely in it.

But I seem to grant (he says) *that the arguments for infallible church authority prove, that it is fit, that it is necessary, there should be such*. From whence he forms this *sylogism*: *Christ settled in his church, whatever was fit and necessary for its preservation: but such is (as is granted) an infallible authority: ergo, Christ settled an infallible authority in his church*. I know not how the gentleman came so much to mistake my meaning, for I do not find, that my words give him any occasion for it. But if they had done so, in that one place, by some negligence or obscurity in the expression, methinks the principles, on which I argue all along, might have led him to
examine,

examine, with a little more care, whether the words would not bear some other sense, less inconsistent with the rest of my letter. But indeed the place, taken by itself, would be very gross nonsense, if it were meant, as he understands it; just as much as if I had said, it is necessary, that there should be an infallible authority in the Church; but we cannot be secured from error by submitting to it, unless that infallible authority is infallible. Now if the gentleman will believe I did not intend this profound reasoning, he will find, that my words could have no other meaning, than, That those arguments taken from the practice of the church, and from the reasonableness of inferiors submitting to superiors, or the minor to the major part, prove only, that there should be some government in the Church, but not that those governors should be infallible. For how else could I say, that those arguments might prove a fitness or necessity of submitting to superiors, for the security of *order and union*; yet such submission could be no security against *error*: and from thence conclude, as I do, that therefore we cannot be absolutely, in all things, obliged to such submission, because, though *order and union* are very valuable things, *truth* must not be sacrificed to them. And thus, if it must be concluded, that Christ has established in his Church whatever I might think fit or necessary (not to its *preservation*, for to that I have not granted, or so much as supposed, that any authority is necessary, but) for the security of order and union; all that can follow from what I have said, will be, that Christ has established some government in the Church: But, as I observed, that will no more prove, that our spiritual governors are infallible, than that our natural or civil governors are so.

Well then, since such inferences as these, are not likely to satisfy one, who would build on a divine promise of an infallible guide, with a rule given by Christ, or his apostles, how to know this guide
in

in case of divisions ; of which, I had urged, that they said never a word ; the gentleman answers, *That this is groundlessly said ;* and asks, *By what rule I know, that Christ, or his Apostles, said never a word of it : is every thing they said writ down in Scripture ?* To which I reply, No, certainly ; for of this I have a very good rule to be assured, viz. The Scriptures telling me so. And if he could give me as good a rule, how to know *what* they said, which was not written, I would willingly submit to it. But methinks the same Evangelist, who assures us, *That Jesus did many things, which were not written,* when he adds, *but these are written that you may believe ;* seems to imply, that succeeding ages could not have sufficient certainty to ground their belief on, if they had not been written. However, if the gentleman will not allow this inference, if he will think, that though the Evangelists profess to write, that we might believe, and that believing we might have life, yet that they *needed not* to have writ for that end, nor did write all that was necessary to it ; but that this very necessary point, of a rule how to know our guide, was one of the things, which they omitted to write ; yet I hope he will not in earnest expect an answer to his question, *How shall I know, that Christ or his Apostles said not a word of it ?* Every one knows, that a negative sufficiently proves itself ; at least it is the same to us, if it does not appear that a thing is, as if it were not. The question therefore is not, how I know, that they *did not* speak of such a rule ; but how I can know that they *did* ; and till that is proved, I may be allowed to suppose they did not.

And now, if the gentleman thinks fit to maintain, *That tradition is an expressive proof* (as his words are) *of the infallibility of that part, which adhere (in case of divisions) to the successor of the chief of the Apostles ;*

^a John xx. ver. 31.

gles; let him consider, that he must support their infallibility with the same moral arguments, on which Protestants believe the divine authority of the Scriptures; (though I might exact stronger from him, who supposes those not sufficient for our belief of Scriptures; but to one, who seeks the victory of truth alone, arguments equally strong will suffice) and I beg leave to give him a short view of the task, which such an undertaking would engage him in, that he may the more easily judge, whether it can be performed or not.

If then he would maintain, on moral grounds, the divine institution of all the subordinations in the church, and the infallibility of superiors, from *their exercising authority, with the submission of the faithful to their decisions*; he may be pleased to consider, whether he can affirm, that it is morally impossible, that such subordinations could ever have been established, if they had not been instituted by Christ, or his Apostles; or, that when they were established, it was impossible for the superiors to extend their authority to things, in which they had none; or that their inferiors should submit to their decisions, without believing them infallible. But if none of these things are morally impossible (which all the subordinations, that are in any human society, all the encroachments on the privileges of subjects, and all the exercise of authority in civil governments, that have ever been submitted to in the world, abundantly evince that they are not) then such exercise of authority, with the submission of inferiors, are not so good grounds for our believing the infallibility of superiors, or their divine institution, as we have for the authority of the Scriptures. For no instance can be produced to confute the assurance we have, from the nature of things, and of mankind, that the Scriptures could never have been received, as books written by inspired men, if the first Christians, to whom they were delivered,
had

had not known the great facts contained in them to be true; which facts proved, that their authors were divinely assisted; and farther, that it is morally impossible, that books of such importance, which were so early dispersed into all parts, and on which so many eyes were, in all corners of Christendom, could have been corrupted in any succeeding age; those books being read among all Christians, from the Apostles time, constantly appealed to in all their controversies, and most of them having never been questioned to be written by those, whose names they bear, but were owned as such, even by the enemies of the religion they contain. These are grounds, on which all mankind are agreed, that we may be sufficiently certain of the Author, and the faithful conveyance of a book; but they are such, as perhaps nothing, of any other nature whatsoever, is capable of. However, if the gentleman would apply them to a traditionary doctrine of the infallibility of the church; if he will say, That 'tis equally impossible, that this doctrine could ever have been received, unless it had been delivered by the Apostles; or, that being delivered by them, it is morally impossible, that a doctrine of such importance could be corrupted, misunderstood, or misrepresented, in any succeeding age: let him observe, first, that there is nothing in this doctrine, that answers to those facts contained in the Scriptures, which serve so well to assure us of their divine authority, being of such a nature, as the first Christians could not be mistaken in, and which, by receiving these book, they attested to; an advantage, that no unwritten doctrine can pretend to, by which to prove itself of divine original. And next, let him consider, how the doctrines of the *Millennium*, and that of the necessity of the *Eucharist* for infants, came to be received as apostolical traditions, so early and so generally as they were: how those many traditions, by which the Jews made the word of
God

God of none effect^b, were received among them as delivered by *Moses*: And lastly, how that most important doctrine, of the being of one God, truly delivered to our Fathers, was corrupted and lost, in the polytheism and idolatry of almost the whole world; tho', when men lived to see the third and fourth generation, there were far greater advantages than since, for conveying an unwritten doctrine securely.

If then these general propositions cannot be maintained, to support the doctrine of a living infallible guide; and he would venture the matter on this particular one, "That in fact we have as clear, un-interrupted, and universal a tradition of this doctrine, as we have of the authority of Scriptures:" he may be pleas'd to consider first, what evidence we can have of that, without those general propositions: that is, How we can be certain, that any thing has been conveyed to us, through many ages, clearly, and without any alteration, unless we can affirm, that it is morally impossible it should be otherwise. Next, whether the great number of Christians, who own no such tradition (as those of the *Greek Church*, and of the more southern and eastern parts, who yet do all give testimony to the Scriptures) will not be a great prejudice against such an assertion, not to say a plain confutation of it. And lastly, Whether the many different opinions about this infallible *Guide*, even among the assertors of it, as, Whether the *Pope* alone is infallible, or a *Council* without the *Pope*, or with him, or neither *Pope*, nor *Council*, but the *Church* diffusive; and whether this is by a continued conveyance of tradition from one age to another (according to Mr. *Serjeant* and his disciples) or by a perpetual assistance of the Holy Ghost, as is more generally taught: Whether, I say, these various opinions of

^b Mark vii. 13.

the infallible guide, are not proofs, That this doctrine has no more come down to us by any clear, or certain, than it has by an universal tradition.

And if on all these considerations it should appear, that we cannot have an equal certainty of the infallibility of the church, as of the Scriptures, by tradition; (as I doubt not to affirm, that there never was so clear, so uninterrupted a tradition for any thing, as that which conveys the Scriptures to us;) then it will follow, that my arguments cannot justly be turned against the Scriptures, though they are good against a living *infallible guide*; which is what I was to shew, and consequently that I had reason to require a plain proof of such a guide, from the written word of God.

But we are exhorted, in the last paragraph, *Not to forget what the Holy Ghost inspired St. Paul to record, to stand fast, and hold the traditions we have been taught, whether by word of mouth, or writings apostolical*; which text being often brought to prove, that the Scriptures are not *our only* rule of faith, I would not omit to consider it in particular, and it may not be improper here. St. Paul charges the *Thessalonians*, to hold what they had been taught, either by word, or his epistle^c, not by writings apostolical, which seems artfully substituted, that St. Paul may be thought to include all that was written by the *Apostles*: from which text I see not that any thing can be proved, but that St. Paul had taught the *Thessalonians* some things, which were not in his *Epistle*, as no doubt he taught them all the doctrine of *Christ*, all that is contained in the Gospels; which they were certainly as much obliged to hold, when they received it from the Apostle's mouth, as if it had been written. But perhaps it will be urged, that St. Paul, in this chapter, is speaking of *traditions*, which were never written, as of the hindrance of the coming of *Antichrist*; and

^c 2 Theff. ii. 15.

that therefore the exhortation in the text must not belong only to such *traditions*, as were afterwards written. To which I answer, That supposing this argument good, and that the *Thessalonians* were obliged to hold some *traditions*, which were never written, particularly that concerning *Antichrist*; yet if they have not performed their duty therein; if not only they, but the whole *Catholic Church* has suffered this *tradition* to be intirely lost, so that to no *church* in the world it can be said at this day—*Now you know what withholdeth that he should be revealed, etc.* this can only shew, how much more faithfully *traditions* are kept, by writings, than by word of mouth; since we only know, that there was some hindrance of the coming of *Antichrist*, because so much is written; but *what* that hindrance was, we know not, because it was not written. And so of all the miracles, which our Saviour did, those few only, which are written, are preserved and believed; those infinitely more, which St. *John* tells us he did, that were not written, are intirely forgot; and therefore, tho' the first *Christians*, who saw and heard those things, might be obliged to hold them, yet we cannot be so, who have no possible means of knowing them. But since there was so great danger, as appears by the things mentioned in these texts, that what was trusted to *oral tradition*, should be absolutely lost; have we not great reason to conclude, that God in his providence took care, that all that was necessary to be believed, should be plainly written; and that among them, we shall find some direction to a living infallible guide (if such a guide was designed us) that we may believe, and that believing we may have life.

Nothing then remains, but to examine what the gentleman has said against the sense, in which I understand those texts of Scripture, which are usually urged.

urged in this question. But, *What are we now to do?* Judging for myself, of the meaning of Scripture, is it seems an offence against it, or as he calls it, *ruling my rule*. I confess I did think the use of a rule to be, that those, to whom it is a rule, should judge by it, whether such things, as ought to agree with it, do so, or not; and I did not imagine, that it was a presumption, to pretend to understand our rule, so far as is necessary to that end; or that understanding a rule, is ruling the rule; which if it be, How can a rule be of any use to us? That is, indeed, How can it be a rule? But why is it, that private persons cannot understand such things, as seem plain in the Scriptures? Were those things understood by the people, when our Saviour or his Apostles spoke them? If they were, could not the Evangelists write the same things, in words as intelligible, or in the same words, in which they were spoke? If they could, what reason is there to doubt, that they would? or, to think the same things are less intelligible, when they are written, than when they were spoken? 'Tis true, the Scriptures have been misunderstood, or perverted, and that in matters of great importance: but this is no argument, that they are not plain in such things; for those, who have misinterpreted them, have not done it, by adhering to the plain and obvious sense of them; but, either by expounding plain texts, in a different sense from the most literal meaning of them, when there was nothing in the known nature of the thing, that required it; or, by determining obscure texts, to a certain sense, as agreed best with their prejudices. And perhaps there are none more in danger of being misled by these means, than those, who submit their judgments to a church, that professes to have another rule besides the Scriptures, by which they may *rule this rule*. However, all the mistakes about the meaning of Scripture only shew the great danger, of being too careless, too curious, or any way
biassed

biased in studying them; for as they must be very liable to err, who will too curiously search into things not plainly revealed, or who establish articles of faith on obscure texts; so there is nothing so plain, that a mind strongly prejudiced may not pervert, or a negligent person misunderstand. My letter, I presume, does not need an infallible interpreter; though the gentleman, for want of a little care, has mistaken my meaning, in more places than I have mentioned.

But after all, whatever may be said against judging for ourselves, How is it avoidable, in the question we are upon? I am enquiring for a living *infallible guide*, and am told, that the *Scriptures* assure me, there is such a guide. I am very glad of it, and desire to see this in the *Scriptures*. When the texts are produced, I do not find, that they express any such matter. What then, says the gentleman, you must not judge for yourself, what the sense is of those texts. I then desire him to tell me, how I shall know, whether they mean, that the Church is an infallible guide or not, if I must not judge of their meaning. To which I know not what answer he can give me, but this, That I must understand them in the sense, that the Church understands them in. But I reply, I am searching in the *Scriptures*, whether the Church is an infallible interpreter of them or not. Must I then believe, that she is an infallible interpreter, because the *Scriptures* say so; and believe the *Scriptures* say so, because she is their infallible Interpreter? For my part, I know not how to get out of this circle, unless I may take the liberty of judging for myself. And indeed, to what purpose are any arguments brought either from *Scripture* or tradition, for an infallible guide; or how should we be convinced by them; if we must not judge for ourselves what force they are of? Let us then take a review of those texts of *Scripture* I had mentioned, with his objections against the sense, in which I understand them.

The first I remarked on was that of St. *John*^r, which is always applied to the *Church*, and in which there is a plain promise of infallibility, to those to whom it is spoke. But I had observed, that there is no more reason to extend one part of the promise, viz. that the *Spirit should lead them into all truth*, to the Successors of the apostles, than the other, that *He should shew them things to come*, which is not pretended to belong to them : and to this the gentleman did not think fit to give any answer.

On the promises in St. *Matthew* and St. *John*, of our Saviour's *being with them to the end of the world*, and the *Spirit's abiding with them for ever*^r, I had observed first, that such expressions are frequently used in the Scriptures, when they must be taken in a restrained sense, not to signify eternally, but perpetually, to the end of their lives, to whom they are spoken. To this he says nothing ; but I added, that how far, or to whomsoever these words may be extended, a promise of *being with* any one, signified assistance and protection, but not infallibility ; and the reason I gave for saying so, was, That that expression is used in several places of Scripture, for a promise of God's protection to his people. This, he says, *is a poor shift to evade the force of those terms*. Whereas I thought, that examining in what sense an expression, found in one text, is used in other places of Scripture, is so far from being a shift to evade, that it is the best shift we can make, to find out the importance of any disputed expression. But it seems, that what those terms signify in other places, is not the rule of their meaning *here*, unless I can prove, that they *do not* signify something else here, when CHRIST employs them to express his consolatory promises to his sorrowful church. This task of proving, that a thing is *not said*, or what it does *not mean*, the gentleman is frequently putting me upon : But I hope he will think

^r John xvi. 13

^r See Deut. xv. 17. Epist. to Philem.

me a little more reasonable, if I rather require of him to prove, that those terms *do* signify something else here; for till that is done, their meaning in other places will be a very good rule to judge by of their meaning here, tho' employed to express Christ's consolatory promises to his afflicted Church. For why, I pray, can nothing but a promise of infallibility comfort her? Are not God's promises of assistance and protection sufficiently consolatory to her? If he thinks so, I should be tempted to desire a proof from him, that they *are not*: but, I hope, he has higher thoughts of such divine favours, than to attempt that, or to need any proof from me that they are. If then a promise of God's assistance and protection may be a consolatory promise to his sorrowful Church; and that those expressions of God's *being with* any one, of his never leaving, or forsaking them, do in other places signify his providence in assisting and protecting them, but not infallibility (tho' they may signify here a more than *ordinary* providence; for I did not intend that word in so strict a sense, as he seems to take it) what reason is there to think, they have a different signification here, when *Christ* employs them to comfort his sorrowful Church? Is there not rather all reason to think they have not, unless, as I said, it be plainly proved, that they must signify something else here?

On that expression in St. *Matthew*, *Tell the Church*, he says, *I am too bold in affirming, that it is meant of private differences in civil matters; and that beathen and publican signify no more than a man sued at the King's-Bench.* As to that part, *Let him be to thee as a beathen, or a publican*, I was the less exact in expressing my thoughts of it, because my subject only required me to observe, what kind of matters our Saviour there enjoins them to refer to the Church. But when I said, that those, who re-

¹ Matt. xviii 17.

fused to submit their differences to the judgment of the Church, might be prosecuted in temporal courts, I did not mean, that heathen and publican signified *no more* than a man sued at the *King's-Bench*; but on the contrary, that the reason, why he might be so prosecuted, was, because he was to be looked on as a very ill, and incorrigible man, (such as the *Jews* thought the *Heathens* and *Publicans* were) and no longer to be considered as a member of the Church.

But as to the matters, which our Saviour commands them to refer to the Church, whatever the gentleman thinks he *means*, I would appeal even to himself, whether our Saviour's words, *If thy brother trespass against thee*, are not usually spoken of injuries done by one man to another, either in his goods, person, or reputation: And if they are so, let any indifferent person judge, whether there is most boldness in affirming, as I do, that our Saviour meant what he said, and meant nothing else; or in supposing, as he does, that our Saviour did *not mean* what he *did say*. But perhaps it may be again required of me to prove, that the words here *do not mean* something else, than they used to signify in other places; a task I desire to be excused from. However, though it is more than necessary, I will offer at something like a proof, that our Saviour did intend what he did say, *i. e.* that private differences should be referred to the judgment of the Church, or that assembly of Christians, which the contending persons were members of. For why else does St. Paul so severely blame the *Corinthians*, for going to Law before the unjust, and not before the Saints. And y 6. *But brother goeth to Law with brother, and that before the unbelievers* *. I suppose it will not be said, that it was about matters of Faith, that St. Paul reproves them for going before the unbelievers: And whether it was on the ac-

* 1 Cor. vi. 1.

count of any infallible authority in the Church, that he would have them submit their differences to the judgment of the Saints, or only for fear of giving scandal to unbelievers, let the whole discourse determine, particularly observing the 5th verse, *Is it so, that there is not one wise man among you? No not one, that shall be able to judge between his brethren?* And *¶ 7.* Now therefore there is utterly a fault among you, because ye go to law one with another. *Why do ye not rather take wrong? Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?* It seems then St. Paul would have them bring their causes before the Saints, (*Tell the Church*) not because they could not judge amiss, but because it was better to submit to the decision of any one, though least esteemed in the Church, as verse 4. or to *take wrong*, than to give scandal by their quarrels, to those that were *without*. And why our Saviour's words, which seem so plainly to express the same thing, must be understood in another sense, I see no reason but to serve an hypothesis.

I come now to the last text I had considered, which is the first taken notice of in the answer, *viz. Christ's promise to his Church, That the gates of Hell shall not prevail against her.* And here the gentleman desires it should be observed, how I cavil at the term *prevail*, which he says *I like not*, and assigns a reason why I don't like it, because, says he, "If it is allowed, that the Church shall not be prevailed upon by the powers of Hell, then it is clear error (a hellish power) shall not prevail against her, which is the same thing, as that she shall not fall into error." To this I answer, first, That I did not intend to cavil at the word, by saying, that in the original it signified an entire victory, but only to express what I understood by it. And next, that if I had done so, it would have been upon some better reason than to avoid the consequences of it; for I assure him, I have no

more laid it down for a principle, That the Church *is not infallible*, than I would have others do, that *she is infallible*. But I began my search with a full persuasion, that my eternal salvation depended on my judging with sincerity of the arguments on both sides, especially of those, which are urged from the Holy Scriptures. But whether the gentleman will believe this, or not, he might have seen by my reasoning on this text, towards the end of my letter, that I needed not to cavil at the word *prevail*, for fear of the consequence he draws from it; for it is there very plain, that I do not allow that consequence. So far am I from taking errors prevailing against the church to be the same thing with her falling into error, that I have there supposed, that *dangerous errors* may be in the Church, whilst she retains all truths *necessary to Salvation*; and then I enquire, how, whilst she retains all such truths (tho' with a mixture of many errors) the gates of Hell (supposing that to mean error) can be said to *prevail against her*. So that I could not cavil at the term, *prevail*, to avoid a consequence which I did not, nor do yet see; and if he had a mind to convince me of it, he should not have thought it sufficient barely to affirm, what I had desired a proof of, *viz.* That if ever any error should be received in the Church, the gates of Hell would prevail against her. 'Tis plain indeed, as he says in another place, *That if ever she should make shipwreck of her faith, she ceases to be a Church*; but it is not so plain, that every error is a shipwreck of the faith. The Church of *Pergamos* is told, that she *had not denied the Faith*^{*}, though there were a few things against her, the Doctrine of *Balaam*, and that of the *Nicolaitans*, which doubtless was a very erroneous one, since Christ says he *bates it*. The *Jesuits*, the *Dominicans*, and the *Franciscans*, will be

^{*} Revel. ii. 13, 14, 15.

allowed;

allowed, I suppose, to have the Faith; and yet either the *Dominicans*, or the other two, must hold an error, since they hold things contrary to each other. And why the whole Church may not as well keep the Faith (and *so the gates of Hell not prevail against her*) though she should hold some errors, I see not. Were not the doctrines of the *Millennium*, and of the necessity of the *Eucharist* for infants, errors, which once were generally receiv'd in the Church? Had then the gates of Hell prevailed against her? If not, then the promise, that the gates of Hell shall not prevail against the Church, is not the same, as that she shall not fall into error, notwithstanding error's being (as he tells us) a hellish power. And I desire the Gentleman to consider, whether by insisting on the word *Hell*, making it to signify error, as a hellish power, according to the importance of that word in *English*, he has not given me just occasion to cavil at that term? unless he thinks the meaning of the word in the original is not the rule of its meaning here; for no doubt he is not to learn, that the word translated *Hell* has not the same signification in the original, as the term *Hell* commonly stands for in our language. And if by *Hell*, should be understood the *grave*, and by the gates to it, death or destruction, what would become of his *hellish power*? But let that phrase signify what powers he pleases (as it very likely includes every power, that would oppose the Church) the promise plainly is, that none of them should overcome, or destroy her; for what else is to prevail against her? Nor is this sense, I suppose, disallowed by him: the difference between us is rather in this, That he thinks the Church is destroyed, or that she ceases to be a Church, if she has any error in her; and that therefore that promise includes, that she shall not err. Whereas I do not see, but that the building may remain firm enough

on its foundation, and lose nothing essential to it, though *wood*, and *hay*, and *strubble*, should be superadded: and till it is proved, that every error destroys the being of the Church, that text will make nothing for her infallibility. Thus I have enlarged on my reasons for that sense, in which I understand those places of Scripture, that are chiefly urged in this question; and I dare appeal to *Roman Catholics* themselves, whether they would not have understood them in the same sense, if they had not first laid down for a principle, that they must believe them in the sense they are taught by their infallible Church. And whether that be a right disposition, for seeking the true meaning of those texts, from which we would learn, if she is infallible, or not, let any unprejudiced person judge. And now I think all, that is material, has been spoke to; for I have shewn, *First*, That his chief argument, why Protestants should own the Church infallible in all her decisions, is built on a wrong supposition, *viz.* that they believe her infallible in all her decisions concerning Scripture; which since they they do not, that argument, which runs through the whole paper, is of no force. *Secondly*, I have shewn, That his great objection to my arguments against an infallible guide, *viz.* That they equally overthrow the infallibility of Scripture, neither is just, or, if it were, would be of any use toward establishing the authority of the Church. On the contrary, I have shewn, that by supposing (as he plainly does) that my arguments are good against the Scriptures, he has overthrown the infallible authority of the church; for he has not pretended to a *greater* evidence from tradition of the infallibility of the church, than we have of the divine authority of Scripture; and I have maintained, that we cannot have an *equal* evidence of it from tradition. So that, if my arguments *are good* against the Scriptures, they are certainly good against the infallibility

I

lity of the Church ; and if they *are not* good against the Scriptures (as I have shewn they are not) then his objection is groundless; and either way my arguments will remain in their full force against a living infallible guide ; this objection being so unlucky, as to do his cause no service, whether true or false. And thus the authority of the church being again reduced to a trial by Scripture, I have shewn, *Thirdly*, That the sense, in which I understand the text urged for her infallibility, is the most plain and obvious sense of them, according to the usual signification of the words (which is St. *Austin's* rule to understand them by, when there is nothing in that sense absurd, or impious, to force us to seek another) and no proof has been offered, that these texts ought to be understood in another sense. But I am put on the unreasonable task of proving in one place, that the words *do not* ; and in another, am accused of boldness for affirming, that they do signify, what they used to stand for ; and to the most important, which I had shewn must be limited to the Apostles, nothing at all is said. So that I am as far to seek as ever for a living infallible guide, finding no direction to such a guide in the Scriptures, nor any tradition sufficient to give a moral certainty of it.

And now (tho' it is foreign to my subject, yet being greatly to my purpose in entering on it) I would mention a consequence I draw from the little certainty I have found in the arguments for a *living guide* ; which is, That finding it most rational, to take the Scriptures for our guide, there seems to me much greater safety in the communion of Protestants, than in that of the church of *Rome*, for this reason, That in all those practices, by which they differ in their way of worship, as *adoration of the host, prayer to saints, Worship of images, half-communion, &c.* every ordinary understanding may see,

see, that these things are not plainly contained in the Scriptures; and that therefore they cannot be necessary, which the church of *Rome* allows they are not; whereas nothing less than an infallible interpreter can assure us, that they are not contrary to the *Scripture*, and consequently very dangerous.

A
D E F E N C E
O F
Mr. LOCKE'S ESSAY
O F
Human Understanding.

W H E R E I N

Its Principles, with reference to *Morality, Revealed Religion*, and the *Immortality of the Soul*, are considered and justified: In answer to some REMARKS on that Essay.

First printed in the Year 1702.

I am not prepared to admit that I have been
 a champion in any cause, but as an officer
 of the law, to make the best apology I can for a
 course of conduct which has been the subject
 of so much public censure, and which has
 been the cause of so much suffering to
 many of our fellow-citizens, I feel it my
 duty to state the facts as they are, and
 to leave the public to judge for themselves.
 I am, Sir, very respectfully,
 Your obedient servant,
 J. H. H.

To the Excellent

Mr. LOCKE.

S I R,

I Do not presume to address these papers to you as a champion in your cause; but as an offender, to make the best apology I can for a bold unlicensed undertaking. That excellence of the *Essay of Human Understanding*, which gave me courage in encountering a caviller against it, strikes me with shame and awe, when I think of coming before you; like a rash lover, that fights in defence of a lady's honour, the juster his cause is, the more reason he has to fear her resentment, for not leaving it to assert itself by its own evidence; and the more it secures him of success against his adversary, the less pretence he has to her forgiveness. But, Sir, *The Essay of Human Understanding* is a publick concern, which every one has a right and interest to defend. It came too late into the world to be received without opposition, as it might have been in the first ages of philosophy, before mens heads were prepossessed with imaginary science. At least, no doubt, if so perfect a work could have been produced so early, it would have prevented a great deal of that unintelligible jargon, and vain pretence to knowledge of things out of the reach of human understanding, which make a great part of the school learning, and disuse the mind to plain and solid truth.

But

But the great Mr. *Locke* was reserved for a citi-
 zious and learned age, to *break in upon this sanctu-*
ary of vanity and ignorance; and by setting men on
 considering first *the bounds of human understanding*,
 to help them in a close pursuit of true and useful
 knowledge. And is it possible for a lover of truth
 to be unmoved, or silently suffer any injurious in-
 sinuations of so excellent a design?

Your time, Sir, is too precious to be employed
 in taking notice of them. You still go on in farther
 designs for our advantage and improvement; and
 whilst you labour in that great end, to which you
 were destined, *the good of mankind*, it is every one's
 duty to be watchful for you, and zealous to secure
 the benefits you have already done us.

It is confessed, the vast disproportion between
 one of so mean abilities as the author of this de-
 fence, and the incomparable Mr. *Locke*, might
 with reason have deterred from the attempt. But
 I did not presume to consider myself in any kind of
 comparison with him. I only observed the adver-
 sary's strength, and thought (with reason and justice
 on my side) I need not be discouraged to enter the
 lists with him; and I am persuaded, what I have
 done will leave him no cause of triumph, how
 much soever it is unworthy of you. I wish, Sir,
 you may only find it enough worth your notice,
 to incite you to shew the world, how far it falls
 short of doing justice to your principles; which you
 may do without interrupting the great business of
 your life, by a work, that will be an universal bene-
 fit, and which you have given the world some
 right to exact of you. Who is there so capable of
 pursuing to a *demonstration* those reflections on the
 grounds of *morality*, which you have already made?
 Which, on the hints you have given, is impatiently
 expected from you by many, who lament the great
 need there is of it in this age. That consideration,
 no doubt, will animate one, who has ever shewn a
 careful

careful zeal for the advancement of practical religion; and I cannot but think a man so greatly qualified for such an undertaking was given in mercy to an age, in which it is more than ever wanting; for never any age abounded like this with open advocates of irreligion, upon pretended rational grounds. To silence these unhappy reasoners, by a demonstration of the obligations their nature lays upon them, is a work worthy of the excellent Mr. *Locke*; and perhaps the weakness of this defence may shew you, that those, who mean well to religion, have no little need of your instruction. In hopes of which, I have ventured to publish these papers, not without much apprehension and awe of your displeasure. But, Sir, in my offence you must perceive my zeal; and though I have not the happiness to be known to you, believe me with the profoundest respect,

S I R,

Your most humble,

and most obedient Servant.

P R E-

P R E F A C E.

AS the science of true morality is of the most universal and highest concernment to mankind, no doubt, those writers, who establish it upon the clearest, most obvious, and the most solid grounds, do the best service to religion, which has received no little prejudice, by the attempts of some well-meaning men to support it upon metaphysical notions, upon false or abstruse reasonings : And as there appears a hearty zeal for setting men right in that great concern, in all the writings of the excellent author of the *Essay of Human Understanding*, I know no philosopher before him, that has fixed morality upon so solid a foundation, as he gives many hints of in that *Essay*, wherever the subject will permit ; a foundation strong enough to satisfy the wisest, and plain enough to be conceived by the weakest capacities. And yet there have not been wanting some, who have taxed that admirable *Essay* with principles prejudicial, or not sufficient to those great ends, which are evidently the main scope of all that author's works. So hard it is for men, who have been used to receive truth in a particular dress, to know her, when stript of those false colours and borrowed ornaments, with which she is too often disguised. At least, this is the worst I would think of such cavillers. The most favourable judgment, that can be

be made of them, is that they have either mistaken Mr. *Locke's* principles, or the true grounds of morality, and write out of too great a fondness of their own *hypothesis*, or ignorance of his.

But as there are no reflections so weak or ill grounded, that some or other may not be deceived by, I have met with two or three, who upon reading some remarks on the *Essay of Human Understanding* (which fell but lately into my hands) concluded it contained very dangerous principles, and without farther examination, condemned the *Essay*, having never read, or as they owned, very little considered it; on which account, several, who have a great respect for Mr. *Locke*, have wished he had leisure to answer the difficulties objected against his principles by the Remarker. But as I did not think them strong enough to need so great a hand to remove them, I persuaded myself I might do something towards it, which at first I designed only for my own satisfaction, and those few friends, who had spoke to me of them; but in examining their force, I found them so much grounded on mistakes, not only of the principles the author contends against, but of the foundation of those grand points he contends for, that it fell unavoidably in my way to make some reflections upon the *true grounds of morality*, and the danger of establishing a point of so great concern as that, and the immortality of the soul, upon false or uncertain *hypothesis*, which having been frequently attempted, and by well designing men, made me think it might not be unuseful to publish these papers. And I hope, whatever may tend to removing any prejudices against a book of so great use as the *Essay of Human Understanding*, will be thought of some consequence to the publick. And though I am far from pretending to have set the principles I defend in all the lustre

they are capable of, I doubt not, that I have sufficiently shewn the weakness of the objections against them, and that all impartial readers will easily perceive, that whatever is defective in this defence, can only be imputed to want of judgment in the undertaker, equal to the truth and justice of the cause.

A
VINDICATION
OF AN
ESSAY
CONCERNING
Human Understanding.

TIS happy for mankind, when men of an elevated genius, and uncommon penetration, have too a truly noble and beneficent nature, above any low particular ends, and resolute enough to encounter all the oppositions they must meet in an unbiassed search of truth, from those, who having with much pains imbibed the opinions of revered authors, are unwilling to unlearn all their former knowledge, to examine what they have been taught for first principles, not to be questioned, and lay aside their sacred *ipse dixit*. He, who dares attempt against this established monarchy over mens judgments, must be looked on as a troublesome and dangerous innovater, and needs a mighty force of reason and generous courage, to break through all the prejudices of men, and free them from a willing slavery. To that united force we owe the excellent *Essay on Human*
D 2 Under-

Understanding ; and to these prejudices, all the cavils against it.

When the light of truth shines too clear and strong to be directly faced, the only shelter for those, who would not feel its force, is to seek for far fetched dangerous consequences, supposed inconsistencies with revealed truths, and mysteries of faith, deduced by a long train of arguments, which engaging in an intricate dispute shades them with some pretence, for not confessing the splendor of that truth, they cannot encounter ; inconsistencies with revealed truths, when the real necessary consequence of any principles being sufficient proofs against them, how plausible soever they appear. But Mr. *Locke* has so well vindicated his *Essay* from those imputed to it by the most considerable of his opposers, that the rest could only hope to triumph in his neglect of their attempts, who by the help of some suppositions, and many mistakes, have endeavoured to draw an odium on that excellent *Essay*.

The Remarker, whom I have now under consideration, in his first letter^a, desires to be informed how far all the principles of that ingenious *Essay*, taken together, will give us a sure foundation for morality, revealed religion, and a future life, which he does not find that they do. What his reasons, or rather difficulties (as he terms them) are, is my design to consider, and endeavour to satisfy. In his second remarks, he mentions an answer of Mr. *Locke's*, which I have not read, but suppose, by what he quotes out of it, that it was rather designed to shew the weakness of his objections, than to give a full answer to them, Mr. *Locke*, perhaps, thinking it sufficient to shew they required none. But I find they are still of weight with the Remarker, his second and third remarks being only enlargements upon the same heads.

^a Page 4.

I shall therefore examine them in their order, taking on each head the substance of what I find relating to it in all the three remarks, that the answer, lying together, may be the more clear, and the better considered, which, I hope, will be done by the Remarker without prejudice, as it was writ, with a design to satisfy him, and in a sincere love of truth, to do justice to a book, which, I think, removes the obstacles to it, and shews the method of attaining it, clearer and more effectually, and is writ in an exacter method, than any before it, to vindicate it from a defect in the foundation of certainty, in those things, which are of greatest concern to us; which I doubt not to do; it being clear to me, that whatever we can know at all, must be discoverable by Mr. *Locke's* principles; for I cannot find any other way to knowledge, or that we have any one idea not derived from sensation and reflection. But let us see, how those points may be established on them, for which the Remarker doubts their force; and first of morality, or natural religion; of which, he thus begins:

“As to morality, we think the great foundation of it is the distinction of good and evil, virtue and vice.—And I do not find, that my eyes, ears, nostrils, or any other outward senses, make any distinction of these things, as they do of colours, sounds, &c.—Nor from any ideas taken in from them, or from their reports, am I conscious, that I do, or can conclude, that there is such a distinction in the nature of things^b.” In which words^c, he says, he thought he had taken in enough to comprehend both Mr. *Locke's* principles of knowledge, *sensation and reflection*, which I should not have thought; but since he owns he designed them to do so, we will suppose both expressed, and proceed with him. “I allow, that we may infer from observation and reason, that such a

^b 1st Rem. p. 4.

^c 2d Rem. p. 8.

“ distinction is useful to society, but both philoso-
 “ phers and divines, you know, make a more im-
 “ mutable and intrinsic distinction, which is that
 “ I cannot make out from your principles.—This
 “ I am sure of, that the distinction, suppose of
 “ gratitude and ingratitude, fidelity and infidelity,
 “ justice and injustice, and such others, is as sud-
 “ den without any ratiocination, and as sensible
 “ and piercing, as the difference I feel from the
 “ scent of a rose and *assa fatida*.” One would
 think here, he were doubting, whether upon Mr.
Locke's principles we can distinguish *gratitude* from
ingratitude, *fidelity* from *infidelity*, &c. that is, know
 that breaking a trust is not keeping a trust, &c.
 which (as all other moral virtues, as Mr. *Locke* has
 shewn^d) are a collection of simple ideas, received
 from sensation and reflection. But since he allowed
 above, that *we can from observation and reason, in-*
fer such a distinction to be useful to society, and by
 consequence, that we can by them perceive such
 a distinction, we will guess his meaning here, to
 be, that the perception of the *morality* and *immo-*
rality of these things is as sudden, &c. *as the diffe-*
rence he feels from the scent of a rose, and assa foeti-
da; though I do not know what it is, to perceive
 the *morality* and *immorality* of these things *with-*
out any ratiocination. *Justice* and *injustice*, I think,
 depend upon the rights of men, whether natural,
 or established by particular societies; and therefore
 to know what they are, it is necessary to know
 what right is, which sure requires some *reflection*.
 But to know, that *injustice* is *evil*, without any *re-*
flexion, seems to me no more than to know, that
 the term *injustice* stands for something that we do
 not know, which is evil; unless it will be said, that
 we may know it to be a detaining any one's right,
 without knowing what right is, which will be a
 very insignificant knowledge. But if the Remarker

^d *Es.* p. 195. § 14.

means,

means, that as soon as he knows what it is to have a right to a thing, he perceives, that to detain from a man what he has such a right to, is evil, without any farther reflection, I understand him, but see not how it can be objected against the force of Mr. *Locke's* principles, being only a perception of the disagreement of these two ideas, of one man's having a right to a thing, and another's having a right to take it away: but this only by the way.

Let us now consider that, for which this sudden perception without ratiocination is brought as a proof, *viz.* that the ground of the distinction of moral good and evil is in the *nature of the things themselves*, abstract from the good of society; which is that he cannot make out from Mr. *Locke's* principles. By which distinction in the nature of things, if he means, that without respect to men, or to society, though mankind had never been, or never been designed, justice, gratitude, fidelity, &c. had been good, and their contraries evil; I confess myself incapable of having a notion of these virtues abstract from any subject to conceive: For example, that it would have been good to be faithful to a trust, though there had never been any one to trust, or be trusted: nor do I find, that the assertors of this distinction in the nature of things have any real idea of them more abstracted than I have, which will appear in examining their particular instances. I will take that, which the Remarker gives*, being one of the most incontestable principles in morality, *That it is a wicked thing, for a man maliciously to kill his friend, or his father, or any other innocent person.* The truth of this, he says, seems to him as clear and eternal, as any proposition in mathematics; and it seems to me as clear, that it cannot possibly be conceived at all, either true or false, in itself, *i. e.* without any relation to man. I desire any one, to try, whether he can conceive

* 2 Rem. p. 26.

it to be an eternal truth, that it is a wicked thing, for a man to kill his father, or his friend, though there had never been, or designed to be, such a thing as friend, father, or man. But whether he can or not, it will still be a truth as *certain and immutable*, as any proposition in mathematics. No mathematician, that I know of, thinks it necessary to establish the immutability of this truth, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; to affirm, that it is true, without any relation to angles or triangles. Either of these propositions are sufficiently established, if it is, and always must be true, supposing those things, to which it relates, to exist¹.

But here the Remarkers² question will be made, upon what grounds must it be so? If *good and evil*, virtue and vice, are not such in their own nature, *they must be so from the arbitrary will of God; and all things are indifferent, till he declare this, or that, to be sin, according to his pleasure*: that is, he might, if he had so pleased, have made *virtue, vice; and vice, virtue*: To which, I answer, that God having made man such a creature as he is, it is as impossible, that good and evil should change their respects to him, as that *pleasure* can be *pain*, and *pain pleasure*, which no one in his senses will affirm; and yet, I think, no body has supposed them to be real existences, independent

¹ This whole paragraph is a partial and temporary consideration of moral truths (as the opposers of Dr. Clarke do now consider them) with relation only to the present constitution of things, not to their original ground, as they exist eternally in the divine mind. An error, the author is now sensible of, and that there was no need of this for the defence of Mr. Locke's principles. If his plan led him only to speak of the immediate origin of our ideas, or how we come by our ideas of moral relations, his principles are sufficient by the reflections we make on the operations of our own minds, to lead us to the supreme mind, where all truth, and the abstract nature of all possible things, must eternally and immutably exist.

² 2 Rem. p. 22.

of any subject. And if the relation, which moral good and evil has to natural good and evil, were sufficiently observed, there would be as little dispute about the nature and reality of *virtue* and *vice*. Those, who think they are only notions in the mind, would be convinced they are as real as natural good and evil; all *moral good* consisting in doing, willing, or chusing, for one's self or others, whatever is a *natural good*; and all *moral evil*, in doing, willing, or chusing whatever is a *natural evil*, to one's self or others. This, I doubt not, will appear a full definition, when tried by every instance of *moral good* and *evil*, to all, who reflect on it; unless there are any, who do not place the perfection and imperfection, the advantages and disadvantages of the *mind*, in their account of *natural good* or *evil*; which I believe no rational man will own.

And as this unalterable relation makes the real and immutable nature of virtue and vice undeniable; so also from thence it is plain, *that the nature of man is the ground or reason of the law of nature; i. e.* of moral good and evil. But if the Remarker will rather have it, that the nature of these things is the reason of the nature of man, that they are essentially in the nature of God, which is the rule of his will, and according to which he formed man; let it be so, as it is unquestionable, that he cannot will any thing contrary to his nature. But however the moral attributes of God, goodness, justice, &c. are in him (who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities) this I say (which Mr. *Locke* has observed of our idea of their infinity) that we have no idea of them, but what carries with it a respect to their objects, *the natural good or evil of his creatures*; and we could have no idea of them at all without reflection upon ourselves; for whatever is the original standard of good and evil, it is plain, we have no notion of them

them but by their conformity, or repugnancy to our reason, and with relation to our nature; and that what according to it we perceive to be good, we ascribe to the Supreme Being; for we cannot know, that the nature of God is good, before we have a notion of good. It must be then by reflecting upon our own nature, and the operations of our minds, that we come to know the nature of God; which therefore cannot *be to us* the rule of good and evil; unless we will argue in a circle, that by our notion of good, we know the nature of God, and by the nature of God, we know what is good.

From whence it will follow, that the nature of man, and the good of society, are *to us* the reason and rule of moral good and evil; and there is no danger of their being less immutable on this foundation than any other, whilst man continues a *rational and sociable creature*. If the law of nature is the product of human nature itself (as the great *Grotius* speaks) it must subsist as long as human nature; nor will this foundation make it the less sacred, since it cannot be doubted, that it is originally the will of God, whilst we own him the author of that nature, of which this law is a consequence.

If then, in Mr. *Locke's* way, we can perceive what is conformable, or not, to our own nature, which cannot be doubted; if by reflecting on ourselves, we can come to know there must be a Supreme Being, the source of all others, which he has admirably shewn^h; we have a sacred and immutable foundation for natural religion, on his principles; this being a plain and infallible inference, that the Author of our being does require those things of us, to which he has suited our nature, and visibly annexed our happiness, which he has made the necessary motive of all our actions. For it is inconsistent with that divine wisdom, which we see has

^h *Es. B. iv. c. x.*

fitted all other things to their proper and certain end, to have formed us after such a manner, that if we employ those faculties, which he has given us, we cannot but judge, that such things are fit to be done, and others to be avoided, and this to no end at all. Much less can we suppose he has designed us to act contrary to the necessary motives of our actions, and judgment of our minds; it being a flat contradiction, that infinite wisdom and power should form any of his works so disproportionate to their end.

It will not be much from the purpose here, to take notice of the folly of those men, who think to weaken the authority of religion, by calling it a politic contrivance, established for the good of government or society; which is as much as to say, it is the less obligatory, because it is necessary. Whereas that very thing shews it to be our indispensable duty, and of divine authority, without any revelation; since the divine workmanship, *human nature*, could not subsist without it. If they could prove it unpolitic or destructive to society, it would be much more for their purpose; for such a religion must necessarily be false; nothing can be a *law to nature*, which of direct consequence would *destroy nature*.

But if any one thinks it better established on the nature of God, I have shewn how we come to the knowledge of it in Mr. *Locke's* way, by ascribing to him whatever by its conformity to our nature we perceive to be good; because we see, that we cannot admit any imperfection in the Supreme Being, without a contradiction (which I shall shew in Mr. *Locke's* way, when I come to the next head) and having by the *effect* found out the *cause*, we may then conclude the nature of God to be the arch-type of ours, because we cannot suppose the most perfect Being can will any thing contrary to his own nature; for if he could, the rule of that will must be something less perfect than

than himself, (for whatever is most perfect is God) and therefore to will any thing contrary to his own nature, would be an imperfection in him, which to admit in the most perfect being, is a contradiction. Thus (when I have more fully shewn, how we come by the idea of perfection in the Supreme Being) the Remarker may perceive, that we can, in Mr. *Locke's* way, arrive to the original notion of intrinsic holiness, ¹ into which 'tis ultimately resolved, which he is so much concerned to find; and that I hope will reconcile him to Mr. *Locke's* principles.

And if he will attentively examine his own without prepossession, if he will trace his idea of God, and of moral good and evil, to their first source, I believe he will find he has no other principle of knowledge than Mr. *Locke*; and that the mistake lies, in that being taught truths after they are discovered, and finding them agreeable to our reason, we immediately assent to them, without reflecting, how they were first found out, and are apt to conclude those things, which we find first in our knowledge, to be the first principles of knowledge; tho' they were proceeded to by many steps and degrees, and were the last established in the discovery.

But the Remarker will object, that Mr. *Locke* does not establish morality upon the nature of man, and the nature of God, ² but seems to ground his demonstration upon future punishments and rewards, and upon the arbitrary will of the law-giver; and he does not think these the first grounds of good and evil. To which I answer, first, supposing it were so, the question is not what Mr. *Locke* thinks, but what may be proved from his principles. ¹ But secondly, I say, that Mr. *Locke* does ground his demonstration upon the nature of God and man, as will plainly appear by his express words, which are these. ³ "The idea of

¹ 2 Rem p. 2. ² 2 R. p. 2. ³ 2 R. p. 4. ⁴ Ess. B. iv. c. 3. §. 18.

“ and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and
 “ on whom we depend, and the idea of ourselves,
 “ as understanding rational creatures, being such,
 “ as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly con-
 “ sidered and pursued, afford such foundations of
 “ our duty and rules of action, as might place
 “ morality among the sciences capable of demon-
 “ stration.” Nothing can be clearer than this; and
 in all those places, which the Remarker quotes out of
 Mr. Locke, where he seems to establish morality upon
the will of God, and rewards and punishments, he is
 speaking of it, as it has the force of a law; and the
 Remarker cannot deny, whatever he thinks, *the first*
grounds of good and evil; or however clearly we may
 see the *nature of these things*, we may approve or
 condemn them; but they can only have the force
 of a law to us, considered as *the will of the Supreme*
Being, who can, and certainly will, reward the com-
 pliance with, and punish the deviation from that
 rule, which he has made knowable to us by the light
 of nature.”

“ Some, who had lately read this defence, have thought, that
 the author’s sentiments, on *the grounds of moral obligation*, were
 different when this was wrote, from what they now appear to be
 in some late pieces. But the author thinks there is no real dif-
 ference: the grounds of moral obligation are not here discussed
 at all; the notion of founding morality on arbitrary will is
 carefully rejected; and the nature of God, or the divine under-
 standing, and the nature of man, all along supposed to be the
 true ground of it. New terms have been since introduced into
 these subjects; we talk now of essential differences, nature, rela-
 tion, truth, and fitness of things: but the meaning is the very same;
 for all these are to be sought for in the nature of God, or of man.
 But Mr. Locke is here defended in establishing morality on *the*
will of God, and rewards and punishments considered, as it has
the force of a law; there I suppose lies the apparent difference,
 tho’ there is none in reality. The author still agrees to that pro-
 position; for strictly and properly speaking a law implies au-
 thority and sanctions; and though we say *the law of reason*, and
the law of nature, this is in a less proper sense, importing, that they
 are as effectual grounds of obligation, as if they were real laws, but
 they oblige us, not as *dependent*, but as *reasonable* beings; in the
 same manner as the Supreme Being, who is subject to no laws, and
 accountable

But that we can only know these things to be his will by their conformity to our nature, and that therefore they cannot be arbitrary, I have before shewn; and that he will punish or reward us according to our obedience or disobedience to it, is a consequence of his nature. So that, tho' Mr. *Locke* says, that the will of God, rewards and punishments, can only give morality the force of a law; that does not make them the *first grounds* of good and evil, since by his principles, to know what the will of God is (antecedently to revelation) we must know what is good by the conformity it has to our nature, by which we come to know the nature of God, which therefore may be to him the first ground or rule of good; tho' *the will of God, &c.* can only enforce it as a law.

I cannot here omit to take notice of a question the Remarker asks on this subject: ° How, pray you, upon these principles, do you preserve the distinction (that good old distinction, which it may be you despise) of *Bonum Utile*, and *Honestum*? In your way, either the parts are coincident, or *Bonum Utile* is superior to *Bonum Honestum*. I'm afraid the Remarker will have hard thoughts of me, if I should say I do not like his good old distinction, and that I think the parts are coincident. I know not whether he will have a better opinion of me, when I tell him, I do not mean it in the way, which he injuriously insinuates to be Mr. *Locke's*; but that nothing can be truly profitable, that is not honest. However, not to cavil about words, this am I sure of, that there is no ground for the Remarker's reflection on those principles, which he is dissatisfied with, *viz.* "That

accountable to none, obliges himself to do always what he perceives to be right and fit to be done. In this light the author has all along considered the grounds of moral obligation; and this I presume is not inconsistent with allowing, that the will of God, rewards and punishments, can only give morality the force of a law.

“ morally good and evil is the conformity or dis-
 “ greement of our actions to the divine law; which
 “ Mr. Locke says is the only true touch-stone of
 “ moral rectitude; and that by comparing them to
 “ this law, men judge of the most considerable
 “ moral good or evil of their actions, that is, whe-
 “ ther as duties or sins, they are like to procure
 “ them happiness or misery from the hands of the
 “ Almighty.” Upon these principles *Bonum Utile*
 can never be superior to *Bonum Honestum*, in Mr.
 Locke’s way, till the Remarker can shew him some
 moral evil, that is not contrary to the divine law;
 or a way to escape the hands of the Almighty, when
 we disobey him.

What has been said, will be sufficient to answer
 all that the Remarker has said directly on this
 point: but what further concerns it, of *natural con-*
science, and the proofs of the *moral attributes of God*,
 will be considered in their order; which leads us to
 the second head, of which the Remarker.

“ As to revealed religion, my difficulty is only this, how
 it can be proved from your principles, that the author
 of the revelation is veracious; and p. 7. to establish the
 certainty of revealed religion, we must know the moral
 attributes of the divine nature, such as goodness, justice,
 holiness, and particularly veracity. Now these I am
 not able to deduce from your principles. You have
 proved very well an eternal all-powerful and all-know-
 ing being: but, &c. The Remarker, it seems, does
 not find what Mr. Locke says, after he has very well
 proved an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing
 being; That from this idea, duly considered, will easily
 be deduced all those other attributes we ought to ascribe
 to this eternal Being. The Remarker is not able to do it,
 tho’, to help him, Mr. Locke says, he may be ashamed
 to have raised such a doubt as this, viz. whether an
 infinitely powerful and wise being be veracious, or no,
 unless he concludes lying to be no mark of weakness, and

folly. * As I find in his words repeated by the Remarker, which he complains of, *as misrepresenting, and perverting his sense; the question is not* (says he) *whether God be veracious, but whether, according to your principles, he can be proved to be so.* Answ. But the question is, *whether an infinitely powerful and wise being is veracious or no; for such a being Mr. Locke has very well proved, as the Remarker owns: so that the doubt must be, whether, as such, he must be veracious; for the Remarker allows veracity to be a consequence of infinite power and wisdom.* The veracity of God is proved by Mr. Locke's principles; and this is an absurd question, whether the veracity of God can be proved from his principles, if *falsehood* is allowed to be *a mark of weakness and folly*; for then it cannot possibly be admitted in a being, which he has proved of *infinite wisdom and power*; and I know no better way of proving any thing, than by proving principles, upon which it cannot be denied without a contradiction; so that Mr. Locke has not *perverted* the Remarker's sense; for he cannot avoid this dilemma, either he concludes falsehood to be *a mark of weakness and folly*, or he does not: if not, then Mr. Locke has rightly represented his sense; if he does, then this is an absurd question, whether one, who has proved an infinitely powerful and wise Being, can prove he is not false.

But this is not sufficient for the Remarker: he is *not able to deduce one attribute from another.* Let us see then what is his way to know the moral attributes of God, which, he tells us, is this, *he ascribes veracity to God, because it is a perfection.* But from what grounds does he conclude, that whatever is a perfection must be in God? Will he say, that it is a principle imprinted on the mind, without any reflection; that is, we clearly see, that God must be perfect, we don't know why: or will he not rather say, that the want of any perfection would imply

* 2d. Rem. p. 3.

either

either that he does not know what is best, or cannot attain it, and therefore is inconsistent with infinite wisdom and power? Or that to suppose there may be a being of greater perfection than the supreme source of all being, is a gross contradiction? I believe, if he reflects attentively on the progress of the mind in the knowledge of God, he will find perfection is not first in our notion of him, (as an ingenious author has shewn^c) but that having discovered a first being, the source of all others, and what attributes we must necessarily ascribe to him, as such, we perceive, that to admit any imperfection in him would be a contradiction to our first necessary conceptions of him; which Mr. *Locke* has established in his way, and tells us, that from them all his other attributes will easily be deduced.

But this will not satisfy the Remarker, unless Mr. *Locke* tells us, *what is to be understood by perfection in his way; how it is derived from the senses, and how it includes veracity*^d. The Remarker is very apt to forget, that Mr. *Locke* has another principle of knowledge, which he calls *reflection*; or he thinks it insignificant. Perhaps it may be so as to his purpose; but happening to be serviceable in the present enquiry, I take leave to remind him of it, that we may consider how far it will help us to the idea of perfection.

But first, I observe, that we have no adequate idea of perfection; but perceiving in ourselves some *powers and faculties*, as of *knowing, willing, moving*, &c. and of particular actions, and general abstract ideas; that some are congruous, and others repugnant to each other, and to our reason; we know, that some things are better than others; and from every thing about us, and within us, we may learn, that the vastly greater part of them escape the extent of our power, knowledge, and goodness; from whence we conclude, these things may be far more extensive,

^c *Norris* Reason and Religion.

^d 1st. Rem. p. 8.

even to all that can exist. And the highest possible degree of these, which we find it better to have, than to be without, that we call perfection; which to have an adequate idea of, we must comprehend the existence of an infinite spirit. But we cannot add any thing to make up this idea, which we do not find in ourselves; only the degrees, which we perceive must be ascribed, far beyond our measures, to that Being, from which we received all our powers and faculties, and by whose wisdom, power, and goodness, all things exist; for perfection is only the highest degree, or the best manner of possible existence; and that the eternal source of all being must exist in the most perfect manner possible, cannot be doubted; for there cannot be a greater absurdity, than to suppose there may be a more perfect being, than the eternal source of all Being. Thus we see how the idea of perfection, such as we have, may be derived from *sensation and reflection*; and any one, who considers it, will find, that he has no positive idea of it, and that there is nothing in that idea, which he has, but what the objects without him, or the faculties he perceives in himself, have furnished him with; and that therefore it is needless to seek for any other original of it.

Having now got the idea of perfection, in Mr. Locke's way, and found, that it must necessarily be ascribed to the eternal source of all being, we must next consider the other part of the Remarker's question, *how it includes veracity*, which he is the more concerned to know, because he says, *not only the truth of revelation, but also of our faculties in other things, depends upon the veracity of their author*. And here he must give me leave to ask him, upon what grounds veracity is to him a perfection? He will not say, because God is veracious (tho' the nature of God is to him the rule of good) for he ascribes veracity to God, because it is a perfection, and he

does not approve of arguing in a circle. He must then know, that veracity is a perfection from some other rule; and here I am afraid he will be involved in a great difficulty; for *the truth of our faculties*, he says, *depends upon the veracity of their author*: but before he can know the veracity of their author, he must be sure, that veracity is a perfection, since it is only as such he does, or it can be ascribed to him. Now by whatsoever means he perceives it to be so, how can he be certain, that the faculty, by which he receives that information, does not deceive him? for unless he is certain, that veracity is a perfection, he cannot be certain, that God is veracious, nor therefore of the truth of his faculties. He must then remain in doubt, whether God is veracious, unless he can know it without the help of his faculties, that is, without the power or capacity of knowing it; or he must suppose the truth of his faculties without any proof. If that is not a first principle not to be doubted of, I see no defence against an incurable scepticism: we cannot argue for, or against any thing, and the Remarker cannot know, that his position is true, *viz.* That the truth of our faculties depends upon the veracity of their author, since he must take it upon the credit of those faculties. Let him doubt the truth of his faculties as much as he will, if he affirms any one thing, in that one he must believe them upon their own evidence; and since he could not trust them in other things, till he was certain of the veracity of their author; whatever principle he establishes that certainty upon, he must rely upon the evidence of his faculties for the truth of that principle, which he tells us is this, *that veracity is a perfection, and consequently must belong to the nature of God*². For which propositions we may therefore conclude, he was contented to suppose the truth of his faculties; and he cannot deny Mr. Locke the same

² 1st. Rem. p. 7. 2d Rem. p. 18.

privilege, till he can show him some way to knowledge without their help.

In the mean time there can be but two ways of knowing, that veracity is a perfection: either it is an innate principle, originally imprinted on the mind; (which I shall not endeavour to confute, Mr. *Locke* having done it sufficiently, nor is it needful to my purpose.) Let that be the Remarker's way of knowledge, if he pleases, since he must no less rely upon the truth of his faculties in that way than any other, it being impossible for God himself to make any impression on us, without giving us a faculty whereby to receive it. But let us see, whether it is discoverable in the other way, which must be Mr. *Locke's* of *sensation and reflection*. I suppose the Remarker does not doubt, that in this way we can distinguish truth from falshood, *i. e.* know, that things are as they are; appear, as they appear; and that doing a thing differs from not doing it; that an apple, for example, is not a horse; that pain is not pleasure; and that performing our promise is not breaking it; or that representing things as they are, or as they appear to us, and performing our promise, *i. e.* veracity, is more agreeable to our nature, and beneficial to mankind, than the contrary; which how far *to us* the rule of good and evil, I have before shewn, and shall only add here, that if in Mr. *Locke's* way we can know, that what is beneficial to mankind, is better than what is destructive to it; that happiness is better than misery, that power and knowledge is better than impotence and ignorance; if we may trust our faculties in discerning truths, as sensible to us as our own existence; it cannot be doubted, that in his way we can be assured, that veracity is a perfection, till some other reason of falshood can be imagined, than ignorance, impotence, or willing evil for its own sake, which cannot be conceived possible; to chuse or prefer evil, as evil, being no less a contradiction, than to judge that to be best, which we know to be worst. And

And the Remarker could not have been at a loss how to deduce this, and all the other moral attributes of God, from Mr. *Locke's* principles, if he had carefully considered his discourse of our idea of God, where he shews, that it is *made up of the simple idea we have received from sensation and reflection, by putting together all the qualities and powers, which we experiment in ourselves, and find it better to have, than to be without, and enlarging every one of them with our idea of infinity*; to which place I refer the Remarker. And if he can by *reflection* find veracity, justice, and goodness, among the things, that *it is better to have than to be without*, I hope (with what I have said) it will help him to deduce those attributes of God from Mr. *Locke's* principles; which will satisfy him, that they give us a sure foundation for *natural and revealed religion*; by which we have a full assurance of a future state; the Remarker's third head of enquiries, which we are next to consider.

That the immortality of the soul is only highly probable by the light of nature, none can deny, who believes that Apostle, by whom we are told, *that life and immortality is brought to light by Jesus Christ through the gospel*. Why then is it objected against Mr. *Locke's* principles, that they give us no certainty of the immortality of the soul without revelation? By what other way can we be certain of any thing, that is only highly probable by the light of nature? Which is all that can be proved by any principles; and so far Mr. *Locke's* will go, as I doubt not to make appear. But farther I shall shew, that there is nothing in his principles, which at all weakens the main proofs of a future state; so that if they are thought to amount to demonstration, they have no less force and evidence, upon his principles, which will leave no pretence on this account against them; as will plainly appear in examining the Remarker's objections.

70 *'A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay*

" You suppose (says he) that the soul may be sometimes absolutely without thoughts, of one kind or others, and also, that God may, if he pleases (for any thing we know by the light of nature) give, or have given, to some systems of matter a power to conceive and think. Upon these two suppositions, I could not make out any certain proof of the immortality of the soul, and am apt to think it cannot be done.

As to the first of these objections, I confess I do not see of what consequence it is at all to the proofs of the immortality of the soul. Do they depend upon the contrary supposition, that the soul *always thinks*? If they do, proofs upon a supposition have a very unsure foundation. But let it be granted, that it is ever so clearly proved, that thinking is necessary to the soul's existence, that can no more prove, that it shall always exist, than it proves, that it has always existed; it being as possible for that omnipotence, which from nothing gave the soul a *being*, to deprive it of that *being* in the midst of its most vigorous reflections, as in an utter suspension of all thought. If then this proposition, *that the soul always thinks*, does not prove, that it is immortal, the contrary supposition takes not away any proof of it; for it is no less easy to conceive, that a *being*, which has the power of thinking with some intervals of cessation from thought, that has existed here for some time in a capacity of happiness or misery, may be continued in, or restored to the same state, in a future life, than that a *being*, which always thinks, may be continued in the same state. But to do the Remarker all the justice, and give him all the satisfaction I can, I shall examine the substance of what he objected against Mr. Locke's assertion, without entering farther into the dispute, than may serve to shew, whether it is of any consequence for, or against, the immortality of the soul.

Mr. Locke says, *men do not think in sound sleep*; and his reason is, because they are not *conscious* of it, and it is a contradiction to say a man thinks, but is not *conscious* of it; thinking consisting in that very thing of our being conscious of it. Upon which supposition, the Remarker cannot make out any certain proof of the immortality of the soul.

I suppose Mr. Locke did not design it a proof of the immortality of the soul: but let us see, whether it weakens any proof of it, which the Remarker should have shewn, but instead of that proposes difficulties, which that supposition involves him in, and begins with this notable one, *I wonder how you can observe, that your soul sometimes does not think; for when you do observe it, you think: if a man could think, and not think, at the same time, he might be able to make this observation.* This reversed may be an argument of some force indeed; but to conclude, that my soul does not always think, 'tis sufficient to know, that there has some time past, in which I was not conscious, that I thought; unless we will allow, that the soul may think, when the man does not, which is plainly to make them two persons, as Mr. Locke has shewn * p. 44, and 45. in which the Remarker says he does not understand what that discourse about the identity or non-identity of the same man, sleeping and waking, and about Castor and Pollux, aims at, and tends to^b. A discourse about the non-identity of the same man would, I confess, be very hard to understand; but I find no such in that place, or any other of Mr. Locke's Essay: he does not trifle at that rate, as to talk of the same man's not being the same man. He says indeed, that if the soul can, whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking and enjoyments apart, which the man is not at all conscious of; his soul, when he sleeps, and the man consisting of body and soul, when he is waking, are two persons. And he further illustrates the same thing in his discourse of

* Essay of Human Understanding.

^b 1st Rem. p. 12.

Castor and Pollux, which, if it be thought absurd to assert, 'tis not hard to find what that discourse aims at, v. g. to shew, that such an absurdity will follow from this supposition, that the soul thinks, when the man is not conscious of it. But whatever that discourse aims at, of what consequence can it be to the immortality of the soul, supposing it *does not* always think? That the Remarker says nothing of. But it will not be improper here to take notice of an inference he draws from it in his second Remarks; that Mr. Locke does not think the soul a *permanent substance* distinct from the body. *This (says he) seems to be the supposition you go upon, when you question, whether a man waking and sleeping without thoughts be the same man. If there be still the same soul, the same permanent substance, I see no room for that question, or doubt, which you make.* Here the question is again turned, not only from the same *person* to the same *man*, but to sleeping *without* thoughts, from sleeping *with* thoughts, that he is *not* conscious of; which are very different cases as to this question, tho' much the same indeed, as to the thing itself; but that the Remarker won't allow. But perhaps he takes the *soul*, *man*, and *person*, to signify the same thing, and so they may to him: every man has the liberty to make his own words stand for what idea he pleases; but when he argues against the opinion of another, he must consider in what sense those terms are used by that other, and in that sense oppose him; otherwise he fights with his own notions, and not his, whom he seems to dispute with. And 'tis impossible to read Mr. Locke's *Essay* with the least attention, and not know, that he does not use those three terms in one and the same signification; which if the Remarker had considered, he could not have so much mistaken Mr. Locke, or found such difficulties in his discourse. If Mr. Locke had understood by the *soul*, *man*, and *person*, the same thing, he would never have made such a question, whether the *soul* thinking

thinking apart, what the *man* is not at all conscious of, were not a *distinct person*, from the *man*; which would be just the same thing, as to ask, whether the soul thinking apart, what the soul is not conscious of, be not a distinct soul from the soul: But understanding by *person*, as he does, *self consciousness*, and by *man* the *soul and body united*, he may question, whether the *same soul*, the *same permanent substance*, thinking apart from the body in sound sleep, what the waking *man* is not conscious of, whether that *incommunicable consciousness* does not make the *soul*, and the *man* consisting of body and soul, two distinct persons; *personal identity*, according to him, consisting in the *same consciousness*, and not in the *same substance*: for whatever substance there is, without *consciousness* there is no *person*. *Consciousness* therefore, and not *substance*, making a *person*, the same consciousness must make the same person, whether in the same, or in different substances; and no farther than the same consciousness extends, can there be the same person: but wherever there are *two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses*, there are two distinct persons, though in the same substance.

But farther, not only Mr. *Locke's* question may be made, supposing the soul a *distinct permanent substance*, but he could not make it upon any other supposition with the least sense, to his purpose, which is to confute this opinion, that the *soul* thinks, in sound sleep, when the *man* is not conscious of it. Now what manner of argument, I pray, would this make?

If the soul thinks, when the man is not conscious of it, the *soul* and the *man* are two persons.

But the soul not being a permanent substance, may make two persons. *Ergo*, the soul cannot think, when the man does not, because that makes them two persons; the sum of which is, the soul cannot think apart, because it can.

But if this assertion, that the soul and the man are two persons, implies, that it is not a perma-

nent substance, let those look to it, who say, that the *soul* thinks, when the *man* is not conscious of it, since it is only a consequence of that supposition, but can no way concern Mr. *Locke*, who denies that supposition. But the Remarker is to be excused for making an inference so inconsistent with the design of that discourse, since he confesses he does not understand what it tends to, and perhaps only ventured at a shrewd guess to provoke a clearer account. And indeed, the best construction I can make of the Remarker's writing against Mr. *Locke's Essay*, is, that he understands very little of it; so groundless are the difficulties he makes, and his consequences so wrong. This I am sure, no man that means well, if he understands any thing of what Mr. *Locke* says upon this subject, *that men think not always*, can from thence infer, that he does not think the soul a permanent substance; for it is plain, all the difficulties he finds in supposing the soul does always think, arise only from its being in a sleeping, and waking man, the same permanent substance. Why else does he find it *so very hard to be conceived, that the soul in a sleeping man should this moment be busy a thinking; and the next moment in a waking man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts?* Why, does he think it strange, *if the soul has ideas of its own, that it derived not from sensation or reflection, that it should never, in its private thinking, retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them; and then make the man glad with new discoveries?* Or why does he call it an *absurdity*, to make the soul and the man two persons? There is nothing strange or absurd in all this, if the soul in a sleeping and waking man be not the same permanent substance.

I hope what has been said, is sufficient to help the Remarker's understanding in that discourse of Mr. *Locke's*, which so much puzzled him; and

then I am certain he cannot apprehend it of any consequence to the immortality of the soul, supposing it does not think, when the man is not conscious of it. I now proceed to his second difficulty.

I do not understand (says he) how the soul, if she be at any time utterly without thoughts, what it is, that produces the first thought again, at the end of that unthinking interval^f. And what then? Must we therefore conclude it cannot be done? If that be a good argument, we must deny the most common and visible operations in nature. Do you understand how your soul thinks at all? How it passes from one thought to another? How it preserves its treasure of ideas, to produce them at pleasure on occasions? And recollects those it had not in a long time reflected on? How it moves your body, or is affected by it? These are operations, which I suppose you are not so sceptical as to doubt of; nor yet pretend to understand how they are done: and since we are certain, that the soul is affected with all the considerable changes of the body, that it is sick, and in pain, and unable to perform its functions, according as the body is disordered; since we so sensibly perceive it to become drowsy, when the body is so; so many degrees abated of its action, even to very near not thinking at all, from that intenseness and vigour of thought it had, and recovers, when the body is refreshed with sleep; whatever is the cause of these effects, whether some immediate connexion between them, or an arbitrary law of their union; where is the difficulty to conceive, that the same cause, which lulls it almost, should lay it quite to rest, and awaken it again with the body?

But upon this supposition (says the Remarker) that all our thoughts perish in sound sleep, we seem to have a new soul every morning^g. That is a pretty conceit indeed, but how does this seem? Thus, as he

^f 1st Rem. p. 9. ^g 2d Rem. p. 17.

explains

explains himself; if a body cease to move, and come to perfect rest, the motion it had cannot be restored, but a new motion may be produced. If all cogitation be extinct, all our ideas are extinct, so far as they are cogitations, and seated in the soul: so we must have them new impress, we are, as it were, new born, and begin the world again. The force of which argument lies thus: cogitation in the soul answering to motion in the body; as the same motion cannot be restored, but a new motion may be produced; so the same cogitations cannot be restored, but new cogitations must be produced. *Ergo*, we seem to have a new soul every morning. This may be a good consequence, when the Remarker has proved, that every new motion makes, or seems to make a new body. In the mean time, all I can infer from this parallel, is, that my thoughts to-day are not the same numerical thoughts I had yesterday; which, I believe, no body supposes they are, though they did not suspect they had a new soul with every new thought.

But if the Remarker thinks, that if all our thoughts cease in sound sleep, all our ideas are extinct, and must be new impress; I desire him to consider, when a sleeping or waking man thinks, what becomes of all those ideas, which he does not actually perceive in his own mind; for the mind is capable of taking notice but of very few at once: must not all the rest by this argument be extinct? And so we must have them new impress; and are, as it were, new born, whenever we have any ideas, which we have not always actually perceived, *vide* every time we pass from one thought to another. This is a sure consequence, if, when all our thoughts cease, all our ideas must be new impress, unless a man could actually perceive all the ideas he ever had at once; for his having only one thought in his mind can no more keep any other there, or excite any other, that it has no connexion with, than

if

if he had no thought at all. I am thinking, for example, in my sleep, of a horse; his beauty, strength, and usefulness: does this thought preserve in my mind the idea of a church, of happiness or misery? Or can it help me to any of them, when I have occasion for them? If not, then these ideas must be new imprest, when I awake; but if they remain in the soul, when I was only thinking of a horse, wherever they are bestowed, it may be presumed, there is room for that one idea more without thrusting out another to give it place; and when that one is among them, I see no more reason, why they must be all new imprest, than that the others must have been new imprest, when I only thought of that one; unless it be supposed, that the soul has always just one idea more than there is place for in the repository of its ideas; and if that happen to crowd in, before another has got out, they will all be stifled together, or fly away for air.

But here the Remarker interposes, *If you say the ideas remain in the soul, and need only a new excitation; why then, say I, may not infants have innate ideas (which you so much oppose) that want only objects and occasions to excite and actuate them, with a fit disposition of the brain?* By what hath been said, it will appear, that this argument gains no force from Mr. Locke's opinion, that *the soul does not always think*; since if the soul does always think, it can perceive but very few ideas at once; so that the same consequence will follow from a man's having only one thought, as from his having no thought at all; whether all his other ideas must be new imprest, or remain in the soul, and need only a new excitation. This objection therefore would have been as much to the purpose in any other place: the Remarker might have asked, if when a man thinks only upon one object, there remain

ideas in the soul, which he does not perceive to be there; why may not infants have *innate ideas*, that want only occasions to excite them? This then, having no particular relation to the question in dispute, requires no answer here: but that the Remarker may not think he has entangled Mr. Locke with his own principles, I desire him to consider, if these are parallel cases, how comes it, that when objects or occasions excite these ideas in children, they do not perceive, that they were in their minds before; but consider them as things new, and till then absolutely unknown to them? But when ideas are excited in a man, which he has before received by sensation or reflection, he considers them as things he is acquainted with, and clearly perceives they have been in his mind before. Why does not every thing appear equally new to a man, which he has, or has not known before, as every idea does, the first time it is excited in him? But since it is certain, that the mind does perceive when any ideas are excited in it, that were there before; and that every idea appears new to it the first time it is excited; this can be no argument, that because the soul is capable of retaining the ideas it has received by sensation or reflection; that it can record them for its use, and recollect them at pleasure; therefore, it may have innate ideas, though it never perceives, that it had them, not even when they are excited in it; for this makes the cases so far from being the same, that it is one of the greatest arguments against *innate ideas*, that the mind does always perceive, when the ideas, which are excited in it, were there before. Besides, how can it be conceived, that *innate ideas* should need any objects to excite them; and that the mind should never excite any of them in itself without those objects; as it often does excite in itself the ideas it received by sensation, or reflection, without the presence of those objects, by which it first received them. Why then

then are such objects necessary to excite *innate ideas*, since the mind has a power of exciting ideas in itself, without the presence of any object? When the Remarker has shewn the reason of this considerable difference, and proved, that it does not hinder them from being parallel cases; then we may conclude against Mr. *Locke*, that since the soul can retain the ideas it has received, and excite them at pleasure, though it do not always perceive them, therefore it may have ideas, which it never did perceive, nor can excite in itself, nor, when they are excited, perceive, that it ever had them before; and then he can have nothing to say for himself, but must let us enjoy our *unperceivable ideas*, and be as much the better, and wiser for them, as we can.

But still the soul may be sometimes without any thought, and yet (for any thing we have heard) not endanger its immortality. Let us consider the Remarker's next difficulty.

Besides (says he) *I am utterly at a loss, how to frame any idea of a dead soul, or of a spirit without life or thoughts!* How a dead soul comes in here, I do not know. Can there be no life, where there is no thought? I confess, that I have hitherto thought, that insects and plants have life, though I did not suppose, that they do always think. He goes on: *What is the soul, when she does not think? She must be actually something, if she exist. She must then have some properties, whereby she is distinguished from nothing, and from matter.* And again, in the second Remark, *You say the soul has no extension, nor at certain fits any cogitation. What can the soul be then but a certain power acting in the body, when the body is prepared for the exercise of it; and ceasing to act, when the body is indisposed?*^k To which I answer, that it is true, we have no idea of the soul but by her operations; but that is no more a reason to

^l 1st Rem. p. 9. 2d R. p. 16. ^k Page 14.

conclude, that she is nothing when she does not operate, than when she does, since we are equally ignorant what the soul is, when we do think, as when we do not. I ask what is the soul when she does think? Is she a real permanent substance? What then are her peculiar properties, whereby she is distinguished from other substances? If it be said the power of thinking; I ask, whether she has any other properties to distinguish her from nothing, and from matter? If not, then nothing, or matter, may have the power of thinking. This is plain, if the soul has no essential properties distinct from matter, whereby she alone is capable of the power of thinking, there can be no reason, why matter may not have that power. If it be said she has other essential properties, without which she could not have the power of thinking, when the Remarker has found out what those properties are, he will then know what the soul is, when she does not think; for whatever that substance is, that has the power of thinking, there is no reason to doubt, that it remains the same, when it ceases from that action, any more than there is to doubt, that a body in motion, and at rest, is the same substance; for we have no clearer idea of the substance of body, than we have of the substance of spirit, as *Mr. Locke* has shewn¹; which excellent discourse alone one would have thought sufficient to prevent the least insinuation, that he does not think the soul a real permanent substance.

There is much more reason to conclude, that those do not think the soul a real permanent substance, who make this question, If the soul has no extension, nor at certain fits any cogitation, what can the soul be then, but a certain power acting in the body, when the body is prepared, &c. For from what other reason can they make it? If the soul be really something else than a certain power

¹ Essay B. ii. c. 23.

acting

acting in the body, what can hinder it from being the same thing, when it does not act? But if it must be nothing, when it is not in action, *What then can the soul be, but a certain power acting in the body, when the body is prepared for the exercise of it, and ceasing to Be when the body is indisposed?* But (to retort the Remarker's words) *whether that be a superior divine power distinct from matter, as a vis movens; or a power fastened; I know not how, to the body, or upon such and such systems of matter; whether I say of these two suppositions better agrees with this doctrine, I cannot certainly tell, but either of them destroys the immortality of the soul, upon the dissolution of the body.* I leave the reader to judge, which is most concerned in this consequence, Mr. Locke, who says, that it is not necessary to the existence of the soul, that it should be always in action; which would be absurd to say, if it be not a *distinct permanent substance*; or the Remarker, who thinks the soul cannot exist, when it is not in action; which there is no ground to think, if it be a *real permanent substance*.

The vanity of men seems to be the great reason, why they have so readily supposed, without any proof, that the soul does always think; for having no idea of it, but by its operations, we are unwilling to perceive our own ignorance, and loath to part with the only idea we have of that dear thing which we call self. On this account the Remarker seems offended with Mr. Locke. *Why (says he) do you affirm or introduce a new and unintelligible state of the soul, whereof neither you, nor others, can have any conception*^m? And why is this complained of, but that men are willing to believe they know more than they do? Or how else could they think a state of *thinking*, without being conscious of it, more intelligible, than a state of not thinking at all? Or how could they conclude thinking, which is the action

^m 2d Rem. p. 16.

of the soul, necessary to the existence of the soul itself, if they did not make our knowledge the measure of things, and our not having an idea of a thing, sufficient to exclude it from being? I proceed now to the Remarker's last difficulty.

Then after all (says he) what security can we have upon this supposition, that we shall not fall into this sleep at death, and so continue without life or thoughtⁿ? What I have said in the beginning of my discourse upon this head, might serve for an answer to this objection; but the Remarker, by repeating it, page 12. seeming to lay a great weight on it, I shall consider it more particularly.

And first (as I observed before) if our security of a future state depends upon this, *that the soul always thinks*, it has a very unsure foundation; for there is no pretence of a proof, that the soul does always think; and there are great probabilities, that it does not think in sound sleep (as Mr. Locke has shewn.) But if the proofs of a future state do not depend upon the soul's always thinking, the contrary supposition cannot lessen our security of it; and that they do not depend upon it, I think needs not be proved, no body, that I know of, did ever offer this proposition, *that the soul does always think*, as a proof of its immortality. And the reasons we have to expect a future state are of such a nature, that they can receive no force from it, nor lose any by the contrary supposition. The Remarker on another occasion tells Mr. Locke, the grounds of our expectation of *future punishments and rewards* are, *that there is a presage of them from natural conscience*; and *that they are deducible from the nature of God, if we allow him moral attributes^o*. Now it is evident, that neither of these two grounds can lose any of their force upon this supposition, that the soul does not think in sound sleep, and will not they secure us, that we shall not continue

^o 1st Rem. p. 9. ^o 3d Rem. p. 13.

in this sleep after death? If not, why does the Remarker mention them as proofs of a future state? But if they do prove it, why does he say, he *could make out no certain proof of the immortality of the soul, upon this supposition, that it is sometimes without thoughts?* Since those proofs he mentions remain in their full force, notwithstanding this supposition. Thus having shewn, that all the consequences the Remarker draws from Mr. Locke's supposition are without grounds, I may with assurance conclude, that it is of no consequence to the immortality of the soul, nor does at all weaken any proof of it.

I cannot here forbear taking notice, how little service they do to religion, who establish the main principles of it upon such an uncertain foundation, as the nature of a thing, of which we are so very ignorant, as we certainly are, of *what the soul is*. Her operations we have clear ideas of; and therefore from our capacity of discerning and chusing good or evil; and from the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, which we may certainly know to belong to his nature; we have very good arguments, and great probabilities of a future state of punishments and rewards; such as no considering man can deny, and within every ones understanding. But when the soul's immortality is said to depend upon such suppositions as this, *that the soul always thinks*, or that it is *immaterial*; what can the consequence be, but to make men think they have very little assurance of a future life, when they find themselves so much in the dark as to those principles, upon which it is established, that the greatest proofs of them are drawn from our ignorance? As that we cannot *conceive how* matter should be capable of such and such powers as we perceive in the soul; or (as the Remarker objects) *what the soul is*, when she is without thoughts.

But could the immateriality of the soul be proved to be as certain, as it is highly probable, it can never be of good consequence, and may be dangerous, to make that the main proof of its immortality; for this is an argument of no use to the generality of mankind, who want either leisure, or capacity, for such nice speculations; and if they are convinced on other grounds, that the soul is immortal, it is no great matter, whether they think it immaterial, or no. But if they are persuaded, that it cannot be immortal, if it is not immaterial, 'tis easy to see of how ill consequence that must be, if the proofs of the soul's immateriality should not happen to convince them; as it often falls out by the different cast of mens heads, that the same arguments, that are very strong and persuasive to one man, have no force at all with another, especially in abstract reflections. Those, therefore, who are zealous for truth, should endeavour to establish it upon the plainest, and clearest principles, and such as are most adapted to common apprehensions. This is not the only instance, in which I have observed, that truth does not suffer less from those, who would maintain it upon false or uncertain grounds, than from those, who openly oppose it. I have known several, who have been carefully enough instructed in their duty, who yet for want of being taught at first, or applying themselves to consider the true grounds of it, have been easily argued out of their good notions, though some of them persons of no mean capacity; for if the foundation fail, the best superstructure will fall, though strong and immoveable, when established upon its proper grounds. And this does not only happen, when the foundation is in itself weak or uncertain, but when truths are taught upon principles, which, though true, and solid in themselves, are not the ground or reason of those truths; which some have done out of a good design of rendering
the

the truths they teach the more sacred. But every thing stands firmest on its own foundation: and I believe, if it were rightly considered, it would appear, that the reasons of all moral truths are plain and clear, and within the reach of the lowest apprehensions. These things, which I have only hinted at, are of great consequence to be thoroughly considered by all, who have the instruction of others under their care, that they may not think they sufficiently acquit themselves of their duty by inculcating good maxims, when their negligence, or *mistaken zeal* in teaching the grounds of them, may at least give too great advantage to those, who make it their business to corrupt the *principles*, as well as the *practice* of their companions, which are but too many in this libertine age.

This being a matter of so universal concern, I hope I shall be excused, if I have led the reader a little out of the way for it. We now return to the Remarker, who, after he has repeated his last difficulty, *i. e. If the soul be sometimes without thoughts, why may she not be so, thoughtless, and senseless, after death?* he adds, *it is some comfort, indeed, that we shall at length return to life at the resurrection: but I know not how you explain that; nor how far you allow us to be the same men, and the same persons then that we are now.* This is a great comfort indeed, and I suppose the Remarker here designed to make Mr. Locke amends for all the faults he has imputed to his principles, by owning, that they afford us this comfort; but I cannot guess what *that* is which he knows not *how* Mr. Locke explains. Mr. Locke never attempted, that I know of, to explain *how* we shall return to life, which *that* seems to refer to, nor how far we shall then be the same men; and he needed not have told him, that he knows not now he explains a thing, which he has not explained at all. But Mr. Locke has very clearly explained how far he allows us to be the same per-

sons, consciousness according to him, as far as it is extended, makes the same person, in which, he says, is founded all the right, and justice, of reward, and punishment, happiness, and misery^p. And thus, he says, we may without any difficulty conceive at the resurrection, the same person, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same he had here, the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it^q: Which may be sufficient to satisfy the Remarker how St. Peter at the resurrection will be the same^r; and how Mr. Locke conceives the resurrection, as far as is revealed of it, and to all its ends and purposes, which is our happiness, or misery. Further than this he does not pretend, nor are we concerned to know; and I think, in a matter, which can only be known by revelation, no man ought to determine, or enquire farther than the Holy Spirit has thought fit to reveal. Mr. Locke knows too well the vanity and presumption of such an attempt, to offer at it. "It is enough" (*says he*) that every
 "one shall appear before the judgment seat of
 "Christ, to receive according to what he had done
 "in his former life; but in what sort of body he
 "shall appear, or of what particles made up, the
 "Scripture having said nothing, but that it shall
 "be a spiritual body raised in incorruption, it is
 "not for me to determine." The Remarker must be contented *to walk in the dark* as to these things, though he says he does not love it, since there is no way to have farther light in them than the Scripture has given. And if he thinks Mr. Locke's doctrine of the soul obscure, because he does not pretend to be certain by his natural faculties, of things, which they cannot certainly discover (a way to knowledge, which some are very fond of) I believe Mr. Locke will be content not to be understood by him, rather than write what he does

^p Ess. B. ii. c. 27. ^q Ibid § 15. ^r Vid. 2d Rem. p. 15.

^s Reply to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 182. ^t 2d Rem. p. 15.

not understand himself, to appear intelligible to others.

The Remarker * next proceeds to the second supposition, which he thinks weakens the proofs of the immortality of the soul, viz. *That God may give, or have given, for any thing we know, to some systems of matter, a power to perceive, and think.* And here one would expect he should have shewn how this supposition weakens the proofs of the soul's immortality; but all his objections are against the probability of the supposition, and to shew the difficulties of conceiving how matter should have such a power; which he enlarges upon in his third remark, and has several pages to that purpose, for what reason I know not, since Mr. *Locke* allows it to be highly probable, that the soul is immaterial, but where he is speaking of demonstration, only says, that it is not *impossible, for any thing we know*, that God may give, or have given, to some systems of matter, disposed as he sees fit, a power to perceive and think. But my design being only to vindicate Mr. *Locke's* principles from the dangerous consequences imputed to them by the Remarker, I shall not enter into that dispute, and I think Mr. *Locke* has said enough, in his last additions, to silence the triumph of such sort of arguments, drawn from *the unconceiveableness of something in one hypothesis*, which cannot be a proof of the contrary opinion, in which there are things altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from our comprehension. All the demonstration we can have from such difficulties, is of the weakness and scantiness of our knowledge, which should not make us forward in determining positively on either side, much less to establish the immortality of the soul on so uncertain a foundation; which is a consideration I have before insisted on, and I cannot but think Mr. *Locke* has done much more service to religion

* 1st Rem. p. 13.

in that discourse, *B. iii. c. 4.* where, after he had said, that he "sees no contradiction in it, that Omnipotency should give to certain systems of matter a power to perceive and think, though it be most highly probable, that the soul is immaterial;" he adds, that "if our faculties cannot arrive to demonstrative certainty about it, we need not think it strange: all the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured, without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality; since it is evident, that he, who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible, intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state in another world", and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men, according to their doings in this life; and therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as some over zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul have been forward to make the world believe." These are Mr. *Locke's* words; and I appeal to all unbiassed men, whether he does not better secure the belief of a future state, by establishing it on such grounds, as give an equal assurance of it, whether the soul is immaterial, or no; than those, who take pains to persuade men, that a future state is less certain, if the soul is not immaterial.

But besides the uncertainty and danger of this argument, which I have before taken notice of, the uselessness of it, to the generality of mankind, sufficiently shews, that it cannot be the foundation of the belief of a future state. That it is not so to the Eastern Pagans at this day, we have the evidence of a ² judicious author, both from the information of the missionaries, who have been longest among them, and his own conversation with them,

¹ Vide the 4th edit.

² *Loubers du Royaume de Siam.*

who tell us, that they believe the *immortality* of the soul, but have no notion of its *immateriality*; and that they only suppose it of a *matter* subtile enough to escape being seen or handled. And that many of the old philosophers, who expected a future state, had no thoughts of the soul's being *immaterial*, any one must observe, who has read them with attention. And I believe, if well examined, it will appear, that those among them, who had a notion of the soul's being immaterial, did not believe its immortality upon that foundation, but only sought an explication, how the soul by its own nature might be capable of that immortality; which they found great reason to hope for, on other grounds much more firm and persuasive.

But what is yet more considerable, were this proof of the soul's immortality as certain and as universally received, as any self-evident proposition, it would not at all serve to the chief end of our assurance of the soul's immortality, *viz.* The expectation of rewards and punishments in a future state according to our doings in this life; without which 'tis no matter, whether we think the soul immortal or no. And this we could never have by the most attentive consideration, and the clearest knowledge of what kind of substance the soul is. It must be established on far different grounds, such as the consideration of ourselves as rational and free creatures, of which we have an intuitive, infallible perception; and of an omnipotent Being, from whom we are, and on whom we depend, of which we have a demonstrative knowledge within every one's understanding to whom it is proposed. And if the consequences drawn from them are not sufficient to assure men of a future state of rewards and punishments, as the clearest proofs of the soul's immortality can signify nothing without them, so neither can they add any force to them, and therefore are of no use to the great ends of morality and religion. For suppose
to

to convince an intelligent heathen, who thought the soul material, and doubted of a future state of rewards and punishments, arguments were used to prove the soul in its own nature undissolvable, and that therefore it must remain after death; he might then reasonably enquire in what state it remains, how he may be sure, that it is in a state of rewards and punishments, and that it does not return to the universal soul, of which it may be an effluence; or inform the next parcel of matter it finds fitted for it, as some philosophers have thought. This, it is plain, must be still in doubt to him, notwithstanding those proofs of the soul's immortality; and arguments of another nature must be used to satisfy him in this point, whatever may be most proper to work on his understanding. Suppose those I have before hinted at; That 'tis reasonable to think that the *wise and just* Author of our being, having made us capable of *happiness and misery*, and given us faculties of discerning and chusing *good or evil*, designed we should be accountable for our actions, and *happy or miserable*, according as they are conformable, or not, to that law, which he has established in our very natures, that his will might be certainly known to us; and since it is visibly not so, in the ordinary course of his providence, but all things happen alike to the righteous and the wicked, in this world, 'tis most consonant to reason to think this is only a state of probation, and that the dispensation of rewards and punishments is reserved for a future life; there being no other way to reconcile the partial distribution of things here to that order which we know is agreeable to the divine will, by the conformity it has to our reason, which is a ray of his own wisdom. We will suppose the heathen convinced by these arguments, or others to the same purpose; that he owns it is highly reasonable to conclude there must be a future state of rewards and punishments; but he does not so well digest the soul's being immaterial; he has no notion
of

of a substance without any extension. Suppose then the Remarker should tell him, as he does Mr. *Locke*, if the soul is not *immaterial*, there can be no certain proof that it is immortal. And I desire him to take this dilemma for the heathen's answer: Either the arguments, by which I have been convinced, that there will be punishments and rewards in a future state, are proofs of it, or they are not; if not, then tho' the soul should be immortal, I have no assurance that it will be in a state of rewards or punishments; and if they are proofs of a future state, then a future state is equally certain, tho' the soul be not immaterial, since that does not make it less consonant to the justice and wisdom of God, nor less within his power. I believe the Remarker will find he has no way to solve this dilemma, but must either give up the certainty of rewards and punishments, or the necessity of thinking the soul is immaterial, to prove a future state; and I defy him to establish the belief of rewards and punishments in a future state on any arguments, that will not be equally conclusive, whether the soul is immaterial or not.

This then is evident, that Mr. *Locke's* supposition, that God may have given (for any thing we know) to some systems of matter a power to perceive, and think; does not at all weaken any proof of the soul's immortality, that can be of use to the great ends of religion, for which alone we are concerned to know, that the soul is immortal. And perhaps the insignificancy, as to those ends, of our knowing what kind of substance the soul is, may be the reason we are left so much in the dark about it. Our wise Maker has proportioned our faculties only to our necessities, and has made his will known to us by a light of nature clear enough to render any one inexcusable, who does not follow it; tho' the full assurance of an eternal retribution is only given us by *Jesus Christ, who has brought life, and immortality, to light, through the Gospel*, which I have already shewn, that
Mr.

Mr. *Locke's* principles give us a sure foundation for, both of natural and revealed religion. So that I think no more remains to clear the Remarker's difficulties; his doubts of *natural conscience*, (which is the chief subject of his third Remark) being easily resolved from what has been already said. But the Remarker being a little unlucky at drawing inferences from Mr. *Locke's* principles, I will give him some help in his enquiry what *natural conscience* is, according to them.

But first, I must take notice of a cavil he begins with, at Mr. *Locke's* defining conscience to be nothing else but 'our own opinion of our own actions, without expressing what sort of actions are the subjects of it. Now any one, who reads that part of his *Essay*, will find that discoursing of "innate practical principles, he all along mentions only such actions, as are to be referred to moral rules; and that he had no reason to apprehend being misunderstood, or that it could be supposed he included any other sort of actions, no other being at all to the purpose in that question.

Before I proceed to speak of what I think the true notion of natural conscience, of what authority, and of what use it is; it will be fit to consider what the Remarker says he understands by it, which he next proceeds to tell us, but defines it more particularly in another place thus: *A natural sagacity to distinguish moral good and evil; or a different perception and sense of them, with a different affection of the mind arising from it; and this so immediate, as to prevent and anticipate all external laws, and all ratiocination.* This, he says, he takes to be the foundation of natural religion, without which he does not know how it can subsist; tho' he approves of Mr. *Locke's* account of natural religion, so far as it goes. You place natural religion (says he) "I think in the belief of the being of a God, and of obedience due to him. This is good, so far as it goes, and is well supported. But the question is,

1 3 Rem. p. 5.

2 B. i. C. 3.

3 P. 5.

what

what laws those are that we ought to obey, or how we can know them without revelation, unless you take in natural conscience for a distinction of good and evil, or another idea of God, than what you have given us. Having already anticipated this doubt, by shewing how the moral attributes of God are deducible from Mr. Locke's principles, and how we know what his will is, by the conformity or repugnancy of things to our reason, and with respect to human nature, of which he is the author, I need not give a particular answer to this question. But since the Remarker lays so great a stress upon his *principle of natural conscience*, in that sense and notion, which he has given of it, that he ^b takes it to be the foundation of natural religion, and thinks the distinction of good and evil, is manifested, and supported by it; let us farther consider it.

It would be too tedious to repeat all that the Remarker says on this subject, from the beginning of his third letter to the 16th page. I need only hint at some observations, by which it will appear, that he has not settled in his own mind a determinate idea of his *principle of natural conscience*, but argues for it sometimes in one sense, and sometimes in another; that Mr. Locke is not at all concerned in the greatest part of his argument; and by which the weakness of the whole will be obvious to every reader.

^c After his definition, he gives us a notable illustration of his principle in the soul of distinguishing *morally good and evil*, without ratiocination, by the power we have of distinguishing *sensible qualities* without reflection, or ratiocination. He might every whit as well have told us, that since we have a power of distinguishing *moral relations*, without making use of our eye-sight, we may distinguish red, and yellow, without eyes; they being no more the proper and only inlets of our ideas of colours, than reflection is of moral distinctions; which the Remarker says we may have without reflection, since

^b P. 4, and 5. ^c P. 8.

we can distinguish colours, and other sensible qualities without reflection. But if this were so, Mr. Locke may very well say, what the Remarker believes he will not, ^d that then children would be able to distinguish moral good and evil, for they very clearly distinguish all the objects of sensation, that come in their way; and this principle could never be *improved*, or *corrupted*, as no one can be persuaded, that any sensation he has is more or less agreeable, or that a disagreeable sensation is an agreeable one; which if we could, it is evident, that our senses would not be sufficient to their end, to give us notice of what is convenient, or inconvenient to the body. And it is reasonable to think, if there were such an inward sensation designed, as the Remarker says, to direct us as to what is good or hurtful to the soul, it would operate as constantly as those others do: no man could prefer vice to virtue, any more than he can pain to pleasure; otherwise it would not answer the end it was designed for.

Another thing to be observed is, that most of the Remarker's arguments were anticipated by Mr. Locke, tho' he takes no notice of the answer to them; as to the same purpose we were now upon, Mr. Locke having owned, *that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men, and that from the first instances of sense, and perception, there are some things grateful, and others ungrateful to them;* ^e the Remarker takes occasion from thence, to desire he will grant such alike impression on the soul, with reference to moral good and evil, as a rule or direction to our actions; tho' Mr. Locke there says, ^f that those impressions he speaks of, are so far from confirming the like, with relation to moral good and evil, *that this is an argument against them;* since if there were any such impressions, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do those others on the will and appetite, the desire of

^d Ibid.^e P. 9.^f Ess. B. i. C. 3. § 3.

happiness.

happiness, and aversion for misery, continuing (as innate practical principles ought) to influence all our actions without ceasing, and are in all persons, and all ages, steady and universal. But this the Remarker takes no notice of. ^a In another place he argues, that exorbitant practices against natural conscience are no proof, that there is no such principle; ^b which Mr. Locke grants, nor does he contend against a natural rule. But the generally allowed breach of a rule any where, he says, is a proof, that it is not INNATE, which he had given instances of in several nations. This objection not being easily answered, the Remarker chuses rather to oppose an argument, which Mr. Locke does not use, but on the contrary owns that it is none. But any one, who considers what ^c Mr. Locke objects, will easily see to how little purpose the Remarker takes so much pains to shew, that the same arguments, which he brings against innate principles, may be used to prove, that the law of Christianity is not known among Christians; for besides the great difference of an innate law, which men must always carry about with them, from any other, that they may avoid reflecting on, or misunderstand; the case of Christians acting against a known law cannot be the same with that, which Mr. Locke represents, unless the Remarker can shew any Christians, who constantly, without the least remorse, or shame, offend against that law, which they believe; and that all the by-standers, even law-makers, and governors, silently connive at it, nay affirm that it is their duty to do so: For this is the case of those nations, which Mr. Locke mentions. ^d But the Remarker has a shrewd objection against this argument: they are barbarous people, he says, and he excepts against them for witnesses, as *personæ infamæ*. I find, if Mr. Locke would convince him, that there are no innate principles, he must shew him some polite nation, where the people have diligently, and

^a 3d Rem. p. 11. ^b Ess. B. i. c. 3. ^c 3d Rem. p. 14. ^d P. 10.

rightly imployed their faculties, and yet are ignorant of the law of nature. This might be required, if Mr. *Locke* denied a law of nature, knowable by our natural faculties; but to prove what he affirms, that this law is not knowable to men, but by their making a right use of their faculties, it is sufficient to shew, that there are men, who are absolutely ignorant of the clearest principles of that law. No, says the Remarker, they are barbarous ignorant people; and therefore are no good witnesses, that there are no innate principles. But are they not men, I pray? What is it then, that makes them more barbarous, or ignorant than others, but their not having made a right use of their natural faculties? This is Mr. *Locke's* argument, that there are no innate principles, since some nations, for want of making a right use of their faculties, are so barbarous, or ignorant, as to have no notion of the clearest of those principles, which are esteemed innate. To which the Remarker's objection, that they are a barbarous people, not fit to be admitted for witnesses, is indeed very extraordinary. If he pleases to consider what he means by barbarous, and what is the cause, that these people are so, I believe he will better see the force of Mr. *Locke's* argument, and allow them to be very good witnesses in this case; tho' perhaps he might with reason except against them at the bar. All he is desired to take upon their credit is, that men do not know their duty, without making a right use of their natural faculties; and that therefore there are no innate principles, or none to any purpose, since they do not operate, till men by reflection discover that law, which is to be the rule of their actions. To prove this, Mr. *Locke* mentions some vicious practices approved in several nations; which the Remarker calls *'raking up their dirt and filth, to throw in the face of human nature'*. It shews men indeed, that they should not idly, or rashly, take up with the first notions they meet with,

¹ *ibid.*

but

but employ their faculties in the best manner they can, which God has given them to attain the knowledge of their duty, which they can only be ignorant of by their own fault. But what *indignity* this can be thought upon mankind, or what *piece of ingratitude to our Maker*, I believe no body but the Remarker can apprehend.

" He next preceeds to mention some virtuous actions of heathen states, contrary to their interest, and yet done with general applause, as a proof of natural conscience. They are indeed proofs of a *law of nature*, which Mr. Locke is no less an advocate for than he, tho' he denies *innate principles*; which leads me to a very material observation, which is, that, throughout this whole discourse, the Remarker uses indifferently, as terms of the same signification, *law of nature, natural conscience, innate principles, innate powers, and natural principles*", which all signify very different things; and of which Mr. Locke has only denied *innate principles*; which considered, it will appear, that he is very little concerned in the greatest part of this dispute. But I shall only instance two or three places particularly, as where he argues, that *universal consent is not necessary to declare a principle to be natural*; for the sense of musick, of beauty, of order, and proportion, are natural to mankind, tho' some men are not at all affected with them. Even the power of reason, (says he) several passions, &c. appear sooner in some than others; and if you allow these principles to be natural, and born with us, I know not why you should make such ado about the word innate. If you allow none at all, not these last mentioned, nor so much as willing, or nilling this, or that, the controversy will be changed; and I desire to know what idea you can form of a soul without any powers, or any action. Now here it is plain, that by natural principles is only meant powers or faculties of the soul; which is a very different sense from that, in which

" P. 11. • Vide p. 5. 9. 12.

VOL. I,

G

Mr.

98 *A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay*

Mr. *Locke* denies any *principles* to be *innate*, tho' he does not deny them to be *natural*. But in this sense of them he will make no a-do about the word *innate*: if the question be, whether there are innate *powers* or *faculties* in the soul, the controversy will not be *changed*, for there will be no controversy at all. Mr. *Locke* only contends against those, who say there are principles of metaphysical or moral truths originally imprinted on the mind; by which if they only mean, that there is an *innate* power or capacity in the soul of knowing those truths, they mean nothing different from Mr. *Locke*, who denies *innate principles*; for he does not deny, that there is a power in the soul of perceiving, and assenting to those truths, or of distinguishing good and evil; tho' he is not so ready at it as the Remarker, without employing his faculties about it, or without ratiocination. So there is no occasion for him to form an idea of the soul without any powers, nor for that supposition, which, with a seeming charitable wish, the Remarker would so groundlessly fasten on Mr. *Locke*.

The next place I shall mention, where *innate* principles, and *natural* principles, are used in the same sense, and both only for *powers* or *faculties* of the soul, is p. 15. where he pretends to answer a dilemma, which Mr. *Locke* proposes concerning *innate principles*. But any one, who takes the pains to consider what he there says, will find, that he uses those terms in a quite different sense from that, which Mr. *Locke* understands by *innate principles*; and that therefore Mr. *Locke* is not at all concerned in that argument. Neither is it any thing to the Remarker's purpose of establishing *natural conscience* in his own sense and notion of it, if we may take it from his definition, p. 7. But, indeed, his uncertain use of these, and those other terms I have mentioned, makes it very difficult to know what he means by his *principle of natural conscience*; for those

* P. 13.

† P. 16.

principles,

principles, which he here affirms to be *innate*, are powers of the soul, the *exercise* of which, he says, is *conditional*, and depends upon the *disposition* of the *body*, *culture*, and *other* circumstances: which, as they are very different from those *principles*, which Mr. Locke denies to be *innate*; so are they also from the Remarker's ¹ *principle of distinguishing in moral cases without ratiocination, sufficient for a general direction of our lives, and the foundation of natural religion*. For how can it be sufficient for those ends, if it depend upon *contingent circumstances*? Or how can the exercise of a power of distinguishing things *without ratiocination*, depend upon any *culture*, or be hindered by *contrary principles*²; as, he says, this power may? For by *culture* here must be meant a *right instruction*, or *right reflection*; and by *contrary principles*, false maxims, or opinions, (though in the same place he uses that term in a quite different sense, for *powers* of the soul) which are all acts of *ratiocination*; and therefore to say, that the *exercise* of this power depends upon them, is the same thing as to say, that the power of distinguishing things *without ratiocination* depends upon *ratiocination*. Which if the Remarker understands, I believe he will hardly make it intelligible to any body else.

From all these observations compared, and rightly applied, it will plainly appear, that Mr. Locke is very little concerned in this discourse, which, the Remarker says³, is in defence of natural conscience, against whom I know not, the most part of it being arguments for things, which Mr. Locke no less affirms than he, though he appear to oppose him, by using Mr. Locke's words in a different sense from that, which he understands them in; and those arguments, by which the Remarker really does oppose him, being anticipated, and fully answered in Mr. Locke's Essay.

¹ Page 5, 8, 9.

² Page 16.

³ Ibid.

And from the inconsistency of his definition of *natural conscience*, with his illustrations of it in several places, and his loose and undetermined use of those terms, which are of greatest consequence in this discourse, I must take leave to conclude, that he has not fixed in his own mind a clear idea of that principle which he contends for; though he thinks he has given *rules, and marks*¹, by which it may sufficiently appear to others what he means by it. And therefore by those *marks* I will endeavour a little to clear his own notion to him; and for his satisfaction to establish what I think natural conscience is, according to Mr. *Locke's* principles, and in the true notion of it; though Mr. *Locke* is without reason brought into this dispute, as is evident from the Remarker's own words; *I do not remember* (says he)² *that in this sense you have once named natural conscience in your book.* Why then, I pray, are so many arguments used, as if he had writ a whole book against it? By what rule is a man concluded to deny every thing, that he has not affirmed? But the Remarker is not the first, who has thought this good logic, and fair dealing against Mr. *Locke*. Whatever he writes next, if it should be of *gravitation*, or the *motion of the planets*, I think he would do well to put the articles of his religion at the end of it, for fear he should be accused of having none, if his book should not happen to name any.

But as to *natural conscience*, I desire the Remarker to examine, whether that *principle* he speaks of, or (as I had rather express it here, as less equivocal) that *power* of distinguishing in moral things *without ratiocination*, be not a consequent of a *previous* ratiocination, or instruction; by which, having got some clear or *confused* ideas of good and evil, a different affection of the mind constantly arises from them, and this so immediate, as that it

¹ Page 8.² 3d Rem. p. 5.

may be truly said to be *without* ratiocination; from which the mistake may come, that it prevents, or is *before any* ratiocination, though it is really an effect of it, only operating without taking notice of its cause; as in other cases, the likings or aversions of the mind, to things, or persons, may be observed to do, which having been at first produced by some outward cause, some good, or evil, we have found, or heard, or apprehended of those things, or persons, the same affection constantly exerts itself at their presence, without any reflection on the cause, or perhaps the least sense, that it ever had a known cause.

And this sudden affection in moral cases is indeed of excellent use, when it is once *set on work by an enlightened judgment*, to keep up the distinction of good and evil; to incite, or to be a check upon mens actions, in the heat of a temptation, when they have neither time nor power to reason the case, or to reflect upon the instructions, that have been given them; and *thus* may be truly called *the support of natural religion*; or, as the apostle says, *a witness accusing or excusing those, who have no other law but that of nature*; but must not therefore be taken for the law itself; or as the Remarker calls it, *the foundation of natural religion*, but rather *natural religion for the foundation of it*; and then it may with safety be relied on. Therefore philosophers, and divines, having mostly writ for such, as have had in some measure a knowledge of their duty, do with good reason give great authority to this witness, and frequently send men to consult their consciences, as if it were the original rule and an infallible director. For it is not easily perverted, or silenced, when once rightly set on work; and has a great influence on mens actions, nothing being more insupportable, than to stand condemned in our own judgments; or more delightful, than the approbation of our own minds: and therefore this

monitor may prevail, when our passions have misled or silenced reason; or the hopes of escaping future punishments made us for a while secure.

But powerful and faithful as this witness is, since it may by false opinions, or vicious habits, take a wrong bias, (which the greatest assertors of its authority confess) and is always set on work by the first persuasions, which happen to take possession of mens thoughts, since it does not direct their opinions, but is influenced by them; this not only shews, that it is not designed for the original rule, and first director of our actions, or *the foundation of natural religion*, but that it is of dangerous consequence to lay the whole weight of morality upon conscience alone, independent of the occasions, from which it has taken the first bent. For no doubt there are too many, who by an unhappy early education, pursue with the same bent of conscience, or without the least remorse, what others (who have been better taught) abhor. Now in this case, to bid these men appeal to their consciences, as an innate guide, that will infallibly direct them in their duty, can only serve to confirm them in their prejudices, and to make them go on securely in their vicious habits, without farther examination, when they find themselves acquitted by that inward sense, which they are taught to revere as the impression of God himself. That this may be the case of many, is not denied by the Remarker^w: *We do not conceive (says he) natural conscience such a light as may not be dimmed, or it may be extinguished in some people^x; and in another place, appeal with sincerity to your conscience; if that be obscured, perverted, or seared, we cannot help it^y. These principles of conscience are seeds, that may die, or may thrive, &c. they may be weak in some, and ineffectual in others, by contrary principles, or other impediments.* This being granted, it is evident, that those people

^w 3d Rem. p. 10.^x Page 15.^y Page 16.

in whom these principles happen to be *extinguished, or perverted*, will in vain appeal with sincerity to their consciences: there is no way to set them right but by rectifying their judgments; they are to be warned not to trust to so dangerous a security, and to be convinced of their errors, and their obligations, on rational grounds.

I appeal to the Remarker, whether this is not the only way of dealing with a man, who has been educated from his infancy in false principles, confirmed by vicious habits, and the approbation of all his companions; whether such a man may not by reflection and reason be corrected, and convinced of the natural obligations, which the Creator has laid on him, as a rational, sociable, and dependent creature? This, I doubt not, the Remarker will allow: his zeal for an *innate light* will not transport him so far, as to put out the *light of reason*, that it may shine alone, and leave men irrecoverably in the dark, in whom this light of conscience happens to be *extinguished*: Though, he says, * *he does not see, by what ratiocination we can collect what the will of God is, unless we take in natural conscience for a distinction of good and evil.* I hope on farther consideration, and what I have before said on that subject, he will not deny the consistency of our duty to reason, and the evidence of it to all, who diligently set themselves to know it. That would indeed be *an indignity to mankind, and a great ingratitude to our Maker*: But all, who perceive the reasonableness of what is required of us, the necessity of it for the preservation or perfection of our nature; all, who read the will of God in his *wisdom*, must acknowledge, that he has not been thus wanting unto men, but that all the precepts of natural religion may be clearly known by the light of reason, to any one, who sets himself to search. This being what I believe the Remarker will not

think fit to deny, I take for granted, and desire him to consider, whether a man, in whom the dictates of conscience (supposing them innate) have been early obscured, or perverted, being brought to a knowledge of his duty by reason, or reflection; whether, I say, this man has not a sure foundation for natural religion, without taking in his principle of conscience for a distinction of good and evil? This he must grant, unless he will say, that *general, obscure, and indistinct notices* (for so he describes his innate principles^a) are a better foundation for natural religion, than clear and distinct knowledge; which if it be too absurd to assert, the Remarker must own, notwithstanding his zeal for *innate principles*, that those, who deny them, may have a sure foundation for natural religion, as long as the precepts of it are consistent with, or evident to, the light of reason.

And farther, I suppose the Remarker will very readily allow, that when a man is thus brought by reason to a true sense of his duty, his conscience, though before perverted, will then be set right, and thenceforward condemn or acquit him, according as he obeys or not that law, which his understanding has assented to; and this *without ratiocination*, by an immediate affection of the mind. But let him consider, whether this be the effect of an original impression on the mind, anticipating all reflection, or ratiocination; or whether it does not plainly prove, that conscience is nothing else but a judgment, which we make of our actions, with reference to some law, which we are persuaded ought to be the rule of them. This, I believe, will, upon an unprejudiced examination, be found to be the true notion of natural conscience, and the best with regard to religion (as truth always is a surer support for it than the most pious mistaken notions) for this account cautions men not to trust to a

peace of conscience, which may proceed from false opinions; and leaves all its authority in those, who have had occasions of being rightly informed of their duty.

Thus I have done with each particular head of the Remarker's enquiries, and I hope have said enough to convince him, that Mr. *Locke's* principles of *Human Understanding* give a sufficient security against such a system, as he apprehends, a *Manichean God*^a, a mortal soul, an arbitrary law of good and evil^c, and any dangerous inferences from Mr. *Locke's* notion of cogitant matter, viz. That God may, for any thing we know, give the power of cogitation to some systems of matter. For I have shewn, that the proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments are equally conclusive without a demonstrative certainty of the soul's immateriality. And as to that other difficulty, with which the first Remarks conclude, concerning the nature of God and his immateriality, upon this concession, that matter may be capable of perception and thought, Mr. *Locke* has so well confuted the *Materialists* on that point^d, so strongly proved, that cogitation cannot be the power of matter, or that the supreme cogitant Being cannot be material, that I cannot imagine to what end the Remarker brings in those arguments against the immateriality of God, if he means as well to religion and Mr. *Locke*, as he would be thought to do.

But whatever he there meant, it seems he has repented upon farther thoughts, or better seen the force of Mr. *Locke's* proofs, that God is immaterial; which he there fears will rise no higher than probability, though he heartily wishes they may. But in his third letter, his judgment is brought over to his hearty wish, and he confesses^e, that Mr. *Locke* very well refutes the *Materialist*, who would have

^a 2d Rem. p. 11.
c. 10.

^c 3d Rem. p. 16.

^d Essay B. iv.

^e Page 23.

but one single substance in the world, namely matter. And to shew his sincerity and good will the more, he owns this where one would least expect it, when he is giving the worst insinuations he can of Mr. Locke's principles. But the manner of his doing it is an extraordinary mark of the kind intentions, and respect to Mr. Locke, which he professes, and which nobody can doubt of, who observes how ingeniously he endeavours to fasten the principles of Deism on Mr. Locke, by shewing, that some of his notions are not inconsistent with them; and that some of the questions, which he discusses, may be raised upon their principles, though none of them do necessarily depend upon those principles; and a great part of his *Essay* is directly contrary to that, which the Remarker says he cannot but think is the mystery aimed at all along, but concealed from us, viz. *That the soul of man is not a distinct permanent substance*. Let the impartial judge, whether this be to *argue fairly*; or whether it does not look like a *desire to make use of names* to no very fair purpose. But, that I may not be suspected to have misrepresented the Remarker's way of imputing the Deists principles to Mr. Locke, I will, as briefly as possible, run over the particulars, which he compares to them.

“The grand principle of Deism” (says he) is
 “this; there is one infinite, universal spirit, that
 “actuates matter always, without the operation of
 “particular spirits. And if the soul of man be no-
 “thing but an influx from another principle, not
 “a distinct permanent substance, whosoever goes
 “upon this principle, I do not wonder, if he can-
 “not allow innate ideas, or practical principles in
 “the soul; for there is no permanent soul to im-
 “print them upon.” *Answer*. But may not one,
 who does think the soul a permanent substance,
 doubt, that it has any ideas but what it received

! Vide 2d Rem. p. 12.

6 3d Rem. p. 23.

from sensation and reflection; because he is not conscious of any but what he can trace to those originals? And the power or faculties of receiving ideas no less require a permanent substance to exist in, than ideas themselves. *Moreover* (says the Remarker) *upon that hypothesis the soul cannot be said to be immortal.* And what is that, I pray, to Mr. Locke? Has he any where told us, that the soul cannot be said to be immortal? Does he not frequently profess a stedfast belief, that the soul is immortal^b? Has he not zealously contested¹, that our ignorance of what kind of substance the soul is, does not at all weaken the assurances of its immortality? Why then is this, that *the soul cannot be said to be immortal*, brought in as an opinion of Mr. Locke's, but at any rate to make that position, *that the soul is not a distinct substance*, be supposed a principle of his?

“ Furthermore (says the Remarker) in consequence
“ of this principle of Deism, and the mortality of
“ the soul, great difficulties must needs arise to
“ them about the resurrection, how it can be the
“ same man, or the same person, that rises again,
“ when both the body and the soul are new. And
“ this would bring on nice disputes about the no-
“ tions of identity, and diversity, which accord-
“ ingly we find discussed at large in the *Essay*, for
“ their satisfaction, I suppose, that go upon those
“ principles.” It may be so; but the Remarker
must give me leave to *suppose* too, that those no-
tions are not discussed for their satisfaction *alone*,
who go upon those principles; and the reason, why
I take the liberty to suppose so, is, because Mr.
Locke determines the ideas of *identity* and *diversity*,
upon several very different principles; and because
those, who do think the soul a distinct permanent
substance, may have some *difficulties about the re-*

^b *Essay*, B. iv.
Second Letter,

¹ *Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's*
resurrection,

urrection, and about the notions of identity and diversity; for identity of substance will not determine it in all cases, as personal identity, and human identity, to those, who take the body into their idea of man; and for their satisfaction, who place human identity in the same immaterial spirit, united to such and such particles of matter, in such a shape and form, Mr. Locke shews, how we may easily conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same he had here. But supposing, with the Remarker, that discourse was designed for the satisfaction of those, *who go upon the principles of Deism*; that does not sure intitle Mr. Locke to their principles; and indeed these are a sort of Deists very well worth satisfying, whatever they think of the soul, since they allow the resurrection. I suppose they are of that party, which the Remarker ^b tells us will own both natural and revealed religion. And to satisfy such men, how consistently with their own notions, they may conceive the same persons at the resurrection accountable for their actions in this life, is worthy of a good man's pains, though he differs from them in their opinions of the soul; and much more serviceable to religion, than those can be (whatever zeal they pretend for it) who will not allow, that the resurrection, or a future state, can be established upon any hypothesis but their own. For no doubt, if men are convinced of a future state, it is of no consequence upon what grounds they are so: their mistakes about the substance of the soul, will not endanger their morals, or their salvation. And if Mr. Locke's discourse of *identity and diversity* was designed to resolve the difficulties, that may arise about the resurrection, that can only shew his concern to secure that essential point upon every man's principles, since he determines the ideas of identity and diversity upon several contrary suppositions;

^b Postscript.

and

and therefore there can be no reason to conclude any one of them to be his opinion, more than another, unless he has declared in favour of one, which he has done two or three times in that chapter for this, *That the soul is one individual, immaterial substance*¹, the direct contrary to that, which the Remarker would have thought to be his opinion.

We come now to the next and last dispute, which the Remarker mentions, as arising from that principle, "That the soul is not a substance distinct from God and matter. From this position (he says) a question springs up concerning the powers of matter, or whether matter be not capable of cogitation^m?" I should rather think this question preceded that position; it seems more rational, and natural, in the ignorance men are of *what the soul is*, first to enquire, whether that power of cogitation, which they perceive in themselves, may not be communicated to matter; and if they find no contradiction in it, (and upon that think fit to determine of the nature of a thing, which they cannot certainly know) thence to conclude, that the soul is not a substance distinct from matter. But howsoever that be, it cannot be concluded, that those, who make this question, go upon a supposition, *that the soul is not a distinct permanent substance*, which is the principle the Remarker would have supposed to be Mr. Locke's. The question, as Mr. Locke makes it, is not, *whether our cogitations are the operations of God, or of matter*; but whether God has given the power of cogitation to a material, or an immaterial substance: and which way soever this question is resolved, the soul must equally be supposed a distinct permanent substance; for a material substance is not less a substance, than an immaterial.

But the fallacy, by which that supposition, *that the soul is not a distinct permanent substance*, is im-

¹ Vide § 13. § 25.

^m 3d Rem p. 24.

puted to Mr. *Locke*, upon his doubting whether the soul may not be material, lies in this, that supposing the soul not to be a substance distinct from matter is taken for the same thing, as supposing it not to be distinct from the body, which are very different suppositions; and upon this fallacy it is concluded, that those, who think the soul may be material, cannot suppose it to exist after the dissolution of the body. But that one, who thinks God may have given perception and thought to some systems of matter disposed as he sees fit, may suppose this system distinct from the body; and to continue in the same state of cogitation, when the body is dissolved, we have for an instance (not to mention many others) a no less eminent philosopher than *Cicero*, who in all his enquiries about the substance of the soul, went not beyond that matter, of which the heavens are made, *Aristotle's Quinta Essentia*; though he finds reasons to think it may be immortal and survive the body; and plainly distinguishes it from body, taken for the sensible, organical parts of a man, though there is nothing of immateriality in all his considerations about the substance of the soul.

This then is evident, that none of these discourses in the *Essay*, which the Remarker mentions, as agreeing with the notion of one universal mind operating according to different systems of matter, without any particular thinking beings distinct from the universal; none of them, I say, do necessarily depend upon, or terminate in that supposition; and some of them do necessarily suppose the contrary: for if the soul is not supposed a particular substance, distinct from the universal spirit, to what purpose are any questions made or resolved about the resurrection? There is no ground for such an expectation. Who can take account, or be accountable for actions done here, if they are all the operations of one universal spirit? And who but the Remarker

could find any consistency in that supposition, with a discourse to satisfy men how they may conceive the same persons at the resurrection, and justly subject to rewards and punishments, whatever substance the soul is, or of whatever particles the body is made up? No sort of Deists, or sect of men, that I know of, did ever reconcile these two opinions.

Those sects, which the Remarker says ^a were noted for holding only one universal mind, consistently with themselves denied the resurrection; and to such men Mr. Locke's discourse about *identity* and *diversity* could give no satisfaction in that point, nor could it be made upon their principles. But I leave the reader to judge what ground there is, from any of the particulars mentioned, for the Remarker to impute that opinion to Mr. Locke, and to ^a think that the mystery aimed at all along in an *Essay*, where upon every occasion he speaks of the soul as a real distinct substance, in too many places to be instanced; and of man as a free agent, subject to an eternal retribution, according to his doings in this life; and that so frequently, and so expressly, that it is impossible to declare his sentiments upon that grand point (for the Remarker's ease as he desires) more plainly than he has done; which, indeed, is so effectual a way of *concealing a mystery* so opposite to those notions, that I believe nobody will suspect it to be Mr. Locke's aim, but the Remarker. And he, I hope, upon further reflection, will find an easier key to decypher this philosophy, and be as forward to own his mistakes of Mr. Locke's principles, and wrong inferences from them, as he was to publish Remarks so injurious to him, upon uncertain conclusions, and groundless suppositions.

^a Page 13, 22.

^a Ibid.

A
L E T T E R
T O
Dr. *HOLDSWORTH*,
Occasioned by his
S E R M O N
Preached before the
Univerſity of *OXFORD*,
On EASTER-MONDAY,
Concerning the Reſurrection of the Same Body.

IN WHICH
The paſſages, that concern Mr. *Locke*,
are chiefly conſidered.

By the AUTHOR of *A Defence of Mr. Locke's
Eſſay of Human Underſtanding*; in answer to *Some
Remarks on that Eſſay.*

Printed firſt in the Year 1726.

J. E. T. E. R.

Dr. W. D. S. W. O. R. K. M.

S. E. R. M. O. N.

University of O. F. O. A. D.

On the 1st of November.

Constitution of the University of O. F. O. A. D.

IN THE

The University of O. F. O. A. D.

of the University of O. F. O. A. D.

In the University of O. F. O. A. D.

of the University of O. F. O. A. D.

of the University of O. F. O. A. D.

of the University of O. F. O. A. D.

of the University of O. F. O. A. D.

P R E F A C E.

I Think it proper to inform the Reader, that the following letter was written about three years ago, and sent in *May* 1724 to the author of the sermon, which occasioned it, with a design entirely to suppress it, if it should have the desired effect upon him. But after nine months the Doctor was pleased to let me know, that he had drawn up a large and particular answer to it, but was unwilling to trust me with his manuscript, till I should publish mine. However, after a long time, and with much difficulty, I at last obtained the favour of perusing it; but not meeting with that conviction in it, which would have made me give up my cause, I have been prevailed on to let the world judge between us; and the Reader may perhaps see an answer to this as soon as it appears. I could wish I had been provident enough to be as ready with my reply, that the whole state of the controversy might be considered as it were with one view; though that indeed was no easy matter, in the short time I was allowed the Doctor's papers. But as I find my endeavour to vindicate Mr. *Locke* has occasioned more particular and severe accusations against him, I think myself bound to do him all the justice I am able, with what expedition my health and leisure will permit.

If it is somewhat unusual to publish remarks upon a sermon so long after it has been preached,

the Reader will perceive some reasons of the delay by the account I have given here, and at the beginning of the letter itself: but however late, I believe it can never be thought unseasonable, to treat of a subject, which will never be out of date, or to vindicate a great and worthy man, whose works will always be known, and always esteemed by unprejudiced persons. The great zeal Mr. *Locke* shewed for the conversion of *Deists*, the serious veneration he expresses for the divine revelation, and (how little soever he was fond of particular systems) the care he took not to oppose any established articles of faith, make it a work worthy a sincere Christian to support his character against the injudicious of those, who have reproached him as a *Socinian* heretic, an enemy, an underminer of religion. That there are no plain proofs from his writings, to ground such a charge upon, is a sufficient foundation for this defence: but that he was certainly no *Socinian*, I am farther well assured by the authority of one, who was intimate to his most private thoughts, and who is as eminent for his probity, as for the high station he at present possesses. I offer not this as an argument to others; but I confess it adds much to my own satisfaction in pursuing this undertaking; though I would gladly resign it to some abler pen, and less obscure hand, that might do honour to so just a cause.

A LET-

A
L E T T E R

T O

Dr. Holdsworth, &c.

REVEREND SIR,

YOUR sermon, preached at *Oxford*, in defence of the resurrection of the *same body*, published 1720, did not fall into my hands till some years after. I was immediately inclined to make some animadversions upon it; but necessary affairs and ill health prevented me a considerable time: however I hope it is not yet too late to do an act of justice to one, whose name will never die; which is the intention of this letter.

I do assure you, Sir, it is not written upon any particular pique against you, or from a spirit of contention. My only motive to it is a love of truth, and a concern for the interests of religion; and if you please to receive it (as I beg you will) without prejudice, and in the same spirit, with which it is writ, whatever be the event, there will no enmity be raised between us. You may perhaps be convinced, that you was too severe in your censures of that great man, whom it is my purpose to defend; and then we shall be both pleased with the

H 3

success;

success; or if not, you will at least allow, that his advocate has treated you in such a manner, as can in no respect deserve your resentment.

I very much commend the zeal you express for defending the articles of our faith^a, against any person of how great fame and abilities soever. Nay, the greater any man's fame and abilities are, who opposes our holy faith, the more earnestly, the more resolutely, and with the stronger force of argument, ought the pastors of the church to contend against him, that they may prevent the influence, which men of that character usually have over the judgments of others.

But then the same consideration should, on the other hand, make a prudent pastor very cautious of accusing any such eminent man, as an opposer of the articles of our faith. The matter of fact ought to be very plain, that he does openly and directly oppose some such article. On any weaker grounds a man of weight should not be given up to the adversaries; it is yielding them an advantage, which they will more triumph in, and perhaps do more execution with, than all the force of their arguments.

But if this is an offence against prudence, with respect to the interests of the church, it is yet more so against justice and charity, with respect to the man, to lay so heavy a charge as heresy against him, upon any less grounds than a direct opposition to the faith. If either the matter in question is not an acknowledged article of faith, or that he does not deny it, the man is certainly injured, upon whom such a censure is past.

These, Sir, are general propositions, which I believe you would readily assent to, if offered without any particular view in the application; and upon these principles I beg leave to examine, how far

your conduct towards the celebrated Mr. *Locke* has been agreeable to prudence, charity, or justice.

The main design of your sermon is to defend the resurrection of the *same body*, the denying of which you impute to Mr. *Locke* as an heresy, and give him many harsh words upon it. But besides this, you do in more places than one tax him with *Socinianism*; particularly p. 6. you call him, *a writer of the Socinian kind*, and p. 11. more expressly, *a late Socinian writer*. Why such a reflection was brought in, where it had nothing to do with the matter in hand, I cannot guess, unless it was to prejudice your audience against his opinion in the point you was then so zealously contending for, by insinuating, that he erred in the most fundamental articles. However that be, if there were any of your learned auditory, who had not read Mr. *Locke's* works (as no doubt many of your readers have not) they must certainly conclude, that he had writ something against the Trinity, or the divinity of our blessed Saviour, as the most notorious error of the *Socinians*. It is therefore chiefly to do him justice in this point, that I have engaged in the matter. But when I am entered, I shall consider your main subject likewise, and on both endeavour to shew, that Mr. *Locke* has not deserved the charge of heresy, which you have laid against him. Let us begin with the first, and examine, what grounds you had to accuse him of *Socinian* principles.

In order to this, it may be necessary to look back into that controversy, in which the learned Bishop *Stillingsfleet* unluckily engaged, (as I have reason to believe himself thought) with that great man; for you have left us to guess at the grounds of your accusation, and this is the strongest, that I know of. From that alarm alone, which the Bishop had taken of something dangerous in his *Es-*

say to the article of the Trinity, could any jealousy of him be raised on that subject.

You know very well, Sir, no doubt, and I think it of importance to observe, that he had not in his *Essay*, or any where else, written one word directly or indirectly concerning the Trinity; nor does the Bishop accuse him of having an intention to oppose it, or express any suspicion of his being a *Socinian*, as you have since taken the liberty to call him. The only reason the Bishop had, for drawing Mr. *Locke* into this dispute, was, as he himself tells him, that some of his terms had been made use of by the enemies of our faith in opposing it, particularly that of *ideas*, and his definition of certainty to consist in *the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas*. This the Bishop was afraid *might be of dangerous consequence to the article of the Trinity*. But the only reason he gives for his fearing so, is, *That it had been made use of by ill men to do mischief*, i. e. to oppose the article of the Trinity, without offering at any proof, that the definition was inconsistent with, or dangerous to that article. Now, Sir, let us consider Mr. *Locke's* behaviour upon this apprehension of the Bishop's. Does he join issue with those enemies of our faith? Does he oppose his definition to that article, which the Bishop was so apprehensive for? This would indeed have been a sufficient foundation for your reflections; but far from any thing like this, he expresses a great concern to vindicate his book from having any such danger in it; in order to which, he goes even farther than the laws of dispute require, and with great clearness of reasoning, in which he was so much a master, shews, that the objected definition can no ways affect any article of faith. To this purpose, give me leave here to set down some of his own words: "Your Lordship" says, it may be of dangerous consequence to "that article, which you have endeavoured to defend.

“ fend. Though the laws of disputing allow a
“ bare denial, as a sufficient answer to sayings with-
“ out any offer of a proof, yet, my Lord, to shew
“ how willing I am to give your Lordship all satisf-
“ faction in what you apprehend may be of dange-
“ rous consequence in my book, as to that article,
“ I shall not stand still sullenly, and put your Lord-
“ ship upon the difficulty of shewing wherein that
“ danger lies; but shall, on the other side, endea-
“ vour to shew your Lordship, that that definition
“ of mine, whether true or false, right or wrong,
“ can be of no dangerous consequence to that arti-
“ cle of faith. The reason, which I shall offer for
“ it, is this, because it can be of no consequence to
“ it at all.” He then proceeds to shew, that the
grounds of faith, and of certainty or knowledge,
are so entirely distinct, that into whatsoever the last
is resolved, the foundation of the other will remain
unshaken; that faith will still stand firm upon its
own basis, let knowledge consist in whatever any
one pleases. After which he concludes, “ And
“ thus much of my way of certainty by ideas,
“ which I hope will satisfy your Lordship, how far
“ it is from being dangerous to any article of the
“ Christian faith whatsoever.”

A great deal more passed between the Bishop and
Mr. *Locke* on this subject, but all of it on his part
had the same tendency, to justify his *Essay* from
having any thing in it inconsistent with, or dange-
rous to, the article of the Trinity. And I believe
every impartial reader must allow, that he had very
much the advantage in the argument, which, as it
was rashly begun, was weakly supported. But
however that be, if this celebrated author was so
concerned to satisfy the Bishop and the world, that
he had writ nothing that could favour the *Socinian*
principles; if he was so unwilling to be ranked
among *Socinian writers*, as by the pains he took to
clear himself we must believe him to be; why
should

should we wantonly throw him up to them? Why should we labour to persuade them, that he is on their side? There are, I doubt not, many among them, that would be the more confirmed in their error by such a persuasion; and many others, perhaps, who have a high esteem of his judgment and penetration, may be biassed that way by being told it was his opinion: for there is nothing more certain, than that a great part of mankind build their faith upon the authority of such persons judgments, whom they esteem, more than they do upon their own.

On this account then, Sir, there is certainly no prudence, nor can it be of any service to the Church, to rank Mr. *Locke*, as you do, with heretics, and even with the worst enemies of our religion: A treatment he never received from any other that I know of; a treatment, which one would think the serious veneration and awful submission he on all occasions expresses for the revealed truths of God, might well have exempted him from. The Bishop of *Worcester* does at no hand use him thus: he was indeed afraid where no fear was, and had unwarily drawn Mr. *Locke* into a dispute, before he had much considered his book; as he owned to a mutual friend of theirs, and that he was sorry he ever engaged in it. Mr. *Locke's* defence had, no doubt, convinced him, that his apprehensions were without grounds; and I think it should have had the same effect upon all that read it: at least, it should have prevented any farther accusation, without stronger evidence to support it. And this, not only in regard of the influence, which a man of his weight may have over others, as I have already observed; but in regard of justice to himself.

That he took pains to vindicate his book on the article of the Trinity, is sufficient reason to conclude, that he believed it; for what other motive

tive could he have for such a concern in that point? He lived in an age, when *Arianism*, *Socinianism*, and all manner of *free-thinking* was openly professed with impunity; nay in an age, when, as you too justly observe, *men are made teachers and governors in our church, who deny or betray all the great articles of the Christian religion.* It could not then be either from fear of suffering, or from any views of interest, that he was thus earnest to justify himself. What other motive then should we in justice suppose he had, but a sincere regard to the article of the Trinity.

But if you will needs have it, that he was a *Socinian*, notwithstanding his care to conceal it; what reason will you, what reason can you, assign for his conduct? For my part I can think of none upon that supposition, but that in modesty and humility he would not disturb the peace of the Church, by opposing her received doctrine. Now if this was his case (which is the very worst, that can be supposed) does such a temper and behaviour deserve a severe and publick censure? Of such a man we may say, as an eminent father did of himself, *He might err, but he would not be an heretic.* And therefore if you, Sir, had any private reasons to suspect him of *secret infidelity*, that charity, which is due to such a peaceable and unassuming temper, should certainly have obliged you to be as careful, as he was, to have kept it still a secret.

But I am fully persuaded there can be no sufficient reason to suspect him of such *secret infidelity*, or rather heresy, as you accuse him of; and dare venture to affirm, that he was no *Socinian*: for besides what I have urged from the concern he shewed to vindicate his book on the article of the Trinity, and that I am farther assured he solemnly declared his belief of it to a worthy friend of mine, who upon that dispute did, in the freedom of friendship, put the question to him (a matter of fact, which I think

think it incumbent upon me on this occasion to declare :) besides this, I say, there are many passages in his *Comment on St. Paul's Epistles*, which plainly assert or imply the direct contrary to several of the most considerable errors of the *Socinians*; as in all those places^b, where he treats of the inability of man to work out his own salvation, the necessity of grace, and the efficacy of the spirit of God dwelling in us as a new quickening principle; one of which places I shall here set down, because I think it likewise implies an acknowledgment of our Saviour's divinity. The *New Testament*, says he^c, "teaches, that those, who receive Christ by faith, "with him receive his spirit, and its assistance "against the flesh. And so spirit here may be "taken for the spirit of their minds renewed and "strengthened by the spirit of God." This is plainly asserting the spirit of God and the spirit of Christ to be the same. And as to the doctrine of our Saviour's satisfaction for sin, whatever fault may be found with his note on the word *Redemption*, Rom. iii. 24. the author of *Remarks on Mr. Locke's paraphrase*, &c.^d does himself own, in his censure on that note, that Mr. Locke in other places asserts the same thing, which he denies to be the sense of the word *Redemption* there; as on 1 Cor. vi. 20. vii. 23. *Ye are bought with a price, viz. the precious blood of Christ. Christ had paid a price for them, and they belong to him.* How, says he, could Mr. Locke so soon forget these words, being his own *Paraphrase and Notes* on the texts last mentioned? In his note on Rom. iv. 25. he asserts, that *our Saviour by his death atoned for our sins*; and on Eph. v. 2. that *Christ hath given himself for us, an offering and an acceptable sacrifice to God.* These are all assertions directly contrary to the *Socinian* errors.

^b Vide note on Rom. viii. 11. 2 Cor. viii. 1.
Gal. v. 18.

^d Dr. Jenkins.

^c Note on

Now if this be so; if Mr. *Locke* did really believe the sacred Trinity, the divinity of our blessed Saviour, or even if you have no clear proof to the contrary; and if on other important points he maintained such doctrines, as the *Socinians* will by no means allow; consider, I beseech you, Sir, how great is the injustice you have done him; and consider too, whether so public an injury does not require a public reparation. How good, how truly Christian would it be in you, Sir, to take some occasion of vindicating this *late celebrated author* as publickly as you have accused him; to declare yourself convinced upon farther thoughts, that your censure was on insufficient grounds! This is what you are the more obliged to, as he is now incapable of defending himself; and as such an unforced self-condemnation is what none but the most ingenuous natures are capable of, it will gain you the love and value of all, who know how difficult it is to overcome that false shame, to which our natural pride subjects us; and which will strongly oppose so mortifying, but withal so generous, and so necessary a piece of justice.

I now come to consider the main subject of your sermon, so far as Mr. *Locke* is concerned in it. And here I must confess I was not a little surprised to find so much warmth, and such angry expressions (to say no worse) against one, who upon that *contentious* part of the subject, as you very justly call it*, had given so little cause of offence. And I should have been willing to think, you had only heard in general, that Mr. *Locke* had writ against the resurrection of the *same body*, but had never read what passed betwixt him and Bishop *Stillingfleet* on that point, if you had not quoted some particular passages out of it; so little had he deserved that indignation, to which it seems your subject had raised you. "It was, you say^f, laid

* Page 5, 26.

^f Page 26.

“ upon you ; and to aim all your force against so
 “ eminent a name might perhaps be necessary to
 “ raise the weight and importance of a discourse ad-
 “ dressed to such a learned assembly.” But, now that
 the honour of the day is decided, I beg you will
 take a cooler review of Mr. *Locke*’s part in that
 controversy ; and I am persuaded you will find
 reason to moderate your censure of him.

He did not, you know, Sir, intrude himself into
 this dispute, as I observed before on that of the
 Trinity ; nor did he give any other occasion to it,
 but that he had asserted *personal identity* to consist
 in self-consciousness ; a thing one would think fo-
 reign enough from the question of the resurrection
 of the same body. However the Bishop of *Wor-*
cester took a fancy, that his idea of personal iden-
 tity was inconsistent with that doctrine, because it
 made the same body *not to be necessary* for the raising
 the same person. To which Mr. *Locke* answers,
 that this was the first time he had heard, that *not*
necessary was the same with *inconsistent*. And that
 it is no good consequence, that one, who thinks the
 same particles of matter not necessary to the mak-
 ing the same person, cannot therefore believe, that
 the same person shall be raised with the very same
 particles of matter, if God should reveal, that it
 shall be so. He very frequently and earnestly ex-
 presses his belief of the last judgment, the resur-
 rection of the dead, and that the dead shall rise
 again with their bodies. This is surely all, that is
 important to the great ends of religion in the article
 of the resurrection ; and this certainly should se-
 cure a man from being taxed of infidelity or he-
 resy, with respect to that article, whatever he may
 think of the resurrection of the *same body* ; or, as
 Mr. *Locke* himself urges to the Bishop*, “ He that
 “ believes this, and has said nothing inconsistent
 “ herewith, I presume may, and must be acquitted

“ from being guilty of any thing inconsistent with
“ the article of the resurrection of the dead.”

What particles of matter the resurrection-body shall be made up of, Mr. *Locke* thinks a question of curiosity, which the Scriptures having said nothing of, he modestly concludes, is not for him to determine. And by the way, Sir, do not you mean much the same thing, when you call this the *contentious* part of the subject, tho’ you do not think fit to make the same conclusion? For wherefore should this be more *contentious* than any other part of the subject, but because the Scriptures have not determined the matter, and therefore men are left at liberty to dispute and exercise their wit about it? However, Mr. *Locke* does not *deny* even this contentious part, the *resurrection of the same body*; which, methinks, might have prevailed for some abatement of your anger. “ For tho’, says he to the Bishop of *Worcester*, I do by no means deny, that the same bodies
“ shall be raised at the last day, yet I see nothing
“ your Lordship has said to prove it to be an article
“ of faith ^b.” This indeed he does deny, not finding, as he says, any express words of Scripture for it; and this is all, that he denies of it, not *in the impudence of over-abounding reason* (the words, with which you *not over-decently* treat him) for he has not so much as offered one argument from reason against the truth, or probability, or raised any difficulties about the thing itself; though, to shew the inconclusiveness of some of the Bishop’s arguments, he has mentioned some odd consequences, that would follow from them. He makes no difficulty of believing, that God may, if he thinks fit, give to every one, at the last day, a body consisting only of such particles, as were before vitally united to his soul: the only question with him is, whether God has revealed, that he will do so. But all his modesty and professed submission to what the Scriptures have declared, con-

^b P. 195.

cerning the resurrection, could not, it seems, admit him to your good graces, unless he had allowed the resurrection of the same body to be an article of faith.

But I beseech you, Sir, what authority have you, or had the Bishop before you, to erect this into an article of faith, and to exclaim against a man as an infidel for not owning it to be so, as you have done, unless either of you had produced plain words of Scripture for it? The Bishop says the Christian church has always understood it so; and you tell us of the most ancient Christian writers, who have defended this doctrine, and supported themselves by it under their sufferings, and of the eastern and western creeds¹. But after all this ostentation, what do they assert more than that the dead shall rise again with *their bodies*, a term Mr. *Locke* would not have objected against, and which seems as sufficient to support the martyrs under their sufferings as that of the *same bodies*? It is plain, that the church has not thought fit to assume this term into any of her creeds, which are the only explanations of Scripture, that carry any authority with them. And though you may think Mr. *Locke's* rule too great a confinement, "That it" is not only safest, but our duty, to keep close to "the words of Scripture, so far as one delivers any" thing for revelation;" yet you must certainly allow, that no private person ought to go farther in explaining it, (or at least that such a one has no right to impose his explanations on others farther) than the church has thought fit to do in her creeds. And therefore since the resurrection of the same body are neither the words of Scripture, nor of the church in her creeds: there can be no just support for that *scorn and contempt*, nor excuse for the hard words, with which you treat those, who deny it to be an article of faith².

But that we may consider with the more clearness the particulars, on which you are offended with Mr.

¹ P. 16.

² P. 16.

Locke, we will begin with the first head of your discourse, where you begin with him, after you have told us your purpose to enquire, "what is usually meant by the sameness of human bodies¹. It is maintained, *say you*, by some, and particularly by a late writer of the *Socinian* kind" (your subject it seems, had not warmed you enough yet, till p. 11. to call him, in absolute terms, a *Socinian*; but let us see what you say he maintains) "that, to defend the identity of the resurrection body with that which lived here, it is necessary to suppose, that the very same individual and numerical particles, which were at any time in life, but all of them at death united to the soul, must be raised again at the resurrection. This, *you add*, is by no means to be agreed to; *and the reason you give for it, is*, that considering the various ebbs and flows of matter, if the sameness of a natural body consists in the same precise number of particles, there is no one body in the universe, which can be imagined for any little time the same; and if there is no such thing as this abstracted identity in any other natural body, much less will it be found in the human body; and therefore it is not in the least necessary, nor in the least to be attended to." This is the sum of your argument, tho' you own that, "mathematically and precisely speaking, it is most true, that a body is not the same, if any one particle be lost from it." If so, then certainly what *Mr. Locke* says of the resurrection body, may by *some means* be agreed to. Mathematically and precisely speaking, it is most true by your own confession, that the body at the resurrection will not be the same with that which lived here, if it does not consist of the same numerical particles.

And in this strict mathematical sense it is, that *Mr. Locke* must always be understood, when he denies or affirms any thing of the *same body*. He had in

¹P. 6.

a chapter on the subject of identity told us, in what he took the identity of several things to consist, as that of the same plant, the same man, and among others that of the same body, the identity of which he places in the same numerical particles; and having thus fixed the signification of the term *same body*, he steddily and constantly uses it in the same sense: A rule, which as he much recommends to others, to prevent confusion, so he always strictly observes it himself; and therefore he can by no means allow any body to be the same, longer than it consists of the same numerical particles. For what he says on this matter is not particular to the resurrection-body, as by your way of arguing one would be apt to think: it is very plain, that he does not allow the human body, whilst *living here*, to be for any considerable time the same, because compounded of continually fleeting particles. So that he would hardly take your argument from the perpetual variation of bodies here to be any answer to him, or any proof, that there is no necessity of the same particles to make the *same body* at the resurrection: Tho', when you say afterwards, p. 8. "That those parts of the old matter, which belonged to the human body before death, be they more or less, which it pleases God to restore to life at the resurrection, will be sufficient, whatever new particles may be added, to make it as much the same with that which died, as that which died was with that which lived before, or that which lived was for any little time the same with itself." In this I believe Mr. *Locke* would have perfectly agreed with you, tho' I fear he would still have stubbornly maintained, that not one of these was the same body with either of the other.

But there is an identity, you say, p. 7. *by which even a river is the same.* Same what, Sir? The same river indeed Mr. *Locke* would own, but not the same body, which is the subject in question: But you go on, *And all the sameness we are obliged to allow to any*
fleeting

fleeing varying body. I crave leave by the way to ask, who has obliged us to allow any sameness at all to such a body? But to proceed, "All the sameness, we are obliged to allow to any fleeing body, is only that, which preserves it distinct from all others of the same, or of a different species." And in what, I pray you, Sir, does this sameness consist? That you "do not say the schools have very properly assigned, but you think it needs not be farther enquired after." Here, methinks, you seem fairly to drop the very thing you was in quest of, viz. *What is meant by the sameness of human bodies?* But your reason for so doing is, I confess, beyond my depth: "What that sameness is, you say, needs not be farther enquired after, because the principle of individuation is undoubtedly secured by that sameness, which preserves any body distinct from all others." If you had said by that *something*, your meaning would have been every whit as clear, and your principle of individuation as undoubtedly secured; for I think it is plain you use the word *sameness* in a confused undetermined sense, for *something* you know not what, and will not trouble yourself to enquire about, since you are sure it does the business of *preserving any body distinct from all others*: tho' one would think, if it does such mighty feat, it is the more worth enquiring after.

But whatever your meaning be, I believe, Sir, you do not suppose, that Mr. Locke denied the distinction of bodies, or in the least doubted, that every human body is preserved distinct from all others; tho' he would not allow, that it is a *sameness*, by which they are so preserved. Every human body, from the first moment of its vital union with the soul, is by its existence in that union and organization of life, distinguished from all others; and by a participation of the same continued life, tho' in a succession of constantly fleeing particles of matter, is preserved so distinct. In which consists according to

Mr. *Locke*, the identity of the *same man*, tho' not of the *same body*.

But what if all this weighty contest should appear at last to be only about *words*, as I shrewdly suspect it is; for, as to the reality of things, you seem to me perfectly to agree with Mr. *Locke*? You say "That the human body is compounded of fleeting particles continually exhaling and flowing from it, so that it cannot be imagined for any little time to consist of the same numerical particles." Which is all that Mr. *Locke* means, when he says, "That the body, which a man has at fifty, is not the same with that which he had at five or at fifteen, *i. e.* as he explains himself, it does not consist of the same individual particles of matter." You say, "That those parts of the old matter, which belonged to the human body before death, be they more or less, which it pleases God to restore to life at the resurrection, will be sufficient, whatever new particles may be added, to make it as much the same with that which died, as that which died was with that which lived before," &c. *as above.* Mr. *Locke*, in answer to the Bishop, who from St. Paul's words, "That every one must receive according to the things done in his body, contends, that every man's body at the resurrection must consist of the same particles of matter, which were once united to his soul, and no other:" on this occasion Mr. *Locke* says, "Why with the remaining particles of a man's body, long since dissolved and mouldered into atoms, other new particles of matter mixed with them, may not serve to make *his* body again, as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the old did in the compass of his life make *his* body, I think no reason can be given. Since whatever matter is vitally united to his soul, is *his* body, as much as is that, which was united to it, when he was born, or in any other part of his life." This is so perfectly the same sense with
your

your words last quoted, that, methinks, this single paragraph should have been sufficient to have prevented all your heavy accusations, and helped you to see, that there was no material difference between you; but that, notwithstanding his opposition to your darling *sameness*, he had just the same thoughts about the resurrection-body that you have. You both assert, that it may consist of part of the old materials, with some new particles added to them. You say this will make it as much *the same*, &c. He says it will be as much *his* body, as that which he had in any part of his life: and what real difference can there be in your meaning, since the materials of your *same* body, and Mr. *Locke's* *his* body, are exactly the same? The only dispute then, that can be between you, is, whether a body, compounded of new and different particles, mixed with some of the old matter, may properly be called the same body with what it was before these new particles were added. Now whether such a dispute is a sufficient ground to exclaim against a man, as denying an article of faith, I appeal even to yourself: Nay whether you do not as much deny the resurrection of the *same* body, in Mr. *Locke's* sense of the same body, to be an article of faith, even as he does? For what are you here contending for^m, but that it is not necessary to believe, that the body at the resurrection, shall consist of the same numerical particles with that, which was formerly united to the soul? And what does Mr. *Locke* mean by denying the resurrection of the same body, to be an article of faith, but that it is not necessary to believe (because the Scriptures have not declared) that the body shall be raised with the same numerical particles? For that is always his sense of same body.

But if he would have receded from this strict way of speaking, and owned the faith of the resurrection of the same body, in your sense of *same* body, though this might have secured him from your censure, yet

From p. 6. to p. 9. and 10. still and

he could not have passed for *orthodox* with the Bishop of *Worcester*, who insisted, that the body, at the resurrection, must consist of the same particles, which had been formerly united to the soul, and *no other*. Much less would his faith have stood approved to some of those *well-meaning men*, whose impertinent learning, you say, hath raised so much dust about the resurrection-body^a: A dust raised by endeavouring to bring together all the scattered particles, which had ever in the whole compass of a man's life been united to his soul; they fancying, good men! that they were obliged to believe the resurrection of the same body, in the downright real meaning of the words. And, in which of all these three senses, Sir, is the resurrection of the same body an article of faith? Or, is there such a charm in the words *sameness*, that, if a man will put it into his *creed*, he may take it in any sense he pleases, or in no determinate sense at all? This seems, indeed, to be the case; and if we are at liberty to understand the word in any of the forementioned senses, as you have taken the liberty to enlarge the meaning of the word, beyond the Bishop, and many other assertors of this doctrine, I do not see but that if another should go a little farther, and maintain, that it is not necessary to the sameness of the resurrection-body, that it should consist of *any* of the same particles, that belonged to the old body; but that, whatever particles shall then be vitally united to the soul, will make the *same body*; I do not see, I say, but that such a one must be allowed a very good believer of your article of faith; since it is plainly the *word*, and not the *thing*, on which the stress is laid. But is not this making an article of faith of a mere sound?

This *easy* way of explaining the *sameness* of human bodies does, I confess, deliver us, as you say, out of all that dust, which has been raised about the resurrection-body: But how it performs the other part, which

you ascribe to it, I am at a loss to find out. *It clears off*, as you express yourself, *on the other side*, all the open scepticism, and secret infidelity of the writer above-mentioned, his confounding identity and personality, and his unknown resurrection of persons. Mr. Locke's scepticism, or in plainer words, his not pretending to determine of what particles the body shall be made up at the resurrection, is grounded on *the silence of the Scriptures*, which your *easy account* does no way clear off: And therefore I am afraid it would leave him, and all who think as he did, in the same *scepticism* it found them. For this very reason likewise it is, that he denies the resurrection of the same body to be an article of faith, viz. because the Scriptures have not declared, whether we shall be raised with the same bodies, or not; *the Spirit of God*, as he observes to the Bishop, *having not thought fit to gratify any one's curiosity therein*. This is all the *infidelity*, that I know of any ground to tax him with, and this is not *secret*, but as open as his *scepticism*.

On all that is important in the great article of the resurrection, he has declared his faith so fully, and spoke with so Christian and awful a sense of it, that there can be no pretence to doubt his sincerely believing that article of faith; and therefore, what injurious *insinuation* you intended in those words, his *secret infidelity*, I must leave to your own conscience.

As for his *confounding identity and personality*, I find nothing like it in all his controversy with the Bishop; and since you do not refer us to any place, nor tell us in what respect he is guilty of this fault, no particular answer can be given to it: But this I will venture to say, that no man was ever less apt to confound one idea with another than he; and that if all writers had been as careful as he was to distinguish their ideas, and to use the terms, which stood for them, always in one determinate sense, we should have had less confusion, and less contest, than has been in the learned world.

As to his *unknown resurrection of persons*, which your *easy account* seems likewise intended to *clear off*, I do not remember, that he has used that expression. *The resurrection of the dead*, as being the language of the Scriptures, are the words he commonly chuses to express himself by; but if he has used that expression, or any other of the same importance, I hope, Sir, your zeal for the resurrection of the same body will not carry you so far as to deny, or to endeavour to *clear off*, the resurrection of the same persons; though what else you can mean, by mentioning it in the manner you do, I must own, I cannot understand.

We are now come to your second inquiry, *viz.* "How far the Scriptures declare to us, that the *rising bodies of men shall be the same with those that died.*" The different sense, in which, as I have shewn, the assertors of this doctrine, as an article of faith, have understood the words, is, I think, a sufficient indication, that the Scriptures have declared nothing particular about it: and the little real difference, which, as I have likewise shewn, there is in Mr. *Locke's* meaning and yours, makes this contest appear to be of so very little importance, that I should not think it necessary to go along with you any farther, if I did not find in what follows, as hard and injurious a treatment of the person, whose defence I have undertaken, as any I have yet complained of.

• You begin with telling us, that where *the doctrine is entirely matter of faith and revelation, there the words and expressions of Scripture are principally to direct us.* And it were to be wished, you had kept close to that excellent rule. But you go on; Now, *that the Scriptures do directly lead us into this belief,* (they do not then, it seems, expressly affirm it) *will appear from those expressions and passages,* (you should have added, with my interpretation of

them) in which the doctrine of the resurrection is delivered. And upon this occasion, say you, we are told, that the Scriptures are so far from owning the resurrection of the same body, that even the resurrection of the body is not so much as mentioned in them. But how consistently with any show of truth, or modesty, is evident to any man, who reads these words of St. Paul, Rom. viii. 11. It should have been, *He that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies, by his spirit that dwelleth in you.*

The Bishop of Worcester having undertaken to shew, that Mr. Locke's notion of ideas was inconsistent with an article of faith; he answers, that what his Lordship instances in, is not, that he yet knows of, an article of the Christian faith. And afterwards adds, "In the *New Testament* (wherein I think are contained all the articles of the Christian faith) I find our Saviour and the Apostles to preach the resurrection of the dead in many places. But I do not remember any place, where the resurrection of the same body is so much as mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable in the case, I do not remember in any place (where the general resurrection at the last day is spoken of) any such expression, as the resurrection of the body, much less of the same body." These are Mr. Locke's words, which I have set down, that it may be the more evident, where the want of truth and modesty lies. Such an imputation of gross and barefaced falsehood one would expect to have been followed by some plain text of Scripture, where this very expression, *the resurrection of the body*, is used, and where the general resurrection, at the last day, is undeniably spoken of; for nothing less will make his assertion inconsistent with any show of truth or modesty. But, instead of this, you produce a text, in which not only the expression he mentions is not used, but
which

which is understood by many commentators and able divines, who had no view to this controversy, in a quite different signification from the resurrection at the last day; and that not by *violently throwing the words into a figurative meaning, when the first and simplest will stand good* (as you very unjustly accuse Mr. Locke of doing in this place) but for reasons taken from the sense, the scope, and tendency of the Apostle's discourse. A rule for interpreting Scripture, which you afterwards lay down', but I think have very ill observed here. The words of St. Paul Rom. viii. 11. *He that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies, by his spirit that dwelleth in you,* taken alone as they stand quoted by you, introduced with such a preface, and followed by a positive assertion, that "there is no reason, why the "Apostle's words should not be taken in the "sense he uses them wherever he treats of the resurrection; that it is *manifest* he is here speaking of Christ's and our own resurrection; and "that it is *certain* his discourse in this place is not "in the least foreign to such a mention of the resurrection." The words, I say, thus represented, may strike your hearers or readers with some appearance of a contradiction to what Mr. Locke had said. But how fairly it was done in you to quote them thus, and to talk in this absolute manner, without taking the least notice of the several reasons Mr. Locke gives in a very large *Comment upon the place*, for understanding them in another sense, I leave to your cooler consideration. You do indeed in your margin refer us to his *Comment*; but, besides that your audience had already taken the impression, I have much ado to persuade myself, that you did not trust to the laziness or negligence of most readers, who seldom are at the pains to consult the books referred to in margins:

otherwise I cannot think but you must have some apprehension, that the plain and judicious arguments he brings, for understanding the *quickenings of our mortal bodies* to signify a *quickenings to newness of life* or to a *life of righteousness*, might be thought by the readers strong enough to shake the certainty of your bare assertions, and at least sufficient to support his modesty in denying your sense of the words, even though he should have mistaken the Apostle's meaning. But that the lazy readers may be enabled in some measure to judge between you, without the trouble of having recourse to the *Comment*; and the more curious be incited to a thorough examination of it, I shall set down, as briefly as I can, some of the reasons he there alleges for the sense, in which he understands the words, and why they cannot be meant of raising our dead bodies out of the grave.

He begins his *Comment* on this 11th verse, with a review of the scope and tendency of all the former chapters of the Epistle, too long to be here inserted. He then shews the connection, which this viiith chapter has with the preceding, *where St. Paul had been discoursing of the weakness of the law to deliver from the dominion of sin, and goes on here to shew, by whom we are enabled to keep sin from reigning in our mortal bodies; that Christians are delivered from the dominion of their carnal lusts by the spirit of God, that is given to them, and dwells in them.* As y 10. "If Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, or as to sin, but the spirit is life because of righteousness." After which the 11th verse, taken entire, seems to follow very coherently in Mr. *Locke's* sense, "But if the spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you, he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies." But to return to the *Comment*; after Mr. *Locke* has explained these words *mortal bodies* thus, "i. e. bodies,"

"dies,

"dies, which, as the seat and harbour of sinful
 "lusts, are indisposed and dead to the actions of
 "a spiritual life;" in the same *sense, continues he,*
 "and upon the same account, St. Paul calls the
 "bodies of the Gentiles their mortal bodies ch.
 "vi. 12. where his subject is, as here, freedom
 "from the reign of sin, upon which account they
 "are there stiled, *y. 13. Alive from the dead,*
 "To make it yet clearer, that it is deliverance
 "from the reign of sin in our bodies, that St. Paul
 "speaks of here, I desire any one to read what he
 "says, ch. vi. 1. 14. to the Gentiles on the same
 "subject, and compare it with the thirteen first
 "verses of this chapter, and then tell me, whether
 "they have not a mutual correspondence, and do not
 "give a great light to one another? If this be too
 "much pains, let him at least read the two next
 "verses, and see how they could possibly be, as
 "they are an inference from this 11th verse, if the
 "quickening of your mortal bodies in it mean
 "any thing, but a quickening to newness of life,
 "or to a life of righteousness." I have been thus
 particular, that the reader may judge, whether this
 way of reasoning, and comparing one place with
 another, can be called *violently to shroud the words*
into a figurative meaning. I shall next set down the
 reasons he offers, why the sense, which you call *the*
first and simplest, will not stand good. These seem
 so clear to him, that he begins this part with won-
 dering to see a late commentator and paraphrast po-
 ssume that the words we are upon, do here signify,
shall raise your dead bodies out of the graves. To his
 argument (which is likewise yours) that the word
quicken, when spoken of the resurrection, is of the
 same import with *raise*; he answers, "But what if
 "St. Paul, which is the question, be not here
 "speaking of the resurrection? Why then, accord-
 "ing to our author's own confession, *quicken* does
 "not necessarily import the same with *raise*? And
 " h

" he can never prove, that *St. Paul* is here speak-
 " ing of the resurrection, till he can prove, that
 " *mortal* here signifies the same with *dead*; and I
 " demand of him to shew mortal any where in the
 " *New Testament* attributed to any thing void of
 " life. Mortal always signifies the thing it is
 " joined to, to be living, so that *St. Paul's* words,
 " in that learned author's interpretation of them,
 " do here signify, God shall raise to life your
 " living dead bodies; which no one can think, in
 " the softest terms can be given to it, a very pro-
 " per way of speaking." A little after he says:
 " I next desire to know of this learned writer, how
 " he will bring the resurrection of the dead into
 " this place, and to shew what coherence it has
 " with *St. Paul's* discourse here; and how he can
 " join this verse with the immediately preceding
 " and following, when the words under considera-
 " tion are rendered, *shall raise your dead bodies*
 " *out of their graves at the last day*, which must
 " make *St. Paul* in the midst of a very strong and
 " coherent discourse, concerning walking not after
 " the flesh, but after the spirit, skip of a sudden
 " into the mention of the resurrection of the dead,
 " and having just mentioned it, skip back again
 " into his former argument: but I take the liberty
 " to assure him, that *St. Paul* has no such starts
 " from the matter he has in hand, to what gives
 " no light or strength to his present argument. I
 " think there is not any where to be found a more
 " pertinent close arguer, who has his eye always
 " on the mark he drives at. This men would
 " find, if they studied him as they ought, with
 " more regard to divine authority than to hypo-
 " theses of their own," &c. A little after he says,
 " One thing more the text suggests concerning
 " this matter, and that is, if by quickening your
 " mortal bodies, &c. he means here the raising
 " them into life after death, how can this be men-

tioned as a peculiar favour to those who have the spirit of God? For God will also raise the bodies of the wicked, and as certainly as those of believers; but that, which is promised here, is promised to those only, who have the spirit of God: and therefore it must be something peculiar to them; viz. that God shall so enliven their mortal bodies by his spirit; which is the principle and pledge of immortal life, that they may be able to yield up themselves to God, as those that are alive from the dead, and their members servants to righteousness unto holiness; as he expresses himself, ch. vi. 13. 19." If any one can yet doubt, whether this be St. Paul's meaning here, he refers them for farther satisfaction to St. Paul himself in several other places, which he quotes at the end of this note.

I believe, Sir, you may by this time perceive, that you unluckily hit on a text, which Mr. Locke had so largely explained in a different sense from that, for which you alledge it; and that all, who see his reasons for it, must allow, that, notwithstanding those words of St. Paul, he might both with *truth and modesty* affirm, that, where the resurrection of the last day is spoken of in Scripture, he found no such expression as the resurrection of the body.

But let us see, whether your next text will more closely affect him; for *this*, you say, is *not the only place of Scripture, where express mention is made of raising, or quickning the mortal bodies*. The place you instance in for this express mention seems indeed somewhat oddly chosen for your purpose. "The same Apostle, you observe, Phil. iii. 21. tells us, that the Lord Jesus shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body." If punning on so serious a subject were as allowable, as it was fashionable in the last age, I shall be tempted to say you had put the *change* upon us. Where is the

the express mention in this text of quickning or raising the body? "*But you tell us, that tho' the word*" here used is of a different signification, no question "can be made, but that it imports the change to be made at the resurrection of the dead." None indeed; but what is that to the question in hand, or to Mr. *Locke*? Did he ever deny, that our bodies should be changed at the resurrection? Or does this prove (which was the thing to be proved) that there is such an expression in Scripture as the resurrection of the body? Nay, does this change relate at all to the bodies of those, who are to be raised from the dead? For of that a question may be made, since this very expression is used of those, who are not to die, and consequently cannot be raised from the dead. *We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed*. And whether the changing our vile bodies mentioned here may not concern the same persons, I leave to be considered. However that be, it is plain this text does no way contradict what Mr. *Locke* had asserted: But I should have been more surprized to find it brought as a proof of the resurrection of *the same body*, if you had not told us before, that the greater change a body undergoes, it is the more proved to be still *the same*; which, you will give me leave to observe, is at least using the word in a very large sense. "These," you say, are very express texts: and yet there "is another, where the words are rather more undeniably direct to this sense than either of these two; it is 1 Cor. xv. 53. *For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality.*" How express the two former are to this sense, has been already considered. On this last you refer us as before to Mr. *Locke's* comment upon this chapter, and to his Reply to the Bishop of *Worcester's* answer, &c. but take no notice of the reasons he gives in both places for the sense, in which he understands that whole dis-

1 Cor. xv. 51. the body of the dead
course

course of *St. Paul*, and for applying the words you have quoted, not to the bodies, but to the persons dead; as if it had been said, mortal corruptible *man* must put on immortality and incorruption. But to prove, that this text is express for the resurrection of the *same body*, you argue, "That it is by
 " their bodies alone that men die; that the soul
 " must be allowed to live after the death of the
 " body; and if the body alone die, it must be by
 " the raising of that body alone to life again, by
 " which the dead, or dead person, or man; can in
 " any sense or construction of words be said to be
 " revived, or raised, since the joining of a living
 " soul to a new body can never be called a resurrection or reviviscence." To this I answer, that it is not by the body alone, but by a separation of the soul from the body, that a *man* dies; and by a reunion of that soul with a body, the *man* may in a very proper sense be said to be raised from the dead, whether the body, to which it is united, be new or old. Or, as *Mr. Locke* had before answered to this very objection proposed by the Bishop of *Worcester*, "As to the propriety of the name, I
 " think it will not be much questioned, that if the
 " same man rise, who was dead, it may very properly be called a resurrection of the dead, which
 " is the language of the Scripture."

But you tell us, That "there is no distinction
 " in Scripture between the dead and the bodies of
 " the dead; and that it is a strong delusion, to affirm, as the writer often mentioned does, that
 " there is any other distinction between the dead
 " and the bodies of the dead, besides that of the
 " words in Scripture." You seem however aware, that *St. Paul's* question 1 *Cor.* xv. 35. stands in your way to support this delusion, when in the name of some *inconsidering* man (as you will have it) he asks, *How are the dead raised? And with what*

body do they come? Hard shift you make here to drop the distinction of the *dead*, from the *bodies* of the dead, in a place where it is so undeniably plain; for whether the question relate to the sameness of the resurrection-body or not, turn the words how you will, to *what sort of body*, or *with a body how qualified*, still it will be with what body do *they*, i. e. the dead, come? And your paraphrase in these words, “The dead bodies of men, when raised to life again, what qualities shall they be endued with?” is too manifestly strained from those of the Apostle, to recover us from this *strong delusion*. But it is not my purpose to examine your *more exact inquiry into the sense of Scripture upon this point*; nor to take the pains I did on the first text you instanced in, of going through the place you refer to in *Mr. Locke’s Comment*, or his *Reply* to the Bishop of Worcester. I thought it necessary to be so particular there, to shew how injuriously he had been treated on that occasion; but the contest itself seems to me of so little importance, that it matters not much which way it is determined. I shall therefore only set down some of *Mr. Locke’s* words in the *Reply*, which you refer us to, relating to *St. Paul’s* discourse of the resurrection, in *1 Cor. xv.* on which you have likewise made your remarks, and shall leave it to any one, who will be at the pains to consult his *Comment*, and to compare what both of you have said, to judge between you, according to the bias of his own mind (for that is most people’s way of judging) which of you has made the best observations, and most just inference, from that discourse of *St. Paul*. *Mr. Locke’s* words, with which I shall conclude what I had to say on your second Inquiry, are these:

“This therefore being so; that the spirit of God keeps so expressly to this form of speaking

“*Mr. Locke’s Reply to the Bishop of Worcester’s second Answer.*

“ in the *New Testament*, of *raising, quickening,*
 “ *rising, resurrection of the dead*, where the re-
 “ surrection at the last day is spoken of; and that
 “ the body is not mentioned, but in answer to this
 “ question, with what bodies shall those dead, who
 “ are raised, come? so that, by the dead, cannot
 “ precisely be meant the dead bodies: I do not
 “ see but a good Christian, who reads the Scrip-
 “ ture, with an intention to believe all that is there
 “ revealed to him, concerning the resurrection, may
 “ acquit himself of his duty therein, without en-
 “ tering into the enquiry, whether the dead shall
 “ have the very same bodies, or no? Nor, if he
 “ shall think himself bound to determine concern-
 “ ing the identity of the bodies of the dead, raised
 “ at the last day, will he, by *St. Paul's* answer,
 “ find the determination of the Apostle to be much
 “ in favour of the very same body; unless the be-
 “ ing told, that the body sown, is not that body
 “ that shall be; that the body raised is as differ-
 “ rent from that which was laid down, as the flesh
 “ of man is from the flesh of beasts, fishes, and
 “ birds; or as the sun, moon, and stars are dif-
 “ ferent one from another; or as different as a
 “ corruptible, weak, natural, mortal body, is
 “ from an incorruptible, powerful, spiritual, im-
 “ mortal body; and lastly, as different a body as
 “ that which is flesh and blood, is from a body that
 “ is not flesh and blood: *For flesh and blood cannot,*
 “ says *St. Paul*, in this very place, *inherit the*
 “ *kingdom of God*. Unless, I say, all this, which
 “ is contained in *St. Paul's* words, can be supposed
 “ to be the way to deliver this as an article of
 “ faith, which is required to be believed by every
 “ one, *viz.* That the dead should be raised with
 “ the very same bodies, that they had before in
 “ this life; which article proposed, in these, or
 “ the like plain words, could have left no room

Ver. 50.

for

“ for doubt in the meanest capacities, nor for contest in the most perverse minds.”

On your third enquiry, “ What congruities there may be in the nature of God, or man, to confirm our belief, that the dying and raised bodies of men shall be the same;” Mr. *Locke* is not much concerned, and therefore I shall say but little upon it. You tell us, “ That it seems highly congruous to the justice of God, that those very bodies, which were partners with, and instruments to the souls of men, in the good or evil actions they did in this life, should in the other be partners with, and instruments to the happiness or misery due to their sins or virtues.”

I shall only observe on this argument, that it seems not very well suited to your notion of the sameness of the resurrection-body, whatever force it might have from those, who maintain, that every individual particle of matter, which was at any time in life, or all that were at death, at least, united to the soul, must be reunited to it at the resurrection. For what reason can be assigned, why the justice of God should not require, that *all* the particles of matter, as well as *any part* of them, which were instruments to the souls of men in their good or evil actions, should be instruments to the happiness or misery due to them? If your argument is good, we shall be in danger of raising all that *dust* again, which your *easy account* had delivered us from. For though you may satisfy yourself with calling that, in some respects, the same body, which consists of some of the same, mixed with different particles of matter; yet, if the justice of God is concerned in the case, it will be equally concerned, that *all*, as well as that *any part* of the unconscious matter, which was joined with the soul in the whole course of its actions, good or bad, should be joined with it in

reward or punishment. You say indeed afterwards, in softer terms, that by the rules of divine justice, the unconscious matter *may* be joined with the soul in reward or punishment. That it *may*, I believe no body will deny; and you, it seems, are not assured enough to say it *must*, notwithstanding the *congruities* you talk of. But you proceed: "And there seems to be the same sort of congruity in the soul of man, to receive eternal happiness or misery in its own proper, and the same body. For there seems to be a certain congruity of the soul with matter." Here you quote Mr. *Locke* in your margin, for saying the contrary, *after his manner*: an expression you use more than once, though what you intend by it, I cannot guess. As to the soul's having a congruity with matter in general, to which your margin seems to relate, Mr. *Locke* says nothing contrary to it in *any manner*. All that he says on the point in hand, in his *Reply* to the Bishop, who contends, that the resurrection-body must consist of the same particles, which were once united to the soul, and *no other*; after having asked, what an *embryo*, who should die soon after it had life, must do for a body of the size his Lordship seems to require? and urged, that according to this doctrine, it must remain a man not an inch long to eternity: he adds, "Though what greater congruity the soul hath with any particles of matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer, than it hath with particles of matter, which it was never united to, would be hard to determine, if that should be demanded." If you, Sir, can determine this, give me leave to ask, much to the same purpose of what I offered on your former congruity, by what reasons you can do it, which will not equally conclude, that the soul has a congruity with *all* the particles of matter, which were ever united to it, as with *any part* of them,

v. g. with those parts of the old matter, which you think sufficient to make up your same body? I am afraid, Sir, you must either take into your account of the *same body* what Mr. *Locke* requires to the sameness of the resurrection-body, which at the beginning you tell us must by no means be agreed to; or relinquish your argument from any congruities in the nature of God and man. This I suppose you will make no great difficulty of doing, notwithstanding the flourish you have made with it; since towards the conclusion of this head you seem to own, that there is nothing^{*}, but imagination in it, and return to the Scriptures for the support of the doctrine. How well the Scriptures you have produced serve to support it, let every unprejudiced person judge. But you have so warmed yourself with the heat of argument, that, rather than part with the identity of the rising body, you will part with the resurrection itself. "If we are still confidently opposed in it, say you^{*}, with this fallacy, that the resurrection of the dead is the only language of Scripture, and that this implies no more than that persons once dead shall live again; we may and must give up this article of the resurrection, forasmuch as they, who deny any resurrection, do yet believe, that persons, dying in this world, may or do still live in another." What you call a fallacy, Mr. *Locke* hath, both in his *Comment* on 1 *Cor.* xv. and his *Reply* to the Bishop of *Worcester*, sufficiently shewn to be a certain and plain truth, viz. that the resurrection of the dead is the only language of Scripture, and that St. *Paul* plainly distinguishes between the dead that shall be raised, and the bodies of the dead; but that this implies no more than that persons once dead shall live again, Mr. *Locke* has no where said. This is an inference of your own, and not of his. And therefore how

^{*} Page 18.

^{*} Ibid.

you can justify yourself in setting this down as his words, by putting in your margin with a reference to them, *so Mr. Locke*; it may be proper for you to consider. In the mean while I would beg you not to be too hasty in giving up this article of the resurrection; for though it may be true, that some, who *deny* any resurrection, do yet believe, that persons dying in this world may still live in another; it will by no means follow that those, who *own* the resurrection of the dead, must mean no more by it, than that persons dying in this world do still live in another. Being raised from the dead has manifestly a quite different signification, and those, who believe this article, must believe something more, than that an unimbodied spirit, such as is the soul when separated from the body, continues to live elsewhere; for that can, by no construction of words, be called a resurrection of the dead. The raising must be understood of that which died, the same species, a creature consisting of soul and body: the same man must be raised at the last day; otherwise there is no resurrection of the dead. That this was Mr. *Locke's* faith in this great article, is evident from many passages in the above cited places; and I doubt not, that, from a just zeal for what the Scriptures have plainly revealed on this point, he would, instead of *giving up*, have as earnestly contended against you for the resurrection of the *dead*, as you have done against him for that of the *same body*. And which of you has the most express texts, the strongest supports for your doctrine in the Scriptures, I believe by this time may be plain enough to every unbiassed reader.

As to your fourth enquiry, "What is the true foundation of a Christian's belief of this truth, against the difficulties objected to it?" Mr. *Locke* is not at all concerned in it. He has not, as I observed before, made any objection against the possibility,

bility, or so much as denied the truth of it; tho' not being plainly revealed in Scripture, he is cautious of allowing it for an article of faith. And as your reasoning on this subject, if the supposition you go upon is true, *viz.* that God has declared he will raise the same body; as your reasoning, I say, upon that supposition is just and good, I have nothing to remark on this head, having already considered the two texts, with which you triumph at the end, as undeniable proofs of your assertion; texts, in which tho' God does indeed, as you say, *expressly tell us, that he will quicken our mortal, and change our vile bodies*, I believe enough has been said on them, to make it a question, whether *we must be satisfied*, as you add, *that he there means, that the same body, which dies, shall rise again.*

Your fifth and last enquiry, *viz.* "By what fault of men or times, the doctrine, you have been contending for, is disputed or denied?" I take Mr. *Locke* to be as little concerned in as the former. But your Sermon having been all along chiefly aimed against him, no other person being named or quoted, those, who are unacquainted with the writings and character of that truly valuable man, may imagine those reflections are applicable to him, which you throw about on the two faults you mention, as causes of this dispute, *a false value set upon human reason; and a false method of interpreting Scripture.* To remove the prejudices therefore of such as are strangers to him, (for to those, that know him, it is wholly needless) I shall observe, that as the subject of Mr. *Locke's* celebrated *Essay* was the *human understanding*, he has taken great pains and care to fix the bounds of it; to shew how far reason may pretend to determine, and where it has nothing to do, but to be contented in its ignorance, where revelation has not interposed; or to submit to the divine authority, where it has. And I think his *Essay* on no account more valuable, than the check it has given to that vanity and presumption,

sumption, by which many, otherwise truly great men, have in most sciences pretended to explain and determine things, not discoverable by our natural faculties; for I know no book that affords us better helps to perceive what is, and what is not so, than that admirable *Essay*.

And as Mr. *Locke* was careful to observe the bounds of human reason, I may add, that few men were ever less guilty than he of transgressing those bounds; of pretending to examine and explain by reason and philosophy things out of their sphere, whether natural or divine. In matters of revelation, he used his reason indeed to discover *what* the Holy Spirit has declared (and that certainly is the province of reason) which is all that he has done in this dispute of the resurrection of the same body. For he is none of those, that have, as you say, *artfully entangled it in wonderful difficulties*. If the spirit of God had revealed it, he has nothing to say against it.

Nor has he given the least cause to suspect him of any sinister design in his interpretations of Scripture. What *security* you would have a man of skill and abilities give for his integrity, I know not; but all the security the case can admit of, I think, Mr. *Locke* has given, that he was nothing of all, that against which you want a security. That he was neither *Atheist*, *Deist*, nor *Free-thinker*², in the ill acceptance of that word, his writings do sufficiently evince; nor do they give us any ground of suspicion, that his "mind was tinctured with depraved opinions." He is none of those you complain of, who have "denied, "blasphemed, or ridiculed those great articles of "faith, the blessed Trinity, the divinity of our "Saviour, the satisfaction he has paid for our sins, "the unity and communion of the church:" Articles truly great and important, and which I confess I cannot without indignation see ranked with *the resurrection of the same body*; a doctrine so doubtful in

¹ P. 22.² P. 23.³ P. 26.

its meaning, so variously understood, of which the Scriptures have determined nothing clearly, and which is of so little importance to be determined, that all, that is of consequence to the great ends of religion in the article of the resurrection, is sufficiently secured without it. And I must own I do not see what service it can be of to the Christian religion, to equal a question of curiosity with the most necessary articles of our faith; or to arraign an eminent and worthy man, one, who on all occasions seems to have his *heart filled with sacred awe and sincere veneration for the holy Scriptures*, as an heretic and an infidel, for doubting about so useless and undetermined a question. That every *man* shall be raised again at the last day in *his own proper body*, to be punished or rewarded according to what he had done in this life; and that those, who have pleased God, shall with *their own eyes, and not another's, see God*, are truths, in which Mr. *Locke* and you agree: and what particles of matter their bodies shall be made up of, would not have been worth the least dispute, if it had no way been imposed as an article of faith.

I leave you now, Sir, to consider, whether you have made good the charge of your title-page against Mr. *Locke* of cavils, false reasoning, and false interpretation of Scripture; and if I have said any thing, which may help to convince you, that you have borne too hard upon him, and which may incline you to make him some publick reparation, or at least to repent betwixt God and your own conscience of the wrong you have done him, I shall not think my pains ill bestowed; and the least intimation of any such effect would engage me to be, with the greatest esteem and respect,

S I R,

Your most humble servants.

A
VINDICATION
OF
Mr. LOCKE's Christian Principles,
FROM
the injurious Imputations
OF
Dr. *HOLDSWORTH*.

PART I.

Now first published.

VINDICATION

OF
MR. LOCKYER'S Christian Principles
AS SET FORTH IN HIS Christian Principles

REVISED BY
B. R. O. M.

THE author of the Christian Principles, in his preface, has made me aware, for a right treatment, that I should be able to go through with, in the face of your zeal, and an unshaken heart. However, I shall not attempt to do so, but since I must own a great conclusion in you, to bestow so much learning and labour in my manner, upon my short and plain remarks; especially, when a great deal of it might have been spared, without losing any thing of the force of your arguments. I shall therefore give no answer to many personal slight, cavils, and reproaches, all along thrown at me; and shall even pass over a great deal of what may be called mere railing at Mr. Lockyer, since these things have nothing to do with the question in hand, and would be an unnecessary trespass upon the reader's patience. But there is one of your remarks, which, though it concerns me alone, I am tempted to take notice of, for the singular ingenuity of it.

A
VINDICATION
O F

Mr. LOCKE's Christian Principles.

REVEREND SIR,

THE hopes you express in your introduction, of having it in your power to treat me personally with decency and respect, made me *hope* too for a gentler treatment, than it seems you was able to go through with, in the heat of your zeal against an imagined heretic. However I willingly submit to some rough language, since I must own it a great condescension in you, to bestow so much learning and labour in any manner, upon my short and plain remarks; especially, when a great deal of it might have been spared, without losing any thing of the force of your arguments. I shall therefore give no answer to many personal slights, cavils, and reproaches, all along thrown at me; and shall even pass over a great deal of what may be called mere railing at Mr. *Locke*; since these things have nothing to do with the question in hand, and would be an unnecessary trespass upon the reader's patience. But there is one of your remarks, which, though it concerns me alone, I am tempted to take notice of, for the singular ingenuity of it.

I had

I had said, that the *intention* of my *Letter* was to do Mr. *Locke* justice; and that my *only motives* to it were a love of truth, and a concern for the interests of religion. To which you answer: "The defence of Mr. *Locke* may possibly be thought very consistent with truth and religion; but then it is certainly a motive distinct from them both; and if that were the third motive, it is plain the other two were not the only motives."

Such an extraordinary piece of logic from a learned member of a famous university cannot but have its due weight with me; and therefore I shall from henceforth acknowledge, that my *third motive* for defending Mr. *Locke* was to defend Mr. *Locke*. But, notwithstanding this *third motive*, which you have ingeniously found out for me, you may, if you please, believe me, when I say, that if you had opposed and censured Mr. *Locke*, without any injury to *truth*, or the *interests of religion*, I should have been silent, and had no motive at all to write in his defence. To the charge of having been led into it by *prejudice*, *partiality*, and a *blind veneration for a celebrated name*; I shall only retort, that if my papers have given any ground to think, that I am *blind with prejudice* in favour of Mr. *Locke*, yours have made it pretty evident, that you are too much prejudiced against him, to see any thing, that concerns him, in a *true light*.

Of this we have an early instance in your second chapter, by the character you have there drawn of him, and his *manner* of writing; the finishing strokes of which, I shall here transcribe as a sample of that *false light*, in which you represent him throughout your book. "He always treated his adversaries with so much haughtiness and scorn, and insolence of language, that his management of the controversy became much more grievous and insupportable, than any clearness or strength
" of

“ of his reason ; and so they rather dropt the man
“ than his argument.”

I dare say, Sir, if you had not set a name to this picture, no body could have guessed for whom it was meant : it certainly resembles no one less than it does Mr. *Locke*. He was eminently a well-bred mannerly writer^a, and had a singular soft and respectful way of insinuating those arguments, which most pressed his adversaries ; which was always his way of *management* ; unless he had to do with writers of Mr. *Edwards's* spirit, whose usage of him demanded another kind of treatment. In the controversy betwixt him, and the Bishop of *Worcester*, (which you think it not impossible might be managed in the way you have represented) he remarkably preserved all the respect, that was due to the Bishop's station and character ; no insolence appeared, but that of daring to defend himself against a person of such eminence, and presuming to shew, where the weak side of his objections lay ; so that there was no occasion given to *drop the man*, if his arguments could have been defeated. This, Sir, is a fact, which gained the general approbation at that time, and for which the controversies themselves may be now appealed to ; and those, who consult them impartially, will, I doubt not, find so much prejudice in all your observations upon Mr. *Locke's manner*, as may warn them what to expect in your remarks on the *matter* of his writings, which we are now going to consider.

In chapter i. you set down several *Socinian principles*, which you pretend Mr. *Locke* has maintained in his writings ; and that therefore you might justly call him a *Socinian writer* in your sermon ; which was the first imputation I had singled out to complain of. But as your proofs of his agreement with the *Socinians* in those points do not occur till

^a Vide second and third Letters concerning Toleration. And his answer to the Occasional Paper.

long after, I shall consider them^b in their place, and doubt not to make it appear, that you had no sufficient grounds from them for such a charge.

In the mean time you enquire chap. iii. whether Mr. Locke was a Socinian in the doctrine of the Trinity. And give us your proofs, that he was, in sect. i. from *the reasonableness of Christianity*, and the two vindications of it: Which we must first examine.

I pass over your preliminaries, and groundless observation, to come to the great points maintained in those books, upon which your charge of *Socinianism* is founded: They are these.

“ That believing *Jesus* to be the *Messiah* was
“ all, that was required to make any man a Christian, who first acknowledged the one eternal God.

“ That the belief, that *Jesus* was *the Son of God*,
“ was nothing more than this. And

“ That whenever the expression of *the Son of God* is used in all the Scripture, the signification
“ of it is only, that *Jesus* was the *Messiah*.”

The first of these propositions, you yourself, Sir, seem to own the truth of, when you say^c, “ Neither will I enter into the examination of that
“ question, viz. whether the belief, that *Jesus* is the
“ *Messiah*, be all, that is required to be believed
“ to make a man a Christian; for there is no doubt
“ but all men are made Christians, and must be
“ saved by faith in *Christ*.”

If there is *no doubt* of this, it must be, because it is a doctrine contained in the Scriptures. Why then is it brought as one of the articles to prove Mr. Locke a Socinian? Why may he not be allowed (without owing it to Socinus, or *the richness of his own invention*) to have found this truth in the Scriptures? And if Socinus happened to find it there too, must Mr. Locke be obliged either to give it up, or to bear the imputation of *Socinianism*, for

^b Chap. ii. § iii.

^c Page 18.

^d Page 20.

embracing a truth in common with that heretic? At this rate he might have been required to renounce his *Bible*, because *Socinus* believed it. But this article is for the present dropped.

“What you insist upon against him under this head, is, that the words *thr. Son of God* signify and mean, not only the *Messiah*, but also the divine nature of *Jesus Christ*; that it was the opinion of the *Jews*, that their *Messiah* was not only to be an extraordinary man, but a divine person; and that this was proposed to the faith of those, who were made *Christians* in the preachings of *Christ* himself, and his Apostles: and this you doubt not will clearly appear, if we distinctly consider the use and import of this phrase *Son of God*, in those passages of the *Evangelists*, and *Acts* of the Apostles, where Mr. *Locke* has traced it.”

You will not now, it seems, insist, “that the phrase *Son of God* must be always distinct from, and imply something more than the *Christ*, because the one is often joined with the other expression in the same sentence.” Though you had once, as Mr. *Edwards* does, laid great stress upon that argument, which upon second thoughts you have given up.

“But there are other undeniable proofs, you say, That *Christ*, or *Messiah*, and the Son of God, were very different appellations, and generally implied different things, when predicated of *Jesus*.”

You then proceed, to consider the places of Scripture, from whence you collect these *undeniable proofs*; and most of them are the very same, from which not only Mr. *Locke*, but a very eminent Prelate of our church, has drawn the contrary con-

clusion; of which I shall have occasion to take further notice hereafter. Mr. *Locke*, on his part, to prove, that *Son of God* and *Messiah*, are synonymous expressions, argues from several texts compared with one another. As, when our Saviour asks his Disciples, whom they thought him to be, *Peter's* answer is set down in these words, *Mark* viii. 29. *Thou art the Messiah*; in *Luke* ix. 20. *The Messiah of God*; and *Matth.* xvi. 16. *Thou art the Messiah, the Son of the living God*. Which expressions, says he, we may hence gather, amount to the same thing. In like manner he compares *John* i. 45. with verse 49. *Luke* xxii. 70. with the three preceding verses, *Acts* ix. 20. with verse 22. from which places, so compared, he concludes, that *Son of God*, and *Messiah*, signify the same thing.

This method of reasoning, from texts compared with one another, as it is the surest way to find out the true sense of Scripture, so it shews us the sincerity of what he professes in his vindications; that he “ took not the sense of the texts in debate, “ from the *Antitrinitarians* and *Racovians*, but from “ the Scripture itself, giving light to its own meaning by one place compared with another.”

You on the other hand argue, from the different conduct of our Saviour himself, and of others towards him, with regard to those two titles, that they must have been understood to imply *different* things. Which of these two contrary opinions are best supported, I am not obliged to consider by the design of this undertaking; which is not to defend Mr. *Locke's* interpretations of Scripture, but to shew, that he has not by them given any ground to justify your charge of *Socinianism*.

However, in regard to truth, and to the judgment of many orthodox divines, who have main-

tained with him, that *Son of God* and *Messiah* have always the same signification in Scripture, I shall make some observations on the chief arguments you have brought to prove, that they generally signify *different* things; which may help us to see, whether they are so clear, so *undeniable*, as you suppose them to be.

The sum of what you offer in proof of this, is, that our Saviour freely owned himself at all times to be the *Son of God*; but with great reserve, if ever, to the unbelieving *Jews*, that he was the *Messiah*. That he forbade his Disciples to make known, that he was the *Messiah*; but laid them under no such obligation, as to the title of the *Son of God*. That when the unclean spirits cried, saying, *Thou art the Son of God*, it would have been in vain to have charged them not to make him known, if *Son of God* and *Messiah* had been titles of the same import; for then confessing him to be the one, would have discovered him to be the other.

In answer to this, it may be remarked, that the account we have in the Gospels, of the malice and cunning of the *Jews*, in endeavouring to lay hold of our Saviour's words, that they might have wherewith to accuse him, gives great light into the reasons of this different conduct of his, without supposing any difference in the signification of those two appellations. It was, no doubt, known to the *Romans*, that the *Jews* expected a temporal king and deliverer, under the title of *Messiah*; and therefore our Lord did with great prudence, all along, avoid taking upon himself that title, (as he avoided being made a king) that his enemies might have no ground to accuse him as a mover of sedition. But *Son of God*, though equally understood, both by his Disciples, and by the unbe-

lieving *Jews*, to signify the same with *Messiah*, (for, it is plainly upon a supposition of his being, or pretending to be, the *Messiah*, that the first confessed him to be, and the others enquired whether he was, the *Son of God*) yet this title being not so peculiarly appropriated to him, but that it had been applied to other eminent persons, and might denote the character of a great prophet, was less obnoxious to the *Roman* governor; and therefore freely owned by our Lord at all times, and in all places.

The same observation will take off the force of most of your other arguments. As to that, which you urge from our Saviour's charging the unclean spirits not to make him known, which you say would have been in vain, when they had already done it, by saying, *Thou art the Son of God*, if that title signifies the same with *Messiah*, I see no ground for supposing, that this charge relates to the very time and place, where they had already proclaimed who he was. It seems a command not to publish farther abroad, that he was the *Messiah*; probably, that it might not come to the knowledge of the supreme powers, who might have been alarmed with that title.

This reason of our Saviour's conduct will likewise account for that of the *Jews*, and their high-priests, whom you suppose^h to have "thought
" there was a wide difference between those two
" titles, because when *Jesus* appropriated that of
" *Son of God* to himself, they still charged him
" with blasphemy; whilst the worst construction
" they could put on his being called the *Christ*, or
" *Messiah*, was only sedition or treason. Which
" distinction, you conclude, they could not have
" been inclined to make, if they had apprehended,
" that *Messiah*, and *Son of God*, were names im-
" plying the same thing."

^h Page 28.

Sedition and treason were crimes against the authority of the *Romans*; and if the *Jews* and high-priests apprehended, that the title of *Messiah* was obnoxious to them, as that by which the great king, whom they expected to free them from the *Roman* yoke, was commonly known, it was natural for their malice to cry out sedition, upon his being called *Messiah*; a title, which the *Jews* would fain have drawn our Saviour to own, that they might make a handle of it, wherewith to accuse him before the *Roman* governors.

But as he carefully avoided this snare, yet he freely owned the title of *Son of God*, which could be no ground of accusation to the *Romans*; when they found they could not fasten the charge of treason against him, they accuse him of blasphemy, which was a crime against their own law, that they might get him condemned upon that. But this can be no argument, that they did not *themselves* apprehend *Messiah*, and *Son of God*, to be names implying the same thing, since it was only, as they denied him to be their *Messiah*, that they accused him of blasphemy, for calling himself the *Son of God*; a title, which they knew belonged to that office; and, on the other hand, it was upon that supposition only of his pretending to be the *Messiah*, that they inquire, *Art thou the Son of God?* And it is remarkable, that our Saviour in defending himself against the charge of blasphemy, maintains his claim to the title of *Son of God*, solely on account of his office as *Messiah*; though with his usual caution he does not name it, *Say ye of him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God*ⁱ; which passage alone might be sufficient to determine the sense of that phrase.

ⁱ John x. 36.

What has been said makes it needless to give a particular answer to your argument ^k from the distinction our Saviour himself made, when being asked by the chief-priests, *Art thou the Christ? Art thou the Son of God?* he declined saying, that he was the *Christ*, but owned himself the *Son of God*; upon which you conclude, "no question he did not distinguish without a difference." A difference there certainly was, in the consequence of owning one, rather than the other of those titles, as I have observed above; which sufficiently accounts for our Saviour's conduct, without supposing a real difference in their meaning: and I believe those, who would infer from this conduct, that those two titles must have *different significations*, will be at a loss to find any other reason for our Saviour's owning himself to be the *Son of God*; and declining to own, that he was the *Christ*, than that which I have mentioned. And if this was the true reason for his making such a distinction, it can never be proved from thence, that there was any other ground for it.

Nay, I am almost persuaded, notwithstanding the weight you seem to lay on this argument, you do not yourself imagine, that the Chief-priests in questioning our Saviour, had any other intention (though they varied the terms of their question) than to know, whether he would profess himself to be the *Messiah* or not. Their question, as we have it in one of the Evangelists, is plainly one, though both the terms are expressed, *I adjure thee by the living God, tell us if thou be the Christ the Son of God*. Nor do I believe you will deny, that when our Lord owned himself to be the *Son of God*, they as much understood him to mean, that he was the *Messiah*, as if he had directly affirmed it; or that he certainly knew they would so understand

him, which they manifestly did. For when he was on the cross, they reproached him with having falsely pretended to be the *Messiah*, though he had never publickly taken upon him that character, otherwise than by owning himself to be the *Son of God*. And therefore our Saviour's answering the last, when he had declined to answer the first question, could not be on account of any real difference in the meaning of the expressions, or in the apprehension of the *Jews* concerning them; but only, as has been said, to avoid giving them any handle, whereby they might accuse him of sedition to the *Roman* government. So that from none of these places of Scripture is it so clearly proved, as you¹ pretend, that Son of God is distinguished from *Messiah*, when predicated of Jesus.

As for those passages, in which *Son of God* is distinguished from, by being directly predicated of, *Christ*, or *Messiah*^m; you tell us, Mr. Locke pretends, that "there the word *Christ* is only a proper name." But that he should make this good (say you) in the places cited, is impossible. It might be expected you should have given us some reasons, why this is impossible; but perhaps, you did not find it so easy to refute, as to rail at the assertion, by calling it false and ridiculous, a mean and low evasion. A censure, which if the assertion has any support from Scripture or history, must itself pass for nothing but a poor evasion. And that we may the better see, whether there is not some ground for the assertion in Scripture, give me leave to consider a little that one passage, which you have particularly set down here, where Mr. Locke pretends, that "the word *Christ* is only a proper name." It is *Acts ix. 20.* where it is said of St. Paul, straightway he preached Christ in the

¹ Page 33.

^m Ibid.

synagogues, that he is the Son of God. Now if *Christ* is here to be taken for the dignity or office of the *Messiah*, it must be supposed, that the *Jews*, to whom *St. Paul* preached, already knew, that *Jesus* was the *Messiah*, and only wanted to be informed, that this *Messiah* was the *Son of God*: for it is plain, that he instructs them in something, which they did *not* know, of one whom they *did* know, by the name or title of *Christ*, *that Christ is the Son of God.* Whereas, it clearly appears, by verse 22, that the persons, to whom he preached, were such, as *denied* him to be the *Messiah*; for it is there said, that he *confounded the Jews, proving that this is very Christ.* But if the word *Christ* in verse 20, is to be taken for a proper name, as *Mr. Locke* contends, then the sense will be the same as in verse 22, this person called *Christ* is truly *the Christ*, or *the Son of God.* And indeed these two verses compared together do very much illustrate one another, since they relate to us the same preaching, at the same time, and to the same persons; for it cannot be doubted, that the same doctrine is delivered ver. 20, in these words, *that he (Christ) is the Son of God*, and ver. 22, in these words, *that this is very Christ*, which both shews, that those expressions signify the same thing, and that *Christ* must be understood as a proper name in verse 20, unless we can imagine, that *St. Paul* there takes for granted, that those very persons owned *Jesus* to be the *Christ*, or *Messiah*, whom immediately after he mightily confounded by proving, that he was truly so, *that this is very Christ.* It may likewise be farther observed here, that the same word, as a proper name, seems to be the antecedent implied, which the relative *This*, in verse 22. necessarily requires; *Christ* (the person commonly so called) *this is very Christ.*

Mr. Locke maintains, that many other places of Scripture plainly require, that *Christ* should be taken

taken as a proper name, particularly *Acts* iii. 6. iv. 10. and all those places, where the words are, *In and by the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth*; because, as he argues, if *Christ* in those places signified the personal dignity or office of the *Messiah*, the word *Nazareth* would bring an inconvenient relation upon it, as it stands in the text. These, Sir, are not *bare assertions*: reasons are brought from Scripture to shew, that *Christ* is sometimes used there as a proper name; and whether it is a sufficient answer *barely to deny it*, as you pretend, must be left to others to judge.

Mr. *Locke* had farther urged on this subject, that as it was usual for the disciples of eminent philosophers to be called by the name of their master, so the followers of *Christ* were called *Christians*, from their master's name: and this he confirms by observations from *Tacitus* and *Suetonius*, where our Saviour is called *Christ*, as a proper name. But these are contemptible arguments with you. "It may be presumed, you say", that the first *Christians* thought it a greater honour to be called by the kingly style of their Lord, and with that view gave themselves that name: and in what manner *Agrippa*, or the *Roman* historians, used, or applied the words *Christ*, or *Christians*, it is not in the least to the purpose to enquire."

But may it not be *presumed* (at least as probably) that the name of *Christians* was first given to the followers of *Christ* by the unbelievers? Who might derive it, as was usual, from their master's name. We are not told, that the Disciples called themselves, but that they were called, *Christians*, first at *Antioch*. But whosoever gave them that name, it was certainly very much to the purpose of the question in hand, to enquire how the *Roman* historians

applied the words *Christ* or *Christians*. For when the sense of some passages of Scripture seems to require, that *Christ* should be taken as a proper name, it is sure a great confirmation of that sense, if we find the word so applied by the *Roman* historians; and makes it the more probable, that from the time of the Apostles down to them, *Christ* was sometimes used as a proper name.

Your next argument to prove, that *Son of God* does not signify the same with *Messiah*, is, that °
 “ our Saviour, in several places of the Evangelists,
 “ calls himself the *Son of Man*. And you believe
 “ it will not be questioned, but that this expression
 “ signifies the *Messiah*.” Upon which you ask,
 “ if there is no difference between the meaning of
 “ these two expressions, *Son of God*, and *Son of*
 “ *Man*, though both applied to the same person?”
 To this, I answer, that if both these appellations are given to our Saviour, on account of his Messiahship, as that of *Son of God* most unquestionably is; then they both mean the same thing, when so applied, how exalted a sense soever the one may otherwise have more than the other. That the title of *Son of Man* belongs to the *Messiah* will certainly not be questioned, since he often applied it to himself: yet that it signifies or imports the great office, to which he was appointed, as that of *Son of God* and *Messiah* do, may perhaps bear a question, as what cannot be so clearly proved, though you take it for granted. It must be confessed, that we are left very much in the dark, on what account it is, that our Saviour *peculiarly* styles himself *the Son of Man*, probably alluding to the vision in *Daniel*: and as no solid argument can be founded upon titles, that are not absolutely incommunicable, which neither of these are, I see not how any certain *conclusion* can be drawn from them.

However, from all these observations of yours laid together, you go on with ^p consequence upon consequence, till you have concluded Mr. Locke a Socinian convict. "If, say you, the words *Son of God* cannot signify the same with *Son of Man*, nor barely the same with *Messiah*, they signify his divine nature; and if they signify his divine nature, then the divine nature of *Messiah* was also a part of that faith, which was necessary to make men *Christians*: and if so, then a man, who endeavours to persuade the world, that it is not necessary, may be supposed to deny it: and to deny the divine nature of *Jesus Christ* is *Socinianism* in the doctrine of the Trinity. And therefore Mr. Locke may be justly charged with it in these his writings."

Not so fast, good Sir, though we have here the whole foundation of your charge against Mr. Locke, your conclusions may not so certainly follow from the premises, as you imagine. First, it is possible, that the words *Son of God* may in their most exalted sense signify the divine nature of our Saviour; and yet that sense of them not have been so plainly taught, as to be part of the faith, which was necessary to make men *Christians*; since that title was undeniably applied to our Saviour on many other accounts. Or, secondly, it is possible, at least, for a man to think, that that highest sense of those words was not commonly understood by all, who acknowledged *Jesus* to be the *Messiah* the *Son of God*; or even to think, that those words do not signify his divine nature, without denying his divine nature, if there are other proofs of it in Scripture. For by what rule, I pray, must a man be supposed to deny the truth of a doctrine, because he does not think it contained in some cer-

tain words, when there are several stronger proofs of it? Or, because he thinks the belief of it is not absolutely required to make a man a *Christian*? Do you, Sir, acknowledge no truths in the Scriptures, the explicate belief of which you do not think necessary to make a man a *Christian*? If so, you must have a larger catalogue of fundamentals than was ever yet heard of in the Christian church: Or else you must allow us to *suppose*, by your own rule of judging Mr. *Locke*, that you *deny* many important truths contained in the *Holy Bible*.

But Mr. *Locke* has left no room to *suppose* this of him, for he has plainly declared, that “ though “ it is certain, that what our Saviour and his Apostles admitted men into the Church for believing, “ is all, that is absolutely required to make a man “ a *Christian*; yet this is not in defiance of all the “ rest: this excludes not the belief of any of those “ many truths contained in the Scriptures, which “ it is the duty of every *Christian* to study, and “ thereby build himself up on our most holy “ faith.” This Mr. *Locke* asserts more than once: and why may not that doctrine, which you will needs *suppose* him to deny, be one of those truths, which he affirms, “ it is the duty of every *Christian* “ to study, and thereby build himself up on our “ most holy faith, though not absolutely necessary “ to make him a *Christian*?” Let us but *suppose* this, and your sole proof of Mr. *Locke*’s being a *Socinian* from these his writings falls entirely to the ground.

Nor can his denying, that the words, *Son of God*, were understood by all, who used them, to signify the divine nature of the *Messiah*, be any bar to this supposition: for you must allow, Sir, that the proofs of our Saviour’s divinity cannot be taken chiefly, much less solely, from his being styled in
Scrip-

Scripture the *Son of God*; since it is undeniably plain, that *that* title is given him on several other accounts, (Bishop *Pearson* reckons four) and therefore it would be impossible to maintain his divine nature on that foundation alone, without the support of other places of Scripture, where the *attributes* and *works* of the supreme God are ascribed to him. So that those, who think the words *Son of God*, are every where in Scripture used to signify no more than the *Messiah*, may yet firmly believe the divine nature of that *Messiah*, from the authority of those more *undeniable proofs*.

This evidently appears to have been the case of many eminent divines of our Church, who were strenuous assertors of our Saviour's divinity, though they maintained the same sense of those words, in which Mr. *Locke* understood them. Some of these he has quoted in his vindication, *viz.* Archbishop *Tillotson*, Bishop *Taylor*, and Bishop *Patrick*. From the first he cites these words concerning *Nathanael*; "and being satisfied, that he (our Saviour) was the *Messiah*, he presently owned him for such, calling him the *Son of God*, and the *King of Israel*." From Bishop *Patrick's* witnesses to Christianity, p. 14. he gives us these words, "to be the *Son of God*, and to be *Christ*, being but different expressions of the same thing;" and p. 10. "It is the very same thing to believe, that *Jesus* is the *Son of God*, and to believe, that *Jesus* is the *Christ*, express it how you please. This alone is the faith, which regenerates a man."

Against the authority of those great men you object⁹, that Bishop *Taylor* was known to have had many singular and false opinions; and that Archbishop *Tillotson* was not free from the charge of being a *Socinian*. As to the first, I shall only

say here, that whatever singular opinions he had, he was known to be no *Socinian*; which is all that is requisite to the point in question. And as to your exception against the Archbishop, it is of a piece with your censures of Mr. *Locke*, founded on suspicions, and uncertain conjectures. If the Archbishop has any where maintained *Socinian* heresies, it is *too little* to say, *he was not free from that charge*: if he has not, it is *too much*: such calumnies are not to be so lightly dealt about. But since you have thought fit to except against him on that account, give me leave to substitute another for his and Mr. *Locke*'s support, against whom I believe you will find no exception, and that is Bishop *Pearson*, who has these express words, "to be the *Christ*, and to be the *Son of God*, were ever inseparable, and even by the *Jews* themselves accounted equivalent." And in proof, that the *Jews* did account those expressions equivalent, he produces those very texts, which you bring to shew, that they are not equivalent, of which I gave some hint before. "Thus, says he, *Nathanael* that true *Israelite* maketh his confession of the *Messias*, *Rabbi thou art the Son of God*, &c. Thus *Martha* makes expression of her faith, *I believe, that thou art the Christ the Son of God, which should come into the world*. Thus the High-Priest makes his inquisition, *I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ the Son of God*. This was the famous confession of St. *Peter*. And the Gospel of St. *John* was therefore written, that we might believe that *Jesus* is the *Christ the Son of God*." All these passages, from which you conclude, that *Son of God* cannot signify the same with *Messiah* or the *Christ*, and upon which you lay the chief weight of your charge

against Mr. *Locke*, for maintaining that they do mean the same thing; Bishop *Pearson* quotes, to shew, that those expressions are equivalent, and by the *Jews* so accounted; and the ground of this their faith, he tells us, was a constant interpretation of the second *Psalms*, as appropriated to him. Which *Psalms* you know is in the *New Testament* applied to our Saviour on account of his resurrection.

The single authority of this last named *Prelate* might have superseded all other arguments in defence of Mr. *Locke* upon this point, since it sufficiently justifies his interpretation of those texts: And as you could not but know, that the same sense of them was maintained by this unquestionably orthodox divine, as well by those others before cited, that alone ought to have prevented your vain labour to support the charge of *Socinianism* upon a foundation so evidently insufficient.

To this argument you object indeed, that “when
“ a man is firmly engaged in the defence or advancement of heretical opinions, it is not popular names, and great authorities, not any of
“ those Bishops cited by Mr. *Locke*, that can screen
“ him from the ill reputation of them.” But what is this to the purpose? It is not pretended, that Mr. *Locke* was engaged in defending or advancing heretical opinions, otherwise, than by interpreting certain texts of Scripture, as they are said to be understood by the *Socinians*. And if it be abundantly shewn, that *this* is the avowed sense of many great divines acknowledged to be no *Socinians*, their authority must undoubtedly screen him from being convicted of *Socinianism* on that account.

You had just before produced some words of Mr. *Locke's* on this subject, where you say, “He

^c *Acts* xiii. 33. *Luke* xx. 36. *Rom.* i. 4. ^v Page 36.

^w Page 35.

owns, that he understands many places of Scripture as the *Socinians* do; though he is so far from *owning* this, that he denies, that he knows any thing of it, but what his adversary had told him. For what reason you set down part of that passage, I know not, unless it be to introduce a *remark*, which perhaps you may think has some smartness in it. But you have given it us so imperfect, and so partially, that I must beg leave to transcribe the place more at large; because I think the part you have omitted, very much conduces to set it in a light, that can reflect no dishonour upon the author of it, nor answer any purpose of yours. The passage, as I find it in the *Vindication*, from which you quoted it, stands thus: "I know not but it may be true, that the *Antitrinitarians* and *Racovians* understand those places as I do: but it is *more than I know*, that they do so. I took not my sense of those texts from those writers, but from the Scripture itself, giving light to its own meaning, by one place compared with another. What *in this way* appears to me its true meaning, I shall not decline, because *I am told*, it is so understood by the *Racovians*, whom I never yet read. If the sense, wherein I understand those texts, be a mistake, I shall be beholden to you, if you will set me right: but they are not popular authorities, or frightful names, whereby I judge of truth or falsehood."

Upon this passage, as you had mangled it, you judiciously remark, "This seems to have been one of Mr. *Locke's* particularities: he would enjoy the opinion, but disown the bad company." Whether this be a *particularity* or not, I humbly conceive there is nothing wrong in it. He had certainly reason to *disown* the company, whose opinions he never consulted or knew, when he had so much better grounds for his, by comparing places

places of Scripture; and so much better company, as we have shewn, to countenance him in it.

You next * observe, "that Mr. Locke, in the place above cited, thinks it hard upon him to be thought a *Socinian*, for following (so you express it) the *Socinian* opinion in one point; and therefore, says he, I must certainly be of their persuasion in every thing else." To which you answer, "No, this is not necessarily to be inferred; but so much is certain and necessary, that he, that joins with the *Socinians* in their great and distinguishing doctrines, may be justly called a *Socinian*, though he does not acknowledge all their errors; as a man would be a *Mahometan*, who believed in *Mahomet*, though he did not receive into his faith all the errors of the *Alcoran*."

This is just as much to the purpose, and of the same kind with the objection taken notice of above. How is it at all an answer to Mr. Locke's complaint? It was not for joining with the *Socinians* in their great and distinguishing doctrines, that Mr. Edwards had then, or that you have now, charged him with being a *Socinian*; but for agreeing with them in that one point of understanding this phrase, *the Son of God*, in those texts, where our Saviour is so called, to signify the same with *Messiah*. This has been shewn to be no such distinguishing doctrine of theirs, that if Mr. Locke had been disposed to take his sense of those texts from any other authority than that of the Scripture, he had any need of going to them for it, since we have so many orthodox divines, from whom he might have had the same doctrine: and as their concurrent opinion sufficiently shews, that it cannot be inferred from his interpretation of those texts, that he denies the

* Page 36.

divine nature of *Jesus Christ*; he might well think it not only *hard*, but most unreasonable, and unjust, to conclude him a *Socinian* barely on that account.

In pages 37 and 38, you give us a notable declamation upon some scraps collected here and there, out of Mr. *Locke's* two *Vindications*, which I might well pass over, as there is no manner of argument or reasoning in it, nor one word to the purpose you was then upon, of proving him a *Socinian*. What indeed can be proved from disjointed sentences patched in that manner together? And what can be more unjust or groundless, than that which you there (after Mr. *Edwards's* example) retort on Mr. *Locke* as a *creed-maker*, *imposing his authority*, and *insolently dictating to others*? For no man can communicate his thoughts in a less imposing manner, than he has done in his *reasonableness of Christianity*. One need only read his preface to that book, to be convinced of this, of which I give you a part in the following words: "If by this my labour, " thou receivest any light, join with me in thanks " to the Father of lights. If upon a fair and " unprejudiced examination, thou findest I have " mistaken the sense and tenor of the Gospel, " I beseech thee, as a true *Christian*, in the spirit of " the Gospel, which is that of charity, and in the " words of sobriety, set me right in the doctrine " of salvation." Is this, Sir, the language of an *imposing creed-maker*? Or is it not a full refutation of all that fine piece of rhetoric, which you have brought in by head and shoulders, only to make a flourish? You then return to your task of proving Mr. *Locke* a *Socinian*.

This you say *will appear*, if we consider his particular interpretation of some of the texts before-mentioned; to which you next proceed, and continue

through the nine following pages. Most of the texts you there instance in, are some of those, where *Son of God* is applied to our Saviour, and by Mr. Locke understood to mean no more than *Messiah*. But as part of them has been already considered, and enough said on that point to shew, that his interpretation of those texts, whether true or false, affords no foundation for your charge against him, it is needless to be more particular in considering them, though I may have occasion to take notice of some objections of yours against his reasonings on that subject. In the mean time, let us stop at page 42. where you mention Mr. Locke's sense of several other texts, on which your candour in judging of his intentions is not a little remarkable.

He had cited ² three places, where in the original, there is only *I am*, which he says implies, *I am the Christ*, the sense necessarily requiring the word *Christ* to be supplied. But you tell us, "there is ^a one place, which he considered not, where the word *Christ* cannot be supplied. And that is, where our Lord tells the Jews, *Verily, verily, I say unto you, before Abraham was, I am*." After which you give us this wonderfully just and charitable remark ^b. "Mr. Locke; no doubt, saw these texts stand in his way against him, and implying the divinity of the *Messiah*; and therefore; though he was upon another pursuit in the places, where he speaks to them, he thought it worth his while, as it were *en passant*, to subdue them to himself." The last of these texts, which you have brought in here, where it had nothing to do, is the only one of them, that can imply the divinity of the *Messiah*; and this text you own; Mr. Locke did not consider, that is, he meddled not at all with it: how then can he be said to intend to subdue it to himself? He had indeed

^a John xiii. 19. Luke xxi. 8. Matth. xxiv. 5. ^a John viii. 58. ^b Page 43.

no occasion to consider it, for he was speaking only of texts, where the word *Christ* must be supplied, and he knew it could not be supplied in this: nor could he intend to *subdue* those other texts to himself, which he did consider, since he gives them no other sense than our translators understood them in, who have put in all of them *I am He*, or, *I am the Christ*, as the occasion of the words plainly demand in those places. What ground then could you possibly have for this remark from those texts? Or how indeed could any texts *stand in his way*, or be *against him*, by *implying the divinity of the Messiah*, unless he had attempted to oppose that doctrine? Whereas you know he never wrote one word against it. What then must we think of this treatment? Is it justice? is it charity? or what is it?

But lest all you have hitherto insisted on should not do your business, 'you challenge Mr. *Locke's* friends to *acquit him if they can from being Socinian* in another place, where, as you tell us, "*Son of God* is a title at last grown so mean with him, that he supposes *Adam* was called so, by as just a title as the only Begotten of the Father; and that only because they both received immortality from God the Father." Upon which you desire Mr. *Locke's* friends "to consider, with what consistency *Adam* can be equally a son with the only Begotten of the Father; or how equally possessed of immortality with him, who was in the beginning with God, and who made *Adam*, and all things that were made."

As a friend to truth, Sir, and in justice to Mr. *Locke*, I must take the liberty to assure you, that he does not, in the place you quote, nor in any other that I know of, say, that *Adam* was called *Son of God*,

by as just a title as the only begotten of the Father, or that they were equally his sons. Neither does he make our Saviour's having received immortality from God the foundation of his sonship, as you pretend, but one consequence of it. These assertions, therefore, being none of Mr. Locke's, but an injurious comment on his words, his friends are not accountable for the mistakes, or misrepresentations of others. He says in that place, that our Saviour was properly the Son of God, and that, as such, immortality was his natural right. But he has no where applied the title of only begotten Son to him on any account, that respects his human nature: this title must belong to that nature, which he had with the Father, before the world was. And as it is manifestly incommunicable, no person can be said to be equally a son, or by as just a title as the only begotten of the Father, or equally possessed of immortality with him, who was in the beginning with God. Nor has Mr. Locke ever said any such thing. I challenge all his enemies to produce, if they can, any such expressions of his. But the bare title of Son of God is distinguished in Scripture from that of only begotten, by being undeniably ascribed to our Lord on several grounds, which can only be applicable to his human nature, as his mission, his conception, his resurrection; and therefore if with these, Mr. Locke, when he is speaking of that image and likeness of God, which Adam received, and lost by his fall, and to which we are restored by Jesus Christ; if he reckons that likeness of immortality, which Christ also received of the Father, to be one of the reasons for his being stiled, as Adam was, the Son of God, I see neither extravagance, as you term it, nor Socinianism in it; since it leaves him in the sole possession of that incommunicable, and greatly superiour stile the only begotten of the Father, who was in the beginning with God. Texts, which you cannot pretend Mr. Locke has either directly, or en passant, ever at-

tempted (in your candid expression) *to subdue to himself.*

The next thing we meet with, is your objections to Mr. *Locke's* reasonings, which I promised to take some notice of, tho' I had already sufficiently discussed the subject they are upon. He asks, "whether it can be imagined, that the unclean spirits, when they cried out, *Thou art the Son of God*, had a mind to acknowledge and publish the deity of our Saviour. To which you answer, *No*. "Nor that "*Jesus* was the *Messiah* neither. Their confession "no doubt was extorted from them, and they trembled at his power, while they obeyed it." Pray, Sir, consider, whether the history itself does not confute this answer: our Saviour, we are told, "strictly "charged them, that they should not make him "known, and would not suffer them to speak, because "they knew him." Can it then reasonably be supposed, that he first compelled them to declare, who he was, and then would not suffer them to speak, because they did so? Or may it not be much more probably thought, that they, as well as the *Jews*, had some ends of their malice to serve, by designing to publish, that he was the *Messiah*; and that this was the reason, why they were so strictly charged not to do it.

Once more, Mr. *Locke* had urged, that *Son of God* could signify nothing else but the *Messiah*, because it was used by all sorts of persons, *Jews* and *Heathens*, believers and unbelievers. To which you answer, "That you have already made it appear, "that both friends and enemies sufficiently understood the meaning of that phrase; and that all, who "used it, apprehended, that the person, to whom "it was applied, ought to be divine." A *divine* person is an appellation of latitude, which has been given to many, who had far less title to it, than the Saviour of the world; and whether all, who used the

phrase *Son of God*, might think the person, to whom it was applied, ought to be in some sense *divine*, I shall not dispute. But that they all apprehended he was to be the one *supreme* God himself, will I believe be very difficult to *make appear*. The *Jews* knew, that their promised *Messiah* was to be of the seed of *David*: and can it be imagined, that they were so well acquainted with the doctrine of the Trinity, and the incarnation, as readily to conceive, that this *Son of David*, was likewise to be the eternally begotten *Son of God*? The only argument, by which you have pretended to make this appear, is, that they accused him of blasphemy, when he called himself the *Son of God*, and said, that God was his Father; understanding him thereby, to ascribe divinity to himself, *making himself equal with God*. And from hence you infer, *that we may see what opinion they had of the person of the Messiah; that he was to be in an equality with God*. But with submission, Sir, that accusation of theirs will by no means imply this consequence; they supposed, that our Lord was an impostor; and therefore his saying, that he came from God, that he was the *Son of God*, and that his works were the works of his Father, must in their account be 'blaspheming the name of God, by falsely making use of that name; and in aggravation of his guilt, their malice might call this, *making himself equal with God*. Or suppose they really thought he pretended to be so, that can never be a proof, that it was their opinion, *that the Messiah was to be in an equality with God*. They rather might think, that he ascribed to himself, more than belonged to that character. And if this had not been the case, if they had believed (as you pretend) that the true *Messiah* was to be equal with God, our Saviour would probably have defended himself, against the charge of blasphemy, suitably to that notion: *Say*

^f P. 31, and 42.

ye of him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, thou blasphemest, because I said I am the Son of God, when you yourselves know, that the person, whom that character denotes, is to be equal with God. Instead of any thing like this, he maintains his claim to that title only on his being the *Messiah*; and justifies his so doing from the guilt of blasphemy, not on account of his divine nature, but by the appellation given in Scripture to others deputed by God, *If they are called gods, to whom the word of God came say ye, &c.* This, Sir, I think takes off the whole weight of your proof, *that the Jews understood Son of God, to signify the divine nature of the Messiah.*

Much less can it be proved, that the *Heathens* understood it in that sense; nor have you attempted to *make this appear*. Indeed it is scarce imaginable, that the centurion, who was present at our Saviour's crucifixion, when he said, *Truly this man was the Son of God*, meant to affirm that the person, whom he had just seen expire on the cross, was the ever living God. In all probability he intended nothing more, than that he certainly was what he professed to be, a prophet sent from God, and no deceiver. This St. *Luke's* manner of expressing it confirms, *Certainly this was a righteous man*, for no doubt he gives us the sense of the centurion's words in the parallel places.

Neither do the Scriptures give us any ground to believe, that even our Lord's own Disciples, whilst they conversed so familiarly with him upon earth, when they confessed him to be *the Son of God*, meant to acknowledge his divine nature: for whatever intimations he had given them of his divinity, or how frequently soever his expressions might imply it, their understandings seem not to have been enlightened enough at that time to apprehend so sublime

^s Mark xv. 39. ^h Luke xxiii. 47.

a mystery. He had told them many things concerning himself, of a much lower nature, and more easy to be understood, which yet they did not at all conceive till after his resurrection, when he *opened their understandings*; and even then he tells them, that he had many things to say to them, but they could not bear them yet, till the Holy Spirit should come, *who would lead them into all truth*. And what truth can we suppose them less able to bear, or that more needed that divine instructor to enlighten them in, than this stupendous one, *that the word, who was God, was made flesh and dwelt among us*? And if the Disciples themselves, who had such opportunities of being informed, were so backward, as we find they were, in apprehending many doctrines relating to the *Messiah*; there is little reason to think, that they and all others, who used the phrase, *Son of God*, readily conceived it, without difficulty, and even without instruction, in that sublimest sense, in which you contend it was *understood by friends and enemies*. You say yourself, in the last text you consider in the books we are upon, “ⁱ We may imagine, that it was difficult for *Philip*, and the rest of the Apostles “ to conceive, how by seeing their master, they “ could have been said, to have seen God the Father: “ And to apprehend how he could be in the Father, “ and the Father in him.” But where would have been the difficulty of this, if they already apprehended the divine nature of their master, and his equality with God? for they must then have conceived, that he was *one God with the Father*; unless you would suppose them to believe there *were more Gods than one*. The difficulty they found in conceiving in what sense those words of their master could be true, plainly shews, that they had then no apprehension, of his being one of the persons of the indivisible godhead; and consequently that they did

not understand the *phrase Son of God*, to signify his *divine nature*; so that your pretensions to *make it appear*, that it was understood in that sense, by all sorts of persons that used it, may, I presume, by this time appear to be very insufficient for that purpose. And likewise that Mr. *Locke's* interpretation of it, in all those Scriptures we have considered, is neither *false* nor *Socinian*. So that notwithstanding all the pains you have hitherto taken, the injury of calling him a *Socinian writer*, remains still to be accounted for.

When you have done with his interpretations of Scripture, in his book called *The reasonableness of Christianity*, and the *two vindications of it*; you go on to the end of this section, with some general remarks on these books, not less groundless and unjust than the particulars we have before met with; the most considerable of which I shall take notice of as briefly as I can.

The first is, that “it would be very difficult for
“any man, who is not under very partial engage-
“ments to the memory of Mr. *Locke*, to read over
“those books of his, and not to see, that it is entirely
“his design in all of them, to destroy all proof of
“the divine nature of our Saviour, in the four
“Evangelists, and in the Acts of the Apostles.”

Enough has been already said, to let any indifferent reader see the partiality of this censure. How could Mr. *Locke* design to *destroy all proof* of the divine nature of our Saviour, by interpreting one particular phrase, in the sense it is understood by the most eminent acknowledgers of that divine nature, as has been fully shewn? Those judicious Prelates did not, it seems, ground their faith on a bare title, as you do; but on more unquestionable proofs; which proofs you cannot pretend that Mr. *Locke* has, in any of those books, attempted to destroy: so that without any partial engagements to his memory, he must be acquitted of that design.

The next thing to be noticed, are your groundless animadversions on Mr. *Locke's* asserting, *That believing Jesus to be the Messiah was all that was required to make a man a Christian*; for that is what you must mean, where you say, *sure no age of Christianity ever owned such a faith sufficient to make a man a Christian*, tho' you do not there set down his words, as what perhaps would too plainly shew the injustice of your remark. For sure, Sir, there was never any age of *Christianity*, that denied faith in *Jesus Christ* sufficient to make a man a *Christian*, tho' he should be ignorant of some truths concerning him. But whatever any age of *Christianity* has done, Dr. *Holdsworth* must allow such a faith sufficient to make a man a *Christian*; since he has told us, ¹ that "One, who joins with the *Socinians* in their great and distinguishing doctrines, may be justly called a *Socinian*, tho' he does not acknowledge all their errors; as a man would be a *Mahometan*, who believed in *Mahomet*, tho' he did not receive into his faith all the errors of the *Alcoran*." Certainly then he cannot deny, that a man is a *Christian*, who believes in *Jesus Christ*, (that distinguishing doctrine of theirs) tho' he should not receive into his faith all the truths of the Bible. And to do him justice, he has once in direct words owned this: "^m For there is no doubt (he says) but that all men are made *Christians*, and must be saved by faith in *Christ*." Tho' now this very doctrine is declaimed against, as "debasing, diminishing, and departing from the faith of *Christians*." "Our Lord himself (you say) hath fixed for ever the term, upon which we are to be made *Christians*, in that commission, which he left, to baptize all nations in the faith or belief of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. And whatever *Christians* depart from this faith," &c. Pray, Sir, when did Mr. *Locke* allow *Christians*

¹ P. 49.

^m P. 36. r. 20.

to depart from this faith? Or, what is there more in it than he requires to make them *Christians*? You know that he supposes those, who are made *Christians* by believing in Christ, to have *first acknowledged the one eternal God*; for you have yourself ^a set down this as one of the great points he maintains: Indeed believing in the *Son of God* manifestly implies believing in God the Father, whose Son he is acknowledged to be; and it must no less imply believing in the Holy Ghost; because there could be no ground for believing *Jesus* to be the *Messiah*, without believing, that the miracles, which brought them to that faith, were performed, as they were professed to be, by the power of the Holy Ghost. So that what you call *Mr. Locke's Summary or Creed* does really and necessarily include believing in the three persons, in whose name our Lord commissioned his Apostles to baptize all nations; and therefore he cannot be said to *widen the pale of Christian communion farther than he has authority to do*. Besides, baptizing and being baptized are rather consequences of our being Christians, than the *terms*, upon which we are to be made such: they are acts of obedience, by which we evidence ourselves, and are acknowledged by the church to be *Christians*. And if believing in the *Messiah* did not include faith in the Father and in the Holy Ghost, as it manifestly does; yet this plain command of being baptized in their name could not fail of being obeyed by all, who were *Christians*, as far as *Mr. Locke himself was*, and desired others should be. For he has fully and frequently told us, that those, who are made Christians by believing in the *Messiah*, are bound to believe and do, all that they find their Lord and master has taught and commanded.

If you had not read these books of his, with great prejudice, or very partial views, you must have been

^a P. 19.

convinced,

convinced, by many passages in them, that tho' he waved all doubtful disputations, for the sake of those Deists or unbelievers, for whom he owns indeed his book was chiefly intended, (and I hope no good *Christian* will blame that design) yet he was far from allowing the conclusion you think clear from his doctrine, that if a man is made a *Christian* by only believing, that *Jesus* is the *Messiah*, ^p Then the most thorough *Christian* may be such by believing this, which you call his Summary or Creed only. How groundlessly you have declaimed on this subject, must be evident to every impartial reader, who considers these words of his.

“^q And tho' by his Apostles, our Saviour taught a great many other truths, for the explaining this fundamental article of the law of faith, that *Jesus* is the *Messiah*, some whereof have a nearer, and some a more remote connexion with it, and so cannot be denied by any *Christian*, who sees that connection, or knows they are so taught; yet an *explicite* belief of any one of them is not necessarily required to make a man a *Christian*.” A little lower he says, “All these truths taught us from God are of great use to enlighten our minds, confirm our faith, stir up our affections, &c. and the more we see of them, the more we shall see, admire, and magnify, the wisdom, goodness, mercy, and love of God, in the work of our redemption: This will oblige us to search and study the *Scripture*, wherein it is contained and laid open to us.” Again, “^r All that we find in the revelation of the New Testament, being the declared will and mind of our Lord and master the *Messiah*, whom we have taken to be our King, we are bound to receive as right and truth; or else we are not his subjects, we do not believe him to be the *Messiah* our King, but cast him off, and with the

"Jews say, we will not have this man to reign
"over us."

Do these assertions, Sir, *appear calculated to diminish, and debase the faith of Christians?* Or must not that appear to be a very unjust reproach? Mr. *Locke*, you see, requires all that would be *thorough Christians*, to search the Scriptures and to believe, and do, all that they find revealed, and commanded, in the New Testament. The whole truths contained in the Bible are no doubt the objects of our faith; yet you cannot deny, that a *Christian* may happen to be ignorant of, or misapprehend some of them, without ceasing to be a *Christian*; and perhaps there is no man, who explicitly believes them all. But whosoever is ignorant of, or denies, *that Jesus is the Messiah*, sent to reveal the Will of God, tho' we could suppose him to believe all the rest of the Bible, would notwithstanding be no *Christian*. This, therefore, Mr. *Lock* calls *the fundamental article of the law of faith*, being *that*, without an explicate belief of which a man cannot possibly be a *Christian*; and upon the profession of which *alone* the first converts were admitted into the Christian church, both by our Saviour and his Apostles; as he has abundantly shewn in tracing their preachings through all the Gospels and Acts, where it is plain nothing more is taught or required, in order to their admission. Your assertion, therefore, "That Mr. *Locke* has taken away some of the known fundamentals of faith, and requires less to be believed than was required by our Saviour and his Apostles, to make a man a *Christian*," is manifestly false. It is evident, that they received men as disciples, or *Christians*, immediately upon their professing their faith in *Jesus the Messiah*. Whatever other truths *may be contained* in that fundamental article, or whatever else was necessary for them to be instructed in, after they had acknowledged the

Messiah for their Lord and master, they were no doubt taught by degrees as they could bear, or as occasion offered; which is apparent by many passages in the Epistles. And all the same truths conveyed down to us by the Scriptures, Mr. *Locke* no less requires his *Christians*, by diligently studying them, to inform themselves in, and to receive for right and truth all that they find contained in them; otherwise he declares them to have renounced their allegiance, in effect to reject the *Messiah* from being their master and king, and so, instead of being *thorough Christians*, they are in his account no *Christians* at all; as you have seen in what has been quoted from him. Many more passages there are in these ' books of his to the same purpose, which might have satisfied you, that his real intention was, first to convince Deists, that *Jesus Christ* was a teacher sent from God, and then to engage them to search in the Scriptures for what truths he had taught. So that he could not design to take away any of *the known fundamentals*, if those fundamentals are to be found in the Scriptures by a sincere enquirer.

We are now come to a new, and very unexpected accusation. After being taxed with *taking away*, Mr. *Locke* is next charged with *imposing fundamentals*.
 " ' Let him declaim (*say you*) as much as he pleases
 " against the orthodoxies, fundamentals, and systems of the several sects of *Christians*; it is plain
 " he is very far from striking out of the same old
 " road himself; and that he in his turn is as ready
 " with his set of fundamentals, his *Summary* or
 " *System*; and as willing to impose them upon
 " others, as he complains others have done before
 " him." I wish, Sir, you had been so kind as to have given us a particular of Mr. *Locke's set of fundamentals*; for as ready as you tell us he is with it, I have really never been able to find it out; unless you

† Vind. p. 8. 2d Vind. p. 84. † P. 51.

mean

mean " All that we find in the revelation of the
 " New Testament, being the declared will and mind
 " of our Lord and master ;" for it must be owned
 he obliges every *Christian* to believe this, which may
 make indeed a large catalogue of fundamentals. In
 earnest, Sir, is there no difference betwixt declaring
that one grand article to be a fundamental, without
 the belief of which no man can be a *Christian*, and
 which by consequence all *Christians* must agree in ;
 and for the rest requiring only a sincere disposition to
 receive as right and truth, whatever, they find con-
 tained in the New Testament ; is there, I ask, no dif-
 ference in this, from culling out of the Scriptures, or
 deducing from them, a select number of propositions,
 and declaring it necessary to salvation to believe
 every one of them in such a particular sense ? which
 is the *old road* Mr. *Locke* complains of, and from
 which I am persuaded you rather think he does but
 too far *strike out* ; tho' at present, to furnish matter
 for a rhetorical declamation, he is to be guilty of *im-*
posing, as well as taking away *fundamentals*. Upon
 which subject you thus go on.

" And so it will always be, while *Christians* as-
 " sume to themselves a power of declaring funda-
 " mentals, without attending enough to the per-
 " petual reception and interpretation of the ca-
 " tholic church, and what doctrines were always
 " admitted as fundamentals in it." I dare say, Sir,
 you will not deny, that all the fundamentals, Mr.
Locke has taken upon him to declare, have been *al-*
ways admitted as such in the catholic church ; and there-
 fore you might have given him your licence to *impose*
 them. But how many more doctrines may have been
 always so received, perhaps neither you, nor any
 one else can declare. It is certainly a much surer
 way in every enquiry about *fundamentals*, carefully to
 examine in the Scriptures, what is there plainly re-
 vealed, and declared to be necessary to salvation ;
 rather

rather than as you ^v direct us, to enquire what doctrines were always received as fundamental, by all the successions of Christians, from the beginning of Christianity in the catholic church. This is a task, which by far the greater number of Christians are entirely unqualified for; and I beseech you, Sir, upon whom must an unlearned man depend in this enquiry? The church of England, the Papists, the Arians, &c. will each of them give him a different set of fundamentals, and all of them pretend an equal claim to the faith of primitive Christianity. How then can his faith be guided, as you would have it, first by the Scriptures, and then by their faith also? It is plain he must rather have his last resort to the Scriptures, to find there what primitive faith ought to have been, and which of these has the best pretensions to truth, and to antiquity.

And why might not Mr. Locke be allowed to take the same method? He never pretended to make new discoveries in the Christian religion; but among the many new inventions, which are mingled with it, to find out in the Scriptures themselves, what was that ancient faith, which was once delivered to the saints. He knew without your instructions, that those things, which were matters of faith once, will be always such; and those things which were never matters of faith, will be never such. It was his full conviction of this truth, that made him resolve to consult the Sacred Writ alone, where he was very sure those things were fully contained, and plainly delivered, which were matters of faith from the beginning; and he might think it not quite so sure, to find them unmingled any where else. As excellently as his head was formed for abstracted thinking, he never employed it that way in matters of faith. Those discoveries of the imperfections of the human mind, which you condescend to own his genius fitted him for, were no vain

speculations in him: he was too sensible of the limited nature of human reason, ever to carry it beyond its bounds in matters of revelation; and therefore all your elegant harangue about *new discoveries, exercise of wit, vain philosophy in matters of faith*, and so forth, is quite spoiled, by being (much more than Mr. Locke's enterprizing genius, as you call it) entirely wrong applied. He was so far from *setting out with the vanity of a philosopher to interpret Scripture, and settle articles of faith*, as you alledge^x, that he no sooner begins to search the Scriptures, than he lays the philosopher aside, as every unprejudiced reader may observe in the book we are now upon; where with the greatest simplicity possible he follows our Saviour and his Apostles step by step; and uses no other helps to find out their meaning, but what the Scripture itself affords, by comparing one place with another; well knowing that philosophy, and abstracted thinking, had nothing to do there.

And what was the result of this diligent search? *He informs the Christian world, (as you tell us) that they are more Christians, than they need to be.* The place, or the words, in which he gives us this extraordinary information, you have not been pleased to favour us with: But I have shewn you where he expressly informs *Christians*, that they are *much less Christians* than they ought to be, or rather no *Christians* at all, if they do not receive as right and truth all that they find the *Messiah*, whom the acknowledge to be their Lord and master, has revealed in Scriptures. And if the Christian world receives any thing more than this, I am afraid, Sir, it will scarce be an addition to their *Christianity*.

But you go on: *And insults the ministers of the Christian religion, that he may give the more scope and freedom to his own inventions and interpretations.*

Here, Sir, you have been again defective in not acquainting us with words or place; and as I can find nothing like *insulting the ministers of the Christian religion*, in all his works, you must allow me to doubt of the truth of this accusation, since you would not, or could not, be more particular.

And now upon the evidence you pretend to have brought from these books, that Mr. Locke was a *Socinian* in the doctrine of the Trinity, you tell me that "therefore I may declaim as long as I please, that in *Christian* prudence and charity, such a man as Mr. Locke ought not to be given up for an heretic or *Socinian*; for if he chose with all his acuteness and learning about him, to countenance and defend such opinions, who can help it?" I presume, Sir, it by this time appears, that the opinions Mr. Locke chose to defend, those two grand points we have been so long upon, give no sufficient ground for your severe charge; since I have clearly shewn, that they are not peculiar to the *Socinians*; and on several accounts, that his maintaining them is no proof, that he denied the divinity of our Saviour: and therefore for all that you have hitherto urged, there may still be great want of *prudence and charity* in giving him up for a *Socinian*.

Let it be as *ridiculous* as you please to think, that an acute philosopher must of course be a true believer, and an exact interpreter of Scripture, for I know of no body, that either thinks or says so: But this I must affirm, that when a man of eminent abilities, and character in the learned world, *desires to be thought* a true believer, defends himself against all accusations to the contrary, and has never deduced from his interpretations of Scripture, any doctrine in opposition to the established articles of faith; if it is not *ridiculous* to say of such a man, that he was never given up, but went himself, to the adversaries of the *Christian faith*, you will find it difficult with all your

rhetoric, to clear it, and the methods of introduction to it, from being much worse. To collect all that a man has said in different places, and with quite different views; to draw consequences from them, which he disowns, or are foreign to the purpose he was upon; to pretend from thence to spy out secret designs; and to conclude him a heretic in his heart, tho' he will not confess it; which is your method throughout your book; what is all this but to set up a kind of *inquisition*? Want of *prudence* and *charity* are indeed terms too soft for such a conduct.

Answer to the proofs in Sect. II. from his Notes and Paraphrase on the Epistles of St. Paul.

YOU are willing, Sir, it seems to do a work of supererogation, for tho' you think Mr. Locke sufficiently convicted of Socinian principles in the doctrine of the Trinity, from the foresaid books; yet you will examine two or three passages of his other writings, in which you say he appears to be tinged with the same heresy. Your proof of this consists in remarks upon his notes and paraphrase on two texts in St. Paul's Epistles. The first is, 1 Cor. viii. 6. "But to us there is but one God the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him." The other is, Rom. ix. 5. "Whose are the Fathers, and of whom as concerning the flesh, Christ came who is over all, God blessed for ever. Amen." It is not my purpose, nor does my undertaking oblige me, to defend Mr. Locke's explication of these texts, but only to consider, whether your proofs from thence, that he was a Socinian, are conclusive or not.

It is manifest you say, that his bold explication in the first of these texts of *Κύριος*, "by one Lord agent," signifies, that our blessed Saviour was Lord only
" by

“ by reason of his agency; which being only finite
 “ and deputed, that is, limited to the kingdom and
 “ authority of the *Messiah*, must exclude and deny
 “ his eternal and divine nature; which is the same
 “ Socinian principle observed in Mr. *Locke* above
 “ already.” To this I answer, that when a title is
 given to any person on several accounts, the ascrib-
 ing it to him on one of those accounts, cannot justly
 be construed to signify, that it belongs to him in that
 respect only, excluding all others, unless it be so
 exprest. And since it is undeniably certain, that
 our Saviour is in Scripture styled *Lord*, on account
 of that authority and dominion, which was given
 him by the Father, in virtue of his being the *Messiah*;
 as is fully asserted by Bishop *Pearson*, as well as
 the higher sense of that title, for which you refer to
 him in your margin: Mr. *Locke* might therefore un-
 derstand, that title to signify our Saviour's power
 and dominion as he was the *Messiah*, in this pas-
 sage, and the other you mention, where he refers to
 it, without intending in the least to signify, that he
 was Lord only by reason of his agency, or deputed
 authority. And much less does that application of
 the word exclude or deny his eternal and divine nature.
 For the proofs of our Saviour's divine nature cannot
 depend upon the sense of those titles, which are often
 given to persons far inferior to him; and which are
 plainly ascribed to him in such respects, as can be-
 long only to his human nature; as was observed
 above on the title of *Son of God*. When St. *Peter*
 tells the *Israelites*, that God had made that same *Jesus*,
 whom they had crucified, both Lord and Christ; by
 which he could intend no other than his deputed
 dominion; can it be said, that he excluded or denied the
 eternal and divine nature of Christ? If not, neither
 can Mr. *Locke*'s ascribing that title to him on the

same account, be justly censured as a denial of his divinity; or be at all a proof, that he was a *Socinian* in the doctrine of the Trinity. And as to his paraphrase on the latter part of the verse, viz. "By whom are all things, that come from the Father to us, and through whom alone we find access to him," they are the very same words, with which the learned Mr. *Mede* paraphrases a parallel place, *Dissert. on Pet. ii. 1.* And his authority is unexceptionable enough, to defend Mr. *Locke* from any sinister intention in that interpretation, as false and partial as you pretend it to be.

But upon *Rom. ix. 5.* you tell us, *his paraphrase upon the sacred text is more evidently and remarkably Socinian and unjust.* Whether it is just or unjust, is not my present business to consider; I am not concerned to justify his interpretations of Scripture, and therefore shall not examine the force of your arguments against the sense, in which Mr. *Locke* understands that text; and which, no doubt, you know many learned men have understood it in before him. But this I must observe, that his having no note upon it shews, that tho' he freely set down what he took to be the true reading, he had no intention to oppose the doctrine deduced from the other reading: and I do not see how any thing can prove a man a heretic, but his professedly opposing some article of faith. Let his paraphrase be supposed as *unjust* as you please, how do you prove it to be *evidently and remarkably Socinian*? Why for this very notable reason, because he turns and construes those words, *who is over all God blessed for ever, as our modern Arians do.* I did not know before, that interpreting a text of Scripture, as the *Arians* do, made it *evidently Socinian.* Some of those, that are called the *modern Arians*, and who agree with Mr. *Locke* in his sense of this text, acknowledge the eternal and divine nature of our Saviour; and so might Mr. *Locke* do, for any thing that

that he has said on this text. Indeed, Sir, you had better have reserved it, till you had some occasion to make him an *Arian*, for it can by no means serve for your present purpose to prove him a *Socinian*.

Answer to the proofs in Sect. III. That he maintained several other Socinian Doctrines.

YOU begin this Section with informing us, that the passages just before considered, “ in his *Paraphrase and Notes*, are sufficient, when added to “ what has been already observed, to convince any “ unbiassed man, that Mr. *Locke* agrees with the *Socinians*, in his thoughts of the Holy Trinity.” But I must beg leave, Sir, farther to observe, that since you have not been able to shew, that he has any where ever offered either to assert, or to oppose, any doctrine concerning the Holy Trinity; none but a man extremely *biased* could be convinced of an agreement with the *Socinians* in this point, which must, it seems, be all latent in his secret thoughts.

“ But it is not in this doctrine only, you tell us, “ that Mr. *Locke* was *Socinian*. Most of his other “ principles in religion, in these tracts, appear to be “ of the same make with theirs. To be particular, “ with the *Socinians*, he denies original sin in these “ words; “ It is strange, that the New Testament “ should not any where take notice of the corruption of human nature, in the posterity of *Adam*, “ and tell us, that *that* corruption seized on all because of *Adam's* transgression, as well as it tells us “ so of death: But as I remember every one's sin “ is charged upon himself only.”

It does not promise very fairly, when in quoting a particular passage from an author, upon which an accusation is founded, care is not taken to set down the words precisely as they are, for a very small al-

teration will sometimes make a very great one in the sense, as it has done in the words, which you have given us for Mr. *Locke's*, but which in his book stand thus: ^b " *If by death threatened to Adam* " were meant the corruption of human nature in " his posterity, it is strange, that the New Testa- " ment should not any where take notice of it, " and tell us, that corruption seized on all, *because* " of *Adam's* transgression, &c." These words have manifestly another sense, than the turn you have given them will admit. Mr. *Locke* does not say, that the New Testament takes no notice of the corruption of human nature, in the posterity of *Adam*, as you have exprest it; but that it takes no notice that by death threatened to *Adam* was meant that corruption; or that corruption seized on all, because of *Adam's* transgression. This is what he affirms^c; that the New Testament takes no notice of; which is very consistent with acknowledging the corruption of human nature, as he actually does, tho' not in the way of punishment. And as he had just been speaking of some, who by death (which the Gospel teacheth us, came on all men by *Adam's* sin) understand a state of guilt, wherein every one descended from him were so involved, that they deserved endless torment in hell-fire; and likewise a state of necessary sinning, and provoking God in every action they do; he plainly intends, in the passage you have unfairly quoted, only to oppose that notion, of the universal corruption of mankind being part of the punishment threatened to *Adam's* sin; not of it's being in some measure, and in some respects, a consequence of it. For in that discourse he affirms^d, that what *Adam* fell from, was a state of perfect obedience; and represents his posterity as coming into the world, under much greater disadvantages, than he was at first placed in it; so that no one could by reason of the

^b Reas. of Chris. p. 6:^c P. 4, 5.^d P. 3, 7.

defect of their obedience have obtained eternal life, had it not been for the redemption by *Jesus Christ*. To which in another place * he adds the necessity of assistance by his Holy Spirit. Mr. *Locke* could not, therefore, in that place, design to deny either the corruption of human nature, or that the *New Testament* takes notice of it.

After the words, to which you have given this turn, you add, "But this is evidently false; it is directly contrary to what St. *Paul* assures us, *Rom. v. 12, 19. That by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and that by one man's disobedience many were made sinners.*" Mr. *Locke's* words in that passage, as I have restored them, is not at all contrary to what St. *Paul* here says, even in the sense, in which you would have him understood; as any one may see, who compares them. But it seems somewhat assuming, Sir, to pronounce so peremptorily concerning this matter, and so absolutely to determine the sense of those texts, upon which you cannot but know, there have been great diversity of opinions in the *Christian* church, and even among the divines of the church of *England* itself. St. *Austin's* rigid doctrine, viz. That all *Adam's* posterity were born in a state of damnation, by reason of his sin, all mankind being accounted to have sinned in him, by reason of a covenant made with them in him, has indeed had many followers ever since that time; tho' some have all along opposed it, as contrary to our ideas of God, and our clearest notions of justice and goodness. And as it appeared late in the Western church, where great divisions have been about it, in the Greek church it never was received at all.

Others have maintained, that such a corruption is spread by means of *Adam's* sin, over the whole race of mankind, as puts them under a necessity of

sinning, and provoking God in every action they do; and some have taught, that this was part of that punishment, which was threatened to *Adam's* sin. The harshness, not to say the absurdity, of these opinions, which give great advantage to the enemies of the *Christian* religion, being liable to objections not easily answered, is all, that Mr. *Locke* opposed in the doctrine of original sin; as is plain from his representation of those notions, in the places I have cited, and that passage, which you have brought against him, taken as it stands in his book.

Many again have believed, that an exclusion from *Paradise*, which was a state of bliss, and from immortality, with all the frailties and miseries consequent to a mortal state, was the punishment of *Adam's* transgression, and transmitted to all his posterity by means of that transgression. And this they think comes up to the full sense of all the texts of Scripture concerned in this point; particularly those you have quoted as contrary to Mr. *Locke*: "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and by one man's disobedience many were made sinners," that is, (as they understood it) *were treated as sinners*, by being subjected to death, and to all the miseries of a mortal state, in consequence of *Adam's* sin. And a deliverance from this state by being restored to immortal life at the resurrection, they believe to be that universal redemption, that all mankind shall have in *Christ Jesus*. This they apprehend to be conceivable, and no more: therefore they understand by original sin this only; for which they pretend they have all the fathers with them before St. *Austin*, particularly St. *Chrysostom*, and *Theodoret*. This, they do also pretend, comes up to the words of the article; for as this general adjudging of all men to die may be called, according to the style of

of the Scriptures God's wrath and damnation; so the fear of death, which arises out of it, corrupts mens natures, and inclines them to evil. Bishop Burnet's *Expos.* Art. ix.

This opinion Mr. Locke, it seems, thought most agreeable to the tenor of the Scriptures. And this sense of those texts is much the same with that, which he gives them in his *Paraphrase and Notes*. Not, as you injuriously affirm, because *he very well understood the evidence of these passages to be against him*. A censure you may be allowed to make, when you have produced your charter for looking into men's hearts; but rather (as any candid adversary would suppose) because he sincerely thought *that* to be the true sense of them; taking them, as he says, to be parallel with 1 Cor. xv. 22. *As in Adam all die*; for (whether this be *begging the question or not*) there is no manner of ground to doubt, that this was his true judgment, that he really understood those passages of Scripture to carry the doctrine of original sin no farther, than they have been thought to do, by many great divines, and by most of the fathers before St. *Austin*.

The *Pelagians* and *Socinians*, in opposition to all these opinions affirm, that *Adam's* sin, with all the effects of it was entirely personal: that by it sin is said to have *entered into the world*, Rom. v. 12. only as it was the first sin: that *Adam* was made mortal, and had died, whether he had sinned or not: and that every man is punished for his own sins, and not at all for the sin of another.

But in nothing of this did Mr. Locke agree with them: he is far from denying with them, that *Adam's* sin did in any wise at all affect his posterity: on the contrary, he maintains, that death came upon all men by reason of *Adam's* sin; that

the doctrine of redemption, and consequently of the Gospel, is founded upon this supposition, *that Jesus Christ came to restore us to what we lost by Adam*; and that those, who deny this, thereby do violence to the whole tenor of the *New Testament*. He did not indeed come into the notions of hereditary guilt, incurring God's wrath, and eternal damnation for the sin of another, necessity of sinning and provoking him in all we do; doctrines, which perhaps men would not have so readily received, or been so tenacious of, if it were not to excuse or extenuate their own guilt, by laying the blame on their forefather, or even on their Maker himself.

However, Mr. *Locke* acknowledges such an universal degeneracy or corruption², "that all *Adam's* issue to St. *Paul's* time had actually sinned, so that there was a necessity of a Redeemer to restore them to that immortality, which otherwise could not be obtained but by perfect un-sinning obedience." He likewise asserts, the frailty and weakness of our nature to be such, as renders us incapable of performing even that imperfect obedience, which is now required of us, without the divine grace and assistance; a doctrine, which was always founded upon a supposition of our being in a worse state since the fall of *Adam*, than he was created in: and *that* so inseparably, that none, who have denied this effect of original sin, ever acknowledged, that mankind stood in any need of a divine assistance for the performance of their duty. The *Socinians* deny the last, in consequence of their denying the former; so that it is manifest, Mr. *Locke* can, in no respect be said to agree with them in denying original sin.

You object against Mr. *Locke's* rendering the words, *were made sinners*, Rom. v. 19. by the words

became mortal; that by sinners in this place must be meant something different from mortal, and by righteous something more than immortal; because in the 21st verse of this chapter, sin is mentioned as the meritorious cause of death, and righteousness as the instrumental cause of everlasting life; whereas, according to Mr. Locke's interpretation (you say) of sin and sinners, St. Paul must have been absurd enough to suppose, that the same things might, in the same sense, be both causes and effects. I beg leave to tell you, Sir, that this is an absurdity formed only in your imagination, upon a mistake. Mr. Locke has no where interpreted sin and righteousness to signify in Scripture death and life: nor is that sense of those words a consequence from his having rendered the words, *were made sinners*, and *were made righteous*, by *became mortal and immortal*, i. e. liable to death, the punishment of sin, and entitled to immortality, the reward of righteousness, which is his plain meaning here. On the contrary, the 21st verse of this chapter, *that as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign unto eternal life*, in your own sense of it, is a confirmation of that sense, in which Mr. Locke understands the former verses, and as it were an explication of them; the same discourse being continued, and the same thing asserted in different forms of expression, viz. that as mankind was subjected unto death, made, or treated as sinners, in consequence of Adam's transgression; so they should be restored to life, be made, or treated as righteous persons, by the righteousness of Jesus Christ.

You conclude this subject by saying, "Mr. Locke indeed here refers us to Dr. Whitby's Comments on these places; and he might as well have referred us to Socinus himself, or any of

“his fraternity.” I must first observe, Sir, that this is most unfairly urged; for whatever mistakes, Dr. *Whitby* might fall into at the decline of his age, when perhaps his judgment was decayed with it; he was so far from favouring the *Socinians*, when he wrote his *Comment*, that throughout that whole work, he, on all proper occasions, zealously and solidly opposes their errors; so that his interpretation in those *Comments* might be referred to very unexceptionably. But it is next to be observed, that the sense, in which Mr. *Locke* understands the texts, we have been speaking of, and for which he refers to Dr. *Whitby*, is directly contrary to the doctrine of the *Socinians*; so that you happen to be quite out in this unlucky remark. You are so used, it seems, to join *Socinus* in your thoughts with Mr. *Locke*, that you could not help tacking them together, where they are most opposite. How *Socinus* interpreted those texts, I pretend not to say; but if he was consistent with himself, he could not possibly allow the sense Mr. *Locke* gives them; since he and his followers absolutely deny, that *Adam's* posterity became mortal, in consequence of his disobedience. And I might rather have offered Mr. *Locke's* interpretation of those texts, as one proof, that he did not agree with the *Socinians*, and that he is unjustly charged with denying original sin; though he did not carry it to all the extremes, in which it was once received in this church, and on which the *Calvinist* doctrines are founded, of *reprobation* and *unconditionate decrees*. The next thing you charge Mr. *Locke* with, is, “That with the *Socinians* also, he denies, that the punishment of wicked men in a future state shall be eternal.” Which you ground upon his af-

firming, "that the death, which was threatened to
"Adam, and which was every where the wages of
"sin, as well after as before the resurrection, does
"not mean *eternal life in misery*, but *a ceasing to*
"be, the having no more life and sense than dust
"has." For this you quote several places in his
Reasonableness of Christianity; and it is undeniable,
that he does maintain this.

But it is as undeniable, Sir, that both in that
book, and in several places of his other writings,
he plainly asserts, that the wicked shall suffer great
and terrible, and everlasting punishments in a fu-
ture state; even so plainly, that you yourself are
forced to confess it. Neither has he any where
denied, that the punishment of wicked men in a
future state shall be eternal; though he denies, that
by *that death*, which was threatened to *Adam*, and
came upon all men by his transgression, was meant
eternal life in misery: for in his *Reasonableness of*
Christianity!, he particularly distinguishes between
death the punishment of *Adam's sin*, and that pu-
nishment, which every one shall suffer for his own
actual transgressions; where, after he has been
shewing how it is consistent with the justice and
goodness of God, that the posterity of *Adam* should
suffer the punishment of death for his sin, he has
these words, "and therefore *though all die in Adam*,
"yet none are *truly punished* but for their own
"deeds, *Rom. xi. 6. God will render to every one;*
"how? *according to his deeds.* To those, that obey
"unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, tribula-
"tion and anguish, upon every soul of man that
"doth evil." And a little lower, going on to
prove, that the wicked in a future state shall suffer
only for their own sins, having cited the two places,
where our Saviour describes his own proceeding at

* Page 69. ! Page 9.

the great judgment, he says, "here is no condemnation of any one for what his forefather had done; which it is not likely should have been omitted, if that should have been a cause, why any one was adjudged to *the devil and his angels*." These two passages are sufficient to shew, that by asserting that death, or a *ceasing to be*, was the punishment threatened to *Adam's* sin, he did not intend to deny, that the wicked shall be punished in a future state for *their own* sins. But there are several other places in the same book, where he clearly expresses his belief of the torments and misery of another life. P. 196 he says, "In the parable of the rich man in hell, delivered by our Saviour, repentance alone is the means proposed of avoiding that place of *torment*;" and p. 231, "our Saviour requires obedience to his commands, with the enforcement of unspeakable rewards and punishments in another world." A little after, he quotes this sentence, "depart from me ye cursed into *everlasting fire*. These shall go into *everlasting punishment*." These passages, with many others, are such express acknowledgments, that the wicked are to suffer extreme and endless misery in a future state, that you might with much more colour have charged him with *maintaining contradictions*, than with denying, *that the punishment of wicked men in a future state shall be eternal*; for he does not less clearly and frequently maintain this doctrine, than he does that other, which you think inconsistent with it. And of this you are so sensible yourself, that you set down some of his expressions to that purpose; upon which you add^m, "But whether he had any secret to reconcile those expressions with his own idea of death, the *ceasing to be*, or annihilation, I will not determine."

If you could not find out this secret, you needed not however have bestowed four pages upon proving, what you cannot but confess Mr. *Locke* owns as well as you: Much less ought you so positively to have charged him with denying, what he so fully asserts, by whatever *secret* he might reconcile those seeming contradictions.

Had this *secret* been in favour of any *Socinian* doctrine, I am persuaded, Sir, you would have spied it out with half the light, which he has given you to discover it by. But this happens to be in opposition to them, and in that case, where Mr. *Locke* is concerned, you are not, it seems, very quick-sighted. You must give me leave therefore to acquaint you, since you seem not to have observed it, that throughout this book, he frequently speaks of *Jesus Christ's* coming to restore all mankind to that immortality, which they lost by Adam's transgression; and this, I presume, may serve as a key to let you into the secret. According to his notion all man would have remained under the sentence of death for ever, if *Jesus Christ* had not delivered them from it: but being by him recovered to a state of immortality, they must all appear at his tribunal, where they shall be adjudged to everlasting happiness or misery, according as they have obeyed or disobeyed his laws. And upon this ground, Mr. *Locke* has so fully and so frequently maintained the certainty of eternal punishments in a future state, that no man could take it into his head to charge him with denying it, but one, who was resolved at any rate, even at the expence of truth, to make out his pretended agreement with the *Socinians*.

" " Once more you say, with *Socinus* also himself, Mr. *Locke* denies, that there is any notion
" or opinion of a Deity naturally implanted in the

“mind of man: and the principal reason he gives
 “for it is this, that besides Atheists, whole nations
 “have been discovered, among whom no notion
 “of God was to be found. And the very same
 “reason is given by *Socinus* himself. So that he
 “seems to have been originally inclined to favour
 “the opinions of that sect, and even his seeming
 “singularities are derived from them.”

This is a very extraordinary article to be made
 any part in a charge of *Socinianism*; by which, I
 think, has been always understood an agreement
 with *Socinus* in matters of faith and revelation.
 Mr. *Locke* does without question deny, that there
 is any innate idea of God stamped upon the mind
 of man; not only in that place of his *Essay*, which
 you quote, but more at large in the first book,
 where he is proving, that we have no innate ideas
 at all. It is likewise true, that one of the reasons
 he gives for it, is that, which you mention; and
 very probably *Socinus* might give the same; it be-
 ing too obvious for any one to miss, who is en-
 quiring, whether there be any innate idea of God
 stamped on the mind of man. But that reason is so
 far from being, as you alledge, Mr. *Locke's* principal
 argument against it, that he expressly says, “If
 “all mankind had every where a notion of God,
 “it would not follow from thence, that the idea of
 “him was innate.” And his chief arguments are
 taken from those, who *have* the notion of God.
 As “how late is it before any such notion is disco-
 “verable in children? Can it be thought, that the
 “ideas men have of God, are engraven on their
 “minds by his own finger, when we see men
 “have far different, nay often contrary and incon-
 “sistent ideas of him?” What true or tolerable
 “notion of a Deity could they have, who acknow-

• *Essay*, B. I. ch. iv. sect. ix.

• Sect. xv.

ledged

"Jedged and worshipped hundreds?" Then speaking of the true conceptions, which wise men of all nations came to have of the *unity and infinity* of the Deity, "this (says he) seems to me plainly to prove, that the truest and best notions men had of God, were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of their faculties." These passages, with many more in the *Essay* to the same purpose, might have shewn you, Sir, without my help, that the reason *Socinus* has given, is not the *principal* reason Mr. Locke gives, to prove, that we have no innate idea of God.

But if it had been so, how weakly would this have supported your inference? There is neither a *seeming singularity* in this opinion, nor is it peculiar to that *sect*, from whom you conclude he derived it. It is no new notion, nor confined to any set of people. I am persuaded there are many learned men in both our *Universities* of the same mind, that we have no *innate* idea of God, or of any thing else; who yet would think themselves very ill used to be ranked among the *Socinians*. I leave you to enquire in your own, whether this is not so; but I will name two of *Cambridge*, who have publickly professed that opinion, Mr. *Edmund Law*, who has obliged his country with a translation of Archbishop *King's Origin of evil*; and long before him the learned Dr. *Bentley*, in one of his excellent sermons preached at Mr. *Boyle's* Lecture, whose words are as follow: "As to that natural and indelible signature of God, which human souls, in their first origin, are supposed to be stamped with, I shall shew at a fitter opportunity, that it is a mistake, and that we have no need of it in our disputes against Atheism."

However, if no body but *Socinus* and Mr. *Locke* had ever denied, that the idea of God is stamped

upon the minds of men, an opinion of such a nature will not help to justify the imputation of *Socinianism*. You might as reasonably charge the celebrated Mr. Norris with being a Papist, because he agreed with Father *Marlebranche*, in his notion of having our idea of God, and of all other things, by *seeing them in him*. The manner, by which the idea of God is conveyed to our understandings, is no more an article of faith, than the manner of our receiving any other ideas. In these philosophical or metaphysical speculations, learned men, of whatever persuasion in religion, have always imagined themselves at perfect liberty. If some think we have our idea of God by seeing it in him; others, that he has originally imprinted an idea of himself upon their minds; and others again, "that our idea of him is acquired, by making a right use of the faculties he has given us, by which we cannot miss of discovering him with an evidence equal to the certainty of mathematical demonstration," as Mr. *Locke* maintains; neither of these opinions interfere with any article of our faith, nor has revelation interposed to decide, which is the true: though it may be observed, that the inspired writers, by referring those, who were ignorant of God, to the proper use of their faculties, by which they might discover him in the works of creation, and providence, seem rather to favour the last. Yet it is certain, that they have left every one at liberty to judge in matters of this nature, as their own reason, experience, and observation direct. The proofs of a Deity, and the cause of religion, will suffer nothing, which ever opinion is received. Mr. *Locke's* notion upon this point will not serve in the least towards justifying your charge of *Socinianism*. This article therefore of the indictment must be allowed to pass for just nothing.

We are now come to the last, and most considerable of those *Socinian* doctrines, which this section

tion is to prove Mr. *Locke* maintained. How defective your proofs of the former are, has been shewn; and I doubt not they will appear as insufficient on this article, which we are going to examine.

Lastly, you say, "with the *Socinians* Mr. *Locke* denies the sacrifice and merits of *Christ's* death, and the satisfaction paid by it to divine justice. For in his book of the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, treating on purpose and at large of the advantages we have by *Christ*, he entirely omits this inconceivable advantage." The same reason for this charge was urged before by Mr. *Edwards*; and it was answered both by Mr. *Bold*, and by Mr. *Locke* himself in his *Vindications*; and that so sufficiently, that a man of candour should be ashamed to repeat the argument. Part of Mr. *Locke's* answer is in these words, "The reason of my omitting it in that place was, because my book was chiefly designed for *Deists*; and I think it no blameable prudence, that I mentioned only those advantages, that all *Christians* are agreed in, and that I observed that command of the Apostle, *Rom. xiv. 1. Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations*; without being a *Socinian*. Would any one think, he in earnest went about to persuade men to be *Christians*, who should use that as an argument to recommend the Gospel, which he has observed them to lay hold on as an objection against it?" A little after he says, that the word *satisfaction* not being used in the Scripture, he could not put it into his *Christianity as delivered in the Scripture*: but that as satisfaction may be plainly collected out of the Epistles, though not named, so it may out of several places of his book. Upon which he quotes the places, where he had said, that the de-

sign of our Saviour's coming was to be offered up, and where he speaks of the work of our redemption. And in his first Vindication he mentions other places, where he had said, that *Christ laid down his life for both Jews and Gentiles*, and that he freely gave himself to death for us.

To all this you object, "that he speaks of these things in so loose and general a manner, so entirely en passant, and without any view to the doctrine of the satisfaction, that he dares not say, that he himself takes those passages to imply satisfaction, but only that they are taken to imply it, and that satisfaction may be collected from them."

Had he spoke of those things, which are taken to imply satisfaction, in ever so loose and general a manner at first; yet when he repeats those passages as proofs, that *Christ's satisfaction* may be plainly collected out of his book, that sufficiently implies, that he himself understood them in that sense; and the repetition in both his Vindications certainly cannot be said to be done en passant, or without any view to the doctrine of the satisfaction; since it is on purpose to prove, that though the word *satisfaction* is not in his book, yet it is implied there. Nor indeed can I well imagine (whatever you mean by a loose and general manner) how he can be supposed in any manner to have said, that the design of *Christ's coming* was to be offered up, and that he freely gave himself to death for us; or to have spoke of the great work of our redemption, without any view to the doctrine of the satisfaction; for those expressions either signify the same thing, or are particular descriptions of the manner, by which that satisfaction was made. And though you alledge, that he dares not say, that he himself takes those passages to imply satisfaction, you could not but know, that he has said what is full as strong to the same purpose. One, who has so carefully racked

sacked his works to find matter against him, could scarce unwarily overlook the following remarkable words, concerning the satisfaction of *Christ*. "Mr. *Bald* says right, that this is a doctrine, that is of "mighty importance for a *Christian* to be well acquainted with; and I will add to it, that it is "very hard for a *Christian*, who reads the Scripture "with attention, and an unprejudiced mind, to "deny the satisfaction of *Christ*." Now I appeal to yourself, Sir, whether this is not as full an assertion of the doctrine of satisfaction, as if he had said, that he himself took those passages of Scripture to imply satisfaction. For if he did not take that doctrine to be implied in the Scripture, how could he think it of mighty importance, or of any importance at all, for a *Christian* to be well acquainted with it? Or with what consistency could he think it very hard for a *Christian*, who reads the Scripture with attention, and an unprejudiced mind, to deny the satisfaction of *Christ*, if he himself did not take it to be implied in Scripture? His omitting therefore to mention the satisfaction among the advantages we received by our Saviour, could not be, as you pretend, because with the Socinians he did not admit that doctrine to be true; for what he affirms could hardly be denied by an unprejudiced mind, he certainly admitted to be true.

And as he best knew his own motives, it is most equitable to believe, that the reasons he gives for that omission, were the real reasons of it, which he farther expresses, after the words last quoted from him, in this manner: "But it (*viz.* the satisfaction of *Christ*) "being a term not used by the "Holy Ghost in the Scripture, and very variously "explained by those that do use it, and very much "stumbled at by those I was there speaking to, who were such, as I there say, who will not take "a blessing, unless they be instructed, what need

behold

“ they had of it, and why it was bestowed upon them; I left it with the other disputed doctrines of *Christianity* to be looked into (to see what it was *Christ* had taught concerning it) by those, who were *Christians*, and believed *Jesus* to be the Saviour promised and sent from God.” This defence, one would think, might have prevented any farther insisting upon his omitting to mention this, among the advantages we have by *Christ*.

But you say, that “ in his *Notes and Paraphrase* upon *St. Paul*, where he comments upon many passages generally taken to imply the satisfaction, he gives them a sense and turn contrary and opposite to that doctrine; which makes it very clear, that his omitting to mention it in that place was not only out of caution and prudence, as he pretends, but because, with the *Socinians*, he did not admit that doctrine to be true.” The whole of this charge, Sir, I take the liberty to deny: and whether I have just reason so to do, will appear by considering the several instances, in which you pretend he gives that contrary sense and turn.

The first passage you instance in, is his note on the word *Redemption*, *Rom. iii. 24.* where he has these words. “ Redemption by *Jesus Christ* does not import, there was any compensation made to God, by paying what was equal value in consideration, whereof they were delivered. For that is inconsistent with what *St. Paul* expressly says here, *viz.* That sinners are justified by God *gratis*, or of his free bounty.” Upon which you add, *this assertion is manifestly against the satisfaction.* And in another place, where you resume the same subject, his note on that word is all of it direct opposition, and flat contradiction to the doctrine of our Saviour’s satisfaction for sin.” But this is a mistake,

Sir:

Sir; what he there says of *redemption*, might very consistently be said of *satisfaction* by *Jesus Christ*; they are indeed terms of much the same signification. Your argument against this note of Mr. *Locke's* is founded on a supposition, that there can be no satisfaction made, without paying what was equal value. But certainly, Sir, you cannot be ignorant, that many, who own the doctrine of satisfaction, do not understand it to import, that a compensation was made to God, by paying what was equal value. How indeed can man dare to determine, that no other kind of satisfaction could be appointed or accepted by God, for the sins of men, unless the Holy Ghost had so declared? But this he has not thought fit to do. And as Mr. *Locke* has shewn, that redemption in *Scripture language* does not signify precisely *paying an equivalent* (which would make our pardon due by a claim of right) neither in *common language* does *making satisfaction* generally signify the precise *payment of an equivalent*; but whatever is required, or accepted by the party offended, as the condition of forgiving the offender, is called demanding or making satisfaction; and therefore as denying, that an equivalent was paid, is not denying, that a satisfaction was made, the assertion in that note is no manner of *opposition*, or *contradiction to the doctrine of our Saviour's satisfaction for sin*.

Redemption and satisfaction are general terms, which can only be explained by describing the action done, whereby the redemption was accomplished, or the satisfaction made. And when Mr. *Locke* asserts (as you confess he does in many places) "That our Saviour by his death, attoned for our sins, that the price, with which he bought us, was his precious blood, that he hath given himself for us, an offering and an acceptable sacrifice to God, &c." he expresses the doctrine of *satisfaction* more particularly, than if he had used the word itself. And therefore
you

you are quite out, when you say, that “after his
 “note upon the words *Redemption*, &c. it must be
 “next to impossible to conceive, how he could give
 “those general words of Scripture, *atone*, given
 “for us, *offering sacrifice*, any sense, which could
 “be applied in favour of the doctrine of the satis-
 “faction.” For those, which you call *general words*,
 with others of the same import (except the word
atone) are really *particular* explications of the ge-
 neral doctrine of the satisfaction, or redemption
 by *Jesus Christ*; these two terms standing alone
 without the explanations, importing only that *Jesus*
Christ did by some means or other reconcile God
 to man. Whereas the expressions Mr. *Locke* has
 used are particular descriptions of the means, or
 of the nature of that satisfaction, on account of
 which (tho’ not in the way of an equivalent) God
 was pleased to exempt man from the punishment
 due to his sins.

You object indeed, that “he only repeats the
 “words of the Apostle, to explain them; and that
 “it is always his method, when he has no mind to
 “explain himself, upon any doctrine of *Christian*
 “faith, to leave it as he found it, in the general
 “words of Scripture.” I cannot guess, Sir, upon
 what grounds (unless the carelessness of most readers)
 you expect to be believed in this charge; since in the
 very place, where you make the objection, you have
 yourself confuted it, by setting down no less than
 three several passages from Mr. *Locke*, which are all
 explications of his, in words *different* from those of
 the Apostle, viz. “The *precious blood of Christ*, ac-
 “ceptable sacrifice, our Saviour by his death atoned
 “for our sins.” (which by the way is the same, as if
 he had said; *made satisfaction* for our sins.) In the
 other places you mention, where he retains the Apo-
 le’s words, it is manifestly, because they are so plain,
 that no explications could make them more so. Not
 (as

(as you injuriously alledge) "That he might have it
"in his own power, at any time to give them what
"turn or explication he pleased; the truth of which,
"you say, you have in your papers several times
"made appear." But I defy you to produce one
single instance, that you have given of this, through-
out your book. It was at *no time* Mr. Locke's
method to give particular explications of Scripture,
either where the words are too clear to need, or too
obscure to admit of it; but where he thinks the
Scripture has given any light, by comparing one
place with another, to explain a mistaken or obscure
passage, he makes no scruple to speak his thoughts, tho'
they do not exactly fall in with the commonly re-
ceived notions: And that he has done so, was your
first complaint on the very point we are now upon,
in his note on the word *Redemption*. For on this
doctrine of Christian faith, Mr. Locke it seems so
unfortunate, as to fall under your displeasure, both
for *leaving it*, and for *not leaving it*, in the general
words of Scripture.

But upon the whole I will venture to say, and I
presume have made it appear, that whether he *para-
phrases*, or *explains*, or *retains* the very words of
Scripture, he every way fully and strongly asserts
the satisfaction made by Jesus Christ for the sins of men,
tho' he does not think *that necessarily imports, a
compensation made to God, by paying what was equal
value*.

The next passage you instance in, is verse 25 of
the same chapter, where he observes, that the word
translated *propitiation*, signifies *propitiatory* or *mercy-
seat*. Upon which, with great candour, you make
the following comment: "He was aware, that *pro-
pitiation* here might signify an atonement made
"by sacrifice, which signification would the lead

reader

“ reader to suppose a satisfaction paid, and therefore he took care to provide it with another meaning.” But if that word really has another meaning, which the learned Mr. Mede does as well as Mr. Locke observe, and you do not deny, there was no ground to provide him with another reason for making that observation.

However, whether his sense of that word be right or wrong, it is unlucky, that the only reason you thought fit to help him to for giving it that sense, should happen to be confuted by the very note itself. For he there speaks of the *atonement* under the law, made by blood sprinkled on the propitiatory, or mercy-seat, and of our Saviour, as the *antitype*, the real propitiatory or mercy-seat in his own blood, referring to *Heb. ix 25, 26.* where the sacrifice of himself is opposed to the blood of others. He could not therefore chuse the word *propitiatory*, to avoid one, that might signify an *atonement* made by sacrifice, as you suggest; since in the same note he expressly mentions the *sacrifice*, which *Christ* made of himself, as offered in the place of those, by which the *atonement* under the law was made. So that the reader could scarce avoid supposing a *satisfaction paid*, tho’ he might at the same time suppose, that our Saviour was figured, not only by the *legal sacrifices*, but likewise by the *mercy-seat*, which was sprinkled by the blood of the sacrifice, and which was the *place of God’s presence*; and that in all these respects, our Saviour, who was the *antitype*, might, as Mr. Locke there says, be properly called the *propitiatory*; for certainly nothing of all this is in any respect contrary to the doctrine of the satisfaction.

One passage more, you tell us, you cannot but mention, *for the singular delicacy and novelty in the interpretation.* And if that had been all you had mentioned it for, I should have left it with you, to have made as much *nonsense* of it as you pleased.

But

But you have cited it as an instance of his giving passages of Scripture generally taken to imply the satisfaction, a sense and turn, contrary to that doctrine; which obliges me to take notice of it. Give me leave, Sir, first to observe, that you have been no less unlucky in your choice of this passage than the former, since both his paraphrase and note on the place are directly contrary to what you would infer from them; as will appear. It is upon *Rom. viii. 3.*
 "For what the law could not do, in that it was weak
 "thro' the flesh, God sending his own Son in the
 "likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned
 "sin in the flesh."

You are much displeased with Mr. Locke, for observing upon this text, that *condemned sin in the flesh* does not mean, that *Christ* was condemned for sin, or in the place of sin; but that sin itself was condemned, or put to death in his flesh, i. e. was suffered to have no life nor being in it, referring to *Heb. iv. 15.* *He was in all points tempted as we are, yet without sin.* All these harsh and hard interpretations, you say, appeared plain and easy to Mr. Locke; while they delivered him from the doctrine of the satisfaction of *Christ*. But, as it happens, his interpretation of this passage, as well as of those we have before considered, does nothing towards delivering him from the doctrine of the satisfaction; for that doctrine is as fully asserted in his *Paraphrase and Notes* on the place, as it is in the sense you have given us of it. All the difference is, that he takes it to be contained in one part of the verse, and you in another.

Besides *Christ's* being made an offering for sin, Mr. Locke understands this passage likewise to assert, that he was himself without sin, that sin was suffered to have no being in his flesh. And you say too, that

the passage plainly signifies, that Christ was sent into the world, like all other men, excepting only his innocence. But according to your way of understanding the words *condemned sin*, to be part of those, which express *Christ's* being made a sacrifice for sin, you leave no words in the text, to give the least hint of his innocence; and I fear you must be beholden to the *absurd pains*, which you say, Mr. Locke has taken to do violence to that passage, to make out your own sense of it; for the text plainly says, that God sent his own Son *in the likeness of sinful flesh*, but not a word of his *innocence*, if that be not signified, as Mr. Locke understands it to be, by the words *condemned sin in the flesh*.

However, supposing him to be mistaken in the sense of those words, that he had no design by this interpretation to be *delivered from the doctrine of the satisfaction*, is manifest from his *Paraphrase and Notes on the place*; where he is so far from taking away any proof of that doctrine, that he supplies what was wanting in our translation more fully to express it; reading in his *Paraphrase* thus: "God sending his Son in flesh, that in all things, except sin, was like unto our frail sinful flesh, and sending him also to be an offering for sin, he put to death or suppressed sin in the flesh." And in his note he tells us, that the word, which in the text is translated for sin, signifies an offering for sin, as the margin of our Bibles takes notice; then referring to 2 Cor. v. 21. Heb. x. 5, 10. "So that, says he, the plain sense is, God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and sent him an offering for sin."

Now I beseech you, Sir, of what importance is it to the doctrine of the satisfaction, whether the words *for sin*, or *condemned sin*, be understood to signify, that *Christ* was made an offering for sin? Or how could Mr. Locke be delivered from that doctrine, by denying that sense in one part of the verse, when he asserts it in the other? And with what candour

candour or justice could you infer from his interpretation of this text, that he had any design to lay aside the doctrine of the satisfaction? Since it is as plainly asserted by his explication, as if he had, with you, understood it to be contained in the words *condemned sin in the flesh*. For which ever way those words are taken, the satisfaction made by *Christ* is still fully declared in the text, and maintained in Mr. *Locke's* paraphrase and note upon it, as has been shewn, and you could not but know. So that upon the whole it appears, that in all the passages you have brought to prove, *it was his design entirely to lay aside the doctrine of the satisfaction*, he has in those very places plainly asserted that doctrine; and consequently, that your accusation in this, as on the other points of his pretended agreement with the *Socinians*, is entirely false, and without any foundation.

Answer to the proofs in Sect. IV. That he was a man of unwarrantable latitude in his principles of religion.

AFTER taking all this pains to prove, that Mr. *Locke* was thoroughly engaged in the *Socinian* opinions, you have at last found out, that he allowed himself a latitude of thinking even beyond the bounds of *Christianity* itself. Your whole design here is to have it thought, that he esteems all religions alike, gives no preference to *Christianity*, nor makes any distinction between the worshipers of the true God, and those who worship false gods, or *Mahomet*, or the Devil; an indictment I could not have expected, even from Dr. *Holdsworth* himself. The contrary is so notorious thro' all Mr. *Locke's* works, that those, who are acquainted with them, who know what he has wrote for the service of *Christianity*; and that awful sense of the Deity, the worship and obedience

due to him, which he on all occasions expresses; will scarce think this article worth the notice of an answer. But the present controversy may fall into the hands of some, who are strangers to his writings; and for their sakes I shall consider it as briefly as possible.

The whole of your evidence upon this extraordinary indictment is taken from *his laws of Carolina*, which were constitutions for the promoting of trade in a part of the world; where persons of all religions would probably be concerned, and where the natives were not *Christians*. And all that can be justly inferred from them is, that in such a situation, Mr. *Locke* did not think it proper, that any outward distinctions should be made on account of opinions; that were not in themselves prejudicial to society. Tho' it seems indeed to be his judgment likewise in all other cases, that avoiding such distinctions was most for the *real advancement of true religion*; that the less bias was put upon men's minds, either by civil advantages or disadvantages, the more likely they would be to discern truth, and to embrace it for its own sake; as may be gathered from several passages in his *Letters concerning Toleration*. So that it might be not only for securing the trade and peace of those plantations, that he was for allowing equal privileges to persons of all religions there, but as the likeliest means to spread and promote *Christianity*. Nay he gives that reason for it in the very *Constitution*, quoted by you for his making no distinction between the religion of *Jesus Christ*, and that of the worshippers of the Devil. With how good grounds, let the words of the Constitution shew.

* “ But since the natives of that place, who will
“ be concerned in our plantation, are utterly stran-
“ gers to *Christianity*, whose idolatry, ignorance, or
“ mistake gives us no right to expel, or use them

“ ill; and those, who remove from other parts
“ to plant there, will unavoidably be of different
“ opinions concerning matters of religion; that
“ civil peace may be maintained amidst the diversity
“ of opinions; and also that Jews, heathens, and
“ other dissenters from the purity of Christian re-
“ ligion, may not be scared and kept at a distance
“ from it, but by having an opportunity of ac-
“ quainting themselves with the truth and reason-
“ ableness of its doctrines, and the peaceableness and
“ inoffensiveness of its professors, may by good usage
“ and persuasion, and all those convincing methods
“ of gentleness and meekness, suitable to the rules
“ and design of the Gospel, be won over to embrace
“ and unfeignedly the truth. Therefore any seven,
“ or more, persons agreeing in any religion, shall
“ constitute a church, or profession, to which they
“ shall give some name to distinguish it from others.”

It is upon this Constitution, that all the following exclamations are made. “ By Mr. Locke's most
“ Christian Constitutions, religion is only considered
“ as an instrument of trade: all religions are put up-
“ on the same foot with Christianity; and the sacred
“ name of church is vilely prostituted to be com-
“ mon to the most impious and idolatrous supersti-
“ tion in the world. But this is Mr. Locke's model
“ of a religious comprehension, and a glorious one
“ indeed it is, since the Devil himself is not ex-
“ cluded out of it.”

If you had remarked just the contrary, that Mr. Locke had only considered trade as an instrument of religion, to acquaint infidels and other dissenters from the purity of Christian religion, with the truth and reasonableness of its doctrines; and that he had set them on the same foot with Christians in civil matter, that by such good usage they might be won over to embrace, and unfeignedly receive, the true religion, as the

Constitution particularly expresses; I doubt not every one would have owned it a much more just and judicious comment.

I beseech you, Sir, where did you find Mr *Locke's* model of a religious comprehension, from which the Devil himself is not excluded? Or where does he speak of any terms of communion capable of comprehending all those, whom you are so angry with him for calling churches? It is impossible for me to imagine upon what grounds your pathetic expostulations are raised. You mention three terms of communion laid down by Mr. *Locke*, the most general he could think of, viz. 1. That there is a God. 2. That God is to be worshipped. 3. That it is lawful, and the duty of every man, when required by his governors, to swear by him.

These were terms, that every member of civil society were required to agree in; which you either mistake or misrepresent, as terms of a religious comprehension or communion.

However, after a terrible alarm about fellowship with the Devil, comprehending the worship of him, or of false deities, with that of the true God; and of a government, which calls itself Christian, daring to form such a comprehension; you are so kind in the very next paragraph, that you will not suppose, that heathens, or even Jews and Mahometans, were designed to be comprehended in these terms. (We are then, it seems, in no danger of including the Devil in them.)

"You will only suppose, that those wide terms of communion were intended, to comprehend all the different opinions, or sects of men called Christians, tho' they had no agreement in the belief of Christ, or the fundamentals of Christianity, such as Deists, Quakers, and Socinians.

² It seems he meant by churches, nothing more than religious professions; for he uses them as equivalent appellations.

But even this is more than I must allow you, or than you have ground to suppose: there is not the least appearance of any religious comprehension at all intended in the Constitutions. It is entirely a dream of your own, and, if you please, when you are sure your understanding is awake, and your honest passions for a while suspended, only to read from *Const.* xcvi. to cx, I am confident you will plainly see, that those wide terms of communion were terms of civil communion only, such as were thought so necessary to the well-being of the society, that no man or assembly of men should enjoy any of the privileges of it, that did not agree in them: But that it was never supposed, that all, who agreed in those terms, should be comprehended in one communion. On the contrary you will see, that several of the Constitutions manifestly suppose many distinct communions, being laws to regulate their conduct towards one another, for the preservation of peace among them. And as no person was to have any protection from the law, &c. who was not a member of some church or profession, in which his name was to be recorded, one of the ^b Constitutions expressly prohibits being entered in any more, than one religious record at once; so far were they from intending a religious comprehension, which might include Heathens, Mahometans, or even all the different sects of men called Christians. This laudable scheme, therefore, so much for the honour and interest of the Christian religion, formed, as you say, by men full of the vain philosophy, and villainous craft of this world, who have nothing so much at heart as secular wealth and trade; you may, if you please, take the glory of to yourself, since it is formed only by your own imagination. Mr. Locke has not any share in it. He had too great a regard for religion, the Christian religion, to let wealth or trade in competition with it, or to give the least ground for such unchristian reproaches.

^b *Const.* LXI.

You go on in this spirit, and tell us, “ The members of the church of *England* are not to take it amiss, that Mr. *Locke* disowned one article drawn in is favour, since he could not afford one express law in favour of *Christianity* itself.” A candid judge might have found laws in favour, not only of *Christianity*, but of the church of *England* too, in all those articles, where justice, charity, and a peaceable behaviour, are strictly required towards all persons of what profession soever, for these reasons^b, “ That their conversion to the truth might not be hindered; that dissenters from the purity of *Christian* religion might be won over unfeignedly to receive the truth; and that no scandal may be brought on the true religion which we profess;” that is, on the church of *England*; for that was the religion, which most of the proprietors of *Carolina* did, as well as Mr. *Locke*, profess. And these laws for regulating the behaviour of its professors, he thought, more tended to promote the real interests of that church, than any secular advantages; which it seems he had not so much at heart.

That Mr. *Locke* did sincerely prefer the church of *England*, to all other divisions of *Christians* whatsoever, is evident not only from his constant publick profession of it, but from the private opening of his thoughts, in familiar letters to his friends, than which there is not a more certain way of discovering the real sentiments of a man’s heart. One instance of this may suffice here, out of many, that might be produced. In a letter to a relation of his, a member of the church of *England*, who had asked him, what was the best method for a young gentleman to study religion? to whom he had answered, “ That the only way to attain a certain knowledge of the *Christian* religion, in its full extent and purity, is

^b Vid. *Conf. xxxvi, cxi*. Letter to Mr. *Richard King*, in the collection published by *P. D. Mait.*

to him, yet I am not less sensible of the necessity of the

" the study of the Holy Scripture:" upon a second enquiry he again answers, that if he asks, which is the best way to get the knowledge of the doctrines of any particular church, &c. that will not be hard to tell him: " But in this way of studying (says he) " you pitch upon one as the right, before you know " it to be so, whereas that choice should be the result of your study of the *Christian* religion in the " sacred Scriptures. And the method I have proposed, would, I presume, bring you the surest way " to that church, which I imagine you already think " most conformable to the word of God." The gentleman was, as I said, of the *church of England*. And what can be a greater evidence of Mr. Locke's esteem of that church, than this declaration to a friend, that the surest way to bring a man to it is the study of the holy Scripture?

But what need we concern ourselves about Mr. Locke's favouring, or not favouring, the *church of England*, when you are just going to make him of no church at all? The last paragraph of this extraordinary section, that it may even outdo the rest, has found out something, that looks as if he were sometimes sensible of his own inclination to be an infidel, when he provides an opiate for unbelievers in these words, in his *Reas. of Christianity*: " It is remarkable, that in all the places, where our Saviour describes his way of proceeding in the last judgment, " the sentence follows *doing, or not doing*, without " any mention of *believing, or not believing*. Not " that any, to whom the Gospel hath been preached, " shall be saved without believing; but that the " rest, who want the allowance of being justified by " faith, must answer for all their actions, and being " found transgressors shall be condemned." What can be said now to this plain evidence of Mr. Locke's inclination to be an infidel? I am really almost struck dumb by it, and can scarce give any other answer, than to stare and stand amazed, that any man of

sense or probity, can suffer his *prejudice*, so far to run away with one or both of them, as to be capable of so grossly mistaking, or misrepresenting a passage, which has nothing less in view, than that *miserable consolation of unbelief*, which you impute to it.

The argument he is upon in that place, from whence you have compounded your wonderful *opiate*, is to prove, that a *good life* is an indispensable condition of the covenant of grace; and the words you have cited, are to confute those, who (as he says) doubt, or scruple to call *that* a condition of the new covenant, as well as faith. But how could you possibly think, he intended this for a *consolation of unbelief*? When in the very same place he tells us, "That all being sinners and transgressors of the law, and so unjust, are *all* liable to condemnation unless they believe." These words, Sir, are as plainly there as the others, and if you had thought fit to quote them, would have quite spoiled your *opiate*. This necessity of faith for avoiding condemnation Mr. *Locke* constantly maintains, tho', to shew the necessity of a good life also, he takes notice, that our Saviour's sentence at the last day will be pronounced according to mens actions, without any mention of their believing, or not. But what kind of *opiate for unbelievers* this can be, when it is at the same time declared, that no man can attain salvation, or escape condemnation, that does not believe; or what need there was of quoting Scripture to prove this, which you knew Mr. *Locke* had asserted in that very place, is not easy to apprehend.

Answer to the proofs in Sect. V. That he denied the doctrine of the Trinity, in his dispute with the Bishop of Worcester.

IT looks somewhat absurd to go about to prove a man a *Socinian*, after having attempted to throw

Ans. of Christianity, p. 233.

him

him beyond the bounds of Christianity itself: but that was a little too gross; we must, it seems, return to the old charge of Socinianism.

This section begins with an appeal to me, whether you had not sufficient grounds to accuse Mr. Locke of loose and Socinian principles. But, by this time, I suppose, you may be willing to remove your appeal, if you are not yourself convinced, how greatly you have wronged him, in all your accusations. And I am much mistaken, if his dispute with the Bishop of Worcester will afford you any more sufficient grounds, than all the former have appeared to be.

You grant what I had urged in Mr. Locke's behalf, that he took pains, to clear his *Essay* from the charge of being inconsistent with, or dangerous to, any article of the Christian faith. You likewise grant, that he often complains to the Bishop, of joining him with the Unitarians; as if he had been one of those, who oppose the doctrine of the Trinity: and you believe he was desirous, that the world should think his *Essay* did not favour Socinian principles. But you insist, that "This does not prove he did not believe them. It is one thing (you say) not to have wrote in a certain particular book against the Trinity; and another thing, to believe it. It is one thing, to be unwilling to be thought a Socinian; and another thing, to disown their principles." In reply to which, I insist, that the concern Mr. Locke shewed, that the world should not think any of his writings favoured Socinian principles (for it was not his *Essay* alone, which he vindicated from that charge) and the pains he took to clear them from it, if it is not a proof, that he believed the Trinity, or disowned Socinian principles, it is at least a proof, that he was very sure he had never published any thing in favour of their principles, or that tended to destroy the arguments for the Trinity; and this cuts you off from all pos-

sibility of proving, that he *denied* the Trinity, or that he *owned* any *Socinian* doctrines; for what he *privately* believed about those matters, which he did not publish, you cannot possibly determine, nor have any right to enquire. But to pretend, that Mr. *Locke* has, in many places of his works, *maintained* *Socinian* doctrines, and advanced things contrary to the Trinity; and yet, that he was very desirous, that the world should think he had done nothing of all this, is surely a contradiction: for, how could he expect to persuade the world, that he did not write what (according to you) his works were full of? or, to what purpose did he publish opinions, which, you own, he had no mind the world should know? What consistency is there in this?

I had farther asked, what imaginable reason you could assign for Mr. *Locke's* great concern to vindicate his writings on the article of the Trinity, if he did not believe it; or from favouring *Socinian* principles, if he did believe them; since he lived in an age, when all kind of free-thinking was openly professed, without any manner of discouragements, so that he could have no fears or views of interest, to make him conceal his opinions, or be so earnest to justify himself. To which you answer, "You run yourself perpetually into the same mistakes: he never justified himself in the opinion of any impartial man, to be a friend to the doctrine of the holy Trinity. It is true, indeed, he could be under no fears, — and it is true, also, that the security of the times gave him encouragement to vent his pernicious opinions, and to set himself at the head of the free-thinking tribe." It is certainly no *mistake*, Sir, that Mr. *Locke* did take a great deal of pains to justify himself from having writ any thing contrary to the

doctrine of the Trinity; for you have yourself granted, that *he is full and large upon this subject*. What success his endeavours met with in any man's opinion, is nothing to the purpose here. All you was desired to account for, is, what could induce him to *endeavour* to justify himself; not how effectually he did it. But, it seems, this question somewhat *puzzled* you, since instead of accounting for that fact, which is undeniable, you give a reason for his doing what I maintain he never did; nor has all your labour made it appear, that he ever *ventured any pernicious opinions*.

However, you had told me just before, ' that " I mistake much, if I think I puzzle you, when " I ask you the reason of Mr. Locke's conduct; for " you have given a very inconsistent account of it." This, I suppose, is in p. 89. for you have said nothing, that looks *that way*, but what I find there in these words: " He was a man of eclat and vanity; " he affected to lead and dictate; and was willing " to have his penetration and judgment admired, " and submitted to. And, therefore, of all things, " he endeavoured to avoid an imputation, which " would fix a character of infamy upon himself " and his writings, and forbid him, at once, all " the hopes and glory of gaining applause and disciples." Applause and disciples! To what, I pray, Sir? To opinions, which he disowned; nay, *of all things, avoided the imputation of?* This is a new way to *lead and dictate*. I confess, you have puzzled me, to make this account consistent with itself, or with what I just now cited from you, *viz. He could be under no fears, and that gave him encouragement to vent his pernicious opinions*. And yet here, it seems, he was in great fear of infamy, and that made him *disown those pernicious opinions*. He affected to *lead and dictate, and set himself at the head*

of the free-thinking tribe: and, therefore, he, of all things avoided the imputation of free-thinking. In short, he concealed, or disowned, his opinions, to secure the glory of *gaining disciples to them.* If this is your *consistent account* of Mr. Locke's conduct, it may satisfy those, who have the useful faculty of reconciling manifest contradictions; but those, who have not their heads turned for such purposes, may rather be inclined to think with me, that the concern he shewed, to clear his books from *Socinian* principles, and from having any thing in them dangerous to the article of the Trinity, as it is a full evidence, that he was conscious he had not vented any such *pernicious opinions*; so it ought, not only in charity, but in justice, to determine our judgment in favour of his principles; since no other motive of his conduct can, with any *consistency*, be supposed, but, either as I have before urged, that he sincerely believed those points, upon which he vindicated his writings; or, that, in modesty and humility, he would not, by declaring his opinions, disturb the peace of the church.

To this you answer, "The very supposition of modesty, and humility, and regard to the peace of the church, in such a man as he was, looks like a jest, and a banter upon him. Let any man read his books, and he will soon see how little a share he had in the virtues of modesty and humility. All the language of them is quite of another spirit." This character, Sir, I am persuaded, will pass upon none, but those, who have *never read his books*; and, though it is a reproach you frequently throw upon him, I may say, there is none of all your unjust invectives more groundless. I have given some answer to it, at the beginning of these papers; but must, on this occasion, add, that no man, who was so capable of observing

the mistakes and received errors in any subject he treated of, ever did it with less haughtiness or arrogance than he; or shewed more desire to be convinced by reason, if he was under any mistakes himself; as appears by his preface to *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, his Answer to the author of the Occasional Paper, and many of his private letters to his friends: nay, if we were to judge of him only by his vindication against the *Unmasker*, provoked as he was by ill usage, he would not appear with that *haughty air*, you pretend he assumes. I have consulted the passages in it, which you refer to; and find them quite of another stamp. In one of them, he thus expresses himself: "I did not think myself so considerable, that the world need be troubled about me, whether I were a follower of Socinus, Arminius, or Calvin, etc. nor is it material to any one, what my opinions are, any farther than they carry their own evidence with them." This is not the haughty style of one, who would *lead and dictate*; much less shall we find him of that character, in any other of the books you name; and to determine the truth of this, I may, with great assurance, appeal to *all his works*. But, particularly, in his controversy with the Bishop of *Warcester*, it is impossible for any man to speak with greater modesty of himself, or to treat another with more submission and respect, than he does the Bishop: which, as it was more than usual in controversy, the Bishop was so sensible of, that he returned him thanks for it, in one of his letters. There was, indeed, in Mr. Locke's writings something so eminently opposite to that *haughty air*, which you impute to him, that such a reproach could never have entered your thoughts, but to evade an argument, which you could not answer. He, on many occasions, expresses an earnest desire

^b His book of *Educat.* His *Letters*.

of being set right in his mistakes, and a readiness to recant them publickly; and speaks with such an unaffected modesty of himself, especially in his familiar letters, as is not common in a man of so great talents. Instances of this are too many to be transcribed; but I will set down one evidence of the truth of it, which is the effect it had on Mr. *Molyneux*, who by this behaviour was entirely engaged to his friendship, as he professes in one of his letters. "You so favourably entertain all men's objections, you are so desirous to hear the sense of others, you are so tender in differing from any man, that you have captivated me beyond resistance." In short, *modesty* is so far from being foreign to Mr. *Locke's* character, that it was almost as conspicuous, and as much admired in him, as his penetration and judgment. So that there is no danger it should look like a *banter* upon him, if we impute it to modesty, and a commendable prudence, that he forbore to publish opinions (if he had any such, which is more than we know) that would have disturbed the peace of the church.

Here you will again cry out, "as for his regard for the peace of the church, it is impossible that should ever have entered into his thoughts. He does not appear to have had any determinate notion of the *Christian* church; he speaks of *Christians*, only as of certain sects of men, joined to one another, and their leaders by different systems of principles. As in his laws of *Carolina*, every persuasion is a church; and with such a notion of the church, it is impossible that peace should be consistent. A church made up of sects is essentially a *chaos*."

It is very certain, Sir, that there are few words, which are more generally used in a loose indeter-

minate sense, or in more different significations, than the word *church*. It is, likewise, certain, that by far the greater number of people have not any determinate notion of the *Christian church*; and, among those, that have, there are several very different notions of it. But, I hope, it does not follow, that none of these can have any regard to the peace of the church. You have not been pleased to acquaint us, what your notion of the church is; only we may gather, that it excludes all sects, that have *different systems of principles*; which, I fear, will prove as limited a notion, as that of the *Romanists*, who confine the catholic church within the bounds of their own. Most of the divines of the church of *England* allow *them* to be a part, though an unsound part, of the church; and Bishop *Smalridge* declares himself unwilling absolutely to exclude all, who have not *episcopal ordination*, from being members of the *Christian church*, out of a tender regard to the *reformed churches abroad*. And if these are allowed to be parts of it, we can scarce avoid admitting into our notion of the *Christian church* certain sects of men, joined to one another, not by, as you express it, but notwithstanding different systems of principles; always supposing, that they agree in fundamentals.

However, it does not appear that this was Mr. *Locke's* notion of the *Christian church*. In his *Laws of Carolina*, where he has given you so much offence, by calling every persuasion a church, he never speaks of them as making one church; nor seems any more to have that meaning, than I suppose you would have in saying, the church of *Rome*, the church of *Scotland*, the church of *Geneva*, the *Lutheran church*, etc. But, supposing Mr. *Locke* to have no determinate, or to have a wrong notion of the *Christian church* (the case, I doubt not, of many peaceable *Christians*) how will it follow from thence, that it is impossible the peace
of

of it should ever have entered into his thoughts? In his laws of *Carolina*, the peace of the several churches seems to have entered very much into his thoughts; and if he had a notion, that the *Christian* church was *made up of sects* (which you have no ground from those laws to assert) might he not forbear to oppose a doctrine, which was received by the greatest part of it, either in regard to the peace of the church in general, or of that particular branch of it, of which he lived and died a member?

You ask*, “How is it possible, that he should have any regard to the peace of the church of *England*, when he notoriously opposes the doctrines, and speaks of the orthodoxy, and the clergy of it, in terms of the greatest scorn and contempt?” But this, Sir, I absolutely deny; and as to the first part of the charge, I presume it is by this time sufficiently evident, that you have produced no proof of it; for by no rule in logic, will giving grounds of suspicion, or occasions to doubt, that a man is no friend to certain doctrines, be the same with notoriously opposing them; and that is the most your proofs pretend to, though even that they fall short of. Neither have you proved the other part of your charge: for it is impossible to prove any thing by such disjointed words, as you have raked together, without giving us the occasion, or connexion of them: And it is certain on the contrary, that in several of his writings he speaks with the highest esteem and veneration of some eminent prelates, and others of the clergy; and by many expressions in different parts of his works, it appears, that the church of *England* was in his judgment the *most pure*, and most conformable in her doctrines to the sacred Scriptures, some of which I have had occasion to produce; so that,

though he might not think her infallible, and might speak of *fashionable orthodoxy, prevailing orthodoxy*, with respect to the contrary opinions in disputable points, which it is undeniable have at different times prevailed among us; yet he might have so great a regard for her peace, as not to oppose any doctrine she had constantly received as an article of faith. But whatever were his reasons, it is matter of fact he never did.

I had now got almost to the end of this section, when I began to recollect, that the title of it is, *Proofs that he denied the Trinity in his dispute with the Bishop of Worcester*, which the work I have found to do made me quite forget; for of seventeen pages, that it contains, fifteen of them are nothing but mere railing and invectives: a great deal of it savours too much of passion and pique for me to encounter. But in pursuit of what seemed most material to answer, I have passed over the two pages, wherein are contained all, that has any pretence to argument on the subject of the title, which we will now go back to consider.

In the controversy between the Bishop and Mr. Locke, you say, "when he was told, that the way to clear himself, from being suspected not to be a friend to the doctrine of the Trinity, was to declare, that he owned that doctrine, as it has been received in the *Christian church*:" he answers,

First, "That he need not clear himself, from what was never laid to his charge." And

Secondly, "That how the doctrine of the Trinity has been *always* received in the *Christian church*, he confessed himself ignorant."

To his first answer, you reply, that "though the Bishop did not charge him directly as opposing the doctrine of the Trinity; yet he knew,

“ that his adversary to his *Reasonableness of Christianity* did warmly charge him, as not favouring it. And yet he never thought fit to clear himself from that imputation.”

To his second answer, you reply, “ that it was not required of him to declare, that he owned the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been always received in the *Christian* church, for he added the word *always*; and if he had only declared, that he owned it, as it has been received in the church of *England*, you doubt not it would have been thought sufficient. And that therefore, as both these answers are false and evasive, so it appears from them, that he was no friend to the doctrine of the Trinity.”

To all this I answer, first, that the Bishop was so far from *directly charging* him with opposing the doctrine of the Trinity, that he *directly acquitted* him of having any such intention, in several places of both his answers. So that to have cleared himself, from what the Bishop so often assured him he did not design to charge him with, was, at least, very needless: and for Mr. *Locke* to have cleared himself to the Bishop of *Worcester*, from what had been by *another person* imputed to the then unknown author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, must have been thought very *impertinent*.

Secondly I answer, that Mr. *Locke* did think fit to clear his *writings*, from all that was imputed to them; which was the most effectual, and indeed, the only way to clear *himself*. For suppose he had, in answer to the Bishop, said as you would have had him, My Lord, *I own the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been received in the Christian church*; and therefore, your Lordship had no reason to bring me, or my book, into a dispute about that doctrine: the Bishop might have reasonably replied, that is nothing to the purpose: I have not charged you with denying the Trinity; but the question

question is, whether some things in your *Essay*, your way of certainty by ideas, your notions of identity, or your definitions, are not inconsistent with, or of dangerous consequence to, that article of the *Christian* faith? This certainly was all that Mr. *Locke* could be concerned to clear in his dispute with the Bishop, which he did with great strength of reason, and so effectually cleared himself.

But if he had thought fit to declare (where there was no occasion for it) that he owned the doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been received in the church of England; would that have been by you judged sufficient, to obviate the arguments you have drawn from his writings, to prove, that he denied that doctrine? I doubt not, you would have been ready with the same answer to his publick declaration, which you have given to my piece of secret history; that whether true or false, you ^m will let it pass for nothing. "How little is to be gained (say you) by such a general acknowledgment? Do we not know, that there are persons now living, eminent in their stations, and for their learning, who profess to believe, and subscribe to the faith of the holy Trinity; and yet at the same time disown the divine nature of *Jesus Christ*, &c." This is all the credit his private declaration could gain with you; and there is no reason to think a publick one would have fared better.

It was therefore no evasion in Mr. *Locke* to decline giving such an answer, as the state of the controversy did by no means require, and which would have been neither pertinent nor satisfactory to his adversaries. Nor can the reasons he gives for it be taxed with falsity; for the first, it is matter of fact, that he had not been charged with disbelieving the Trinity: and as to the second, how a doctrine so much disputed, and so differently explained, had

been received in the church (without adding the word *always*, which makes a clearer, though no real difference in the meaning) of this Mr. Locke, who professed to take his faith from the Scriptures, and was much more conversant with them, than with any other writings of the church, might with great sincerity confess himself ignorant.

But supposing these answers to be *false* or *evasive*, does it follow from thence, *that he denied the doctrine of the Trinity*? This is what you here undertake to prove; but an evasion, or avoiding to declare one's opinion about a doctrine, can never amount to a proof of *denying it*. And for all the boast of your title, the most you pretend to on this head is, *that he gave the world occasion to doubt, that he was no friend to the doctrine of the Trinity*; and even this does not appear from any thing you have produced. His answers were such, as the state of the controversy required; for supposing him ever so great a friend to the doctrine of the Trinity, a declaration of it on that occasion would, as I have shewn, been nothing to the purpose, nor in any respect reasonable.

You instance another place in his *third letter*, in which, you say, *he also gave the world occasion to doubt, that he was no friend to this doctrine*; because in speaking of these propositions, *there are three persons in one nature, and there are two natures in one person*; he says, "I do not *here* question the truth of these propositions, or deny, that they may be drawn from the Scripture: but I deny, that these very propositions are in express words in my *Bible*; for that is the only thing I deny *here*." To this you object, that if Mr. Locke had said *absolutely*, I do not question the truth of these propositions, nor deny, &c. without twice adding the word *here*, *he might possibly have given some satisfaction, that he did believe the doctrine of the Trinity*. You have taken care, Sir, to express yourself

yourself pretty cautiously : but I dare venture to affirm, that the most *absolute* words he could have used, (to whomsoever they might *possibly have given some*) would not have given you any satisfaction at all ; you would notwithstanding have found out some *mental reservation* for him. Pardon me for being so positive ; you have given me just grounds for it in the second part of your *Defence*, which I shall have occasion to observe in its place.

Nor need I say any thing farther here to this passage : the most you charge it with is an evasion, or that he did not think fit plainly to declare his opinion of some propositions concerning the Trinity ; and I have not undertaken to prove, that he did. But not declaring his opinion concerning the Trinity will by no rule of logic conclude, that he *denied* it, which is what you should have proved. Mr. *Locke* might have many reasons for not declaring himself, if he was at all dissatisfied with the terms, in which that doctrine has been explained, and is now generally received, (as scruples of that kind have been entertained by some, who yet were stedfast in the faith.) That was one sufficient reason for not speaking in the most absolute manner, tho' he believed the Trinity, as he understood it to be delivered in the Scriptures : and if this was his case, I must again observe, his not attempting to *oppose* the received *terms* was such an instance of *temper and modesty* in so eminent a man, as rather deserves esteem and acknowledgments, than resentment and revilings.

Upon the whole then, since Mr. *Locke* never declared himself on the *Socinian* side, but, on the contrary, disowned them, and constantly vindicated himself from having writ any thing, that could favour their notions ; they can have no *right in him*, whatever ^a you pretend, nor have you any right to

give him up to them, as you take upon you to do. And I am much mistaken, if it will not be a far greater satisfaction to them, to see the members of the church of England, foolishly endeavouring to prove, that he was on the Socinian side, than it can be to see them contending, that he was against them. What satisfaction you can suppose that should give them, is not easy to imagine. But as he lived and died in the communion of the church of England, I had urged, that it is highly imprudent, as well as unjust, to labour to persuade the world, that in his private judgment he did not favour her doctrines; and this I still insist upon, though you exceedingly despise the prudent part: "No man (you say) of sense and probity will be less capable of being convinced of error, because Mr. Locke erred with him; or will alter his own opinion in complaisance to the superiority of his penetration: And what fools or knaves may do, is not worth enquiry."

But may it not be worth enquiry, whether men of sense and probity are not sometimes liable to have their judgments influenced, imperceptibly to themselves, by the opinions of those, whom they esteem? That prejudice of education, which fixes far the greater part of mankind to whatever religion they happen to have been brought up in, seems to be owing in a great measure to their veneration for their teachers; and it would be hard to pronounce, that all are knaves, or fools, who live under such a bias. Some are too busy, some too lazy, or careless, and many think they have not learning enough, to examine the grounds of their religion, and so must take it upon trust. But even those, who endeavour to think for themselves, are not always secure from such an influence. If they happen to be conversant with some eminent author,

who, besides an uncommon penetration, seems to have a love of truth, and to lay aside all other regards in the search of it, how insensibly do the sentiments of such a one insinuate into their minds, whilst they imagine they follow no judgment but their own? And to have had some consideration for a weakness, to which men are on so many accounts liable, without being either *fools or knaves*, might not have been unworthy the severest *honesty and wisdom*.

But if there was no danger at all of influencing others, by persuading them, that Mr. Locke was a *Socinian*, I have in every view considered the part you and I have acted, (as you desire) and cannot for my life imagine, what service you can possibly be supposed to do the church. What can the church be the better, for your *detecting* his private prejudices against her doctrines, if he had any? Or what disservice can I possibly have done her, by maintaining against you, that we ought not to impute errors to him, which he never owned? What could the church have been the worse, if no body but Dr. Holdsworth had ever found them out? I have only pleaded, Sir, for a piece of common equity. As for *receiving a notorious heretic, or mortal enemy to the faith and peace of Christians, into communion*, as you extravagantly talk, I have no concern in it; nor have these expressions any support but passion.

They are, indeed, much of a piece with the virulent language of those other adversaries of Mr. Locke, whom you mention, for having been beforehand with you in their accusations of him. And as their scurrilous performances, full of prejudices and mistakes, were condemned by all the *impartial world*; I no more think it *material*, that they left the same imputation upon him, that you have done, than you esteem it *material*, whether the Bishop of Worcester gave him the like usage to what you have

done, or no. However, it is surely somewhat material, that the Bishop frequently acquitted him of having any intention to oppose the doctrine of the Trinity, which you so positively charge him with; though without any manner of ground for it, as we have seen. And if you had followed the example of those worthy and eminently learned men, *Bishop Stillingfleet* and the *Rev. Dr. Lupton*, another of his adversaries, who, in a sermon upon the same subject with yours, forbears all invidious names, and argues with the decency of a fair disputant; it had certainly been more for your honour, than to have ranked yourself with *Mr. Edwards* and *Mr. Leigh*, as you have done in this controversy, in the warmth of your zeal against heresy, and the strength of your prejudice against *Mr. Locke*.

We are now come to the close of this first part, where you sum up the particulars, upon which your charge of *Socinianism* is founded: but as I have fully vindicated *Mr. Locke* on each point, it is needless to go with you over them again here. I shall only in my turn draw up a short summary of what has been produced in his defence.

If it appears, that *Mr. Locke* did not at all agree with the *Socinians*, in “denying original sin, the “satisfaction of *Christ*, and the eternity of the punishments of the wicked;” If, on the contrary, he maintained, that *Jesus Christ* came to redeem mankind, by the sacrifice he made of himself, and to restore them to life eternal, which they had forfeited by *Adam’s* transgression; which is both an acknowledgment of original sin, and of the satisfaction of *Christ*: And if he fully asserted eternal punishments in a future state, as has been shewn: If he never opposed the doctrine of the Trinity: If he never endeavoured to take off the force of those texts, which are the most incontestable proofs of our Saviour’s Divinity, particularly the beginning

King of St. John's Gospel: And if those other texts, which he is accused of misinterpreting, are understood in the same sense, that he gives them, by those, who are allowed to be most orthodox:

If he never deduced any doctrine contrary to those articles of faith, from any of his interpretations, which is not so much as pretended.

In short, if all you have produced, instead of proofs, are nothing but suspicions, uncertain consequences, mistakes, or misrepresentations, as I have sufficiently made appear; then it is certain *you have not made good the character you gave of Mr. Locke in your Sermon*; and the world must judge, whether your defence of it, or mine of him, most deserves to be thought *weak, absurd, and partial*.

^P You desire me to consider, *what discretion or piety there is in extravagantly preferring the sentiments and reputation of such a man, to those of the catholic church?* My discretion or piety, Sir, are not answerable for your *extravagant representations*. You know, my whole endeavour has been to shew, that he has published nothing contrary to the sentiments of the catholic church; nor have you been able to prove, that he ever did: And as I am well assured, that many persons both of piety and learning highly esteem his *Comments on St. Paul's Epistles*, and think his other writings greatly tend to promote true religion; I am not afraid of the *contempt of good and thinking Christians* (to which, you say, I expose myself) by endeavouring to rescue the character of so valuable a man, from the injurious prejudices you would raise against it; an author, not *eminent for logical triflings* (an expression, by which you do as much wrong to your own judgment, as to his character) but for such useful observations, as greatly tend to the service of truth,

the detection of error, and the advancement of real knowledge.

. But with all his great abilities, if this celebrated man had, as you^a alledge, appeared to be a *professed and obstinate heretic, and one of the worst and most infamous kind, a Socinian*, I should certainly have dropt my defence of his orthodoxy. If you could have made good this charge, Sir, you might have saved us both a great deal of trouble. It was but to have pointed out the place, and the words, in which he *obstinately professed himself a heretic, or a Socinian*; and I assure you I should not have attempted to prove, that he was *not*; nor need you, I think, have been at all this pains to prove, that he *was* what he *professed* himself to be. In the eagerness of your zeal, you have at last overshot the mark.

P. S. I have already replied to what was most material in your answer to some additions of my letter, in the proper place for it. But there are some passages, which deserve a little notice, that did not fall in my way there. I had mentioned a note of Mr. *Locke's* on *Gal. v. 18.* as an acknowledgment of our Saviour's Divinity, since he there plainly asserts the spirit of God, and the spirit of *Christ*, to be *the same*. To this^a you object, "First, that Mr. *Locke* does in the same note say, that "spirit signifies the Gospel, and so, say you, spirit of *Christ* may imply no more than the Gospel of *Christ*; and receiving his spirit no more than receiving his Gospel." But though Mr. *Locke* does in that note observe, that the *Law* and the *Gospel* are by St. *Paul* opposed under the titles of *Flesh* and *Spirit*, yet it is impossible, that in the words I quoted, he should by the spirit of *Christ* mean his Gospel; because that would make a very

^a Page 103.

^a Page 106.

absurd sense, quite inconsistent with the argument he is upon.

This I suppose you was sensible of, and therefore, secondly, you will "let it be said, if I please, "that by spirit of *Christ* in this place is meant a "divine power and assistance given to *Christians* "by *Jesus Christ*." But you ask, "will it follow "from that one passage of Mr. *Locke's*, that he acknowledged *Christ* to be God, because he is allowed to say, that the divine power is communicated to *Christians* by him?" It may not follow indeed, Sir, from his being allowed to say what you think fit to say for him. Mr. *Locke* does not say, that the divine power is communicated to *Christians* by *Christ*; but expressly, that it is the spirit of *Christ*, which assists them against the flesh, which spirit he immediately after calls the spirit of God: and that I still insist upon to be an acknowledgment of our Saviour's divinity; for I see not how the spirit of *Christ* can be the spirit of God, if *Christ* be not God.

Mr. *Locke*, in this note, refers to his *Paraphrase* on *Rom. viii. 9*—11. the words of which you set down, and then ask, "Where is the least appearance of the acknowledgment of the divinity of "Jesus *Christ* in these words?" And who had said, that there is? But as it happens, though the words taken by themselves are not an acknowledgment of his divinity, yet compared with this note, and its reference to them, they are. The words of the *Paraphrase* are these, "and so having received the "Gospel, you have therewith received the spirit of "God?" To which words Mr. *Locke* refers, upon saying in his note on *Gal. v. 18*. that those, who receive *Christ* by faith, with him receive his spirit; which is a plain acknowledgment, that the spirit of *Christ* and the spirit of God are the same; so that these words are a farther confirmation of what I had before inferred from that passage alone.

You

You say indeed, that "it no where appears, that
 " Mr. *Locke* means any thing else by spirit of God;
 " than only a divine power or energy." But the
 falshood of this might be made appear almost *every*
where, so frequently he speaks of the Holy Ghost;
 or spirit of God, in a personal manner:

But "upon the whole", you say, how ridiculous
 "is it to endeavour to squeeze an acknowledg-
 "ment of the divinity of *Jesus Christ*, by conse-
 "quence and implication only, from the words of
 "a man, who no where in any of his writings, in
 "any direct words, makes any such acknowledg-
 "ment, but every where most studiously avoids
 "it." To which give me leave to answer:

That how little weight soever there may be in
 arguments from *consequence and implication only*;
 Dr. *Holdsworth* cannot disallow them in proof, that
 Mr. *Locke* owned the divinity of our Saviour, since
 he gives no other proofs, that he *denied* it, but by
consequence and implication only. And I may fairly
 retort upon him, how ridiculous is it to endeavour
 to *squeeze a denial* of our Saviour's divinity, by con-
 sequence and implication only; from the words of
 a man, who, no where in any of his writings, makes
 any such *denial* in any direct words, but every
 where most studiously avoids it. This is certainly
 as strong on Mr. *Locke's* side, as it is against him;
 though I have no need of it; for the passage be-
 fore us is more than a proof by consequence and
 implication: it is an exprefs asserting, that the spi-
 rit of *Christ* is the spirit of God, *i. e. that Christ is*
God.

As for what you add, that "he bends his whole
 "force to make the acknowledgment (of our Sa-
 viour's divinity) "not only unnecessary, but also
 "false; as you have shewed already:" I take the
 liberty to say, that you have not shewed it at all:

you have not brought, nor can you bring, any one instance of his attempting to prove that doctrine to be *false*. And as for making the acknowledgment of it *unnecessary*, neither have you any proof of that, but by consequence and implication only; and that too upon very fallacious grounds, as I have largely insisted on elsewhere.

Thus, Sir, I presume, I have made it sufficiently appear, that all your proofs fall very short of what you undertook to shew: They are far from making it evident, that Mr. *Locke* denied the doctrine of the Trinity, or that he agreed with the *Socinians* in any other of their *most important and distinguishing doctrines*. We now go on to that of *the resurrection of the same body*, the principal subject of your Sermon.

The end of the First Part.

As for what you add, that "he denies his whole force to make the acknowledgment (of our Saviour's divinity) not only unnecessary, but also false; as you have shewed already." I take the **AN** that you have not shewed it at all.

Vol. 1. No. 1. 1841.

VINDICATION

OF

THE

OF THE

CHAP. I.

OF THE

THE LANCET is this week taking notice of the
the principle to your first lesson, which
consists of a vindication of the same ex-
posed of your position against Mr. Locke, which I
thought, and still think, he had given no occasion
for, and some diminishing expressions of the worth
and character of that truly great man. To the first
part I shall only say, that as Mr. Locke never did
oppose any doctrine, that he knew was esteemed an
article of faith, you might have supposed those
passionate answers, without disobeying the Apostle's
 injunction

A
VINDICATION
OF
Mr. LOCKE,

ON THE
Controversy concerning the Resurrec-
tion of the same Body.

PART II.

CHAP. I.

Of the Resurrection of the same Body in general.

THERE is little worth taking notice of in the preamble to your first section, which consists of a vindication of that *warm exercise of your passions* against Mr. Locke, which I thought, and still think, he had given no occasion for; and some diminishing expressions of the worth and character of that truly great man. To the first part I shall only say, that as Mr. Locke never did oppose any doctrine, that he knew was esteemed an *article of faith*, you might have suppressed those *passionate emotions*, without disobeying the Apostle's injun-

254 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

injunction to contend earnestly for the faith; and might have indulged him on this article, in compliance with the command of another Apostle, Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputation. The just and honest exercise of our natural passions is against the wilful faults of men, not against the errors or mistakes of their judgment. And perhaps the gentlemen of moderation (as you call them) who can bear with those, that differ from them, in difficult and doubtful points, may be as likely to die martyrs for the essentials of religion, as the gentlemen of indiscriminating zeal; who take fire at the smallest opposition, and are generally better disposed to make than to die martyrs.

As to the lessening manner, in which you treat Mr. Locke's character, I believe the world will be apt to conclude, that those, who can suffer themselves to say, *that little honour is to be gained even by the confutation of him, and talk of his infamous heresies, have much more exercised their natural passions* (which you are so fond of indulging) than either their judgment or their candour. I pass over what mostly concerns myself. Whether I have been led to desert or deny my religion out of an idle partiality to Mr. Locke, as you seem to think, must appear by the sequel of this Reply.

S E C T. I.

The question stated.

THO' it may be indeed, as you say, nothing to your purpose to enquire, how Mr. Locke came into a dispute about the resurrection of the *same body* with the Bishop of Worcester; yet it was very much to my purpose, in vindication of him from the warmth of your resentment; for there is a great difference (especially as to the charge of heresy)

refy) betwixt a man's setting himself to oppose a doctrine officiously, or in zeal against it; and his being drawn in, by a groundless accusation, for his own necessary self-defence, first, to shew, that he had said nothing inconsistent with that doctrine; and next, to question, whether, if he had done so, he could be charged with saying any thing inconsistent with an article of faith; "which (says he) I do not yet know the resurrection of the *same body* to be."

But, "it is sufficient (you say) to your design, to observe, that Mr. *Locke*, in that dispute, did several times deny the resurrection of the same body; and upon that ground it is, that you looked upon him, and now upon me, to deny and oppose the *Christian* faith." Give me leave to tell you, Sir, that you go entirely upon a mistaken ground. Mr. *Locke*, as I assured you in my letter, and I here insist upon it, did never, nor do I, deny the resurrection of the same body. There is a wide difference betwixt denying a thing to be true, and denying it to be an *article of faith*.

Neither do those passages, which you have produced out of his third letter, serve at all to shew, as you pretend, *what his opinion of the resurrection was*, whatever appearance they may have, as they stand abstracted from the occasion of them; which was only to observe, that the expressions of Scripture did not seem intended to teach, as an article of faith, that the *very same body* shall be raised. So that it cannot be clear from thence, what his opinion of the resurrection was, one jot farther.

However, you have thought fit to determine his opinion for him, and to set down three propositions, as the state of the case between you and him, in which he is very little, if at all, concerned. The only question he has any thing to do with, in this controversy, is, whether the resurrection of the *same body*, either in his own sense of the words, or the

Bishop

256 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

Bishop of *Worcester's*, is so plainly declared in Scripture, that every *Christian* is obliged to an explicate belief of it. Mr. *Locke* does not find, that it is; and I have undertaken his defence in that opinion, which is all that I am obliged to make good. You, on the other hand, maintain, that the *very same bodies*, in which the dead lived before, shall be raised: That the sameness of human bodies implies not a philosophical and mathematical identity, but, what you term, a *vulgar sameness*: And that this *sameness* of the human body, at the resurrection (about which, by the way, Mr. *Locke* has said nothing) is grounded upon the express words, and clear intimations, of Scripture: And this you will have leave to call, not your *own opinion*, but that of the catholic church.

I must have leave too, Sir, to tell you, that if you defend these propositions, only as the *opinion* of the catholic church, neither Mr. *Locke*, nor I, would contend against you. The *opinion* of the catholic church, that a doctrine is true, will not erect it into an article of faith, in the strict sense of the words, as explained above. The doctrine of the *Milennium*, and some others, now universally rejected, were once the *opinions* of the catholic church, and thought to be grounded on clear intimations of Scripture; which yet, I believe, you will not say, are articles of faith, whatever they might then be esteemed. But I do not oppose even the *opinion* of the *catholic church*; and therefore need not blush, when I reflect who my adversary is. I only contend against you, that the resurrection of *the same body*, however general the opinion may be, or may have been, or how true soever, is not at this day an acknowledged article of faith in the catholic church, or particularly in the church of *England*.

S E C T.

S E C T. II.

The first general defence of Mr. Locke vindicated.

I Had urged, in behalf of Mr. *Locke*, that his faith in the last judgment, the *resurrection of the dead*, and that the dead shall rise again with *their bodies*, should secure him from being taxed with infidelity, or heresy, with respect to the article of the resurrection. For which, you make me give this reason, *because* this, surely, is all, that is of importance to the great ends of religion, in that article. Upon this supposed reason, you say a great deal, that I have no concern in; for I did not offer this, as a reason for my plea, though you have given it that appearance, by inserting the word *because*. The grounds, on which, I think, that one, who believes those articles, ought not to be taxed with heresy in the doctrine of the resurrection, is, because he believes all, that is plainly revealed concerning that doctrine; though he should not determine about something else, which might be obscurely implied in it. So that if it is essential to all heresy, as you say, to substitute false opinions, into the room of articles of faith, upon that foundation, because they answer the great ends of religion, I must be clear of that guilt, having substituted no opinions upon that foundation.

You go on to say: "Certainly it is of the last
" importance to religion, to preserve our faith; not
" only within the words and expressions of Scrip-
" ture, but agreeable also to that sense of those
" words and expressions, which hath been received
" in the church of *Christ*; and which, upon Mr.
" *Locke's* own method of interpretation, by com-
" paring one passage of the sacred books with
" another, appears to be true and genuine.

258 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

Most certainly, Sir, when we can, by comparing one place with another, clearly determine the *particular* sense of any *general* words of Scripture, we ought to preserve our faith agreeable to that *particular sense*: But when we cannot, by the Scripture itself, ascertain any sense more determinate than is expressed in the general words of it, I know no other authority, that can oblige us to any limited or particular sense.

“ General words (you say) are capable of being
 “ applied to many senses, and some of those senses
 “ may be false. They must be limited to a parti-
 “ cular meaning, to have their proper sense ascer-
 “ tained, and understood. — The resurrection of
 “ the same body is the particular sense, to which the
 “ Scriptures themselves, as well as the church of
 “ *Christ*, have ever limited that general expression
 “ of the resurrection of the dead.” *Answer*. If the
 Scriptures themselves had limited this general ex-
 pression to that particular sense, there would soon
 have been an end of our dispute; but that is what
 I cannot find out, nor have seen any proof of. And
 we doubt, whether any other authority has given,
 or can give it that limitation. As to the necessity
 of limiting the general words of Scripture to a par-
 ticular meaning, I beg leave to answer you in the
 words of the judicious Mr. *Chillingworth*: “ This
 “ presumptuous imposing of the senses of men,
 “ upon the words of God; the special senses of
 “ men, upon the general words of God; — this
 “ vain conceit, that we can speak of the things of
 “ God, better than in the words of God; — this
 “ restraining of the word from that latitude and
 “ generality, and the understandings of men from
 “ that liberty, wherein *Christ* and the Apostles left
 “ them, is, and hath been, the only fountain of
 “ all the schisms of the church.” I confess, I
 see not any good use of limiting the general words
 of Scripture to a particular meaning: it is rather
 taking

taking them from, than ascertaining, their proper sense. *General words*, you say, *are capable of being applied to many senses, and some of those senses may be false.* And if this be so, those only, who restrain them to a particular meaning, are in danger of embracing any of those senses, which *may be false*; whilst those, who hold them in that general sense, which they undeniably express, are sure to hold nothing but what is true. As in the case before us, he, who believes the resurrection of the dead, and that the dead shall be raised with spiritual incorruptible bodies, certainly believes truths plainly revealed in Scripture. If any thing more particular concerning their bodies had been necessary to be believed, the Holy Spirit could, no doubt, have delivered it in words as particular as man can invent. But he, who believes all, that the Scripture plainly declares of the resurrection, cannot be in danger of the guilt of heresy in that article, though he should doubt about something, which *may be true*, concerning it, but not *plainly declared*. Heresy does not consist in being undetermined about some particulars relating to matters of faith, *that may be true*; but in asserting something, that is contrary to what is plainly revealed, which must therefore be *certainly false**. So that, Sir, with your good leave, Mr. *Locke* and I do, and must, stand acquitted of heresy, in the article of the resurrection, notwithstanding our being undetermined, whether the bodies raised shall be the *very same*; till you can prove, that, in believing the resurrection of the dead, and that the dead shall be raised with *their bodies*, we believe or assert something that is *false*. You say, that he must not be acquitted,

* There may be erroneous propositions in faith, which are not heretical. The question is, whether a mistaken notion, as to the *manner*, where the thing itself is asserted, can make a heresy. Bishop *Stillingfleet's Misc. Disc.* p. 289. published by his son, in 1735.

260 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

“^b since it is clear, that, under the general protection of that doctrine, he conceals the denial of the resurrection of the body, the same body.” But how can Mr. *Locke* be said to *conceal* what he so frankly and openly professes? That he would not presume to *deny* or assert the resurrection of the same body, because the Scripture had not plainly determined, *with what bodies the dead shall come*. Or what can there be in this *inconsistent* with the article of the resurrection?

S E C T. III.

The second general Defence of Mr. Locke vindicated.

I Had said, that what particles of matter the resurrection body shall be made up of, Mr. *Locke* looked on as a question of curiosity, which the Scriptures having said nothing of, he *modestly* concludes, is not for him to determine. To which you answer: “This expression, *the Scriptures have said nothing of what particles of matter the resurrection body shall be made up*, is very proper to puzzle and perplex his reader, because it is in some senses manifestly true, and in others as manifestly false. For if by it he means, that those very words are not in the Scriptures, there can be no question but it is most true; or, if he means, that the Scripture states not precisely and philosophically, of what contexture the rising body shall be, this also shall be allowed to be true. But if he intends by those expressions, that the Scripture says nothing, directly or indirectly, of the resurrection of the same body, this, I say, is manifestly false. So that this question of curiosity is

“ far enough from being our question, and it
“ would not be want of modesty in him, but im-
“ pertinence to determine it.”

I dare say, Sir, Mr. *Locke* did not intend to affirm, that the Scripture had said nothing *indirectly* upon this subject, because that is not to be enquired after, when we are in search of an article of faith; for all such articles must be directly and plainly declared. But if his question of curiosity be not the question now in debate between us, I know not what our controversy is upon. You allow it to be true, that the Scripture states not precisely and philosophically of what contexture the rising body shall be: but you affirm, that it is false to say, that the Scripture says nothing *directly* or *indirectly* of the *resurrection of the same body*. Supposing then, that this is spoke of, some how or other, in such terms, as obliges us to believe it; is it not a reasonable question to ask, in what sense, or in what respect we are to believe, that the rising body shall be the same? Or can we believe it at all without being informed of this? Those, who maintain the resurrection of the same body, seem without scruple to resolve the doubt. Some will answer, that it must consist of all the particles of matter, that were ever vitally united to the soul, during the whole course of a man's life. Others say, that it will consist only of such particles, as were united to it at the point of death; or that it must have *no other* particles, but what were at some time united to it. You, Sir, tell me, that those parts of the old matter, which it pleases God to restore to life, will be sufficient, whatever *new* particles may be added to make it the same body. Now what are all or any of these answers but a determining this question of curiosity, *what particles of matter the resurrection body shall be made up of?* And this is what Mr. *Locke* affirms, and which you allow in this sense to be true, that the Scriptures

262 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

have said nothing of. But if any one to avoid the *impertinence*, as you speak, of determining this question, shall answer, that we are bound to believe the resurrection of the *same body*, but we are not to enquire in what sense, or in what respect it will be, or what is requisite to make it the same body; *i. e.* we are not to enquire what is meant by that expression; he manifestly makes an article of faith of a mere sound; or else he must mean nothing more by it than those, who say, that the dead shall be raised with *their bodies*, but they presume not to determine, whether those bodies shall be the very same they had in this life; for not to determine of what particles the rising body shall consist, and not to determine, whether it shall be the very same body, is all one. The only difference is, that those, who assert the *sameness* of the resurrection body, and yet confess, that they know not of what particles it shall be made up, use a more absurd expression, and assert somewhat like a contradiction. Mr. *Locke's* question of curiosity therefore must be the question between us, if you mean any thing different from him. And whether it be *impertinence*, or *want of modesty* to determine it, let those consider, who presume so to do.

To your repeated cautions *not to be so fond of mentioning Mr. Locke's modesty*; I shall only say here, that though I am convinced from all his writings, that modesty was a very eminent part of his character; I do not mean such a modesty, as you seek for, which would *stop his mouth*, or hinder him from writing *what he thought*; for that in some cases is a weakness or a vice: but such a modesty, as made him, in matters of reason and philosophy, frequently * profess, that he pretended not to *teach*, but to enquire: And in those of revela-

* Vide third Lett. *Essay* B. ii. ch. ii. sect. xvii.

tion (particularly on the subject we are upon) not to presume to be wise beyond what is written.

S E C T. IV.

The third general Defence of Mr. Locke vindicated.

I did indeed think, Sir, that your calling the subject of your Sermon, the *contentious* part of the article of the resurrection, implied a kind of owning, that the Scripture had not determined the matter. But it seems that was not your meaning, and you shall be allowed to have called that doctrine *contentious*, for what reasons you please; for this I am sure is not worth contending about. But I must not allow you to confound a dispute about the *same body*, with *opposing and contradicting the truth of the resurrection*. I doubt not to make it appear, that Mr. Locke is very clear from that guilt, though your over-abounding zeal for the resurrection of the *same body* will not suffer you to allow any resurrection at all without it.

I had pleaded in defence of Mr. Locke, from his express words to the Bishop, that he does not *deny*, that the same bodies shall be raised at the last day. To which you answer: "he is at the same time
" very far from granting any such thing, as appears
" from the passages before cited out of him, and
" several others referred to in the margin. And
" therefore you must be either obliged to make
" these words consistent with all those passages,
" (which I am sure is beyond your skill) or else to
" suppose, that Mr. Locke does not speak here
" absolutely, and his real thoughts, when he says,
" *For though I do by no means deny, that the same*
" *bodies shall be raised at the last day, yet I see no-*
" *thing your Lordship has said to prove it to be an*
" *article of faith.*"

264 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

After having carefully consulted all the passages you refer to, I cannot find, that *any skill* is required to make these words consistent with them. His design in them is to shew, that the spirit of God always expresses himself in such a manner concerning the resurrection, that a good *Christian*, who reads the Scripture with an intention to believe all, that is there revealed concerning it, may acquit himself of his duty therein, without *entering into the enquiry*, whether the dead shall have the very same bodies or no; or, that if he should think himself bound to make this enquiry, he would not find St. Paul's words much in favour of the *very same body*, or such as could be supposed intended to deliver it as an article of faith. I appeal to you, whether this is not the sum and tendency of all those passages; and what is there in any part of it inconsistent with his saying, *that he by no means denies, that the same body shall be raised, though he sees nothing to prove it to be an article of faith?* To say, that the holy spirit constantly speaks of the resurrection in such general terms, as do not determine either *for*, or *against*, the identity of the rising body, is certainly no way inconsistent with not denying that identity.

There is therefore no ground for me to *suppose*, that Mr. Locke does not here speak absolutely, and his real thoughts. You tell me, that in his *Essay* he had no occasion to deny the resurrection of the same body: and this, say you, is what he really means, when he says he does not deny it. You may remember, Sir, I told you^d above, that you had given me reason for being positive, that Mr. Locke could not have satisfied you, that he believed the Trinity by the most absolute words he could have used. It was your dealing with him here, that I referred to, and take to be a sufficient proof of it: It is impos-

^d First Part, p. 243.

fible to speak in terms more absolute, than those, in which he declares to the Bishop, that he does not *deny* the resurrection of the same body. It is not said with regard to any such mistakes, as you suggest, nor on any other occasion, that could admit of an equivocation. So that it is plain Mr. *Locke* could not satisfy you by the most absolute affirmation, that he believed any thing, which you are inclined to *suppose* he did not believe; though there is no way to be certain, that a man speaks his real thoughts, if Mr. *Locke* did not speak his, when he so clearly and so positively affirms, that he *by no means denies the resurrection of the same body.*

*But that he does not grant it, you say, appears from the words he uses here to the Bishop: "I see nothing your Lordship has said to prove it to be an article of faith." For if he did not grant it to be an article of faith; he knew he need not grant it at all: no body could require his belief of it, and what he could not be required to grant or believe, he need not give himself the trouble to deny. No body indeed had a right to require his belief of it, so as to make it heresy not to believe it; but if it was prest upon him beyond its measure, he might think it worth his trouble to declare, that though he could not acknowledge it for an article of faith, yet he durst not presume to deny the truth of it, since it might be implied or obscurely delivered in the Scriptures. This then, Sir, being the plain tendency and import of Mr. *Locke's* words, (which I wish you had as well as I considered) they could be no sneer of his at the Bishop, as you call them; and if you did nothing to deserve it, it may be matter of wonder, that you should be so ready to apprehend a sneer from me, as you have done more than once, when no such thing was intended.*

S E C T. V.

The fourth general Defence of Mr. Locke vindicated.

I had urged, that Mr. *Locke* denies the resurrection of the same body *to be an article of faith*, because he finds it not clearly delivered in Scripture; but that this is all, that he denies of it, not offering one argument from reason against it. Upon which you say, "Thank you, good Sir: what could Mr. *Locke* do more, or worse, than to deny it to be an article of faith, or to be found in Scripture?" I will tell you, Sir, what he could have done more, and what has been done much worse. He might have argued against the *probability* of that doctrine; or urged the many difficulties, which have been raised, to represent it as *impossible*, that the rising body should consist of the same numerical particles, that were formerly united to the soul. But, instead of raising objections of that nature, he very readily declares, "that he makes no difficulty of believing, that God may, if he thinks fit, give to every one at the last day, a body consisting only of such particles, as were before vitally united to his soul." You ask again, *To what purpose does he say this, while he absolutely denies, that God has revealed he will do so?* I will tell you that too, Sir, since you seem not to know it. His purpose plainly is, to satisfy the Bishop, (and it might even have satisfied you) that it was not an overweening conceit of human reason, or any prejudices against the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body, that hindered him from seeing, that it was revealed in Scripture; since he had faith enough in the power of God, to surmount all difficulties, that could be raised against it, if it was made evident, that *he* had required it to be believed. But not finding either side plainly determined in
Scrip-

Scripture, he no more ventures to *deny*, than to *assert* the resurrection of the same body. If you, Sir, *cannot think, that it was either modesty, or real submission to the Scriptures, which obliged him to this conduct*; I cannot help thinking, that every body else would be at a loss for any other motive to impute it to.

But "you are sure of this, that for a man to prefer his own private interpretation of the Scriptures, to that of the universal church; and to make use of some general expressions in them, to overthrow the particular sense of them, has very little of the appearance of modesty, or submission to the Scriptures." As for the first part of this indictment, it is certain, that Mr. *Locke* frequently declares the holy Scriptures to be the only rule of his faith; and professes himself unqualified for seeking articles of faith in the judgment of the universal church. Probably he thought consulting the Scriptures themselves the *surest*, as well as the *easiest* way to find out what God had therein revealed: and I appeal to you, whether among the several sects of *Christians*, those, who most exclaim against *private interpretation* of Scripture, and most profess to follow the judgment of the universal church, have the most real submission to the Scripture, or have preserved their faith most uncorrupted. However, an implicit faith in any human authority whatsoever is contrary to the very spirit of the Reformation; and since the church of *England* in particular allows the Scriptures to be the last resort, by which all opinions and doctrines are to be tried; a son of hers (though of less capacity than Mr. *Locke*) may with great modesty, in obedience to the divine command of *searching the Scriptures*, make use of the understanding given him, to find out in them, what God has required of him to believe.

To

268 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

To the other part of your accusation, *that he makes use of some general expressions of Scripture, to overthrow the particular sense of them*; I answer, that in adhering to that sense of Scripture, which is exprest by the general words of it, one is sure to hold an incontestible truth, (as I before observed) and *forbearing to determine any further concerning it, as Mr. Locke does, is very far from overthrowing any particular sense, which may be deduced from the words.* But whether those, who are thus cautious of affirming more than is plainly exprest; or those, who peremptorily determine to a particular sense, what the holy Spirit has left in general terms; have most of the appearance of modesty or real submission to the Scriptures, I leave to every one but Dr. Holdsworth to judge.

C H A P. II.

Concerning the opinion and authority of the ancient writers of the Christian church, as to this doctrine.

UPON my enquiry, what authority you, or the Bishop of Worcester had, to erect this doctrine into an article of faith? you ask of me, “whether I honestly think, that the Bishop was the first, that erected it? Or, whether I can name the time or the persons, who laid the foundation of it, till I come to Christ and his Apostles?” If you mean, whether I can name the persons, who were first of this opinion, I frankly own, that I cannot. I know, that such a notion was very early entertained in the church; but I am far from thinking the opinion even of the universal church sufficient to make any thing an article of faith; no, nor even proofs, that it is delivered in Scripture; if it is not so delivered, as to make it necessary to be by every one explicitly believed. The necessity of the Eucharist

for infants; and the doctrine of the *Millennium* were universally believed in the first ages of the church; the last of which is by some learned men, who have of late revived it, thought to have a very good foundation in the Scripture. And yet I believe you will not say, it is an article of faith; though perhaps there is as good testimony for both those doctrines in the ancient *Christian* writers, as for the resurrection of the *same body*.

I must here make an apology for using the word *ostentation*, in speaking of the testimonies brought from antiquity on this subject, which I find gave you no small offence. But it was not at all intended in the sense you understood it. What I meant by it was only, that after all that *shew* or pretension to the authority of the *Christian* church, the fathers, and the creeds, their expressions amounted to no more, than that the dead should rise with *their bodies*. In which I chiefly had regard to the *creeds*, as they are the most certain testimonies of the sense of the *Christian* church. Nor did I give you any occasion to say, that I *insulted those authorities, or braved them with the single name of Mr. Locke, though I may think it would not have been beneath their primitive simplicity*, to have exprest their faith of the resurrection in the same terms, that the holy spirit had done.

You go on to tell me, that “ if I will not be
“ so wise, as to despise things, which you presume
“ I never read, you will be so bold with me, as
“ to repeat the ostentation of citing some of those
“ good people, that I may be satisfied they did not
“ speak *Mr. Locke's* language; and you hope I
“ will be so modest as to think, that the argument
“ from their authority is much stronger than that
“ from *Mr. Locke's*. And then perhaps I may
“ find, that even this ostentation is an argument
“ of more force than ever I can answer.”

270 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

I do not remember, Sir, that I have any where mentioned Mr. *Locke's* authority as an argument of any kind of force; and I must make bold likewise to repeat, that I cannot allow any *human authority* whatsoever to be in itself a proof of any *doctrine*, independent of the reasons brought to support it; though I am far from despising those ancient testimonies to the *truth of Christianity*. But since you are pleased to *presume, that I have never read* those venerable writers, you cannot reasonably require me to take the articles of my faith from them, but must allow me to seek them in the Scriptures, which, *you may presume, I have read*. However, it is certain (whatever I have done) that by far the greater number of *Christians*, either for want of leisure, learning, or inclination, have never read the Fathers; and since they have the same rule of faith, which the Fathers had, and by which all opinions (according to the doctrine of the church of *England*) must ultimately be tried; I see not, why they may not be as safe in consulting with sincerity, and diligence, that sacred rule itself, as in implicitly relying, first on some interpreter of the Fathers for their sense, and then on the judgment of the Fathers for the sense of Scripture; to which they can be no further bound to submit, than as it is enforced by their arguments, or as it appears to be the natural and genuine sense, upon examining the Scriptures themselves. So that this is going a great way about, to come at last, where they might at first set out. You might therefore, Sir, have spared yourself the pains of those large quotations from the *Greek and Latin* Fathers, only to satisfy me, that *they did not speak Mr. Locke's language*; since they tend no further than to shew, that those ancient writers *believed*, that the dead should be raised with the same bodies in which they died, (which is what Mr. *Locke* did by no means deny) but are no proof, that this opinion
of

of theirs is an *article of faith*; which is what alone he did deny of it, and which we can only be assured of from Scripture.

But you produce those passages from the Fathers, to shew me, that they did express more than that the dead shall rise again with their *bodies*; for that expression, you say, as Mr. *Locke* and I use it, is *ambiguous and equivocal, and signifies only new bodies, which God shall join to the souls of men at the last day*. I believe, Sir, it would be very difficult for you, to make it appear, that we use that expression to signify *only new bodies*. Neither of us have any where said, that *God will join new bodies to the souls of men at the last day*; or have shewn any disposition to believe, that he will do so. Mr. *Locke*, on the contrary, wherever he has occasion to speak of the possibility, that the resurrection body may be composed of *some* new particles, always supposes them to be joined with the *remaining parts of the old matter*; as in his third letter[†] he says, "Though the materials of our Saviour's body were not changed at his resurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the body of a man, rotten in his grave, or burnt, may, at the last day, have *several* new particles in it, and that without any inconvenience." And in the page before it, he says, "Why *with the remaining parts of a man's body*, long since dissolved, *etc.* — other new particles of matter, mixed with them, may not serve to make *his* body again, as well as the mixture of new and different particles with the old did in the compass of his life make *his* body; I see no reason can be given." These passages plainly shew, that by *their bodies*, he did not understand *only*, or *intirely new bodies*. Nay they perfectly speak your own sense, as my letter observed; only with this difference, that he will

[†] To the Bishop of Worcester, p. 181.

272 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

not allow a body so composed of new and old particles to be the *very same* body it was before.

But, if Mr. *Locke* did not speak the *language* of the Fathers, much less, Sir, do you speak their *sense*. It is plain, they had no notion of what you call a *vulgar sameness*; they truly and honestly believed a *real sameness*, as appears by your own quotations. But I do no more pretend to urge their authority against you, than I think it valid against Mr. *Locke*, any further than their reasonings are so; which, I cannot say, are always very conclusive.

However, you tell me, "How meanly soever I may think of their reasonings; yet, as to matter of fact, they are unanswerable witnesses of the faith and doctrine of the church of *Christ*, in the several ages, in which they wrote." But to this I can by no means agree. The only matter of fact, that appears from those ancient writers, is, that they believed the resurrection of the same body: but that is no more a proof, that it was the faith and doctrine of the church of *Christ* in those ages, than the yearly sermons on that subject at *Oxford* are proofs, that it is in this age the faith of the catholic church, or even of the church of *England*: which that it is not, you may have, I think, a demonstration of, if you please to make the same experiment, that I have done, since this debate began betwixt us; by enquiring among all I conversed with, clergy and laity, learned and unlearned indifferently, what they believed concerning the resurrection of the *same body*.

In this enquiry I have by some been answered, that they had never at all considered the question; by others, that they thought it a point not clearly revealed, and they supposed it not necessary to determine *for*, or *against* it. Most of the clergy, whom I discoursed with upon it, were of this opinion; but a very * eminent one in the city of *Lon-*

* Dr. *Gaskarth*.

don,

don, made no scruple to affirm, that it was impossible, that our bodies, at the resurrection, should be the very same we had here; which I have since found to be the sentiment of several others. Nor have I met with any but one " in all my enquiry, who maintained your side of the question, which was likewise a clergyman of some note.

Now I appeal to you, Sir, whether a doctrine little considered at all by many of the members of the church; so doubtfully received by others, and contradicted by many, can be called an acknowledged article of faith? Would such doubtful answers be given on any of the established articles of faith? On the doctrines of the Trinity, of the redemption by *Christ*, of the resurrection of the dead, or of the last judgment? I dare say you will not think it possible. No one, who pretended to know his religion, could say, that he had not considered these doctrines; or that he supposed it not necessary to determine about them, or that it is impossible they should be true; at the same time maintaining, that he said nothing contrary to any acknowledged article of faith. But it is not so at all of the doctrine of the resurrection of the *same body*: those who think not of it, or doubt about it, or deny it, (which you will find make up a very considerable number) frankly own either, without the least suspicion, that they do any thing inconsistent with an article of faith. This I take to be a plain demonstration, that notwithstanding the warmth of some divines in preaching and writing in defence of this doctrine, it is not *the faith of the church of Christ* in this age; for that cannot be the faith of the church, which is not known to be such by the members of it: and therefore neither are the writings of those venerable authors you have quoted, any proof *that it was the faith and doctrine*

Mr. Batty Rector of St. John's Clerkenwell.

VOL. I.

S

of

274 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

of the church of Christ, in the several ages in which they wrote. They are unanswerable witnesses of nothing else but their own belief of the point; and those, who think meanly of their reasonings, or are not convinced by them, cannot be overpowered by their authority, since we have the same rule to judge by, which the Fathers had, and which alone can authoritatively determine what is, or what is not, *an article of faith.* So that in this case Mr. Locke against the Fathers, or the Fathers against Mr. Locke, will outweigh each other, only so far, as they have Scripture and reason on their side. Neither *multitude*, which you lay so much stress on, nor *personal character*, which you imagine I rely on, will have the least force in either scale.

But supposing those ancient writers to be, as you say¹, *a cloud of witnesses attesting what was the faith of the church in their times*; allowing you too, what is unquestionable, that the *faith of Christians ought always to be the same*; yet who can help it, if doctrines highly revered, and generally believed in some ages of the church, are in others dropt, accounted false, or of little importance? Who can help it, if some favourite doctrines are, at some times, and by some zealots, preached up as matters of faith, and the most essential parts of religion, which at other seasons, and by cooler judgments, are looked on as matters of mere opinion, or indifference? That this has been so in several instances, ecclesiastical history does abundantly testify; and if this is the case of *the resurrection of the same body*, neither the testimony of some ancient writers, nor the zeal of some modern preachers, will be sufficient to make it an article of faith, which every one is bound explicitly to believe and profess.

C H A P. III.

Of the sense of the ancient Creeds as to this doctrine.

UPON my saying, that the creeds of the church are the only *explanations* of Scripture, that carry any authority with them, into none of which the term *same body* has been assumed; and that no private person ought to go farther in their explications, than the church in her creeds hath thought fit do; you answer with granting, *that the creeds do carry in them the public authority of the Christian church*; but that it may well be questioned, whether they are *always explanations of Scripture*. I suppose you meant, whether they are *all* so; for what they are at *any time*, I presume, it will not be questioned they *always* are.

But whatever the creed, commonly called the *Apostles*, may be, that the *Nicene* and *Athanasian* creeds were intended for explanations of Scripture, will scarce bear a question, which was sufficient for my purpose. And as they are particular enough, I insist on their being the only explanations of Scripture, that carry any authority with them. What you say here concerning the necessity of determining the general words of Scripture, to a particular sense, and the obligation of adhering to the explanations of the ancient writers, has nothing in it, but what I have before answered, and therefore need not repeat.

The only thing now to be considered on this head is, whether the *terms* made use of in the creeds, to express the article of the resurrection, are *sufficient direction to us to understand it of the same body*, as you affirm. You ask what else can any one properly and naturally understand by *corporis* or *carnis resurrectionem*? And you appeal, even to me, whether by any of those expressions, it can be meant, that at the last day, the dead shall have *new bodies* given to them,

276 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

which, you say, is Mr. *Locke's* explanation of the resurrection.

That this is no explanation of Mr. *Locke's*, tho' you so often father it upon him; and that he manifestly supposes, in several places of his writings, a body raised *from the old one*, will hereafter appear. But as to those expressions in the creeds, I believe any man may properly and naturally understand them, as intended only to signify, that the dead shall be raised to life again *with bodies*. This was a thing, which the heathen world in all their guesses about a future state, had not the least notion of, and therefore, the church might very well design to express, that we should be raised compleat men, consisting of a body as well as a spirit, without determining any thing more particular; for which purpose, the words *corporis*, or *carnis resurrectionem*, in one of the creeds seem very proper: And had it been designed, that all the members of the church should believe and declare the resurrection of the *same body*, most probably those very words would have been chosen, as least liable to be misunderstood. But instead of this, the two latter creeds express the article of the resurrection in terms yet more general than the former; one of them very conformably to a phrase of St. Paul's ^k, *Omnes homines resurgere debent cum corporibus suis*. The other in the usual words of Scripture, *resurrectionem mortuorum*. And this is a strong presumption, that the church did not intend to determine her members to that particular sense; since the terms of her latest creeds are most general on that article, tho' on others very particular.

Reply to the Defence of the first head of the Sermon, in Chap. IV.

WE are now coming to be more particular concerning the *sameness* of human *bodies*.

^k 1 Cor. xv.

SECT.

SECT. I. which you entitle *identity stated*, contains nothing but an endeavour to collect a pleasant piece of *logic*, out of my reasoning, by a very unfair representation. It would be too tedious for the reader to go over the whole of that argument again: I shall therefore only draw up here in a juster syllogism, than that you would put upon me what the real sum of it is. It must be allowed by your own concession, that in a strict mathematical sense, a body is not the same, if it does not consist of the same numerical particles.

But as the human body, whilst living here, not consisting of the same particles, is not for any considerable time the same in that strict sense:

Therefore, neither is it necessary to suppose, that the resurrection body shall be the same, *i. e.* shall consist of the same numerical particles.

I hope, Sir, you will allow this to be better *logic*, than that you had formed for me. But you tell me, that this mathematical identity *is not the identity of the resurrection body*. To which you have made me return for answer, that *Mr. Locke says, that the identity of the resurrection body must consist in the mathematical identity*. A very convincing argument, as you say, without doubt.

I wish you had been pleased to mark, in what part of my letter you found this *convincing argument*, for I can find no such there. But tho' you are so good at making arguments for me, which I should never have thought of, give me leave here to answer for myself, that if the resurrection body has not a *mathematical identity*, it may be in danger of having no identity at all, as perhaps will hereafter appear.

Your Sect. II. bears title, *Mr. Locke's Identity not approved of.*

AND here you say, I might have spared myself the trouble of telling you, that Mr. Locke always

278 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

understands the *same body*, in a strict mathematical sense; that he fixed it to this sense in his *Essay*, and constantly uses it in the same signification. “For what, say you, is all this to me? Mr. Locke was at liberty to fix his idea of identity as he pleased, and to retain it as long as he pleased; and I, or any man else, may demand the same liberty. And therefore, I can see no imaginable reason, why I may not make use of the vulgar and unphilosophical idea of the same body, in speaking of the resurrection body, as well as he makes use of the philosophical.” With all my heart, Sir, make the best use of it you can; no body, that I know of, pretends to deny you that liberty.

But if it be nothing at all to you in what Mr. Locke places the identity of body, why have you quarrelled with him about it? He never said any thing concerning the resurrection of the same body, but in his own sense of that term; at least it is certain he never opposed your sense of it, which you call a *vulgar sameness*, that being a new explication of your own, and therefore could not fall in his way. You might then have maintained your own *vulgar and unphilosophical* idea of the identity of the resurrection body, without falling foul upon him for his philosophical idea, since, as you say, *what is this to you?* I confess in that you are in the right, for all he contends for on this subject is, that it is not an article of faith, that the resurrection body shall be the very same, (that is according to his sense) shall consist of the same numerical particles, or of *no other*, than what it was composed of during this life. And what can this be to you? Since it is nothing contrary to your *vulgar sameness*, which you maintain does not consist in the same numerical particles. I see not how there can be any dispute between you here, unless it be about the propriety of the name.

S E C T. III.

Enquiry whether the vulgar consideration of identity is most proper to be applied to the Resurrection.

YOU begin this subject, with sagely reprehending me for making a question of what was so plain, viz. that when you said *there is an identity, by which even a river is the same*, nothing could be meant by it but the same river. I assure you, Sir, I had not the least doubt, that you meant the same river. And when I asked you *same what, Sir?* it was only to make you observe, that this was nothing to the purpose, nothing contrary to what Mr. Locke had said, whom you seemed to be opposing, tho' he had spoke of no other sameness in this dispute, but that of a body consisting of the same particles of matter. But if this is not the sameness you are contending for, if you will not accept of his ideas, but will stand by your own, I again ask you, why are you so much offended with him? Why is he called an heretic, for denying that to be an article of faith, which you do not yourself allow to be so? the sameness you would maintain, that something, which preserves the human body distinct from all others, being what he has said nothing about, and is of a quite different nature from that, which he denies to be an article of faith.

I am again rebuked for another wise question, I had put to you, viz. Who has obliged us to allow any sameness at all to a varying fleeting body? In answer to which you refer me to *common sense and common language*. And these, I own, are sufficient to determine us in the use of any terms. But I deny, that either of them has obliged us to call or suppose every river, even whilst it runs in its own banks, or any man's body from three to threescore, the same bodies, tho' the one is always called the same river,

280 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

and the other the same man. But of their sameness as *bodies* it is plain I was enquiring.

You own, that calling men's bodies the *same* from their birth to their death, "is not done very philosophically; but it is all one for that, *you say*, it is done with very good sense, agreeably to the understanding of mankind. You told me, that any *fleeting* body is the same, while it is preserved distinct from all others of the same, or of a different species. And this was sufficient for your purpose, which was to account for sameness according to the common notions of men. So that I might have spared that other trifling question, *In what does this sameness consist?*"

But as *trifling* as you think this question, it is absolutely necessary to be determined, before we can judge, whether what you are here endeavouring to maintain be true or not, *viz.* That *the vulgar consideration of identity is most proper to be applied to the resurrection body*; for how shall we know this, till we are satisfied, what that, which you call a vulgar sameness, depends upon. You say, that *any fleeting body is the same while it is preserved distinct from all others*. Very well, Sir, but when such a body has by the separation and dissolution of its parts, and by their mixture with other bodies, lost that *distinction*, it may, I think, without trifling be enquired, what becomes of that *sameness*, which, you affirm, *preserved it distinct from all others*? Is it of such a nature, as to continue in being, when it no longer performs its office? Is it so permanent, as to become a principle of individuation to whatever particles of matter God shall think fit to join to it at the resurrection? Or can we know, whether it is capable of either, or not, without knowing in what this sameness consists? *It would not, you say, be in the least danger of being lost, for your deficiency in accounting for it.* That may be, but we shall be in some danger of not knowing, whether it is lost or no after death, or whether it will
be

be found again at the resurrection, if we have no idea at all of it; that is, if we talk of it, without meaning any thing by it. I beg leave, therefore, to explain to you, upon what the vulgar notion of identity seems to be founded; that we may the better judge, whether it is *most proper*, or can at all be applied to the resurrection.

It is plain then to me, that *that* sameness, which men attribute to their own bodies, as it is not founded on any real sameness of the material substance, which we are sure varies every day; as little can it be founded on a *supposed unknown principle*, which preserves it distinct from all other. For however philosophers and metaphysicians may form their notions upon imaginary beings, the common notions of men are founded upon such sensible appearances, as are liable to vulgar observation; and which, as you say, common sense will always be sufficient for. And those sensible appearances in the case before us can, I think, be no other than this, that our own bodies, and those of other men, have continued from the first moment of their existence, or of our acquaintance with them, in the same organization of life, without having ever been shifted all at once. It is this, which gives them that, which you call a vulgar sameness. And in this participation of the same *continued life* it is, not in a *vital union with the soul*, as you alledge, that I have placed the distinction of human bodies.

But to that sense, in which you understood me, you answer, that tho' a vital union with the soul makes a human body, *yet it does not make it a human body particular to itself*. To which give me leave to reply, that if you had not been a little infected with those *fooleries* of the schools, which you seem to despise, you would not have made an objection, founded upon the *subtile* notion of *real universals*, or of one *common human nature* as really existing; for had you been convinced of this plain truth, that nothing really exists

282 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

exists but *particulars*, or *individuals*, you would easily have seen, that the so much talked of *principium individuationis* is nothing else but *existence* itself; every thing, that exists, being necessarily *particular to itself*. And tho' all human bodies have many things in common (besides that, which you observe of being united to the soul) yet each of them has a particular beginning of its existence in a determinate time and place; and so long as it continues in that *organized life*, (which depends indeed upon its union with the soul) it is by its incommunicable relation to that beginning of its existence, *distinguished from all others*. This, Sir, is no metaphysical nicety, but a plain truth, obvious to common sense; and I believe you will find, that it is in this alone, that your *vulgar sameness* consists, or on which the vulgar consideration of identity is founded; for to be *preserved distinct from all others*, and to be *preserved the same with itself*, are but different ways of expressing one and the same thing.

It is you, therefore, that *trifle* with me, when you tell me, that "the particularity and distinction of human bodies depends upon the sameness of them, or that principle of individuation, which distinguishes them from all others; and that any fleeting body is the same, while it is preserved distinct from all others." Which is just as much, as if you had said, that the distinction of human bodies depends upon the distinction of them; or that any fleeting body is the same, while it is preserved the same: An account, that will not much advance our knowledge in the question before us.

But since you have not thought fit to acquaint us, upon what the distinction or sameness of bodies depends, any farther than by telling us, that a human body is the same, while it is preserved distinct from all others; and that it is preserved distinct from all others by virtue of being the same; nor do you pretend to know, in what your *vulgar sameness* consists,

frsts, that is, you know not what is meant by it: we must, therefore, either enquire whether, *we know not what* is most proper to be applied to the resurrection, or you must allow me to make that enquiry, according to the explication I have given (and I believe no other intelligible one can be given) of the real ground of what you call a *vulgar sameness*, or upon which *the vulgar consideration of identity* is founded.

You will, I suppose, grant, that when a human body is rotten in the grave, dissolved and mouldered into dust, it has then lost its *distinction* from all other bodies, and consequently it can no longer retain that *sameness*, which you say *is sufficiently* (and I must add *is only*) *known by its preserving any body distinct from all others*. How then must it be restored at the resurrection, to that vulgar *sameness*, which, with its distinction from other bodies, it must have inevitably lost? According to you, a mixture of old and new particles can alone give it a vulgar *sameness*, when *restored to that sameness*, or to *that principle of individuation, which distinguished it from all others*. But what is that *sameness*, or that principle of individuation? *I do not know*, say you. It is then, say I, (for it can be nothing else but) *the same existence*. But an organized body, which has once lost its distinct existence, can never be restored to the same individual existence. Nor can one and the same thing have *two beginnings* of existence. Much less is it possible for any plant, animal, or human body, whose life has been *discontinued*, and all its parts separated and dispersed, to be restored to the *same continued life*, in which, with its having never sensibly shifted all its parts, consists the identity of each. In a word, it is impossible for a human body to be restored at the resurrection, to any one particular of that, in which its supposed *sameness* consisted during its vital union with the soul here; so that a *vulgar sameness* is so far from being the *most proper*, that it is utterly

284 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

utterly incapable of being at all applied to the resurrection body.

You must therefore at last place the identity of the resurrection body in something else, either in its vital union with the same soul, independent of any sameness of the material substance; or allow it a real mathematical sameness; both which you have with great zeal discarded. Perhaps you would rather place it in the *original stamina*, supposed probable by some modern philosophers, and that indeed will be somewhat more intelligible than a body, which, you tell us, will have *such a sameness, as (notwithstanding its fleeting state) it had with itself here, from three to threescore, according to vulgar notions*: A sort of identity, which, tho' it has a real foundation during the continued life of the body here, you will, I doubt not, find upon examination to be absolutely incompatible to the resurrection body.

S E C T. IV.

Whether Mr. Locke and you differ only in words, and agree in things.

YOU needed not have wrote a section to prove, that your vulgar identity differs from Mr. Locke's mathematical identity; for who ever imagined, that there was any agreement between them? The words, which I had quoted from him and you, as agreeing in sense, and which you repeat as directly contrary to one another, were not brought to shew, that you agree in your notions of identity: (for about that word I own you differ) but that you agreed in your account of the *state* of the human body, both whilst living here, and at the resurrection, tho' you affirm, and Mr. Locke denies, that such a fleeting body is through all its variations *the same*, which is plainly a dispute about the word, and not the thing. But it is pleasant to observe, how hardly you are put to it, to evade any agreement between you and Mr. Locke,

when

when I had of a sudden, it seems, found out, that you were perfectly agreed.

To what end, I beseech you, Sir, (unless that of imposing on an unwary reader) do you, after repeating your description of the varying condition of the human body, add, "Those words, one would think, should hardly be reconcileable with Mr. *Locke's* mathematical identity?" As if any body had gone about to reconcile them. In the same manner you afterwards tell me, that "You do not see what Mr. *Locke's* words are to the purpose of your agreement, except I can find an agreement between your saying, that a body may be the same by a vulgar sameness, tho' it does not for any little time consist of the same numerical particles, and Mr. *Locke's* saying, that a man has not the same body at fifty, which he had at five, because it does not consist of a mathematical sameness. Which two propositions seem to you directly to oppose and contradict one another." I grant they do so, and with all my *shortness* have not pretended to form an agreement between those contradictions. You cannot certainly, Sir, so far mistake my argument, as not to see, that I quoted these words from you both, and those, which you afterwards repeat concerning the resurrection body, to shew, that tho' you contradict one another in the word *sameness*, yet you agree in the nature and composition of the human body, both here, and at the resurrection. This was so plainly my meaning, that I have good reason for asking you, to what other purpose than that of imposing on a superficial reader, you could evade the argument I urged from your agreeing in things, by taking a great deal of pains ingeniously to shew, that you contradict one another, about the *sameness* of the human body; which was the very thing I was labouring to prove was the only difference between you, and that therefore the dispute could be only about the word *sameness*, since you were otherwise

286 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

wise perfectly agreed in your accounts of the human body.

You seem to have been so much at a loss for matter to fill up this section, that you have helped it out with two cavils very insignificant to our purpose. The first is, "that I, *who insist so much on express words*, should not, in quoting Mr. Locke, have given you other words than his." To this I answer, that if I insist on *express words*, it is only when the words are those of the *Holy Ghost*, and when *express words* are the very matter in question. In all other cases I think it sufficient, to keep so strictly to the sense, that no dispute of that can happen; which you cannot deny, that I have done here. Your other cavil is, upon a mistake, it seems, of mine about the *occasion* of the words I had quoted from Mr. Locke; which being, no more than the former, of any kind of importance to the matter in debate, I shall not trouble the reader to excuse a slip of my memory: a small degree of your favour might have let it pass unnoticed, since the *occasion* of the words was nothing at all to the point in question, the agreement between you and Mr. Locke; to which we now return.

After having repeated the words, which I had quoted from your Sermon, and from Mr. Locke's third letter to the Bishop of Worcester, (which I need not do here) you at last confess to me, "that at first sight there does seem to be some agreement between the sense of his words and yours." But you ask me, "whether I myself can think, that Mr. Locke intended in these words, to express fully and perfectly the same sense with yours, setting only aside the consideration of sameness, or identity, after I have considered with you three things, which you there propose to me."

First, that what he says here is in answer to a particular objection, concerning the raising of men with the same bodies, as Christ was raised with the same body. And therefore is only said

"occa-

“ occasionally, and to avoid the particular force of
“ that argument, and his way of expressing himself
“ is doubtful and uncertain, *Why such a thing may*
“ *not be, I think no reason can be given.*”

To this I answer, that tho’ the passage I produced, as agreeing with your notion of the resurrection body, was indeed occasioned by the argument you mention; yet this part of the answer was not peculiarly adapted to it, but might as well have been urged upon any other argument, for the necessity of the body’s being raised with the same particles; and relates to all human bodies in general at the resurrection. As to the doubtfulness of the expression you cavil at, it is so far from being usually taken for a *doubtful or uncertain way of expression*, that I scarce know any manner of speaking esteemed more positive and absolute. To say, that one thinks *no reason can be given against a thing*, is full as strong as to say, that there is all manner of reason for it. So that what you have here said has not the least weight against Mr. Locke’s intending *fully and perfectly to express your sense.*

The second consideration you propose to me is, “ that the reason he gives for his position in his last
“ words in this place, that *Whatever matter is vitally*
“ *united to a man’s soul is his body, as much as is that,*
“ *which was united to it when he was born,* will hold
“ good, if an entire new body were given him at the
“ resurrection; and therefore, that the word *his* is
“ equivocal, and is capable of being extended farther than you can allow in the resurrection body.”

It may perhaps be capable of being farther extended, but it does not follow, that therefore Mr. Locke designed to extend it farther, and there is, on the contrary, great reason to conclude, that he did not design it, because the nature of his argument would not admit him so to do, for he reasons from the construction of the body here, that as during the whole course of a man’s life, it is composed of new particles

288 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

cles continually added to the old; so he thinks no reason can be given, why new particles, *added to the remaining old*, may not serve to make his body again at the resurrection. But to have enforced this argument by such a conclusion, as you suppose him to make, *viz.* that if an *entire new body* were given a man at the resurrection, it would be as much his body, as that he had when he was born, would have been very absurd and quite inconsistent with his own reasoning. And therefore there is no ground to think, that he intended in this place to extend the word *his* farther, than you can allow in the resurrection body.

The third thing you offer to my consideration is, "That whatever agreement Mr. *Locke's* words may seem to have with yours in this place, yet in other places he drops the mixture of new and old particles in the resurrection body, and speaks of the resurrection body as of a new one to be united to the soul, which would be as much the body of the dead, as the old one would be if raised." This you say, "I know very well, and may see in the places referred to in the margin."

I have reviewed those places very carefully, and can assure you, Sir, that there is nothing in them at all to your purpose. In page 196, upon the Bishop's urging St. *Paul's* words, *it is soon in corruption, &c.* Mr. *Locke* manifestly speaks of the body of the resurrection, in the same view and manner, as he speaks of it before the resurrection, as not in a *strict philosophical sense* the very same; affirming only, that revelation has no where declared any thing of the same body in his *Lordship's* sense of *the same body*, which you know was a *strict philosophical sense*, consisting of the same particles, which had been formerly united to the soul, and *no other*. This Mr. *Locke* says, "appears not to have been then

¹ 2d Letter, p. 196, 209, 210.

"thought

"thought of." But here is nothing, that can be called dropping the mixture of new and old particles, nor the least hint of a body *entirely new*.

In the other two pages you refer to, there is yet less to your purpose: P. 209. he says not one word about what particles the resurrection body may be made up of, whether new or old, mixed or unmixed. In answer to the Bishop's argument, *That the same material substance must be reunited to the soul, or else it cannot be called a resurrection, but a renovation*; he says, "As to the propriety of the name, I think it will not be much questioned, that if *the same man* rise, who was dead, it may very properly be called the resurrection of the dead; which is the language of the Scripture." An answer no way founded on the supposition of an *entire new body*, for a new body is certainly not necessary to *the* raising of the *same man*: But if the same man rise, this necessarily implies a *body raised*, tho' not according to the Bishop's strict notion, of the *very same particles and no other* than was before united to his soul. A denial therefore of the necessity of that sameness of the material substance, which his adversary contended for, is all that can be fairly made out of this passage.

In page 210, the last place to which you refer, in order to make it the more strongly appear, that the Bishop had no grounds to maintain, that the Scriptures had delivered it as an article of faith, that the very same bodies shall be raised; he acquaints him, that upon a strict search he had found, that the Scripture does not in express terms mention *the resurrection of the body*, as he before had taken for granted that it did; and that therefore in the next edition, he would change these word of his book, *the dead bodies of men shall rise*, into those of the Scripture, *the dead shall rise*. "Not that I question (says he) that the dead shall be raised *with bodies*;" (an expression, which it is plain he meant to signify the same with that he had used in his *Essay*, *the dead*

bodies of men shall rise.) But that in matters of revelation, I think it our duty, "as far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep close to the words of Scripture; unless he will assume to himself the authority of one inspired, or make himself wiser than the Holy Spirit himself." If you had inferred from this passage, that Mr. *Locke* did not believe the dead were to rise with any bodies at all, there might have been some appearance of a ground for it, tho' he tells us he makes no question of it. But sure there is nothing here, that has any appearance of intending, or the least intimation of a body *entirely new*.

None of the places therefore, which you desire me to consider, having any weight against Mr. *Locke's* intending in the words I quoted from him, fully and perfectly, to express the same sense with yours in your Sermon; I must still maintain, that he means just as you do, that there is no necessity, that the bodies of men at the resurrection should consist of the same, or of no other particles, than those they were composed of during their lives here; but that other new particles mixed with the old might serve to make their bodies *then*, as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the old, did in the compass of their lives make up their bodies *here*. His reasoning on this point is the same with yours, and I see no ground to think there is any difference between you, *setting aside the consideration of sameness*, which *term* you do, and he does not, apply to a body composed of new and different particles, united to the remaining old.

I must therefore be far from allowing, as you expect, "That Mr. *Locke's* meaning is, not only to set aside the belief of the resurrection of the same body, in his own sense of same body; but to introduce also a belief, that a new body, united to the soul at the last day, may be properly a resurrection body." On the contrary, I must assure you, Sir, that upon the most impartial examination

of his dispute with the Bishop on this subject, I am fully convinced, that he had not so much as a design to *set aside* the belief of the resurrection of the *same body*, even in the strict sense of it; much less to *introduce a belief* about a new body, which seems not to have entered into his thoughts. It is very plain to an unprejudiced reader, that he had nothing at heart in all his arguments, but that the belief of the resurrection of the very same body should not be imposed on himself or others, as *an article of faith*, necessary for every *Christian* to assent to: And that he had not the least design of introducing any particular belief concerning the *materials*, of which the resurrection body should be made up; but was rather earnest, that every one should be left at liberty to think of it, as best suited their different apprehensions; it not appearing to him, that the Scriptures had restrained that liberty, by determining any thing clearly and certainly concerning it.

But you have concluded, that he designed to introduce this new belief: "For which reason, *you say*,
"no doubt it is, that he rejects all sameness but his
"own, that which consists in the same numerical
"particles, the ideal identity; and when all same-
"ness is set aside, but that which never was in na-
"ture, then of course, a new body united to the
"soul, notwithstanding the absurdity of words,
"must be the resurrection of the dead." Why of
course it must be so, or why on this account, Mr. *Locke* needed to reject all sameness, but what you call *his own*, or the *ideal identity*, I confess I cannot apprehend. Tho' he requires to the *sameness* of a body the same numerical particles, yet since he contends, that the resurrection body may very properly and very probably consist of the *old* remaining particles, with some new ones added to them, this cannot of course introduce an entire new body; for I suppose you will allow, that if such a body, with a mixture of old and new particles (which is your

292 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

own notion of the resurrection body) be united to the soul at the last day, that may without absurdity be called *the resurrection of the dead*, tho' Mr. Locke and all the world should deny the sameness of such a body. Besides, supposing, that there is no such thing in nature *now* as a body, that continues to have for any little time a real mathematical identity, it does not follow, that a new body must be united to the soul at the resurrection, tho' all other sameness were set aside; for if there is such a thing in nature as a body, consisting of a certain determinate number of particles in some one point of time, suppose the point of death; what hinders, but that the very same numerical particles may be again united to the soul at the last day, and so continue unchanged, and without succession to all eternity? For the nature of human bodies *here* does not determine their nature after the resurrection. So that he needed not on this account, to have set aside all sameness; but that, which you say, *never was in nature*, since whatever the sameness of human bodies consists in *here*, they may have a real mathematical identity at the *resurrection*. Nor will his notion of identity any better serve to introduce a belief, that a new body may be united to the soul at the last day, nay much less than your *vulgar sameness*, which would rather *of course* introduce a new body, since it is impossible, as I have shewn, that the human body can have a *vulgar sameness* at the resurrection.

All, therefore, that you have here laid to Mr. Locke's charge, being without foundation; I need not go about to prove, *that the sense of your words runs equal to it all*, to shew an agreement betwixt you; since to avoid that agreement, you have run his words far beyond his meaning.

However, to make some amends for not owning an agreement with him, where there is no difference, you have all on a sudden found out, that you have no *contest* with him, where there is a real difference.

“ Strictly

“ Strictly speaking, *say you*, I have no contest with
“ Mr. *Locke*, about the sameness of bodies: I dif-
“ fer from him without disputing with him, and
“ establish a sameness, which I think proper to the
“ sense of Scripture, without offering any thing to
“ destroy his. And therefore if any thing falls from
“ Mr. *Locke*, which seems sometimes to you to
“ agree with my sense of same body, you ought not
“ to imagine, that I have any contest with him about
“ sameness, but that force of truth compelled him
“ now and then to say the ‘same as I do, tho’ he
“ would acknowledge no identity but his own.”

What you here mean about Mr. *Locke's* seeming sometimes to agree with your sense of *same body*, and of your having no contest with him about sameness, I profess, I do not apprehend. He agrees with you, as I have often said, not in your sense of *same body*, but in your sense of the *resurrection body*. And I have indeed all along *imagined*, that both in your Sermon, and in this defence, you have not only *differed from*, but very much contested with, him about the *sameness of bodies*. I did really imagine, that when you said you could *by no means agree* to Mr. *Locke's* notion of the identity of the resurrection body, you really designed to contend against him, that it is not necessary to the *identity* of the resurrection body, that it consist of the same numerical particles. I did likewise imagine, that you offered as much as you could to destroy his notion of the identity of body, when you so frequently speak of it, as no where existing but in idea, calling it *his own*, the *ideal identity*, saying, that *it never was in nature*, &c. But it seems I *ought not to imagine* any thing of all this; the great displeasure you have shewn against Mr. *Locke's* mathematical identity, and all the hard words you have given him upon it, is, it seems, only *differing from*; you have at last no contest with him about *sameness*. Which I believe your readers will find it very difficult to imagine.

However, if you do not contend, you go on in asserting, "That while he acknowledges no sameness of bodies but his own, and thereby leaves not only room to suppose, but many clear intimations, that the dead may be raised with new bodies, which are neither the same in his own, nor in any other sense, this is not a dispute merely about words, as I haughtily think: an article of faith is concerned in it."

With all submission, Sir, whatever is concerned in it, I humbly conceive Mr. *Locke* is not, for he has nowhere said, that the dead *shall*, or that they probably *may*, be raised with entirely new bodies: and if this is not a dispute about words, it is about *supposes* and conjectures of *intimations*, which might never be intended. The strongest intimation you can possibly alledge from Mr. *Locke*, amounts to nothing more, than that it is not *absolutely necessary* to the raising of the same person, or the same man, that the very *same body* should be raised; by which he always means the same numerical particles. And let any impartial reader judge (for I must now appeal from you) whether this is a sufficient ground for you "to declare, that this management of Mr. *Locke's* tends to subvert the faith, and is a sly and artificial denial of the article of the resurrection. And such a denial you think deserves all the exclamations you have bestowed upon it."

Exclaim as much as you please, Sir, against a *denial of the article of the resurrection*. But when a man constantly maintains the doctrine of the resurrection to be a necessary article of faith, which you know Mr. *Locke* does, and only denies some particular circumstance of it to be so, such exclamations upon it are rash and injurious: And from you I indeed thought them the more unjustifiable, because you yourself so zealously contend, that the resurrection of *the same numerical particles* is not an article of faith. But I beg your pardon for the *impertinence*,

thence, as you civilly call it; and perhaps it was a little impertinent, to put you in mind of so plain a truth, as that you as much deny the resurrection of the same body, in Mr. *Locke's* sense of same body, even as he does; since it was such a truth, as you had no reason to desire should be taken notice of on this occasion.

But to avoid the reproach of so palpable an injustice, as exclaiming against a man, for what yourself no less affirm than he, you tell me, "It is gross prevarication to say, that Mr. *Locke*, by denying the resurrection of the same body, means only to deny, that the body shall be raised with the same numerical particles: For he sometimes means, that the dead shall be raised by having their souls united to new bodies, and therefore in no sense the same with the old. And this, you again say, "I know well enough."

I know the contrary so well, Sir, that if I would use the same freedom of language that you do, I should tell you, that, notwithstanding your frequent repetition of this charge, it is a gross falshood. Nor is it any prevarication to say, as I have often done, that Mr. *Locke* does not mean *so much* as to deny, that the body shall be raised with the same numerical particles: he *by no means denies the truth* of this, tho' he thinks it not so plainly revealed, as to be an article of faith. Neither does he at any time say or mean, that *the dead shall be raised by having their souls united to new bodies*, or intimate the least inclination to believe, that they shall be so raised. For which I appeal to every unprejudiced and judicious reader, who attends to the occasion, use, and obvious design of all that Mr. *Locke* says on this subject, throughout that controversy betwixt him and the Bishop; having already shewn, that the particular places you refer to, are nothing at all to that purpose: Nor is any thing you have said in this section, any more to the

T 4

purpose,

purpose, of shewing that your difference with Mr. Locke is not merely about words.

S E C T. V.

Dr. Holdsworth's identity different from the Bishop of Worcester's.

I had observed, that the doctrine of the resurrection of the *same body* was maintained in such different senses, by the several assertors of it, that I was at a loss to know, in which of the senses it is an *article of faith*; and urged, that if Mr. Locke had owned it in your sense of *same body*, he could not have passed for orthodox with the Bishop of Worcester. To which you answer, "that you think this is beyond my skill to be sure of. For how can I tell, whether the Bishop might not have approved of an opinion so natural, &c." Really, Sir, I pretend not to tell how successful you might have been in bringing the Bishop over to your notion; but this I am sure of, that so long as he continued in the opinion he was of, when he engaged in that controversy, Mr. Locke could not have passed for orthodox with him, by owning your faith; for he very zealously maintained, that the resurrection body must be composed of *no other particles*, than what had been formerly united to the soul; and pretends to prove it too from Scripture. It was, as you know, in opposition to this, that Mr. Locke^m proposed the very same notion with yours (tho' not under the term *same body*) as most agreeable to reason, and the constitution of the body *here*, and not inconsistent with Scripture. How this relished with the Bishop, I confess, I cannot tell, because he never answered that letter. But it is sufficient for my purpose, that he did, at that time, insist on a different sense from yours.

But you say, "Tho' the Bishop does insist, that the body shall be restored out of the same particles,

^m 3d Letter.

" which

“ which have been formerly united to the soul and
“ no other; yet a body so restored cannot be called
“ mathematically and precisely the same with that
“ which lived, that is, in Mr. *Locke's* sense of same-
“ ness; but in your sense, a vulgar and unphiloso-
“ phical it may; and therefore if Mr. *Locke* had
“ been of the faith, which you defend, the Bishop
“ and he had not been so far asunder as I imagine.”

In my apprehension, Sir, a body consisting of the same particles, which had been at some one time united to the soul, and no other, is the same body with that, which then lived, in the strictest sense possible. But supposing the Bishop's resurrection body could not be called, mathematically and precisely, the same with that, which lived; this would make no other agreement betwixt him, and you, but only a verbal one, an agreement in calling a body *the same*, which has not a mathematical sameness; but none at all in your notions of the *resurrection body*; unless to have *some other* particles mixed with the old, and to have *no other* particles mixed with them, be one and the same notion. It is most certain, that if Mr. *Locke* had owned the resurrection of the *same body* in your sense, the Bishop and he would have been agreed in terms, as no doubt all the assertors of that doctrine are, whether by the term *same body* they mean a mathematical sameness, a vulgar sameness, or what other kind of sameness you will please to call the Bishop's. But this agreement in the term does not hinder them from being as far asunder in their sense, as I have not only imagined, but must maintain they are.

S E C T. VI.

The Doctor's identity different from the ideas of identity commonly received.

I had farther urged, that if Mr. *Locke* had owned the resurrection of the same body in your sense, his faith

298 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

faith would least of all have stood approved to those *well-meaning men, whose learning, and labours in explaining the difficulties of the resurrection*, you had in your Sermon taxed with *impertinence*; who had raised the *dust* you there complain of, by endeavouring to bring together, all the scattered particles, that had ever, in the whole compass of a man's life, been united to his soul. By the way, Sir, it seems either you or I very ill understand raillery, that the design of mine could be so much mistaken. I do, I assure you, very seriously commend the sincerity and integrity of those good people; and all the little innocent raillery there intended was upon the ingenuity of some latter explainers, who, whilst they profess to believe the resurrection of the same body, explain the sameness of it quite away; which those *well-meaning men* did not think themselves at liberty to do. But you tell me, "That a doctrine so agreeable as yours to their own explanations of the resurrection, and which only differs from theirs, by being more express and clear, could not but have been very acceptable to them." I will not dispute with you, Sir, how successful you might have proved in bringing all the world over to your notion, if you could have proposed it to our forefathers: but it must be a stronger *charm* than that, by which you suppose me *bound over body and soul to Mr. Locke*, that can make me imagine your sense of the resurrection body *at all agreeable* to the explanations of those learned men we have been speaking of; or that it only differs from theirs by being *more express*: for as matters appear to me without a *charm*, theirs is more express than yours, and differs from it as much as the *whole* does from a *part*.

Nor can all your *rheterick* persuade me, that the three distinct senses I mentioned *are really but one*; or "that the Bishop of Worcester, and all other learned men and catholic *Christians*, have as well as you, ever agreed, that the resurrection body is

" the

“the same; *not* by having the same precise number
“of particles, but by such an identity of parts and
“particles, as is sufficient to denominate it the same
“now, in the common opinion of men.” Surely,
Sir, *the labours of those learned men you censured,*
in explaining the difficulties of the resurrection in
their sense of it, as well as the whole tenor of the
Bishop’s arguments, plainly shew, that they thought
the resurrection body could be no otherwise the
same, than by *having all the same precise particles, or*
no other, than what had been at some one time united
to the soul: whereas you inform us, that there is no
necessity of *all or of no other* particles to make the
same body; which is allowed to be an easier way of
explaining it. But that all those other learned men
agree with you in this sense, requires (if not an un-
common assurance to affirm) a larger share of com-
plaisance to grant, than I can at present command.
For without being *bound over to Mr. Locke*, as you
speak, by any other *charm* than that of common
sense, and plain reason, I cannot for my life but
imagine, that *all the particles, and not all the particles,*
and that *no other particles, and some other particles,*
are distinct and even *contrary* senses; and that the
Bishop and those other learned men and catholic
Christians were far enough from agreeing in your
sense, a sense, which they so expressly disown.

And therefore I had reason to say, that if we are
at liberty to understand the resurrection of the same
body in any of the forementioned senses, or not to
determine about either of them, it is plainly the
word, and not the *thing*, that is made an article of
faith. Nor am I ashamed of the *logic*, by which I
infer *from thence*, that if another should enlarge the
meaning of the term *same body* beyond what you
have done, and maintain, it is not necessary to the
sameness of the resurrection body, that it should con-
sist of *any* of the same particles, that belonged to
the old body; but that whatever particles shall then
be

be vitally united to the soul, will make it as much the same, as the body of a man at threescore is the same with that, which he had when he was born, when perhaps it has not any of the same particles; such a one, I say, must be allowed a very good believer of your article of faith. A consequence, which I drew, not from your having *enlarged the meaning* of the term same body (as you represent it, to make yourself merry with the argument) but from the stress being laid upon that *term*, in whatever sense it is understood, or whether in any determinate sense at all; so that it seems sufficient, if a man will but acknowledge the resurrection of the *same body*, whatever he means, or whether he means any thing by it, or not.

S E C T. VII.

His identity of no advantage in opposition to Mr. Locke.

I do indeed, Sir, grant, that your way of explaining the *sameness* of the resurrection body does deliver us from many difficulties raised about it; and will further assure you, that I have no objection against your account of the resurrection body; tho' I can neither allow you, that all other learned men have ever agreed in your notion of it; nor that your resurrection body will have such a *sameness*, as men attribute to their bodies here; nor that the resurrection of the *same body* is an article of faith: For I may believe your sense of the resurrection to be true, nay and to be an article of faith too, without acknowledging any one of those propositions.

But how favourable soever I am inclined to be to your scheme of the resurrection, I am never a whit the nearer finding out how it delivers us from Mr. Locke's scheme (as you call it) more than any other way of explaining it would do. I wish however you had better cleared your conscience of what I had sadly laid upon it, than by repeating the injurious charge

charge of *secret infidelity*, upon an ill-founded suspicion from false allegations.

Mr. *Locke's scepticism* (which your way of explaining, was to deliver us from) I had said went no further, than not pretending to determine of what particles the resurrection body shall be composed; and being founded on the silence of Scripture, as to that point, I did not, nor do I yet see, how *your way*, or any way of explaining the sameness of the resurrection body, can *deliver us from it*. To this you answer by repeating the old charge, "That Mr. *Locke's scepticism*, or uncertainty of opinion, is
" manifest, not because he does not determine of
" what particles, &c. but because he speaks of the
" resurrection in such general words, as if men were
" to be raised from the dead, without having any
" body raised. Or, as if a new body given were
" a body raised. Or, that if the same persons appear before the judgment-seat of *Christ*, to answer
" for what they have done in their bodies, this would
" be as properly a resurrection, as if the dead were
" raised in their old bodies; tho', according to him,
" men are persons only by their souls. This, *you*
" say, is Mr. *Locke's scepticism*, concerning the resurrection; and you desire any impartial *Christian*
" to judge, whether a man, who speaks so loosely
" and uncertainly of this article of faith, may not
" be justly suspected really not to believe it at all,
" or to be a secret infidel in this respect.

But what would any impartial *Christian judge*, if he should find, that the facts, upon which you would ground this suspicion of *secret infidelity*, are all mistaken, or entirely misrepresented? And this is really the case. Two of the places you quote for this loose, and uncertain way of speaking, are the same, to which you before referred, to shew, that Mr. *Locke* speaks of the resurrection body as of a *new one*, and

3d Lett. p. 196.
which

302 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

which I have made appear were nothing to that purpose; and the other, which you ^o quote here, I must now tell you, is to a quite *contrary* purpose. He is there defending his idea of *personal identity*, from being inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, and is so far from insinuating, *That if the same persons appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, it would be as proper a resurrection, as if the dead were raised in their old bodies*, that he uses those words of Scripture, which you have taken from thence to shew, that if the Bishop had drawn a right consequence from some supposed words of his *Essay*, he had not only said nothing *against* the resurrection of the *same body*, but had said more *for it* than his Lordship. It is indeed an argument only upon a mistake of the Bishop's. But it would have been quite inconsistent with his purpose, there to have spoke (nor does he any were else speak) as if the dead were to be raised *without having any body raised*, or as if the appearance of the same persons at the judgment-seat of Christ would be properly a resurrection. He says indeed in one of the places you refer to, that, *If the same man rise who was dead, it may very properly be called the resurrection of the dead.* But, whatever persons are, *men*, according to him, are not *men only by their souls*: the resurrection of the *same man* must with him necessarily imply a *body raised*. In short, Sir, he no where speaks with the least uncertainty of any thing, but of what precise particles the resurrection body will be composed; nor has given any manner of ground to *suspect*, that he did not sincerely and fully believe the article of the resurrection. And for this I could venture to appeal, not only to any *impartial Christian*, who has read Mr. *Locke*, with an attention to his view and aim in the matter he was handling; but even to any one a degree less *partial*, or *prejudiced*, than Dr.

gimialqxs to yaw moy chinf ginh the second thing which you say is the resurrection body which is from you
 • P. 295.
 Holdsworth.

Holdsworth. He perhaps does not see the delusion of culling out some particular sentences of an author, without any regard to the scope and design of the argument he is upon; or the unfairness of quoting them to a quite different purpose, which may give them the appearance of a sense, even *contrary* to that, which they bear in the place, where they stand. Prejudiced people always see things in a wrong light.

But supposing Mr. *Locke* to have spoke ever so *loosely and uncertainly* of the resurrection of the body, I cannot still find out, how your way of explaining the sameness of it, can *deliver us from this scepticism*. "How? cry you, I defy even yourself to say, that a man will be left under these uncertainties, doubts, and suspicions, who receives the faith of the resurrection of the same body, as it is now by me stated." Far be it from me, Sir, to say, that a man, who firmly believes the resurrection of the same body, as you have stated it, will be left in any doubts about it. But I suppose this is not a privilege peculiar to your way of explaining the sameness of the resurrection body. Will not those, *who receive that faith* under any other notion of it, who believe, that their bodies shall be raised with *all* the particles they ever had, or with *no other* than they at some one time consisted of here, be equally secure from *doubts and uncertainties* about it? And pray what advantage will either of them have of those, who believing steadfastly, that they themselves, the very *same men*, shall be raised from the dead at the last day, are satisfied with that, which the Scriptures have plainly revealed, thinking it of no importance more precisely to determine, *with what bodies they shall come*? If revelation has not *delivered us from this scepticism*, it seems no great matter, whether we are delivered from it, or not.

The second thing, which your way of explaining the resurrection body was to *deliver us from*, you called

304 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

called Mr. *Locke's* confounding identity and personality, which I, not understanding, could say nothing to; for it was not easy to guess your meaning to be, as you have now explained it: "The mischievous consequences, and confusions, of his applying his philosophical ideas of identity, and personality, to the resurrection. For thereby, *you say*, he endeavours to prove, not only that the resurrection of the same body is impossible to be maintained, but also, that the resurrection of persons, that is the appearance of souls, at the tribunal of *Christ*, in another life, is sufficient. And from these consequences, and confusions, the belief of the resurrection of the same body, in yours and the common sense of mankind, sets us clear."

No doubt, Sir; and so will the belief of it do, in any other sense. There is no occasion for your assistance to deliver us from disorders, which never had a being, however you come to dream of them. For that Mr. *Locke* did ever make the least attempt to prove, either that the resurrection of the same body is impossible to be maintained, or that the appearance of souls, at the tribunal of *Christ*, is sufficient; is, I am sure, impossible for you to prove; nor have you any ground for the assertion. So far is he from any such endeavour, that on several occasions he professes, as has been before observed, "That he by no means denies the resurrection of the same body; that God may, if he pleases, give to every one, at the last day, a body consisting of the same particles, which were formerly united to his soul. That he questions not, that the dead shall be raised with bodies." And in his *Essay*, "Thus we may conceive the same person at the resurrection, tho' in a body [he does not say, without a body] not exactly in parts, or make, the same." I give you here his own words. But I defy you to produce any one passage, where he asserts, or insinuates, much less endeavours to prove, that the resurrection

resurrection of the same body is impossible to be maintained; or that the appearance of souls at the tribunal of Christ is sufficient. So that there is no need of your explanation to *set us clear* from consequences, and confusions, with which we were never incumbered.

The last thing we were to be cleared from, is, *Mr. Locke's unknown resurrection of persons*: An expression I did not remember he had used. But you now quote a page in his third letter to the Bishop, where he several times says, that *the same persons shall be raised*, tho' it seems, as you say, "it escaped my diligent search. Now this new language, you tell me, would be strange in any man: but out of Mr. Locke's mouth, who would not allow any doctrine to be revealed in Scripture, that is not there in express words, it would be very unaccountable, if it were not plain, that he had a turn to serve by it, which was to set aside the belief of the resurrection of the same body."

I assure you, Sir, with the most diligent search I am capable of, I should never have been able to find any *new or strange language* in that page; nor could in the least have suspected, that the resurrection of the same body was intended *to be set aside*, or any other *turn to be served by it*; and therefore did not particularly advert to that expression. But certainly, Sir, this page, upon a cooler review, must make you ashamed of having quoted an author, with so little regard to his meaning, or to the subject and argument he is upon. It is page 205, the same, which you referred to just before, and which, as I told you on that occasion, is to a quite contrary purpose to that, for which you have cited it, or would here deduce from it. The subject he was upon, being to defend his idea of *personal identity*, from having any thing in it inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, he could not avoid speaking of *the same persons being raised*,

306 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

without any intention of introducing a *new language*. How absurd is it to suppose he uses that expression to serve the *turn* by it you pretend, of setting aside the belief of the resurrection of the same body, when he was labouring to prove, that there was nothing in his notions contrary to that doctrine? nay, when it is plain he uses the expression only to shew, that, according to the Bishop's own account of his sense, he was so far from having said any thing inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, that he had proved it to a demonstration: for (as the Bishop understood him) if the same persons are raised, they must have *the same bodies*; upon which he adds, *and there can be nothing plainer, than that in the Scripture it is revealed, that the same persons shall be raised*. This, you see, is not said, to set aside the belief of the resurrection of the same body, but for an argument to his adversary, that he had really proved it.

Why this should be thought *strange language in any man*, I confess I do not see. As to Mr. Locke, he was indeed scrupulous of delivering any thing for Scripture, which was not there in *express words*: but I dare answer for him, he would not have denied any doctrine to be revealed in Scripture, which could be as plainly deduced from it as this, that *the same persons shall be raised*. Nor can this be strange language to any man, who reads there, *that we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body*, &c. or, who repeats in his creed, *that all men shall rise again with their bodies, and shall give account for their own works*. For I suppose no one questions, that those men *who are to rise*, and *we*, who are to appear before the judgment of Christ, are *persons*; or, that those, who are to give an account of their *own works*, and to receive according to what they have

have done in *their bodies*, must be the *same persons* who did those works; for they are expressly distinguished from their bodies. How then should it be *strange* for any man to express in words, what every one must understand, when he reads those passages? Or rather, is it not the same thing to say, that *all men* shall rise again, which is the language of the creed, and that *all persons* shall rise again? For *men* and *persons* in common use, and Scripture language, are synonymous terms.

I beg you, therefore, Sir, to compound with Mr. Locke upon this article; and since they are not inconsistent, nor any way tend to exclude each other, if you will not endeavour to deliver us from *his resurrection of persons*, I will give you my word, no attempt shall be made by it, to *set aside the resurrection of your same body*.

CHAP. V.

Concerning the passages of Scripture produced by Dr. Holdsworth, for the resurrection of the same body.

SECT. I.

I Had said in my letter, that it seemed a sufficient indication, that the Scripture had declared nothing particular about the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body, that the assertors of it have understood *the words* in different senses. By which, you suppose, I mean *the words of Scripture*; upon which you tell me, "that it is my misfortune to be mistaken, when I say, that I had shewed this." It would have been an unlucky mistake, indeed, Sir, to have imagined I had shewn a thing, which I had not so much as attempted to shew. But why would you suppose I meant *the words of Scripture*?

308 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

Was not the words *same body* a more obvious sense, though I did not repeat them? since I had just before been shewing, that the words *same body* were understood in different senses, but had not pretended to shew any such thing about *the words of Scripture*. So that the mistake happens to fall on your side; and whilst you are needlessly declaiming about interpreters, who believe the same doctrines, though they differ very often in explaining the words, which contain them; you have left my objection in full force; for it is the doctrine itself being differently explained, and *not the words of Scripture that contain it*, upon which my argument is founded.

For this reason, and because there is little real difference between Mr. *Locke's* meaning and yours, though you presume you have made this appear to be another great mistake in me; I told you, the contest appeared to be of very little importance. Whether it is you or I, that are mistaken in this matter, must appear by the agreement, which^r I shewed there was between Mr. *Locke's* words and yours, and the little force there is in all^s you have offered to take off from the reality of that agreement.

“ However, you thank me, that I say now, I
 “ should not think it necessary to go along with
 “ you any farther, if it were not in defence of my
 “ great man: for at first I talked that love of
 “ truth, and concern for the interests of religion,
 “ engaged me to write; but now these are little
 “ things in comparison of my desire to support the
 “ reputation of Mr. *Locke*.” No such matter, Sir;
 nor do I there contradict what I had at first said; a
 concern for truth and religion are still my motives
 to defend that *truly great man*. The less impor-
 tance any controverted doctrine is of, or if the dis-

^r In my Letter, p. 34.

^s Reply, ch. iv. sect. iv.

pute is merely about *words*, as I have shewed yours with Mr. *Locke* to be; the more truth and religion suffer by imposing it as an article of faith; and charging any one with *want of truth and modesty* for nor finding in Scripture, what is not particularly and plainly delivered there. I acquit you, therefore, of your *thanks*, and go along with you on account of this injurious treatment of Mr. *Locke*, with the same view, with which I at first professed to engage in his defence; and so much the rather, as the matter itself in contest between you, and upon which you so severely exclaim against him, appears of the less importance; because the injury done to truth and religion through him is for that very reason the greater, by making it *heresy* to speak doubtfully of doubtful things; or to be undetermined about some circumstantials of a doctrine not clearly revealed in Scripture, or not to perceive it to be delivered in a text, which may without violence bear a quite different sense.

Nothing more remains to be taken notice of in this section, but what you say concerning your not being obliged by the rule you had given in your Sermon, to confine yourself in speaking of the doctrine of the resurrection to the very words and expressions of Scripture: "Nay, *say you*, except my words differ from those of the Scripture, how can it be possible for me to explain the sense of them? Since where words are of general or uncertain meaning, it is impossible, that the repetition of them, as they stand, should explain them."

Very true, Sir, and where the words of Scripture want to be explained, words of the *same import*, that are plainer and better understood, if such can be found, may be useful to explain the true sense of them. But to give words of a *general or uncertain meaning*, a particular and determinate sense, is not to explain, but to enlarge the Scripture. If in

310 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

this doctrine of the resurrection, as it is "entirely
"matter of faith and revelation, the words and ex-
"pressions of Scripture are, *as you say*, to direct and
"govern ours;" then our expressions ought to be ge-
neral, as those of Scripture are: at least, if we ex-
press a more particular sense, it ought not to be deli-
vered as the revelation itself, but as the opinions and
conjectures of men concerning it. And you would cer-
tainly have better observed your own rule, if you
had kept within that generality, or not imposed
your sense as a doctrine of faith, though some pas-
sages of Scripture should, as you express it, *lead*
us to think, that the *same bodies* shall rise again;
which I now proceed with you to examine.

S E C T. II.

*Reply to the defence of the application of the
first text, produced in the Sermon for the
resurrection of the same body. Rom. viii.*

I do indeed, Sir, as you observe, *think it very
hard*, and with great reason, that Mr. Locke should
be charged with want of *truth and modesty*, for
saying, *that there is no such expression in Scrip-
ture, as the resurrection of the body, where the
general resurrection at the last day is spoken of,*
unless you had produced a text, where those very
words are used, and the general resurrection unde-
niable spoken of. "Why so? *say you*. Was it
"not the body, which was the subject of dispute?"
And is it not said here, that the bodies shall be
"quicken'd? A word of the same import as
"raised,—it is the very same sense, and that is as
"bad for you as the same words." Quite other-
wise, Sir, the subject of dispute was not the body,
but that *expression* concerning it; and *quicken'd*
may not be of the same import with *raised*, here,
where the general resurrection is not certainly spoken
of,

of; which you know is at least a matter of debate. I apprehend well enough, that in some cases, where the sense is the same, it is no great matter, whether the words are so or not: but in the case before us, the very words were chiefly to be attended to; because Mr. *Locke* was not contending, that the resurrection of the body *is not to be found in Scripture*, as you would have it thought; but only that the expressions concerning it were not such, as could make us think, that the holy spirit intended to deliver it as an article of faith, that the very same shall be raised. To which end alone he observes, that the resurrection of the *same body* is not mentioned in Scripture; and what is remarkable in the case, says he, *there is no such expression, as the resurrection of the body.*" The remark is of that particular expression; and why you change the phrase, both in your Sermon, and in the Defence (even where you pretend to repeat the words, as cited by me) you best know; but in both places, instead of *there is no such expression*, you have put, the resurrection of the body *is not mentioned in Scripture*; which perhaps better served your turn, in producing texts, as if contrary to what he had said, though that expression was not in them, of which alone he affirmed, that it was not in the Scripture, where the general resurrection is spoken of.

Besides producing a text with that very expression, I required likewise, that it should be where the general resurrection is *undeniably*, by which I meant so *certainly* or *plainly* spoken of, that no sincere and intelligent *Christian* could from the text itself, or the design and scope of the author, have any probable grounds to deny that sense, or to understand it in any other. And it was not *unreasonable*, much less *ridiculous* to require this; for nothing short of this can support the charge of *gross and barefaced falsehood*, as you now express yourself.

312 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

yourself. Nay I must farther say, that (if it was not ridiculous) it was very unfair in you, to urge a text in justification of that charge, which you knew Mr. Locke had offered several reasons to prove, is not to be understood of the resurrection at the last day.

But "when we deny that sense of the text, you tell me, we are able to give it no other meaning than a figurative; and therefore (whatever I may think) you do Mr. Locke no injustice in saying, that he does violence to the words, since a figured sense of the words is manifest violence, where the first and simple sense will stand good, and the secondary is not necessary or required."

By your leave, Sir, a figurative sense of the words is not *manifest violence*, when such probable reasons are given for that sense, taken from the design of the author, or arising from the text itself, as may satisfy the judgment of a sincere enquirer. And such reasons I told you in my letter, and you know very well, Mr. Locke has given, why that passage of St. Paul is not to be understood of the resurrection at the last day, but of *quickening our mortal bodies here*, so as to make them assistant to a life of righteousness. And this should have been sufficient to secure him against that injurious charge of having, *without regard to truth or modesty*, violently thrown the words into a figurative sense, even though the sense, in which you understand them, should be the right, for a man may have a sincere regard to *truth*, who upon probable grounds mistakes it. And therefore so gross an imputation will still be unjust, though it should appear, that *the first and simple sense of that passage will stand good*. Your proofs of which, *first in general, and secondly more particularly, and at large*, we are now to consider.

Your first general proof, that those words of St. Paul, Rom. viii. 11. *shall quicken your mortal bodies*, are

are to be understood of the literal resurrection at the last day, is, that "supposing them to have a metaphorical meaning, the metaphor must be borrowed from the resurrection, according to the Scripture notion of it; and if bodies have no concern in the literal resurrection, they would never have been named in the figurative resurrection." We grant it. And what then? Will it follow, that because a metaphor is borrowed from the literal sense, therefore it cannot have a metaphorical sense? What fine logic is this! But if it does not prove the thing, that was to be proved, it is no matter for that, if it prove something else, though it be what Mr. *Locke* has never disputed. We may find, it seems, by this metaphor, "that it is the true sense of Scripture, that the bodies of men are to be raised at the last day; and therefore we are told, it would be but a small point gained to Mr. *Locke's* cause, should it appear, that the resurrection of the body is not expressly mentioned in Scripture."

As small a point as it is, Sir, it is all, that Mr. *Locke's* cause requires, who never express the least doubt, that the bodies of men are to be raised at the last day; though all your argument here is founded upon that fundamental mistake, which you carry through all this controversy, of supposing him to deny, that the resurrection of the body is to be found in, or can be proved from Scripture, barely from his having occasionally remarked, that there is no such expression there.

But that it was not with any design in prejudice of that doctrine (as you insinuate) that in his *Comment* he denies, that the text we are upon, can be understood of the resurrection at the last day, is evident from his having, in that very *Comment* upon this passage, asserted, that God will

Y^r will general proof, that those words of St Paul, Rom. viii. 11. shall quicken your mortal bodies
Page 124
certainly,

314 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

certainly, at the last day, raise the bodies of all men, the wicked, as well as the righteous. For he could not intend by the interpretation of a text, to destroy a doctrine, which he maintains in the comment upon it; and which is one of his arguments, why that text cannot be meant of the general resurrection, because it is a promise to those only, who have the *spirit of Christ*; whereas the bodies of *all men* are to be raised. But it has often happened, unluckily for your purpose, that you have urged Mr. *Locke's* interpretation of some particular texts, as a proof, that he denied certain doctrines, when he has asserted those very doctrines, in his notes upon those very texts; as I have had occasion to observe more than once, in the first part of his vindication.

In your second general proof, that the text we are upon, must belong to the resurrection at the last day, you argue, "that the life of righteousness was no way intended by the Apostle here, seems to be clear, because one cannot suppose that, without concluding, that the *Roman* converts were yet dead in their sins. For quickening in this place is promised to them as a happiness future; and between being *dead in sins*, and *quickened unto righteousness*, there is, you think, no possible medium." You afterwards proceed to shew, from several passages in this Epistle, that the persons, to whom it was addressed, "were not dead in their sins;" and since they were already quickened to a life of righteousness, you conclude, "that the quickening promised to the *Roman* converts in this passage, *Rom. viii. 11.* was the resurrection of their bodies at the last day." This is, in short, the sum of your argument. To which I crave leave to answer:

That it is founded on a mistake of the nature of the quickening, contended for in this place. We readily grant, that the persons, to whom St. *Paul* writes

writes this Epistle, were not at that time dead in their sins; they had *received the faith of Christ*, had been *buried with him by baptism*, and might reckon themselves *to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God*. But notwithstanding that they were thus *renewed in the spirit of their mind*, they continued still liable to be drawn into the death of sin, by the power and prevalency of their *carnal appetites*, that *law of the members*, which is continually warring against the law of the mind; and therefore the Apostle, in ch. vi. immediately after he had allowed them to account themselves *alive unto God*, exhorts them not to let *sin reign in their mortal bodies*, nor to yield their *members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin*. And in ch. vii. after he had been representing the great prevalency of *that law of the members* in the unregenerate, he encourages them with the assurance, that they might be delivered from *this body of death*, through *Jesus Christ our Lord*; and in this ch. viii. § 11. with a promise to those, who were spiritually minded, who had subjected their minds to the law of God, to *quicken also their mortal bodies*, by his spirit that dwelt in them, so as to make them assistant to the life of righteousness, that they might be enabled, as those who were *alive from the dead*, to *yield their members instruments of righteousness unto God*.

I appeal to you, Sir, whether the passage in debate, understood in this sense, does not receive great light from those other places in the two preceding chapters. And this takes off all the absurdity, which you suppose, of *quickenning men to a life of righteousness, who already have that life*. For it is not, you see, a quickening of the spiritual part, which was before *alive unto God*; but of that gross material part, which St. Paul frequently speaks of, as the seat and root of the carnal appetites: and a promise to enliven those *mortal bodies*, by the same power, which raised the Body of Christ from the dead,

316 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

dead, so that they should be no longer hindrances, but helps to them in the life of righteousness, seems greatly consonant to the scope and tendency of this, and the foregoing chapters. In the next verse, it is made a consequence of this promise, that they were not debtors, or were under no obligation to live after the flesh. And in ver. 13. there is a promise to them of a future life, if ye through the spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live; which has a plain reference to that promise in ver. 11. of quickening their mortal bodies, by the spirit, which dwelt in them, as what alone could enable them to mortify the deeds of the body. Nor does it seem at all likely, that the Apostle should interrupt his discourse, of walking not after the flesh but after the spirit, which he goes on with in ver. 12. to promise them a resurrection in ver 11. when he was immediately after to close the whole (as he does with great beauty and strength) by a promise of the reward of eternal life.

The words understood in the sense Mr. Locke intended, as I have explained it, take off likewise your other objection; "that if when St. Paul says, he that raised up Christ from the dead, he speaks of the resurrection of Christ's body, not of his soul; it seems very unlikely, that when he says he shall quicken your mortal bodies, he speaks not of the resurrection of their bodies, but of their souls." Your objections, Sir, are frequently founded on a mistake of your adversary's sense, as this plainly is: the quickening understood to be meant in this text is of the gross material part, which is a continual clog upon the spiritual life. I know no body so absurd as to have supposed, that when the Apostle says, your mortal bodies, he meant your immortal souls.

You now "enter into the consideration of the words more distinctly, that the dependance and connexion of them with what goes before, and follows after them, may be considered and understood." And here you tell us, that after the words, (which you set down) from the sixth verse of the seventh chapter, "we may immediately subjoin those at the beginning of this eighth chapter." But there is no reason to admit this, since they have a plainer connection with the very last verse of that chapter, interpreted according to the reading of the vulgar *Latin*, and of some *Greek* manuscripts; *the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.* And the question in the immediately preceding verse seems to require this reading, as a proper and full answer to it; *Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord.* After which very naturally follows, the first verse of the eighth chapter: *there is therefore now no condemnation to them, which are in Christ Jesus.* But on what account, you introduced this dispute, I know not; it being, I think, of no importance towards determining the sense of the 11th verse, which is our present business. I shall therefore wave it here, and proceed to some remarks on your *Paraphrase*, by which perhaps it will appear, that a man may, without being prejudiced, think it neither just nor natural.

TEXT.

Ver. 1. *There is therefore now no condemnation to them, which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the Flesh, but after the Spirit.*

PARAPHRASES.

Ver. 1. *There is therefore now no obligation upon Christians to observe the ceremonial law, and no condemnation, if they obey it not, upon condi-*

318 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

PARAPHRASE.

tion, that they forsake the lusts of the flesh, and conform themselves to that purity of life, which the Gospel of *Christ* requires.

Truly Sir, at this rate of paraphrasing, *St. Paul* may be made to say what any one pleases. Is it possible for the most *unprejudiced man*, to think the first sentence of what you here give for a paraphrase, either *just or natural*? There is certainly not the least ground for it in the text, and could be inserted on no other account, than to support the supposed connection of this verse with the sixth verse of the seventh chapter; though it is a very proper deduction from the last verse of it, as I before observed. Nor is there the least appearance of its being *a return*, as you pretend, to the Apostle's *former discourse*, of their not being obliged to observe the ceremonial law; which he had done with at verse the 6th. At verse 7. he begins another topic, not in a digression, as you call it, but a close prosecution of the design he had all along been upon, by shewing the insufficiency of the law to deliver from sin and death, since it gave no power to overcome the carnal appetites; from the dominion of which there was no deliverance, but by the grace of God, through faith in *Jesus Christ*. With the mention of this only way to be delivered from what he had before called *the law of the members*, and *this body of death*, the seventh chapter concludes; and the beginning of the eighth goes on to assure all, who had embraced the faith of *Christ*, that they were *therefore* (because of this remedy, which the grace of God had provided) in no danger of condemnation, if they did not indulge the lusts of the flesh: not a syllable is here about *obeying the ceremonial law*. The whole discourse is closely connected, and the subject of *walking not after*

after the flesh, but after the spirit, pursued without interruption, as far as you have carried your paraphrase. Which I shall go on to consider only, so far as is necessary to shew, that it seems rather intended to support your own, than to give the genuine sense of St. Paul, by the liberties you have taken of adding, (as we have already seen) leaving out, or altering, as might best serve your purpose throughout the whole. What is most material of this kind to be here observed, is from the tenth verse, to which therefore we proceed.

TEXT.

PARAPHRASE.

Ver. 10. *And if Christ be in you, the body is dead, because of sin; but the spirit is life, because of righteousness.*

Ver. 10. But if you be sincerely such (*i. e.* Christians) and are conformed to the spirit and purity of the Gospel of Christ; then, though your bodies suffer death, the punishment of sin; yet your spiritual part shall be happy in a blessed life for ever, as a reward of your faithful obedience.

I am persuaded, Sir, you would not have found out, either reward or punishment in this verse, if it had not been necessary to draw St. Paul from his discourse of *living after the flesh, and after the spirit, of dying to sin, and living to righteousness*, in order to introduce your sense of the following verse, which is the present subject of our debate. For it is plain, that the Apostle is speaking in this 10th verse, not of the future, but of the present state of those Christians, in whom Christ, or the spirit of Christ, dwelt: *If Christ be in you, the body is dead*, which expression is equivalent to those of *being dead to sin, of cruci-*

fying

320 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

lying the old man, and mortifying the deeds of the body, used in other places of this Epistle; particularly in the vith chapter, the first part of which will, I presume, be of greater use to explain this passage; than a paraphrase so manifestly strained from the text, and the subject the Apostle is insisting upon.

TEXT.

Ver. 11. *But if the spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you, he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies, by his spirit, that dwelleth in you.*

PARAPHRASE.

Ver. 11. And since, as you are *Christians*, the blessed Spirit, who raised up your Lord *Jesus Christ* from the dead, dwelleth also in your bodies, those bodies also subject to death, and now tending to it, shall, when dead, be raised again, to possess an immortal glorious life.

Here you entirely drop the last words of this verse, *by his spirit, that dwelleth in you*, to which you have nothing, that answers, in your paraphrase: but, to make amends, there are several things in it, that have nothing in the text to answer them. And, indeed, those words were better out of the way, if we are to understand, *shall quicken your mortal bodies*, of raising their bodies, when dead. For, however the spirit of God may be concerned in raising the bodies of the dead, it cannot be conceived, that this is to be effected by virtue of the spirit's dwelling in them, *whilst living*, which the quickening, in the text, was to be. And, therefore, it seems, you thought fit not to take notice of words, which, according to your interpretation of the text, there was no use for.

But those words are of the utmost importance in the sense, which I have given of this passage, as a promise so to quicken their mortal bodies, that they might

might be enabled to yield their members, as living instruments to righteousness; for this could only be effected by the dwelling of the spirit of God in them: which whoever considers, and compares this with the two preceding and two following verses, and with the other places referred to above, will, I doubt not, find a beauty and harmony in this way of explaining it, which is quite lost in the other. Besides that in your way, the Apostle is guilty of an unusual tautology, promising them the reward of a future life, no less than three times in the compass of four verses, in the 10th, 11th, and 13th, which, if the sense I am contending for be admitted, is only done at the close of this discourse, in v 13. And this seems no inconsiderable objection to your way of interpreting that passage. But to go on:

TEXT.

Ver. 12. *Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh;*

Ver. 13. *For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye, through the spirit, do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.*

you must certainly bring death and destruction upon yourselves: but if, by the assistance of the spirit of grace, ye conform your lives to the purity of the Gospel, ye shall, both in body and soul, obtain and enjoy a never ending life.

PARAPHRASE.

Ver. 12. Wherefore, Christian brethren, as you have any concern for the eternal welfare, both of your souls and bodies, remember these obligations to forsake all habits of sin and sensual lusts.

Ver. 13. And that, if ye live under the dominion of the law, which forbids all sin, but assists you to subdue none, and indulge in all the sins, which that law forbids,

322 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

I believe, it would be difficult for any one to give a reason, why, *to live after the flesh*, should signify, in the 12th verse, indulging *habits of sin and sensual lusts*; and, in the 13th verse, should mean *living under the dominion of the law*, as you there turn that phrase. For though, *being in the flesh*, is sometimes used by the Apostle in this last sense; yet certain it is, that in this place, whatever the sense of the phrase is, it must be the same in both verses, the one being consequential to the other; which, I think, nothing can make more plain, than setting them together. *We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh; for, if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die.* If, in the first of these sentences we are to understand, *the habits of sin and sensual lusts*, as you interpret it, there is not the least ground, from the text, for giving a different sense to the same words immediately following them. But it might be of use for your purpose, that the Apostle should not seem to be steddily pursuing the same subject; and so, the danger of *living under the dominion of the law* must be brought in here, though he had done with that point long before. Your bringing in too the *eternal welfare*, and the *never ending life of the body*, in these two verses, could only be thought on, to make a seeming relation in them, to that resurrection of the body in the 11th verse, which you would, at any rate, support; for there is not one word, that regards the future state of the *body*, in either of them. May it not, likewise, be supposed, that if some turn had not been to be served, these words, *if ye — do mortify the deeds of the body*, in the 13th verse, would not have been explained by, *if ye conform your lives to the purity of the Gospel?* but rather by, *if ye deny, or subdue your sensual lusts, or carnal appetites*; which certainly answers much better to the phrase and sense of the text. But that phrase has, perhaps, too near a relation

lation to the promise, in the 11th verse, of *quicken-
ing their mortal bodies*, as understood in Mr. *Locke's*
sense; and, therefore, it might be convenient to lose
sight of it, lest it should give some light to that pas-
sage. And, indeed, your whole paraphrase is so
affectedly distant from the turn of thought, and
manner of expression, of *St. Paul*, that one may
easily guess whose sense it was calculated to de-
liver.

But it is time now to quit a point, that required
not so long a debate, as you have run it into. As
for what you have urged afterwards, against under-
standing the words under enquiry, in a figurative
sense; I believe, enough has been said, in my re-
marks on your paraphrase, to be a full answer to it,
and, therefore, I need not go over the particulars.
The figurative sense is sufficiently defended for our
purpose, if reasons are given for it, taken from the
scope and connection of the Apostle's discourse, which
Mr. *Locke* has done; and I have shewn, that your
objections against it are founded on a mistake of his
sense; and your own chiefly supported by a para-
phrase, manifestly strained to serve that purpose;
as any attentive reader may observe, in more places
than I have marked. Let but yours be compared
with Mr. *Locke's* paraphrase on this viiith chapter
to the *Romans*, and, I dare answer for it, no unbi-
assed judge will find any thing in *his*, like those
deviations from the text, which I have pointed to
in *yours*; nor the least appearance of *straining St.
Paul to serve a turn*, notwithstanding your ground-
less reproach.

I think it needless, likewise, to examine your
large animadversions, upon the reasons Mr. *Locke*
offers in his *Comment*, why the text before us should
not be understood of the resurrection of the last day;
as it is of no importance at all to the doctrine it-
self, which is abundantly attested in Scripture, whe-
ther

324 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

ther this text belongs to it, or not. It suffices, that the grounds, upon which he thinks it does not, are strong enough to acquit him from the charge of want of *truth and modesty*, in that assertion, which this text was brought to confute; as, I doubt not, must appear by what has been said on the subject. And, on the other hand, your arguments for the literal sense of the words, are not so plain and convincing, even with the help of your extraordinary paraphrase, but that an humble and sincere man might still dissent from you; and, therefore, not of force enough to support so gross an imputation, from which Mr. *Locke* may well stand acquitted, whatever the true sense of this text may be, which you have so much laboured to clear.

If you was not in some measure sensible of this, it would be hard to find a reason for your endeavouring to put that fallacy upon us, which I have all along observed, of supposing Mr. *Locke* to deny, not only that there is any such *expression*, but that there is any such *thing*, as the resurrection of the body in Scripture; with which view, no doubt (for sure it cannot be by chance) you always alter his words, on this point; and here particularly at the close of this section, you justify the injurious charge complained of, *as he denies, that the resurrection of the body is in the Scripture*. But that is what Mr. *Locke* never did deny; on the contrary, he frequently asserts, from Scripture, that the bodies of men shall be raised, as we shall have occasion hereafter more expressly to shew, by which the injustice of your gross treatment of him will further appear.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Reply to the Defence of the second text produced in the Sermon, Phil. iii 21.

YOU begin your *Defence* of the application of this text, with telling me, as you had done before, "That it is unreasonable and unjust to insist upon the very words, if the doctrine and sense we contend about, is in, or may be inferred from, the Scripture." But, Sir, it is not a *doctrine* we are contending about here: these texts were brought in opposition to what Mr. *Locke* had asserted, which was not, *that the resurrection of the body was not to be found in Scripture*, as you again represent it, but that there is no such *expression* there. From whence he infers nothing against the *doctrine* of the resurrection of the body, as you would have it thought: all he argues is, that if the *sameness* of it was to be an *article of faith*, the expressions concerning it would have been more exact and particular. And, therefore, I must be so stiff, as again to tell you, that nothing but producing a text with that very expression, *the resurrection of the body*, can be any thing to the purpose against Mr. *Locke's* assertion.

However, we will consider this text, so far as I have concerned myself in the sense of it, or as it is brought in proof of the resurrection of the *same body*. I had owned, in my letter, that the *evangelists* here spoken of was to be at the resurrection of the dead; and, therefore, you needed not ask, "if I can deny it." But I left it to be considered, whether it related at all to the bodies of those, who were to be raised from the dead, that expression being used in another place*, of those who were *not*

* 1 Cor. xv. 51.

326 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

to die. To this doubt you have given a large solution, which I think not unexceptionable; but, waving that point, as I had no design to insist on it; granting, that the change spoken of, in the text before us, which was to be at the time of the resurrection, was also to be of those, who were raised from the dead; what will follow from thence? Why “then (*you say*) it is plain here is another text of “*St. Paul*, which asserts the resurrection of the “*body.*” No such matter, Sir; here is a text, indeed, where mention is made of the body at the resurrection; and no one denies, that there are many, which do the same, but not in such a manner, as to be contrary to what *Mr. Locke* asserted. Nor yet so as to be any proof, that the very same body shall be raised: for with whatever bodies the dead are raised, whether precisely the same, or not, they will equally be capable of being *changed* from *vile* to *glorious bodies.*

I had, therefore, good reason to say, that this text was oddly chosen, for an *express mention of the resurrection* of the body, or for a proof of the sameness of it; since that expression is not in it, and since our bodies may be changed, without being raised, as the Apostle elsewhere expressly says they shall: and those bodies of the dead, that are raised incorruptible and immortal, may certainly be not the less properly said to be changed, for not being exactly the same they were before. So that you have scarce *spoiled me for a wit, upon the use of the word change*, so far as a pun has any pretension to it; and, if you *could afford to laugh at it*, you might have spared your grave man’s advice to one, who seemed cautious enough, not to be in danger of being much troubled with such flights.

But you are almost tempted to be witty yourself, upon the word *surprize*, which I happened to use, upon your bringing this text as a proof of the resurrection of the *same* body. “I must be a per-

“son

“son very liable to be surprized (*you say*) if the
“proof of the resurrection of the body, from this
“text, is capable of surprizing me.” Here, according to custom, instead of the *same body*, you put only *the resurrection of the body*, as if I denied, that this text could be any proof of the resurrection of the *body*; which, I must again assure you, is far from either Mr. *Locke's* or my purpose. You then ask, “if I ever saw it produced against this doctrine?” No, really, Sir; nor even against the resurrection of the *same body*. But a text may be very surprizingly brought in proof of a doctrine, that never was, nor could be, produced against it, if it make neither for one side, nor the other, which I take to be the case here. In short, without being over liable to it, one may be allowed some surprize at your choice of this text, either against Mr. *Locke's* assertion, or for the resurrection of the *same body*. Mr. *Locke* says, there is no such expression in Scripture as the resurrection of the body. “This (*say you*) is spoke without either truth or modesty, “for the Apostle says here, that our bodies shall “be *changed*. And this is also a plain proof of “the resurrection of the *same body*, for a body, that “is *changed*, must needs be *the same*.” These are arguments somewhat extraordinary, which, therefore, might give a little surprize.

And now, I fear, you will be in some danger of being surprized too: You insist still, “that the “alteration of the qualities, modes, and affections “of any body, proves it to be the *same body*, since, “if it is not the same, it must be a new body; “and a new body is not a body changed, but “a body entirely different, and another. And, “when I can prove this not to be true, you have “told me before-hand, I shall say something surprizing.” So I warn you to be on your guard.

The difference of qualities, modes, and affections is that alone, which constitutes the different kinds

328 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

of bodies; so that the alteration of the qualities, modes, *etc.* of any body, will be so far from proving it to be the same, that it unquestionably proves it to be a new *kind* of body. For example; should the qualities, modes, and affections of a worm be changed into those of a bird, no one would say this was the same body, whatever particles of matter composed it. On the other hand, suppose, at the resurrection such a change of the material substance, as you allow of, to make your vulgar sameness, which, though it does not make a body *entirely different, and another*, is yet inconsistent with the *precise sameness* of it. This, no doubt, you will grant, cannot make it the less capable of being *changed* from a *vile* to a *glorious* body; and if *the want of an exact sameness* cannot hinder it from being changed, the change mentioned in the text cannot prove it to be exactly the *same*. So that here you may find a *new kind of body*, though not *entirely different, and another*; and a body *changed*, that is not the *very same*.

And as this text can be no proof of the sameness of the resurrection body; neither is it contrary to any thing, that Mr. *Locke* has advanced; for, as I before said, he never denied, that our bodies shall be *changed* at the resurrection. To this you answer, "Though, perhaps, Mr. *Locke* did never deny in words at length, that our bodies should be changed at the resurrection; yet this is a necessary consequence, that, if he denied the resurrection of the body, he denied, that our bodies should be changed at the resurrection." But what if he did in words at length *assert*, that our bodies shall be changed at the resurrection? Will it not then be as necessary a consequence, that he did likewise acknowledge the resurrection of the body? And that he does, in words at length, *assert* both, you may, if you please, see in his note on 1 Cor. xv. 42, where he thus expresses himself:

alfoqA

Flesh

Flesh and blood (as St. Paul tells us) cannot inherit the Kingdom of God; and, therefore, to fit believers for that kingdom, those, who are alive at Christ's coming, shall be changed in the twinkling of an eye; and those, that are in their graves, shall be changed likewise, at the instant of their being RAISED. I presume, Sir, these words could not escape your notice in reading Mr. Locke's Comments: how then could you possibly charge him with denying the resurrection of the body, or that it is to be found in Scripture? The injustice of which, from this passage alone, must so fully appear.

S E C T. IV.

Answer to the defence of the third text produced in the Sermon, 1 Cor. xv. 53.

If I unjustly charged you, Sir, with taking no notice in your Sermon, of Mr. Locke's arguments; I must now do you the justice to own, that you have made ample amends since, for that supposed deficiency, by your large defence of what you had there said against the Comment.

I shall not enter into the dispute, whether the words *corruptible* and *mortal* in this text ought to have body for their substantive; or whether they are neutrals absolute, and to be understood of persons. Though I cannot but observe, that this sense is every whit as agreeable as the other to the scope and tendency of the writer, which, you say, "is rather to be attended to, than the exactness of words." I must likewise observe, upon what false grounds you accuse Mr. Locke of wilfully disguising the sense of these words to deceive his readers. To which purpose you say, "It is observable, that when Mr. Locke tells us, that the words *corruptible* and *mortal* are neutrals absolute, he leaves out the word *this*, which the
" Apostle

330 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

“Apostle joins with them; and it was necessary,
“that he should do so, to induce his readers to be-
“lieve, that the words corruptible and mortal
“could possibly represent the dead; for when the
“word *this* is added to them, they are manifestly
“uncapable of so indeterminate a sense.”

It is very true, that Mr. *Locke* does not set down the word *this* at the beginning of his note upon the words in question, when he speaks only of the grammatical construction of them: but it is as true, Sir, that he inserts it afterwards, in the very same note, when he gives the sense of the place. *That then, says he, which is meant here being this, that this mortal man shall put on immortality, and this corruptible man incorruptibility, &c.* His omission, therefore, of the word *this*, in one part of his note, since he has it in another, could not be with any design of imposing on an unwary reader, unless such, as are so unwary, as to read notes by halves. That you are one of this sort, is indeed the most favourable construction, that can be put upon your unjust conclusions from this, and many other of Mr. *Locke's* notes.

Your very next charge against him, of *inconsistency with himself*, is founded on the same conduct, of taking notice of one part of this same note, and not considering the latter part of it, which might have helped you to see, that there is no contradiction in what he says at the beginning of it, to what he had said in his note on *Rom. viii. 11.*

You observe, that in his note on that place, “he is very positive, that the word *mortal* is no where in the *New Testament* attributed to any thing void of life: how then, say you, can it possibly here represent the dead?” You know very well, Sir, that Mr. *Locke* does not take this expression, *the dead*, to signify in Scripture *the bodies of the dead*. And if you had read out this note, you might have seen, that when he says *mortal* here

here stands to represent the *dead*, he means the *persons* of the dead; for a little after this, follow those words, which I just now quoted, *that then, which is meant here, being this, that this mortal man must put on immortality, &c.* I cannot say, that you take no notice of this, for you have said a great deal against understanding that verse of personality; but it seems, you did not care to consider, that Mr. Locke understood it so: there was no inconsistency in his saying, *mortal here stands to represent the dead*, with what he had said on Rom. viii. 11; for the persons of the dead are not *void of life*, though it is not till the resurrection, that *this mortal man, must put on immortality.*

The next thing you take y notice of, is Mr. Locke's note upon y 43. of this chapter, where he says, *the time, that man is in this world affixed to this earth, is his being sown, and not when being dead he is put into the grave.* In opposing this interpretation of his, you are very large; but I shall be as brief in discussing it, both because it does not appear, that he *builds much* upon it, as ^a you pretend; and because the question in debate certainly does not much depend upon this interpretation, as you yourself own; for "if it were granted, you say, yet he cannot, as he hoped, get clear of the resurrection of the body by it." Neither am I so well satisfied with Mr. Locke's notion of this matter, as to engage in the defence of it; though I question not in the least, that the reasons he gives for it, were such as truly weighed with him. And those, who observe human nature, will find it nothing strange, to see men of good understandings, and honest minds, fond of some peculiar notion, which others cannot view in the same light.

I agree with you, that the want of an exact correspondence between the burial of a dead body,

332 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

and the sowing of quick seed in the earth, to which St. Paul alludes, is no good proof, that he does not by the figure of *sowing* intend to represent the putting a dead body into the ground; for it is particularly observable, that the eastern writers form their figures and comparisons upon the smallest agreement in any one point; of which there are many instances in the most eminent of the Greek poets, and not a few among the sacred penmen. I shall, therefore, have no dispute with you in relation to this text, but so far, as in discoursing upon it you have *mistaken*, or manifestly *wronged* Mr. Locke. And for this I find occasion at your first entrance on the subject.

After having asked, "what proof he brings to support an interpretation so very uncommon?" you answer, "why, that he tells us is St. Paul's own words, yet he gives us no particular words from St. Paul, but only says in his own, for *dead things are not sown, seeds are sown being alive, and die not till after they are sown.*" These words, it seems, you understand Mr. Locke to have given us for St. Paul's, and thereupon you say, "the sense of these words may indeed be deduced from those at *1 Cor. 15: 36*. But Mr. Locke would not allow other people to say, that a consequence from St. Paul's words was St. Paul's words; and he ought not to have better usage in this place than he gives." I assure you, Sir, he has no need of it in this place, or any other for he is far from giving a consequence from the words of St. Paul, for St. Paul's words. You will find, on a review, that this censure of yours is only founded on a hasty misinterpretation of his meaning. *The time* (he says) *of man's being sown, is not when being dead he is put into the grave, as is evident from St. Paul's own words.* But what are the words of St. Paul, from which he thinks this evident? Not those

those, which immediately follow, as you understood him to mean, for they are plainly his own reasoning upon St. Paul's words, that is upon the expression of *sowing*, and those words in *y 26. That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die.* Which being well enough known, he might think it needless to set them down, but infers from them, that the Apostle does not mean the putting our dead bodies into the grave, *because* (as he argues) *dead things are not sown, &c.* These are indeed his own words, nor were they at all intended to be given us for St. Paul's, as you misapprehend.

You began your remarks on this note with a *mistake*, which may be excusable; but the *wrong* you do Mr. Locke, at the conclusion of them, is too *manifest*, and has been too often repeated, to pass for an oversight. "After all, say you, if Mr. Locke's imagination here, that men are sown in-
" to this life, were granted, yet he cannot, as he
" hoped, get clear of the resurrection of the body
" by it." I am weary of being forced to complain so often of the *injustice* of charging Mr. Locke with having any *hope or design to get clear of the resurrection of the body*; which was so far from his purpose, as has appeared by several instances of his, expressly asserting, that *God will raise the bodies of all men at the last day.* But I must now say, that it is even *ridiculous here*, to suppose any such design, when you have his notes before you on this chapter, in some of which he largely and unexceptionably insists on that doctrine. Let his interpretation of two or three verses in it be as *uncommon*, or even as *wrong* as you please; how absurd is it to impute his giving them that sense to a design of overthrowing, what he establishes in his notes on many more places of the same chapter? That he could not design here, to get clear of the resurrection of the body, let the following extract witness for him. In his note on *y 42*, he thus dis-

334 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

discourses : *St. Paul's reasoning stands thus : Men alive are flesh and blood, the dead in the graves are but the remains of corrupted flesh and blood, but flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither corruption inherit incorruption, i. e. immortality : therefore, to make all those, who are Christ's, capable to enter into his eternal kingdom of life, as well those of them who are alive, as those of them who are raised from the dead, shall, in the twinkling of an eye, be all changed, and their corruptible shall put on incorruption, and their mortal shall put on immortality and thus God gives them the victory over death through their Lord Jesus Christ. In another part of the same note, he says : This victory over death does, according to the Apostle, belong to all those, whose corruptible bodies have put on incorruption. These passages undeniably prove, that Mr. Locke asserted the resurrection of the body, if any words can be strong or plain enough to evince it. And I suppose, Sir, this is not the first time you have met with them, though you suffer yourself confidently to affirm, that " he invented that expression, " that men are sown into life, to ease himself of " the incumbrance of supposing, that it is the " dead body, which is sown in dishonour, that is " to be raised in glory." As if you did not know, that notwithstanding the time he allots for this sowing, instead of easing himself from that incumbrance, he, throughout this note, *supposes* corruptible bodies, the remains of corrupted flesh and blood raised from their graves, to put on incorruption. Since then, it is plain, he did not advance the notion of *mens being sown into this world*, to serve that turn by it, which you pretend, it is but equitable to believe, that he was led into it by *St. Paul's manner of expression*, and his own reasoning upon the nature of things sown. To this, he appeals in that note, and thinks any one, who considers it, will find reason from thence so to understand*

stant

stand St. Paul. Which we may at least allow him to do, tho' we cannot agree with him in that sense. And after all, the sowing of men into the world is not so foreign from Scripture language, but that he might find other texts to confirm his taking St. Paul's words in that sense; for why may not the Apostle be supposed to use the same metaphor to express the peopling of the world, which the prophet *Jeremiah*, uses to signify encreasing the numbers of the Jewish people? *I will sow the house of Israel, and the house of Judah, with the seed of man*. The figure may be thought as properly applied to the whole of mankind, as to a part; and there are other places in the prophets, where sowing, and not sowing, are used for peopling, or dispeopling a particular nation. And if Mr. Locke should be allowed this sense, there would be no getting clear of the resurrection of the body by it, as you very justly argue; for still the body must have a share in the sowing, dying, and being quickened. You ought not, therefore, to have supposed, that this interpretation was invented for a purpose, which you own it could no way effect.

Before you leave this chapter, you resolve to consider one note more of Mr. Locke's, for several reasons: it is upon y 35. *But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? And with what body do they come?* Mr. Locke observes, that these words contain two questions; first, *How comes it to pass, that dead men are raised to life again?* Secondly, *With what body shall they return to life?* To both these he distinctly answers, first, *That those, who are raised to an heavenly state, shall have other bodies.* Secondly, *That it is fit men should die, death being no improper way to the attaining other bodies.* Upon this note you ask, "How comes it to pass, that these words, *How are the dead raised?* should be interpreted, *Why are*

336 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

“ *dead men raised to life again? &c.* How can they
 “ be thought, truly and properly, to import more
 “ than this; how can it be possible for any power
 “ to raise the dead?” Mr. *Locke* has told you,
 Sir, in this note, that it was *St. Paul’s* answer, that
 let him into his sense of that question: *If*, says he,
St. Paul may be allowed to know what he says, his
words must be understood to contain those questions, by
the answers, which he gives to them. But according
 to your usual candour in judging of his designs, you
 roundly affirm, that “ he thought it most proper
 “ here to alter the state of the question, because he
 “ intended to alter the state of the doctrine, con-
 “ cerning the resurrection.” Whether he has altered
 that or not, will hereafter appear: however, you may
 observe as well as he, that *St. Paul’s* answer does not
 seem to relate at all to any doubts about the power of
 God to raise the dead, but refers to his common man-
 ner of dealing, in producing the fruits of the earth,
 for the propriety of men’s dying to live again.

The other question, *With what bodies do they*
come? you say, “ Mr. *Locke* indeed allows to stand
 “ as it does in the text, but you are sure he
 “ gives an answer to it, which the Apostle no where
 “ authorised him to make, that the dead shall have
 “ other bodies. Nor does he dare to refer to the
 “ words, in which the Apostle teaches such doctrine.”
 I believe, Sir, you may find, that in ^e another place
 he refers to many words of *St. Paul*, as seeming to
 teach this doctrine, particularly those, which are the
 immediate answer to this question, *That which thou*
sowest, thou sowest not that body, that shall be, but
God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him. But you
 tell us, that “ these comparisons, taken from the
 “ sowing of seed, &c. which he seems to think
 “ make for his doctrine, cannot be suppose to im-
 “ ply, that the dead shall have other bodies, but

^e Vid. 3d Letter.

“ that

“ that their old bodies at the resurrection shall be
“ given to them again, more glorious, and beauti-
“ ful, and durable, than they were before. The
“ allusion must not be supposed to hold in all
“ points.”

It is granted, Sir, that allusions are not to hold in all points. But when any particular circumstance is insisted on, or pointed at in an allusion, that circumstance must hold in the thing compared to it, as the chief matter intended to be explained, or illustrated by it. And therefore, when it is taken notice of in the allusion, that that which is sowed, *is not that body that shall be*, we cannot but be led to think, that *so also* that, which is laid in the grave, *is not that body, that shall be after the resurrection*. And supposing those comparisons, which St. Paul uses on this occasion, to imply only, that our bodies at the resurrection shall be differently constituted, and have entirely different qualities, from what they had here; this, as I observed elsewhere, makes them a new kind of bodies; and this is just what Mr. Locke means here by *other and better bodies*, which he says the dead shall have at the resurrection. If you doubt, that by *other bodies*, he means bodies differently qualified, you need only look back to what I have lately quoted from his note on § 42, of this chapter, consistently with which the note we are upon must be understood; for it is not to be supposed, that he intended to deliver a doctrine here, contrary to what he asserts so soon after. That therefore, which he means by *other bodies* on § 35, must be the same, of which on § 42. he says, *Those that are in their graves shall be changed, at the instant of their being raised*. In that note you will find, that Mr. Locke's *other bodies* are bodies raised from the dead, and changed from corruptible, mortal flesh and blood, to spiritual incorruptible immortal bodies. “ These, you say, are not other bodies, but the old
“ bodies of the dead given them again more glori-

338 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

"ous, &c." And here arises another dispute merely about words, viz. Whether bodies so changed, as to have all their qualities entirely different from what they had before, may be most properly called *the same* or *other bodies*.

I must here take notice of an observation you make at the beginning of the subject we are upon, "That this note opens all the mystery, at once, of *Mr. Locke's doctrine of the resurrection*." But you have now seen, Sir, that *his mystery* is no other than *St. Paul's mystery*, that *we shall all be changed*. And you may likewise see, that all the changes he describes of bodies at the resurrection, being only of their qualities, and not at all of the material substance, there is no inconsistency in his saying here, that those, who are raised, shall have *other bodies*, meaning bodies, that have quite different qualities; with his affirming to the Bishop, that he does, by no means deny, that the *same* bodies shall be raised. These seemingly contrary propositions may very well agree together, as they relate to the body in different respects. And tho' *Mr. Locke disputes* indeed *with all his might* against imposing that doctrine as an article of faith, there is no *shuffling*, as you term it, when it is affirmed, that he does not deny it. "But it clearly appears, you say, that he does not believe it; and from his note upon this place, it is manifest he declares the contrary." To this, what I have just now said is a sufficient answer, yet I shall add here, that from several notes of his upon other places, it rather appears, that he is much more inclined to believe, that the same bodies shall be raised than the contrary, tho' so wonderfully changed at the instant of their being raised, that they may well be called different, or other kind of bodies, whatever materials they are composed of.

It is nothing strange, therefore, which you tell me, "That *Mr. Locke* was once under the same
" conviction

“conviction with others, concerning the nature of
 “the resurrection, and the sense of this chapter,
 “and in his *Reasonableness of Christianity*, thus ex-
 “presses himself: *These frail mortal bodies shall be*
 “*changed into spiritual immortal bodies at the resur-*
 “*rection, when this mortal shall have put on immor-*
 “*tality.*” But it is very strange you should not
 see, that he still continued under the same convic-
 tion, and expresses himself to the very same purpose,
 but more full and particular, in his note on *Y* 42.
 to which I have so often referred. How you could
 overlook this, when you was criticising upon his
 comment on this chapter, is not easy to imagine.
 But I begin now to be persuaded, that by some
 chance or other, you must certainly have slipped
 that note; for it is yet more difficult to imagine,
 that, if you had read it, you could have allowed
 yourself to write a large book to persuade the world,
 that Mr. *Locke* did not believe the resurrection of
 the body, or acknowledge, that it is to be found in
 Scripture; when you must have found, in that note
 alone, a full refutation of the whole purpose of
 your book.

Perhaps you may think, that Mr. *Locke's* men-
 tioning frail mortal bodies to be changed into
 spiritual immortal bodies, shews him to have been
 under other convictions, than when he interpreted
 the text we have been upon, by *this corruptible man*
must put on incorruption, and this mortal man must
put on immortality. But this interpretation alters
 nothing of the doctrine of the resurrection, which
 is the reason I have not entered into any debate about
 the sense of this text. It is still by the changes of
 the body, that *this corruptible man, must put on in-*
corruption, &c. Accordingly Mr. *Locke*, in his com-
 ment on this chapter, represents the dead bodies
 raised from their graves, to be the subject of all the
 changes mentioned in it, as you have seen, and ex-
 pressly

precisely speaks of *corruptible bodies*, that have *put on incorruption*.

And therefore, if he avoided answering the Bishop, when he urged this text against him, it could not be for the reason you alledge, *viz.* "Because he knew he had once allowed himself the Bishop's sense of the words," for there is nothing in his former words, as you have quoted them, contrary to the sense, which he still allowed. But that does not amount to the Bishop's, who proposes as *an article of faith*, that the resurrection body must consist of the same particles, which were once vitally united to the soul, without the addition of any other. This Mr. Locke contends is not clearly enough revealed, to be an article of faith. And if the text last mentioned, was (what you pretend) *as clear as the light* against him in this, I presume it is as clear against you, who no more allow this to be an article of faith, than Mr. Locke does. And thus we have done with his and your notes on this chapter.

S E C T. V.

Reply to the objections against Mr. Locke's state of the resurrection.

THE only passage of Mr. Locke's, that I find considered in this section, is his answer to this argument of the Bishop's: *That the same material substance must be reunited to the soul, or else it cannot be called a resurrection, but a renovation.* In your Sermon, you had urged the same argument, with the addition of this consideration: "That the soul dieth not; and that if the body alone die, it must be the raising of that body to life again, by which the dead man can in any proper sense be said to be raised." And what I had objected to this in my letter, employs the greatest part of your animadversions here. I had said, that as a *man* consists of body and soul, the *man* dies, not by the body alone

alone, but by a *separation* of the soul from the body.
“ Well, say you, what is this to the purpose? The
“ question asked remains still to be answered; when
“ the soul and body of a man are thus separated,
“ do they both lose their existence, action, and per-
“ ception? Or is it the body only, which is lost to
“ all sense of life?” This you conclude I must say,
whereupon you again draw up the argument just
now set down from the Sermon, “ If the body alone
“ die,” &c. To all which give me leave to reply, that
tho’ we have good grounds, both from reason and
Scripture, to believe, that when the soul is separated
from the body, it is in a state of *perception and action*;
yet it must be granted, that whatever kind of life it
exists in, it is lost to, or ceases to live, the *human life*;
and therefore, if, after such a separation, the soul,
the same conscious principle, is again united to a
human body, it may with sufficient propriety be
said, that the *man* is raised from the dead, without
knowing or considering, whether the body, to which
that soul is united, be the very same material sub-
stance, with which it was joined before, or not.

You tell us, that “ the strict Scripture notion of
“ dying will help us best to the Scripture notion
“ of rising again: But in the strict Scripture notion
“ of dying, the soul, *you say*, has no concern.” And
this you prove from our Lord’s denying, *Math. x.*
28. that *any man can kill the soul*, from whence you
argue, that, “ When at any time in Scripture, a
“ man, who consists of body and soul, is said to die,
“ or to be killed; we know, that in the strictness of
“ Scripture language, we ought to understand that
“ saying only of his body.” But pray, Sir, how
does it follow, that because no man can kill the soul,
nor can it be said to die, that therefore the *soul has*
no concern in the strict Scripture notion of dying? It
is certain the soul has a great concern in the real
nature of death, and in the common apprehensions
of men about it, to which the Scripture is generally

342 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

accommodated. For I ask you, whether upon hearing of a friend's death, or in apprehending our own, we think of nothing but the body's being lost to all sense of life? Do we not consider our friend as having left, or ourselves as going to leave, our habitation in the body? And if this is the true notion of dying, then a separation of the soul from the body must be the strict Scripture notion of dying; and so we may conclude, contrary to you, that when in Scripture a man is said to die, or to be killed, we ought to understand that saying not of his body only, but of the separation of his soul from the body; in which most properly and essentially the death of the *man* consists. "The soul *indeed* having always lived, cannot, *as you urge*, "be said to be raised from the dead;" yet the *man* may, who was properly dead, by ceasing to live the human life.

But "the same man, *you say*, does not rise from "the dead, except he rises with the same body, "for the same body is as necessary to make the "same man, as the same soul." This seems a very bold affirmation. The same soul, the same conscious principle, is so absolutely necessary to make the same man, that if we suppose another thinking substance, we entirely lose all idea of the sameness of the man: but it is not so as to the material substance, for we make no question of the sameness of the *man*, though we are sure the material part of him changes continually. How then can we be certain, that the same body is as necessary to make the same man at the resurrection, as the same soul is? It is sufficient to us, according to our notions here, that the same thinking being continues united to a body, which has never been shifted all at once. This it is, which makes up our idea of the same man, and the same human body. But it must not be supposed, that the *real identity* of either consists in this; for if it did, it would be im-

impossible, that the same man could be raised from the dead, because it implies a contradiction, (as I have upon another occasion observed) that any being should be restored to the same *continued life*, which it has once *discontinued* to live; or that a body, which was once entirely put off at death, and all its parts dispersed, should be restored to an *uninterrupted* succession of particles united in the same organized life.

○ If then the real identity of the man, or that which constitutes the *same man* at the resurrection, must be something else than that, in which we place the sameness of the man in this life; it may be demanded, in what that sameness of the body consists, which you say "is as necessary to make the same man as the same soul?" The same particles of matter you will not allow to be necessary at the resurrection, because not necessary to the sameness of the man *here*. An uninterrupted succession of particles, united by a participation of the same continued life, which is necessary *here*, cannot possibly be restored at the resurrection: how then is the resurrection body to be the same? To this you are ready to answer, according to your account of vulgar sameness, "that those parts of the old matter, which it pleases God to restore to life at the resurrection, will be sufficient, whatever new particles may be added, to make the body raised as much the same with that which died, as that was whilst it lived, for any little part of time, the same with itself." But Sir, the sameness, that the body had with itself *here*, did not consist in its having some old remaining parts, to which new particles were continually added; though that is indeed the *constitution* of the body *here*, notwithstanding which it is always reputed the same; but to place the sameness of it in this mixture of old and new particles, would carry the absurdity with it of supposing the sameness of a thing to consist

344 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

sist in its variations, or in its not being the same. The vulgar notion of the sameness of a human body has indeed no regard at all to the particles, which compose it, whether new or old; insomuch, that if it could be proved to a demonstration, that a man's body at fourscore had not in it any one particle of the same matter, which it consisted of at four, it would still retain a vulgar sameness, so long as it continued in the same organized life, without shifting all its parts at once. On this, Sir, I believe you must be convinced your vulgar sameness is founded, and to this it is plain, the body cannot be restored at the resurrection.

However, a body consisting of part of the old matter, with some new particles added to it, is that same body, which you require to be reunited to the soul, to make the *same man*. Now against this Mr. *Locke* has said nothing, otherwise than as you have made it to agree in *terms* with that same body, which he contends is not *an article of faith*. For he could not design to oppose your notion of the resurrection body under that term, since it is neither the same in his sense, nor in the Bishop's, nor has that sameness, which belongs to human bodies in the common apprehensions of men. But in whatsoever we place the sameness of the body here, we cannot from thence with any certainty determine, what body will be necessary to the identity of the *man* at the resurrection. Perhaps a body strictly the same with that, which died, in a mathematical sense, may be requisite; and therefore Mr. *Locke* does by no means deny, that the same bodies in that sense shall be raised: and in affirming, that the *same man*, who was dead, must rise again, he implies, that whatever body is necessary to make the same man, that of consequence must be raised at the last day, though it is not clearly revealed of what particles it shall be composed. But so far as the Scripture directs he has ventured, as you have
seen,

seen to describe it, viz. ^d that it shall be a body changed from flesh and blood, from corruptible, mortal, to a spiritual, incorruptible, immortal body. These are the new kind of bodies, which he says all the saints shall be in at the resurrection, (for of new bodies in any other sense he no where speaks) and united to such new bodies, bodies, that have so far put off their old imperfections, as to become quite other bodies than they were. I hope you will allow, that without any "affront to common sense, or defiance to the common ways of speaking among men," the same men may be raised to immortality, the corruptible part of them having thus put on incorruption.

And by this time I hope too you are convinced, that your dispute with Mr. Locke on this subject is merely about words, since he fully asserts all that you contend for at the resurrection, except the term *same body*, which can with no propriety be in any sense applied to that body, which you both think proper to the resurrection.

S E C T. VI.

Whether any real difference in Scripture between the dead, and the bodies of the dead.

I might now put an end to this long reply, having sufficiently cleared Mr. Locke from heresy on this article, and confuted your groundless pretence, that he denied, or did not believe, *the resurrection of the body*. But as there is great stress laid on both sides, upon the subject of this section, by you in maintaining the *sameness* of that body (whatever is meant by it) to be an article of faith; and by Mr. Locke in denying it to be so in the sense he understood it; I shall consider, as briefly as I

^d Notes on 1 Cor. xv.

346 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

can, whether he upon good grounds affirms, that St. Paul plainly distinguishes between the dead, and the bodies of the dead; or whether it be true, as you say, that this distinction is only *verbal*; and that the expression of the resurrection of the *dead*, which is constantly used in Scripture, is always to be understood of the *body*.

I pass over the two or three first passages of this section, because I have said enough on the last, to serve for an answer to all the reasoning contained in them; and for your citations from the Old Testament, I am no way concerned to examine them here. The particular text Mr. Locke instances in, is the only occasion of our debate on this point, and abundantly sufficient to determine it. 1 Cor. xv. 35. *How are the dead raised? and with what body do they come?* You had said in your Sermon before, and you now tell it me again, "that the distinction even here, between the dead, and the bodies of the dead, is only verbal." And truly, Sir, you may tell me this as often as you please, without ever being able to persuade me to believe it, whilst the sense of the text is evidently against you. For if there is no real distinction in it, there will be no avoiding that disagreeable sense Mr. Locke mentions, *viz. with what bodies do the dead bodies come?* But in that sense, which you say, and which I grant, is a very natural and proper sense, *viz. "with what kind of bodies, or with a body how qualified, do the dead come?"* a real distinction between the dead and the bodies of the dead is manifestly preserved. I see, indeed, that in your paraphrase of the words, *that distinction is lost*; but I see too, that the sense of the text is lost with it, according to your peculiar art of paraphrasing. Your words run thus, "the dead bodies of men, when they are raised to life again, what qualities shall they be endued with?" Does not any one see, that there is something express in St. Paul's question, even according to your own interpretation

tation of it, just before mentioned, which is not at all signified in yours, as you have now turned it? Both of them, it is true, are enquiries concerning the qualities, that bodies shall have at the resurrection; but St. Paul does besides, and distinct from the body, expressly mention *the dead*, which are to be raised, and then enquires with what kind of *bodies* those dead shall come. Your paraphrase shews, indeed, that the Apostle might have stated the question, concerning the nature and qualities of the resurrection body, as you have turned it for him, so as not to distinguish between the dead, and the bodies of the dead; and so probably he would have done, if he had not intended such a distinction. But the matter of fact is otherwise; he has so really and plainly distinguished them in this text, as if it had been his purpose to make it observed, that bodies are not the only subjects of the resurrection; for it is impossible, without quite altering the question, or making a very absurd sense of it, to understand by *the dead* here, nothing more than *dead bodies*. *How are the dead raised? And with what body do they, i. e. the dead come?* Certainly the dead (as was observed in my letter) are as manifestly distinguished from their bodies in this text, as they are artfully dropped in your paraphrase. If you will not allow this to be something “offered in point of reason, that may deserve to be considered; it is easy (in your own smart language) to sit still, and yawn, and say, “the paraphrase is just, it is natural, it is not strained, nothing can be meant here but dead bodies;” and try who will take your word for it against the plain evidence of St. Paul’s.

To confirm what you contend for, “that by “the dead is always in Scripture meant the dead “bodies,” you observe, that it is impossible to

348 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

avoid speaking personally of a dead body in any language; upon which you produce several instances in Scripture, where dead bodies are thus personally spoken of. And it is not to be denied, that this manner of speaking is common to all languages: but it does not follow, that because dead bodies are usually spoken of personally, therefore whenever *persons* are exprest, *bodies* are always meant. There is certainly a real distinction in nature betwixt the persons of the dead, and their bodies; and when the Scripture mentions both distinctly, expressing the relation of one to the other, as in the text before us, there can be no room for a pretence, that the *dead* there signifies only *dead bodies*. Your grand argument, *that nothing is dead but the body*, must be defeated in this case, where the man or person is plainly spoken of under that appellation *the dead*, and enquiry made with what kind of body dead men shall come at the resurrection. What reason can there be to suppose, that no distinction is intended here between the dead, and the bodies of the dead, but that of words, unless you would persuade us, that nothing really exists of the dead but their bodies? For if there is a real foundation for a real distinction, why should it not be intended, when it is exprest?

S E C T. VII.

Reply to the considerations, on a large passage quoted by me from Mr. Locke's third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

WERE I to go closely along with you, I should be led to take notice of so many inconsiderable matters, and fall into such frequent repetitions, as must be tiresome to myself, as well as the reader. I therefore pass over your pieces of wit upon me as a *pains-taker*; and refer you to
what

what I had said before, in apology for my writing so much on a controversy, which I think of little importance to be determined. I might indeed answer the greatest part of this section in the same way, by references to what has been said above, there being scarce any thing in it, that has not been already obviated.

In following Mr. *Locke's* observations, upon the xvth chapter of 1 Cor. as I had set them before you out of his third Letter to the Bishop, you again object the three texts, which have been lately considered, against his assertion, *that the spirit of God keeps always to this phrase in the New Testament of raising, quickening, resurrection of the dead, &c. and that the body is not mentioned to this purpose.* Enough has been already said on those texts to shew, that they contain nothing contrary to what Mr. *Locke* asserts. But I must here take notice, that the last of them, *this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal shall put on immortality,* is very unfairly brought in opposition to him, since it is expressly excepted by him in the very place you quote; where his words are, *the body is not mentioned but in answer to the question, with what bodies the dead who are raised shall come?* Now as that text is part of the answer to this question, it is included in Mr. *Locke's* exception. But that this might not appear, you have fairly dropped the exception, and make him say absolutely, *that the body is not mentioned to this purpose;* which it seems was fitter for your purpose.

From the general manner of expression in Scripture, Mr. *Locke* infers, *that a good Christian may do his duty in believing all that is revealed to him concerning the resurrection, without entering into the enquiry, whether the dead shall have the very same bodies, or no.* This conclusion you say is false, because you pretend to have proved, that those general expressions of "*raising, quickening, re-*
surrec-

350 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

*“ resurrection of the dead, ought to be understood
“ only of the resurrection of the body.”* But sup-
posing you had proved this, Mr. *Locke’s* conclu-
sion might still be true, for a good Christian may
understand those expressions to signify the resur-
rection of the body, without finding himself ob-
liged to enquire, whether the *very same* body shall
be raised, or no.

Mr. *Locke* observes, that St. *Paul* did not seem
much to encourage such an enquiry, by the appel-
lation he gives to those that make it. To which
you return for an answer, that the harsh word *Thou*
fool is not used by the Apostle to forbid our be-
lieving the rising, and the dying body to be the
same. I grant it. But what then? might not the
Apostle discourage an enquiry about it, intending
neither to forbid, nor to require, our believing the
rising and the dying body to be the same?

Upon Mr. *Locke’s* farther observation, *that by*
the remainder of St. Paul’s answer, a man will not
find the determination to be much in favour of the ve-
ry same body, unless the being told, that the body sown
is not that body that shall be, be the way to deliver
this as an article of faith; and acquainting us,
that the body raised is as different from that, which
was laid down, as the flesh of men is from the flesh
of beasts, &c. upon this you say, “ it is manifest,
“ that he misrepresents, and perverts the sense of
“ the Apostle, whose purpose it is to shew, not
“ that the body raised is a different body from that
“ which was laid down, but only that it shall
“ differ as much in beauty and glory, &c. A
“ body, that is not flesh and blood, may be formed
“ of a body, that was flesh and blood, and differ
“ from it, not as to the essence of a body, but
“ only as to immortality and glory.”

And what is there in all this, contrary to any
thing Mr. *Locke* says? It is you, that misrepresent
and pervert his sense, when you suppose him to
maintain,

maintain, that the body raised differs from that, which was laid down, as to *the essence of a body*. All the differences he describes are plainly those of forms and qualities; the difference of a corruptible body from an incorruptible, &c. You say, a body, that is not flesh and blood, may be formed out of a body that was flesh and blood. And you have seen Mr. *Locke's* doctrine to be, that the resurrection body shall be so formed, in those words, which I have before quoted from his note on § 42. of this chapter, *viz. The dead in their graves are but the remains of corrupted flesh and blood; but flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God: therefore, those, that are in their graves, shall be changed at the instant of their being raised, and their corruptible shall put on incorruption.*

You go on to tell us, “ that the bodies of men, of beasts, of fishes, and of birds, differ only in their forms and qualities.” And this we grant. It is therefore (as was observed above) the difference of their forms and qualities, that makes each of them a different kind of body from the other; and this has been already urged to shew, that the great difference of qualities, which *St. Paul* informs us the body raised shall have, entirely opposite to those, which belonged to the body laid down, makes *that* so much a different kind of body from the other, that Mr. *Locke* might, with great propriety, call it a *new kind* of body, or another body, without intending to deny, that it was formed from the old one; as it is manifest he did not by his notes on this discourse of *St. Paul's*. Nor is the conclusion, which he draws from his observations upon it, in his third Letter, any thing contrary to this: all that he infers from it is, that a discourse, in which the *differences* betwixt the rising and the dying body are only mentioned, and all the comparisons in it made only to illustrate those *differences*, could not easily be thought intended by the

352 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

Apostle to deliver as *an article of faith*, that the *very same body* should be raised, without the addition of any one particle of matter; which was what the Bishop did not allow to his *same body*. As to this point we know you contend, that there may be an addition of several new particles of matter to that *heavenly, spiritual, powerful, immortal, incorruptible body*, which you say is *undeniably the same* with that, which the Apostle speaks of as *earthly, animal, weak, mortal, and corruptible*. So that the only difference between you will here again appear to be, that Mr. Locke does not with you account a body, which may neither consist of precisely the same particles of matter, nor has any of the same qualities, which belonged to the body laid down, to be the *very same body* with it: and that he does not with you take St. Paul's describing the great difference between them, to be a *full declaration and proof*, that they are the *very same*.

The paragraph, with which you conclude this section, must lead your readers to suppose, that Mr. Locke would allow no proof from Scripture, of the resurrection of the same body, but *express words*. To which purpose you say: "Though Mr. Locke demands those plain and express words to be found there, yet plain and express sense is certainly as good. Can that man be said to be a good Christian, who will receive nothing for an article of faith, but what is in express words delivered in Scripture? Are all acknowledged articles of faith so delivered? If the answer to these questions be easy, Mr. Locke's call for express words of Scripture is evasive and absurd."

Whatever may be the answer to those questions, I must take the liberty to answer you, that Mr. Locke makes no such demand for express words, as could give you any just occasion for this kind of expostulation. There are indeed three places in his third Letter to the Bishop, where he mentions
express

express words; but in none of them after such a manner as amounts to a *call* for them. The first passage is only occasional¹, upon the Bishop's saying, that he did not see how St. Paul could more *expressly* affirm the identity of this body with that after the resurrection, than he did in the text he had just quoted. Upon which Mr. Locke says to this purpose, that St. Paul would certainly have *more expressly affirmed it*, if he had said in *express words*, that the *same bodies* should be raised. The next passage is a little after this, which I shall set down at large, because it plainly shews, that he did not insist upon *express words*, as the only proof he would admit, of the resurrection of the same body. *With submission* (says he) *your Lordship has neither produced express words of Scripture for it, nor so proved that to be the meaning of any of the words of Scripture, which you have produced for it, that a man, who sincerely endeavours to understand the Scripture, cannot but find himself obliged to believe as expressly, that the same bodies of the dead, in your Lordship's sense, shall be raised, as that the dead shall be raised.*

Here, you see, he requires proofs of the *meaning* of other words of Scripture, and speaks of that as equivalent to *express words*. And in all other places, when any texts were produced from Scripture for this doctrine, he never objected the want of *express words*, but examined the *sense* of them, to judge whether the doctrine could be deduced from them or not. So that, if you had proved it to be the plain *sense* of Scripture, neither Mr. Locke nor I would contend with you for *express words*.

¹ Third Letter, p. 197.

S E C T. VIII.

Concerning two passages of Scripture produced in the Sermon, not considered in my letter.

IT not being my purpose (for the reasons I gave in my Letter,) to go on with you in every particular of your enquiry, into the sense of Scripture, on the subject we are upon; two of the texts by you produced I there took no notice of; the reason of which, you here again tell me (for, according to your usual candour, mine are not to be believed) you “shall presume to be, that Mr. *Locke* “can supply me with no pertinent answer to “them.” A reflection, which though you are so fond of repeating, I think too inconsiderable to deserve an answer. But now, that I have so fully shewn, how little real difference there is betwixt what Mr. *Locke* and you have asserted, concerning the resurrection body; how little real ground for any contest between you; I might well be excused from any farther considerations on texts relating to that subject. Yet since you would not leave this enquiry, without putting me in mind of my former omission, I will endeavour to repair it, by considering here how far those passages, which were left unanswered, prove the resurrection of the same body, in that sense, in which Mr. *Locke* denies it to be an article of faith.

The first is *John* v. 28, 29. *The hour is coming, in the which all that are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth.* The other, *Rev.* xx. 13. *The sea shall give up the dead which are in it, and death and hades shall give up the dead which are in them.* Upon these texts it is urged in the Sermon, “Why this particular mention of the abode of the dead, if not to assure us, that the same body, which died, and was lodged somewhere in the repositories of
“nature,

“ nature, should be called into life again; and to
“ prevent all pretence of making any distinction,
“ more than that of words, between the dead and
“ the bodies of the dead.”

And here I will observe, that I needed not to have avoided taking notice of the first of these passages, for want of something from Mr. *Locke* to help me out; for tho’ part of what he says upon it, is peculiarly adapted to the Bishop’s manner of arguing, yet all his answer is not so. To the text itself he says: *If the thing here intended by our Saviour were to propose it as an article of faith, necessary to be believed by every one, that the very same bodies of the dead should be raised, would not any one be apt to think, that the words should have been, all the bodies, that are in the graves, rather than all who are in the graves, which must denote persons, and not precisely bodies.*

To this I suppose you will answer, that it is usual in Scripture, to speak personally of dead bodies; and that the mention of the graves shews, that bodies, which alone are in the grave, must be meant. But tho’ it is true, that there is nothing really deposited in the grave but the body; yet as we know no other abode of the dead, the Holy Spirit not having thought fit to reveal to us where the soul resides during its separate state; it is frequent in Scripture, as well as in common language, to speak of the grave, as if it were the repository of the whole man: And it is not to be thought, that our Lord, in delivering the doctrine of the resurrection, should leave the *persons* of the dead entirely out of consideration, or intend to give no idea of any part of the man but the body only: on the contrary it is unavoidable when he says, *All who are in the graves shall bear his voice, and shall come forth*, for us to think of the whole man, the soul and body united, which therefore our Lord must intend, when he uses that phrase, *shall bear his voice, &c.* Nor will the mention of the grave serve to prevent all pretence of

Z 2

making

356 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

making any real distinction between the dead, and the bodies of the dead, unless you would persuade us, that the body *alone* is to *bear* the voice of *Christ*, and *come forth*, at the resurrection.

The other passage in *Rev. xx. 13.* will less serve to prevent this distinction. The dead, which are said to be *in death and in hades*, may more probably denote the *souls* of men, than their bodies; for *hades*, you know, is used by ancient writers, for the place of separate spirits; and I am apt to think it ought almost always to be so understood in Scripture, as in that place of the *Psalms*, *Thou shalt not leave my soul in hades, neither shalt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption.* A prophecy, that the soul of the *Messiah* should not continue long in its separate state, nor his body be corrupted in the grave. But to return to the text we are upon. The mention therein of *death*, as a *place or person* delivering up the dead that are in it, and in the next verse death and *hades* being said to cast into the lake of fire, in short the entire manner of the expression, shews the passage to be written, (as indeed the whole book of *Revelations* is) in that pompous highly figurative style, so common to the Eastern languages, and especially to prophetic writings; and in such kind of figurative discourses, the particular phrases are not much to be attended to. Nothing can be proved from them, but the general design of the prophecy, which here is elegantly to declare, that all the dead, in whatever place their souls or bodies were reposed, must come forth from their several mansions, to appear at the last judgment; from whence we may conclude, that there shall be a body raised. But I do not see how it can from thence be proved, that every man shall be raised with a body *consisting of the same particles of matter, and no other*, which were united to his soul in his former life, the only sense of *same body*, which Mr. *Locke* has denied

to be an article of faith. However, if it proves this, it proves more than you allow to be true, at least what you contend is not necessary to be believed. The mention here of the *grave*, the *sea*, of *death*, and *hades*, are accommodations to our ignorance of the abode of the dead, but must be supposed to include the place of separate spirits, if these Scriptures intend to declare, that the souls of men are to have any share in the general judgment; which, in your great zeal for the same body, I hope you will not deny. Nay this whole chapter leads us much more to a notion of the *souls* of men coming to be judged, than of their *bodies*. In ψ 4, the souls of the martyrs are mentioned separately, as living and reigning with *Christ*; and yet this is expressly called, *the first resurrection*, tho' you so strenuously maintain, that there can be no resurrection, but that of the same body.

C H A P. VI.

Concerning proofs for the resurrection of the same body, from supposed congruities in the nature of God and man.

S E C T. I.

Of the congruity from the nature of God.

I Objected to your argument of a congruity to the justice of God, that those *very bodies*, in which mens actions were done, should be punished or rewarded; that it did not seem very well suited to your notion of the identity of the resurrection body; because, as I apprehend, no reason can be given, why the justice of God should not require, that *all* the particles of matter, as well as any *part* of them, which were joined with the soul in its good or bad actions here, should be joined with it in reward

358 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

or punishment hereafter. To this you answer, that
 “ the argument is not in the least improperly suited
 “ to your notion of the sameness of the resurrection
 “ body: for if a human body be truly and properly
 “ the same, after the resurrection, with that, which
 “ lived before, which consists, not of all the par-
 “ ticles, which were ever united to the soul in this
 “ life, but only of as many of them, as would at
 “ any time in this life be sufficient to have it vul-
 “ garly called the same, which is the notion of iden-
 “ tity stated in the Sermon; then it certainly repre-
 “ sents all that unconscious matter, which was ever
 “ joined to the soul in the good or evil actions of
 “ this life. And if it represents the human body,
 “ under all these several circumstances of variation,
 “ and of guilt or goodness in this life, then it cer-
 “ tainly cannot be disagreeable to the divine justice,
 “ to punish or reward it with the soul, in the other
 “ life.”

I must first observe, that this reasoning is unfor-
 tunately founded on a mistaken supposition; for it is
 not true, as I have before remarked, that a human
 body is *vulgarly called the same*, on account of its
 having any number of the same particles, of which
 it was at first composed; but solely on account of
 its *participation of the same continued life*, to which
 it is impossible for it to be restored at the resurrec-
 tion: And, therefore, a human body cannot *then* be
truly and properly the same with that, which lived
 before, by a vulgar sameness. So that if it has not
 a mathematical sameness with it, it will be incapable
 of representing the former body by virtue of a vul-
 gar sameness, or of being, *on that account*, a proper
 subject of the rewards or punishments supposed due
 to it.

But secondly, supposing that a body, which con-
 sists not of *all* the same particles, may *truly and pro-*
perly represent all that unconscious matter, which
 was ever united to the soul; yet I see not how it can
 be

be agreeable to any justice, that we have a notion of, to reward or punish an individual by, or as a *representative*. It is allowed, indeed, that nations or bodies politic may be, and have been, both by divine and human justice, punished and rewarded in their *representatives*; that is, when those nations did not consist of *all*, or perhaps *any* of the same individuals, which composed them, when the actions, for which they were punished or rewarded, were performed: But these dispensations are always intended for example, or terror to the persons themselves, on whom they fall, and to their posterity. But with what views an individual should, at the great and final retribution, be punished or rewarded *in* or *as* a *representative*, is not easy to be apprehended.

However, as this regards the body only, it may not be *inconsistent* with justice; for to say the truth, when we speak of punishing or rewarding the body, we speak improperly, and according to vulgar apprehensions, but not at all according to the reality and nature of things; the *unconscious matter* being utterly incapable of happiness or misery, of reward or punishment. And therefore, when you say, "It is certain the body is often punished by God, for the sake and sins of the soul in this life," you can only mean, that the soul is often punished here, *in, and by the body*. And in this sense, (the only sense in which it is true) it is certainly, as you observe, most agreeable to divine justice, that it should be so punished; for tho' God might punish the soul immediately, without the intervention of the body, yet such punishment would neither be suitable to the nature of the creature, which had sinned; nor in most cases to the nature of the sins committed.

But you ask, "Will any man say, that it cannot be agreeable to divine justice, to punish the body in this life, except it consists of the very same precise number of particles, in which the sin was committed?" How ridiculous is this! As ridicu-

360 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

lous as you please, Sir, for I know no body it concerns, unless you would think fit to say it, to be consistent with your yourself. But for those, who see not the congruity you talk of, they think, that it is the punishment or reward of *the man* only, about which justice is concerned; and that since the body is in reality incapable of, because insensible of either, justice cannot be supposed to have any other regard to it, than as it is the necessary instrument of punishing or rewarding the man; in order to which it seems of no importance at all, that his body should consist of the same precise number of particles, which composed it when his actions were done; because, whatever particles may be added, or be deficient, they will be equally unconscious of the consequence of those actions. And for this reason they do not see, how the *justice* of God can at all be concerned in the sameness of the resurrection body. You argue indeed, that "the man cannot be said, to be punished or rewarded, except his body, as well as his soul, be punished or rewarded." By which if you mean, that the body must, as well as the soul, be *conscious* of those rewards and punishments, (without which no being can in reality be punished or rewarded) you reason according to vulgar apprehensions, or common ways of speaking; tho' when we are considering what is agreeable to the divine justice, the reality and nature of things, which justice alone regards, ought with great exactness to be attended to. But if your meaning be, that the *man* cannot be said to be punished or rewarded, except the soul be punished or rewarded *in and by the body*; this, as I have said, is strictly true; but it is a truth, which will not support the conclusion you would establish: it will not follow, that it must be the very same body, in which the actions were done; for justice can have no regard to the unconscious matter, farther than as it is a necessary instrument of punishing or rewarding the man; and whether the man cannot be punished or rewarded,

rewarded, unless it be in and by the very same body, may at least be made a question.

You tell me a little lower, that "I do and must allow, that by the rules of divine justice, the unconscious matter may be joined with the soul in reward or punishment, as God at first blessed, and afterwards cursed the ground, out of which *Adam* was formed, for his sake and sin." But if you mean this in any other sense than I have above explained, I neither must nor do allow it. The earth was indeed blessed for the sake, and cursed for the sin of *Adam*; and great alterations, no doubt, passed upon it, in consequence of that curse: but the punishment fell upon *Adam* only and his posterity. The earth was neither more happy before, nor more miserable after the curse, and therefore can with no propriety be said to be punished by it. Nor can I see what congruity there can be in the nature of God to require, that some part of the same unconscious matter, that was instrumental to the souls of men in their actions here, should be joined with them in their punishment or reward hereafter.

The argument, which you make use of, to prove, that this congruity requires only a vulgar sameness, taken from experience of the divine forbearance, and from the example of human justice, which punishes a man at fifty for a murder he committed at twenty, tho' his body cannot possibly then have any other than a vulgar sameness with that, in which the fact was committed; this practice, I say, proves rather that there is no such congruity, as you have imagined, for the divine justice regards not vulgar apprehensions. But if there is any such congruity in the nature of God, as makes the same body necessary to the punishment or reward of the man, in a future state; it must, on all accounts before observed, require a real mathematical, and not a vulgar sameness;

and as to the congruity required to the punishment or reward, it must be a congruity of the same kind, as the congruity of the same body, which is required to the punishment or reward.

S E C T. II.

Of the congruity from the nature of Man.

FROM a certain congruity, which the soul of man seems to have with *matter*, you infer in your Sermon, that "It is highly probable it should have a congruity with that matter, the body, in which it lived, and from which it was separated by death," &c. As to a congruity of the soul with matter in general, to which your mark of * reference seemed to relate, it was to that I told you, Mr. *Locke* had said nothing contrary in any manner: but I could by no means pretend, that what he had said, was not contrary to the inference in your Sermon, when I quoted the very words, that contain a manifest contrariety to it; as Mr. *Locke's* question confessedly does. *It would be hard, he says, to determine, if that should be demanded, what greater congruity the soul hath with any particles of matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer, than it has with particles of matter, which it was never united to.*

To this the sum of your answer is, that the soul of man, being intended by God for an embodied state, and to prepare itself according to the actions done in the body, for happiness or misery in a future life; and many of those virtues, for which eternal happiness is promised, consisting in the sufferings and mortifications of the body, and the appetites of it, in the language of Scripture; and many of those sins, which are threatened with eternal miseries, consisting in gratifying the lusts and sensual desires of the body: it must therefore seem most congruous, that the soul should be reunited to that body, in which it so prepared itself, rather than to any other; and that it should be rewarded or punished in that body, whose mortifications gave birth to those virtues, or the in-

dulgence to whose *lusts and appetites* gave birth to those *sins*, for which it is to be for ever punished or rewarded.

There might indeed be some weight in this argument, if the body was at all *conscious* of those mortifications, or indulgences, those sins, or virtues, which are performed in, and by means of it. But tho' the body's being instrumental to such good or bad actions is a sufficient foundation for common language to ascribe them to it; and that the language of Scripture is usually accommodated to vulgar notions and ways of speaking; yet when we look for the congruity of one thing with another, it must be drawn from the *real nature* of those things. And since, properly speaking, the body has no real desires, lusts, or appetites, tho' an occasion of raising them in the soul; nor is indeed capable of reward or punishment; from whence can such a congruity, as you contend for, result? It is a topic, which may serve to work upon the passions, and adorn a rhetorical declamation, but will scarce bear the test of strict reasoning. Neither is there any thing in experience to confirm it. The soul, during its abode here, seems to have no hankering after any part of that matter, which was once united to it, but is now so no longer. If a leg or an arm be lost, tho' it is extremely sensible of the pain of parting, and grieved to find its body maimed, it has afterwards no concern for the disunited parts; and could a new leg or arm be vitally united to it, would, for any thing that appears to us, be as well satisfied with them, as with the old ones. Whether the soul will be thus indifferent to what body it may be united at the resurrection, is what we can know nothing of with any certainty. And therefore arguments from congruity will be far enough from *strong confirmations* (as you call them) of the resurrection of the same body, if those from Scripture are not strong enough of themselves to support the doctrine; and,
if

364 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

if they are, they will have no need of such *confirmations*, as you confess would be nothing but *imagination* without them, and consequently can give no solid support to them.

However, if there is reason to think, that the soul has a congruity with any particles of matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer; it is an argument (as I observed in my letter) which seems but ill-suited to your account of the sameness of the resurrection body. For what reasons can such a congruity be established upon, which will not equally conclude, that the soul has a congruity with *all* the particles of matter, that were ever united to it, as with that *part* of them, which you think sufficient to make up your same body? To this question of mine you next apply your answer, that "the reasons you have given, are taken from moral, and not the natural congruities of the soul. And therefore, since the body at the resurrection is the same with that, which lived and died, not by having all the particles, which were ever united to it, but only by such, as are sufficient at any time in this life, to have it thought vulgarly to be the same: all the congruities of the soul, which require, that it should be joined with the body in its eternal rewards and punishments, will only determine it to *this* body, *this* body alone being always thought to be the mortified body of the virtuous, and the indulged body of the vicious."

These extraordinary reasons will, no doubt, have their weight with persons of quick apprehensions and lively imaginations; but I confess myself so dull, as to have no notion of *moral* congruities of the soul, which can require it to be joined, in rewards and punishments, with a being incapable of *moral relations*, of vice or virtue, of rewards or punishments; as the unconscious matter certainly is. Neither can I conceive, why the soul should be determined to

its body at the resurrection, on account of its being *vulgarly thought* to be the same (supposing that could be the case of the resurrection body.) If there are any congruities of the soul, which will determine it to that body, in which it lived before, they will much more probably result from *natural*, than *moral* relations; besides that, as I have shewn, a *vulgar sameness* is utterly incompatible to the resurrection body. So that upon the whole, my *idle fears* are in danger of remaining upon me; for I do not see, that you have "ordered your affairs on this nice occasion, much better than I dreamt of." I am still *afraid* (which with you, it seems, is the same as to be *confident*) that you must either require a real mathematical sameness to the resurrection body, or relinquish your argument from the congruities in the nature of God, and of man. But this will be no great matter, since it is an argument, which you own will not prove your doctrine, if it be not sufficiently proved without it.

S E C T. III.

TO your third section you have prefixed this title, "No resurrection without the resurrection of the same body." And you say in it, that you are very sincere, when you tell me, that you cannot "understand the one without the other." But I have already endeavoured to help your understanding in this, and as you here produce no argument, but what I have before answered, either on this point, or against Mr. Locke's assertion, *that the resurrection of the dead, is the only language of Scripture*; I need not repeat what has been sufficiently insisted on. Let us proceed therefore, to consider your fourth section, in which

S E C T. IV.

Mr. Locke's doctrine of the resurrection is falsely stated.

IT having been urged by him, *that the resurrection of the dead is the only language of Scripture*:

" and

and you, it seems, thinking, "that this implies
 "no more, than that persons once dead shall live
 "again," took the liberty in your Sermon, to set
 down this proposition as Mr. *Locke's* words; tho' it
 contains neither his words, nor his sense; which I
 looked upon, as too unfair dealing, to be passed by
 wholly unobserved. You now pretend to justify it, by
 asking, whether, "tho' he has not those very words,
 "he may not have words, which bear that sense?
 "or at least may not that proposition be clearly and
 "justly deduced from his words? In either of these
 "cases, you say, your putting, *So Mr. Locke*, in
 "your margin, can be no unjust reference." To
 which give me leave to reply, that a person so liable as
 Dr. *Holdsworth* to misinterpret Mr. *Locke's* words,
 and to find implications in them, which he neither
 intended, nor saw, has no right to give his own in-
 terpretations, for Mr. *Locke's* words: Nor indeed is
 it allowable for any man, in any case, to set down
 his own consequences as another's words; for at
 that rate an author may be made to say, what is far
 enough from his thoughts; as is the case now be-
 fore us.

That Mr. *Locke* was far from thinking, that the
 doctrine of the *resurrection of the dead*, the doctrine
 of Scripture, implies no more, than that *persons once
 dead shall live again*, is manifest from many places,
 which I have occasionally quoted from him. And
 what you have produced in proof, that Mr. *Locke's*
 doctrine implies only a *new life*, which you here
 again sum up, I have elsewhere shewn to be either
 mistakes of his words, by carrying them beyond
 his meaning, *imaginary insinuations*, or *false imputa-
 tions*, of denying, what he never denied or opposed.
 For instance, when he says, that men shall have *other
 bodies* at the resurrection; that the body raised is *dis-
 ferent* from that, which was laid down; these expres-
 sions, as I have urged, ought in equity to be under-
 stood agreeably to those passages, where he so plainly
 speaks

speaks of the great *changes*, which shall pass upon the bodies of men at the resurrection. As for all those places, which you here again refer to in your margin, for his *insinuations*, that a body entirely *new* may be a resurrection body, there is not one syllable in any of them in the least to that purpose. And for what you farther charge him with, that "he every where constantly disputes against the resurrection of the body," I have frequently assured you, that it is an *unjust imputation*; that he no where disputes against the resurrection of the body, tho' he affirms, that there is no such *expression* in Scripture. You say, that the Bishop told him, as you do, that his doctrine implies only a *new life*, and not a resurrection; "but he makes no proper answer to him, only insisting positively, without any reason, in the words cited before." And what *proper answer*, I beseech you, could be given to the objection? The Bishop says, *unless the same material substance is raised, it cannot be called a resurrection*: Yes says Mr. Locke, *If the same man rise, who was dead, it may*. Or what reason need to be given for this? It is a proposition, that requires no proof; nor could he suppose it would be questioned, that the *same man* might be raised, tho' his body did not consist of the same numerical particles, that composed it here; since the Bishop had, in that very argument, *allowed the same man under several changes of matter*. For if a man may be the same in this life, under *several changes of matter*, why may he not be the same man at the resurrection, tho' there should be great changes in the material substance? And if the *same man* thus rise, who was dead, this is evidently a *proper resurrection*. You now leave Mr. Locke for a while to engage with me, who it seems have displeased you, by "having learned to speak the same language with him;" for tho' I say, that those, who own the resurrection of the dead, mean more by it, than that persons dying in this world *do still live in another*;

yet

368 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

yet you observe, that when I come to explain what I understand by the resurrection of the dead, all the account I give of it is, "that the rising must be understood of that which died, *not meaning the body,* but the same *species*, a creature consisting of soul and body the *same man*, must be raised at the last day." And you would be glad to know, how this resurrection of the dead implies any thing more, than that *persons* dying in this world *do still live in another*. I should be as glad to inform you, Sir, and I hope by this time have given you to apprehend, that when a *man* dies in this world, he does *not* still live in another. The soul, it is true, exists in a separate state, but the *man* notwithstanding is dead; and when the *man* is said to be raised from the dead, this must imply something more, than that the soul still lives in another world. We cannot indeed mean by this, that the *body alone* shall be raised, unless the body alone makes the *man*.

But you tell me, that when I speak of a creature consisting of soul and body, I speak of the "*species*" only, of human nature considered abstractedly, "*not of particular men, the individuals of that species, who are the only proper subjects of the resurrection.*" This had been indeed nothing to the purpose; but I think my words gave you no ground for such a misapprehension of my sense; for tho' I say, the *same species*, I immediately add *a creature* consisting of body and soul, the *same man*, *must be raised*; which seems to me clearly enough to express *an individual of the human species*. I assure you, Sir, I am not so profound a metaphysician, as to apprehend *abstract ideas* to be *real entities*; or to think of raising the *human species* otherwise than by *individuals*, unless in our imaginations.

But you say, when I speak of the *same man*, I cannot by Mr. Locke's doctrine mean the same particular man, consisting of the same soul, and the same body; and if I mean, that the same soul, and
another

another or new body must be raised at the last day, "What does this imply more, than that a person, who died in this world, shall live again in another and new body in a future state?" To this I answer, first, that by Mr. *Locke's* doctrine, I can and do mean *the same particular man*, consisting of the same soul, and of such a body, as is not inconsistent with his identity; but whether a body precisely the same is necessary to the sameness of the man, I do, no more than he, pretend to determine. Secondly, I must take notice, that you have here so altered your *terms*, as entirely changes the state of the question; for instead of persons dying in this world *do still live in another*, you have here put, *shall live again in a future state*. You likewise use the terms *man* and *person* indifferently, substituting one for the other, tho' they stand in this controversy for very different ideas; according to which it is true, that a *person* dying in this world *does still live in another*, but it is not true of a *man*. And tho' those, who own the resurrection of the dead, must, as I asserted, mean more, than that *persons* dying in this world *do still live in another*; yet they may mean nothing more, than that *men*, once dead, *shall live again in a future state*, (as you here express it) for that is a proper resurrection; since what is once dead, can no way live again, but by being raised from the dead.

I had added, that those, who believe this, must believe something more, than that an *unembodied spirit*, such as is the soul, when separated from the body, continues to live elsewhere. This you grant. But say you, "What then? the Sermon does not mention an unembodied spirit; but affirms, that they, who deny any resurrection, do yet believe, that persons dying in this world *do still live in another*. And there are some who believe this, not of unembodied spirit, but of souls united to other new and heavenly bodies, who yet expressly deny the resurrection of the dead."

It may be so, Sir, and pray what then? what is this those, who *expressly own* the resurrection of the dead? Those, who *deny it*, may indulge their imagination as they please; but I must tell you once again, that those, who *own it*, must believe something more, than that the soul, whether *in* or *out* of a body, *continues to live* in another world; for the resurrection they believe in, is not to be till the last day; and is a resurrection of that, which till then was dead, that is of the man; and those, who affirm, that the *same man*, who was dead, shall rise again, must imply, that he shall rise with such a body, as is not inconsistent with his identity.

But you add, "Tho' I believe, therefore, something more than they do, who barely believe the separate existence of the soul, yet while I believe, with Mr. Locke, that at the last day, the souls of men shall be united with other and new bodies, I only believe, that they enter upon a new life in a new body, and I have lost and denied the resurrection."

I beg, Sir, you will give me leave to know best what I myself believe; and I am very positive and very sincere in assuring you, that I firmly believe, that the *very same men*, who were once dead, shall rise again at the last day; tho' I do not precisely determine, *with what bodies those dead shall come*. And therefore, I do not mean, *that the souls of men shall be united in other and new bodies* in your sense, because I do not know, how far the sameness of the material substance may then be requisite to the sameness of the man. Nor has Mr. Locke or I excluded even a mathematical sameness from the resurrection body, revelation not being clear concerning it. Thus far indeed the Scriptures seem plainly *to lead us to think*, that from a natural, corruptible, mortal, shall be raised a spiritual, incorruptible, immortal body; but so differently constituted and qualified, that the body laid down is no more

more *that body that shall be*, than a grain of corn sown is the same with that, which is produced from it. And how it will follow, that those, who thus *believe and expressly confess* the resurrection of the dead, *have lost and denied the resurrection*, because some, who *expressly deny* the resurrection, do yet believe, that souls united to other and new bodies *still live* in another world, I am at a loss to understand. Sure I am, that one may very stedfastly believe the resurrection of the dead, and of the body, without determining of what particles of matter the resurrection body shall be made up; tho' you have no other real ground but our not doing this, for charging Mr. Locke, or me, with having lost and denied that important article.

'Tis truly *pleasant*, Sir, (I must retort) to see you set down your own implications from Mr. Locke's doctrine, and then tell me, you can "allow, that I "speak proper enough, when I call this Mr. Locke's "faith, *viz.* That persons dying in this world still "live in another; since you are sure you have "largely proved, that it is not the *Christian*." You may dispose of it then, Sir, where else you please, for I have largely enough shewn, that it is not Mr. Locke's. That faith, which I told you, was his, is *that the same man, who was dead, shall rise again at the last day*. This is indeed implied in the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, the language of Scripture; and if that is an article of the *Christian* faith, (as sure it must, if the Scriptures are the rule of it) then Mr. Locke's faith is the same with the *Christian*, and in maintaining it, we neither *must*, nor *may give up, the article of the resurrection*. Nor, I think (as *pleasant* as you would make it) is there the least impropriety, or opposition to the *Christian* faith supposed, in calling any particular man's belief of it, *his faith*.

C H A P. VII.

Reply to the defence of the fifth enquiry of the Sermon.

IN this last enquiry, "By what fault of men or times, the doctrine of the resurrection is disputed or denied," I took Mr. *Locke* to be as little concerned as in the fourth, (which I entirely passed over.) But you it seems intended, that most of it should be applied to him; and now pretend to have made it undeniably appear, that he was guilty of all that heavy charge, from which I had acquitted him; "Of sinister designs in interpreting Scripture, of being tinctured with false and depraved opinions, denying those articles of our faith, the blessed Trinity, the divinity of our Saviour, the satisfaction our blessed Lord had paid for our sins, and the unity and communion of the church, which, *you say*, you have proved upon him, in the beginning of your defence." But I hope the impartial reader is satisfied, that all your proofs fall very short of your pretensions; prove indeed nothing, but a mind evidently prejudiced against all Mr. *Locke* says. And where you suffer it to be so warmly transported, as farther to assume, "That therefore, if he was not an atheist or a deist, he was at least a free-thinker, in the ill-acceptation of that word;" you must excuse me, if I am moved to say, it is a *scandalous slander*, unworthy of an answer! Nor does it need one, since Mr. *Locke's* sincere piety, and reverence for the sacred Scriptures, are sufficiently known to be his defence against so gross a calumny.

I may likewise, with good assurance, acquit him of having *denied* those great and important articles, just mentioned; since you, with all your zeal and prejudice about you, with all your resolution to make

make a heretic of him, with all the pains you have been at to ransack and scrape together, whatever you imagined had a tendency that way; even you have not been able to produce one passage, where he denies any one of those articles; but have been indebted to conjectures of his private thoughts, insinuations, consequences, and implications, upon fallacious grounds, with such like, for all that you call proofs, that he denied them. As to the article of the satisfaction in particular, it has been made plainly appear from his writings, that tho' he has not used the *word*, he was so far from denying, that he fully asserted the doctrine. And tho' he did indeed deny the resurrection of the *same body*, in the Bishop of Worcester's sense, to be an *article of faith*, yet you see I have even ventured to say, that he did not deny the *truth* of that doctrine. You tell me, that I may *with as good assurance* say this, as that he did not deny those other articles; and in that I agree with you, but with this difference, that he has denied nothing at all of those others, as of this last he has denied, that it is so plainly delivered in Scripture, as to be made an article of faith.

In your next paragraph, I am haughtily reprimanded for having said, that I could not, without *indignation*, see the resurrection of the *same body* ranked with the most important articles of the *Christian faith*; an expression, which you think too *hot*, and that perhaps so heated you, that you could not censure it with common decency. *Insolence, impudence, detested malice, and arrogance*, are terms indeed too *hot* for arguments of reason and religion. Besides, Sir, when you tell me, that "a man, who defends only an uncommon and new opinion, ought to do it with modesty; but a man, who defends an heresy, with whatever indignation he may see himself opposed, ought in prudence to let no such hot expressions drop from him;" you

374 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

should have considered, that I did not look upon the opinion I was defending as either *new* or *uncommon*, much less as an *heresy*: Nor was the *indignation* raised for seeing *myself* opposed, (for I could not be opposed, before I had declared my sentiments) but for seeing a *question of curiosity* equalled with articles of faith. And that expression may perhaps, by cooler judges, be thought no transgression against *prudence*, or *modesty*, even on a less occasion.

“ But I go on, as you tell me, in this heat very
 “ magisterially to draw up a summary view of this
 “ doctrine of the resurrection of the same body:
 “ As if I had proved, or were capable of proving,
 “ any one of the characters, which I there give of
 “ it to be true.” I profess, Sir, I see nothing *magisterial*, or any marks of *heat* in that summary; but I now *humblly* beg leave to tell you very *coolly*, that I am much mistaken, if I have not proved every one of the characters I there gave of it to be true. That it is *doubtful in its meaning*, and *variously understood*, has, I think, been made appear, by producing three or four different, nay *contrary* senses of it. That it is *not determined clearly by the Scriptures*, I have likewise endeavoured to shew. And I believe it would be hard for you to say, which of the senses of *same body* the Scriptures have clearly determined for the resurrection body. Tho’ you tell us, that
 “ it is partly delivered to us in the express words,
 “ and partly deduced from the clear and natural
 “ sense of the Scriptures,” you will scarcely pretend to determine, whether it is a body consisting of precisely the same particles, and no other; or that has only what you call a vulgar sameness, or what other kind of sameness is thus delivered in, or deduced from Scripture; and how the resurrection of the *same body* can be there *clearly* delivered, if neither those words are there, nor any *determinate sense* of those words, is beyond my comprehension.

From

From this the other characters will follow of course, as well as from the nature of the doctrine, for if it is not clearly determined in Scripture, it must be, because it is *of little importance to be delivered, and that all the great ends of religion in the article of the resurrection are sufficiently secured without it.* But the most, that the Scriptures seem to have clearly intimated, is, that there shall be *a body raised from the old one*; and this is not sufficient to make it an article of faith, that the body raised shall be the *very same* with that, which was laid down.

Those, who in the earliest times asserted this doctrine, understood by it, that all the same particles of matter, that had been once united to the soul, should be collected again, to make up the resurrection body; and this was believing in reality *the resurrection of the same body.* But difficulties having been started upon this doctrine in succeeding ages, several suppositions have been made to avoid them; as that there may be an *original stamina*, which containing all the solid parts and vessels of the body may continue unchanged; or an *insensible seminal principle*, like that, which is observed to be in every grain of corn, which at the resurrection may unfold itself in its proper form; or, as you have now supposed, that a precise sameness of particles is not necessary, but only a *vulgar sameness.* By any of these *suppositions*, (for they are not pretended to be any thing more) the difficulties are indeed removed, and probable hypotheses proposed; but those, who account for the resurrection of the *same body* by any of these explanations, whilst they zealously contend for the *word*, have lost the *thing*; for a body formed by any of these ways, tho' it is properly *a body raised from that*, which was formerly united to the soul, yet it is not that *very same visible and sensible body*, in which it lived, and which was deposited in the grave. Let it be likewise observed,

376 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*

that those, who do ever so firmly believe any of those suppositions, are just in the same uncertainty, that Mr. *Locke* was, of what *particles of matter* the resurrection body shall consist: And that he did, as much as they, believe, that it should be, tho' a new kind of body, yet formed or raised from the old one, changed from the remains of flesh and blood, corrupted in the grave, as has been made evident from his notes on 1 *Cor.* xv. 44.

And therefore, when you say, "That whatever high flown opinion I, and some friends of his, may entertain of him, yet while he obstinately denied the resurrection of the body, and of the same body, and seems to be in such an uncertainty of mind concerning it; you will have the resolution to think, that he was an heretic in the article of the resurrection, and might possibly entirely disbelieve it!" When you tell us this, I say, you must allow us to admire more the strength of your resolution, than that of your *reason* or *candour*. For he was so far from *obstinately denying* the resurrection of the body, that he no where ever denied it at all; and whilst he denied the *identity* of the resurrection body to be an *article of faith*, he believed the same things of it, that others do, who maintain it; which has been plainly shewn in these papers. Nor was he in any uncertainty concerning it, but of that, which you yourself own is not necessary to be known, or to be believed; and which therefore you might allow me to call a *question of curiosity*. For tho' you say, that the resurrection of the *same body* is not such, "but a truth revealed by God in the Scriptures, and consequently a necessary article of the *Christian faith*;" yet you do not pretend, nay you absolutely deny, that God has revealed what *precise particles of matter* that *same body* shall consist of; which (as I have fully made appear)

is

is all that Mr. *Locke* denies to be an article of faith, or that I have called a question of curiosity. And now, Sir, that I have gone through all the particulars of your arguments and objections, upon the whole it plainly appears, that neither Mr. *Locke*, nor I, have opposed an article of faith, and that all the heavy charge against him of heresy in the doctrine of the resurrection, and against me of being scandalously engaged in defence of notorious heresy, is founded solely on a contention about words. This I indeed think in itself not worth dispute; and yet have (as you observed before, and may more justly now) disputed a great deal about it. But my reason for so doing I had told you in my letter: it is not the importance of the question, whether the body raised shall be the very same, or not, (which would bear little dispute, if all parties were agreed in the sense of the term *same body*) but the vast importance of not submitting to have a word imposed, as a doctrine of faith, which seems to carry such a determinate sense with it, as even the most zealous maintainers of the doctrine confess is not determined in Scripture. By which imposition, those, who understand the term *same body*, to signify the same numerical particles, (as it ought to be, and was understood by the first assertors of the doctrine) and in that sense alone, deny it to be an article of faith, will fall under the charge of heresy, for not believing what the modern assertors of *same body*, who have given a different sense to the word, freely own is not necessary to be believed; tho' they will by no means part with the term. Thus many sincere Christians will be condemned with Mr. *Locke*, for heretics and infidels in the article of the resurrection, who never suspected themselves liable to such a charge, who firmly believe the resurrection of the dead, and all that the Scriptures have declared, concerning the body, with which they shall come.

378 *Vindication of the Controversy, &c.*

If after all that has been said, you are still resolute not to be convinced, that this is doing a *great wrong*; yet my pains will not be wholly lost, if others, more open to conviction, perceive the injustice and groundlessness of your accusations. However I am as much resolved as you, that you shall have no more trouble of this nature from,

Rev. Sir,

Your, &c.

First printed in the Year 1743.

REMARKS

UPON SOME

Writers in the Controversy

CONCERNING THE

Foundation of MORAL VIRTUE

A N D

MORAL OBLIGATION;

Particularly the

Translator of Archbishop King's *Origin of Evil*,

A N D T H E

Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses*.

To which are prefixed,

Some *Cursory Thoughts* on the Controversies concerning *necessary Existence*, *The Reality and Infinity of Space*, *The Extension and Place of Spirits*, and on Dr. *Watt's Notion of Substance*.

First printed in the Year 1743.

PREFACE

I have to state, that in the preparation and publication of the translation and notes of the notes on Aristotle's Organon, I have been much assisted by the kindness of several friends, who have been much more concerned to find, than one, who generally seems inclined to do justice to all the authors he has occasion to mention, should have a generally against one of the greatest lights this age has produced; a divine, whose writings are universally allowed (except on one point of great depth and difficulty) to convey the clearest and strongest convictions of the most important truths of religion, that solid reasoning, and the most judicious explanations of Scripture can give, to all sober and rational enquirers. To what then can be imputed that remains able bias against this great man in so candid a writer? I would not suppose a too partial regard for the answerer of the opposition against him, whole figure in the learned world has drawn many rash adventures to engage on his side, though few, I am persuaded, of the weight and discernment of the author of the notes. All personal regards ought undoubtedly to be laid aside, in discussions of such importance, as the ultimate foundation of Moral Science, and of Moral Obligation; and

P R E F A C E.

I Have so great an esteem of the judgment and penetration of the translator, and author of the notes on Archbishop *King's Origin of Evil*; and have received so much light from him on several subjects, that I am sorry to be obliged to differ from him on any. But I am much more concerned to find, that one, who generally seems inclined to do justice to all the authors he has occasion to mention, should shew a *partiality* against one of the greatest lights this age has produced; a divine, whose writings are universally allowed (except on one point of great depth and difficulty) to convey the clearest and strongest convictions of the most important truths of religion, that solid reasoning, and the most judicious explications of Scripture can give, to all sober and rational enquirers. To what then can be imputed that remarkable bias against this great man in so candid a writer? I would not suppose a too partial regard for the *eminent head* of the opposition against him, whose figure in the learned world has drawn many rash adventurers to engage on his side, though few, I am persuaded, of the weight and discernment of the author of the notes. All personal regards ought undoubtedly to be laid aside, in questions of such importance, as the ultimate foundation of *Moral Virtue*, and of *Moral Obligation*; and

as the following remarks on that debate were at first drawn up only for my own use, though now thought fit to be made publick, I hope they may be excused, however different from the notions of some, for whose superior abilities I have not the less deference.

I have not meddled with the comparison of *moral* and *positive* duties, which first occasioned this controversy; because I think, if it be well proved, that the obligation to *moral* virtue is ultimately founded on the *eternal and immutable nature of things*, that will go a great way in deciding where the preference should be laid: and more especially, because I think our Saviour himself has determined that point with such exactness, as might well have superseded all arguments upon it.

On the more abstruse controversies concerning *necessary existence*, and the reality of *space*, the *extension* and *place* of spirits, and the nature of *substance*, I am only an enquirer; in order to which, a few cursory thoughts are prefixed to the principal subject of these papers. If they are thought late in appearing, after the books, to which they relate, have some years been published, let it be considered, that the most noted authors may be long unknown to those, who live in remote parts of the country, who, whenever they meet with them, will at all times think they have a right to examine subjects of universal concernment, and which can never be out of date.

REMARKS

ON SOME WRITERS ON MORALITY.

*Remarks on some passages in the translator's
Notes upon Archbishop King's Origin of Evil.*

Of necessary existence.

THIS seems a subject of too abstruse a nature for human understandings to determine upon decisively; but I venture to make a few remarks upon the dispute, as it has been managed in the late opposition to Dr. Clarke; and must premise, that it obliges them to contend against all proofs from reason of the unity of God, as well as against the *eternal immutable nature* of things; both which have been esteemed essential foundations of natural religion.

I shall next observe, that it is somewhat unfair in the author of the notes to affirm*, that the reason, for which necessity of existence was first introduced, was to exclude a *difference of persons* in

384 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

the divine nature; since he could not be ignorant, that Dr. *Clarke*^b, in that very place, where he first introduced the notion of necessity of existence, from whence he deduces the *unity of God*, does expressly assert, that a *diversity of persons* in that one and the same nature is not inconsistent with it; and that there is no argument, by which it can be proved impossible, or unreasonable to be supposed.

This writer farther urges^c, that “ necessity of existence being, as Dr. *Clarke* contends, simple and uniform, should exclude all difference or variety of any sort; and may exclude all diversity of perfections in the divine nature, for the *very same reason*, that it does exclude a *difference of persons*.” But who has given *any reason*, why it must exclude a difference of persons? The Doctor affirms, that no reason can be given for it, and has professedly proved a diversity of attributes, or perfections, to be essentially in God, as this author himself owns. The unity Dr. *Clarke* contends for, and which he thinks necessity of existence proves, ^d is a unity of *nature* or *essence*: the variety he excludes, is a difference of *natures*, such a variety, as appears to be in all the things of the world, which are distinguished one from another by a diversity, not only of *modes*, but also of *essential attributes*.

The author of the notes likewise asserts^e, that “ necessity of existence must exclude that perfect liberty, or absolute freedom of choice, which is a property of God, as well as of man.” But I can see no manner of repugnance between these two, any more than there is between man’s being determined to existence by the will of God, and yet having a perfect liberty, or freedom of choice. Why must the same principle, that is the ground

^b Demonst. of the Being and Attrib. of God. ^c P. S. and Note 10. ^d Demonst. Prop. vii. ^e Note 10.

of the existence of any being, be the ground of all that being's actions or determinations? Necessitated to *exist*, and necessitated to *act*, are very different ideas, and seem no way consequent one of the other. But "if we cannot admit it in one case, says he, why should we in the other?" Answ. *Because it would be an imperfection in the last case, but is not so in the former.*

As to the question itself, whether the divine being exists by an *absolute necessity*, or without any cause, ground, or reason of his existence, it is a point of too great difficulty for me to determine on either side; but I shall venture to set down such reflections, as occur to me on both.

That the most perfect being, the cause of all other beings, should itself exist without any ground or reason at all of existence, is a supposition, that leaves in a considering mind such a void, as it cannot easily be satisfied with. Could the first cause possibly exist by mere chance? Then it might possibly never have existed. If it existed without any reason, it might *without reason* have existed but a day before the present phenomena; and may, without reason, cease to exist in any time to come. And how, upon this supposition, can those be confuted, who affirm, that the material world, and every existing substance, was eternal, *absolutely without any ground or reason of existence*? If some one thing can exist absolutely without any reason, why not every thing? 'The author of the notes argues upon this subject, "that
"there was a time, when all beings, except one, were
"indifferent to existence, or non-existence, were
"nothing; and that for them to be determined to
"existence, is a *change*, which cannot be effected
"without a cause; whereas in eternal existence there
"is no change, no effect, and therefore, no cause
"wanted." But this, instead of being an answer

Rem. c.

to the followers of *Spinoza*, would be a plain begging the question, since they maintain, that the universe has existed eternally, *absolutely without any cause or reason of existence*; and I see not how they can be confuted by those, who affirm the same of God. If the most perfect of all beings, can be conceived to exist absolutely without any ground or reason at all, how can we determine what may or may not be without reason? In short, may we not more justly say of *this*, what our author says of *necessity*? "It is
 " in truth such a vague equivocal principle, that it
 " will be hard to affirm positively what it may, or
 " may not do."

On the other hand, *necessary existence* seems to give the mind something more satisfactory to rest on: if the first cause is necessarily existent, it must have always existed, and cannot possibly cease to exist: And not only *eternity*, but several other attributes, are deducible from this principle, as *im-mensity, unity, &c.* whereas from existence without any cause or reason, nothing seems to be certainly deducible. The author of the notes affirms indeed, that there may be *two or more* necessarily existing independent beings; but I think he has not proved it, nor answered what Dr. *Clarke* alledges to shew, that such a supposition implies a plain contradiction.

However, it must be confessed, that there is a great difficulty attends the notion of *necessity*, considered as a ground or reason of the existence of the first cause, since the existence must be coetaneous with the supposed reason of it. Nothing can be really antecedent in the order of nature, (whatever it may be in the order of our ideas) to an eternal being. The author of *An impartial enquiry of the being and attributes of God*, who allows the first cause to be necessarily existent, yet requires some ground of that necessity, which ground is, as he asserts, *the perfection of the divine nature*. Some perhaps will be apt to require another ground for that; but which
 ever

ever part we take, the difficulty seems no way removed. Whether we suppose *perfection* the ground of necessary existence, or found the existence on an *absolute necessity*, still the perfection, the necessity, and the existence must be *coetaneous*, how then can we conceive either of them antecedent to the other, so as to be the reason of the necessity, or of the existence?

But may we not perceive, that the first cause must exist by some *internal necessity* of its own nature, so that it was not possible for it not to have existed, tho' the *manner* how this is, be above human comprehension? Do we not allow *necessity of existence* in the divine being, when we suppose, that it cannot be destroyed, even by his own omnipotent will, that can annihilate all other things? Why then may he not have existed by the same *necessity* from all eternity, whatever it is, or whencesoever it arises? But if we can perceive such a necessity of the divine existence, *the perfection of his nature* seems most reasonably to be supposed the ground of it, or rather to be itself the same with that *absolute necessity*.

The author of the notes argues, that necessity is a term merely relative, and that no ideas can possibly be fixed to these terms, *necessity absolute in itself*. The same he says of *truth*, that truth is relative, and all such phrases as *true in itself*, *absolutely such*, &c. are very absurd ones. I should be glad to know, what this gentleman thinks of self-evident truths, such as are no way deduced from any other truths, neither require, nor will admit of any proof. Can they be said to be *relative*? or would it be any absurdity, to say of them, that they are *true in themselves*? For instance, may not this proposition *I exist*, be said to be, by every one that affirms it, true in itself, or absolutely true? Most of our knowledge indeed is acquired by a deduction of one truth from another, and therefore, most of the truths we are acquainted

388 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

with, may be called relative, with respect to our manner of discovering them, tho' many of them may be in themselves *absolutely true*. Thus we deduce the existence of an independent being from the existence of dependent beings; but when we have demonstrated this truth to ourselves, by a deduction from other known truths, we may then perceive, and without absurdity affirm, that it was always true in itself, absolutely true, that this independent being existed from all eternity, when there was no other being but himself.

And may not something like this be the case of relative and *absolute necessity*? We perceive, that the first cause must necessarily have always existed, from the absurdities, that would follow the contrary supposition. This is indeed a *consequential necessity*, which infers nothing of the *modus* of the divine existence: but may not this lead us to see, that there must be some *absolute necessity* in the divine nature itself, which made it impossible, that he should ever not have existed, or that he should ever cease to exist, tho' the manner or ground of this necessity surpasses our comprehension? Perhaps it would be no less difficult for an unprejudiced mind to conceive, that we should be forced to allow the *necessity* of an eternal existence, (tho' only a consequential one) and yet that there may be no cause, reason, ground, or absolute necessity at all of that existence. O! eternal being, who can speak without error of thy incomprehensible nature, unless enlightened by thee!

Remarks on the Notes by Archbishop King's Translator concerning Space, &c. With a digression on Dr. Watts's Notion of Substance.

THOSE, who maintain the real existence of space, seem to me to have given great advantage to their adversaries, by calling it *extension*; which being a term,

term, that stands for an abstract idea, they have taken occasion from thence, to treat of space as such, as having no existence but in the mind. Mr. *Locke*, in asserting the reality of space, might, I think, have denied it to be the same with extension, for the same reason, that he denies *matter* to be so; for that cannot be the same with either, which may be predicated of both; and it may be said of space as well as of matter, that it is extended, which would be nonsense to say of extension itself. Space I take to be one of the particulars, from whence that general idea is abstracted.

The learned writer ^h quoted by the translator, owns, that the idea of space is not the idea of extension, but of *something extended*; yet he will have it to be nothing more, than an *ideal substratum* of extension. "When the mind, he says, has been considering the idea of extension, abstracted from extended bodies; it is a very easy step to frame an *imaginary substratum* to support an imaginary extension." But this seems to me a very *imaginary* account of our getting the idea of this extended something. I rather think we have that idea before we have any of extension in general, or are capable of abstracting: Nor does the mind frame it to itself; it is an idea early obtruded upon it by the senses, and unavoidably perceived by it, as something without itself. This is all the proof we have, that matter is any thing really existing without the mind; and if the translator will not admit of this evidence in behalf of space, but ⁱ require some other proof, that it is more than *mental*, he may be in a fair disposition entirely to embrace Bishop *Berkeley's* scheme, to deny, that there is any such thing as *matter* or motion but in idea. We cannot well conceive motion to be possible without space; so that if bodies are allowed really to exist and move, space will not easily be discarded. We should methinks admit or

^h Note 3. ⁱ See P. S. p. 12.

reject them all together; and to say the truth, the arguments against the reality of each of them seem much of the same kind; they serve rather to puzzle than to convince.

The only ground I can apprehend for denying the real existence of space, is, that we know not in what class of beings to place it. And indeed Dr. *Watts*, who has with great ingenuity discussed all the several opinions about it, seems at last to determine space to be *nothing*, chiefly because he cannot find out what kind of being it is. But sure our ignorance of its nature is no sufficient reason to exclude from existence a thing, which so forces itself upon the mind, that we cannot annihilate it even in imagination. It is enquired, whether space is a substance or a mode? If a substance, whether spirit or body? But how are we assured, that this is an adequate division of being? "Who has told us (as Mr. *Locke* asks ^k) that there was, or could be nothing but solid beings, which could not think, and thinking beings, that were not extended? which is all that is commonly meant by body and spirit." To this question I have met with no answer, but (if that may serve instead of it) a great exclamation against *Cassendus*, quoted from *Bayle*, by the author of the notes ^l, where it is said, that to avoid asserting, that a vacuum is nothing, he chose rather to plunge himself "into the *hideous abyss* of conjecturing, that all beings are not either substances or accidents; and that all substances are not either spirits or bodies; and of placing space among the beings, which are neither corporeal or spiritual," &c. Whether all beings must be divided into substances or accidents, I shall not here enquire; but as to the other part of the conjecture, I see no absurdity in supposing, that there may be other substances, than either spirits or bodies. Why is this thought such a *hideous abyss*, but that

^k Philosoph. Essays. ^l Note 6.

the learned are afraid to suppose there may be any thing in nature that they are ignorant of? For my part I am inclined to take the hint from *Gassendus*, and venture to propose a consideration, which may perhaps serve to confirm his conjecture.

It has been observed by the curious, and beautifully described by Mr. *Addison* and Mr. *Locke*, that in the scale of beings, there is such a gradual progress in nature, that the most perfect of an inferior species comes very near to the most imperfect of that, which is immediately above it: that the whole chasm in nature, from a plant to a man, is filled up by such a gentle and easy ascent, that the little transitions from one species to another are almost insensible: That if the scale of beings rises by such a regular progress so high as man, we may, by a parity of reason, suppose, that it still proceeds gradually through those beings, that are of a superior nature to him; that there is no manner of chasm left, no link deficient in this great chain of beings.

Now according to this observation, which is apparent through all the known works of God, and by a parity of reason presumed of those above our knowledge, there should be in nature some being to fill up the vast chasm betwixt body and spirit; otherwise the gradation would fail, the chain would seem to be broken. What a gap betwixt *senseless material*, and *intelligent immaterial substance*, unless there is some being, which, by partaking of the nature of both, may serve as a link to unite them, and make the transition less violent? And why may not space be such a being? Might we not venture to define it, *an immaterial unintelligent substance, the place of bodies, and of spirits, having some of the properties of both.*

I should think, that space might be more fitly called the *place of spirits*, than, as Dr. *Clarke* has termed it, the *place of all ideas*, which, the author of the notes believes, few besides the doctor can apprehend.

But whatever may or may not be apprehended of the place of *ideas*, to suppose, that *spirits are in no place*, seems to me utterly inconceivable, by whatever subtle or plausible arguments it may be maintained. Dr. *Watts*^m has supported this notion with all his force, whose candour in representing the side he opposes, and modesty in defending his own opinion, are very insinuating. But all his reasonings on this point amount, I think, to nothing but *difficulties*, that seem to follow from allowing spirits to be in a place, as that they must be *extended*, and if so, they must have some *shape or figure*, and consequently be *divisible*. These consequences follow indeed from supposing spirits to be extended in the same manner that bodies are; but may not beings, of whose nature we have but a partial knowledge, have some other kind of extension, consistent with that indivisibility, which we suppose essential to thinking substances? Is not space an instance of extension, or expansion, without figure or divisibility, to those, who allow it any being? However, we are not to reject what is *clear*, for the sake of *difficulties*, that may be raised against it. The learned know, that there are insuperable objections against demonstrable truths; and perhaps there are few truths more clear and evident than this, that whatever has a real existence must exist *somewhere*; nor does any difficulty or inconsistency appear greater to me, than the supposition of any being really existing, yet existing *no where*. This authorⁿ argues, that tho' a body cannot be without being somewhere; yet a spirit, which is a conscious and active power, may have a real existence, and yet have *no proper place*. i. e. as he explains it, have *no proximity of situation to bodies, or fill up no supposed dimensions of space*. This qualifying expression, *no proper place*, which the doctor often uses, seems to me to imply, that he supposes spirits to be in a

^m Essay vi. ⁿ Ibid. Sect. iv.

place after *some manner* or other; and I would ask him, whether he can really conceive, or have any idea of a *conscious active power*, exerting its consciousness and activity, or even barely existing, without being somewhere, any more than he can conceive a body to be, without being somewhere? Should we allow him, that spirits have no proximity of situation to bodies, (a subject, which he has curiously enlarged upon, but is too far out of my way to engage in) yet I would farther enquire, whether he can possibly conceive, that they have no proximity of situation, or distance, with respect to one another? Can he suppose, that a human soul, as soon as it is free from the prison of the body, and finds itself in the world of spirits, is in that moment equally present to all the myriads of spirits, that may exist in the universe? That it can communicate its thoughts to them all in that instant, and receive communications from the whole creation of spirits at once? This surely would be to make them infinite, which, he justly says, *we know they are not*. If then finite spirits cannot be present to all of their kind at once; if they can communicate their thoughts only to some limited number at a time, what ground can we conceive of such a limitation, but that they are nearer to and farther from some spirits than from others? And that, I think, implies being in a *place*. The manner, how spirits *possess place*, we are undoubtedly ignorant of, and may content ourselves so to be, till we enter into the world of unbodied minds. But when we venture to affirm, that they are *no where*, I fear we go beyond our clear and distinct perceptions; as this ingenious author^o owns we are in danger of doing, when we endeavour to turn from sensible ideas. I should be apt to think, with Mr. Locke^p, that spirits must possess a place, so as to exclude any of the same kind from it, other-

* Essay vi. Concluf. P. In his chap. of ident. divers. Sect. 2.

wise all distinction between them must be lost. To this Dr. *Watts* ⁹ answers, that every spirit is sufficiently distinguished from all others, by its particular cogitations and consciousness. But I cannot see how the particular consciousness of any being can distinguish it from others, to any but itself. But to return to the author of the notes.

This learned writer asserts, that "space and spirit, and the distinct properties of each, appear to him as distant and incompatible, as the most remote and inconsistent things in nature; and an *extended soul* seems just such another phrase, as a *green sound*," &c. Yet a few lines after he owns, that it is perhaps impossible for us to imagine any such thing as an *unextended substance*;" which is, I think, not very consistent with the former assertion. If it is as impossible for us to imagine an *unextended soul* or substance, as it is impossible to imagine the colour of a sound, then it should rather follow, that an *unextended soul* must seem just such a phrase as a *green sound*, since they both express things, of which we can have *no idea*. This judicious writer frequently blames others, for going beyond their ideas for knowledge: why does he go beyond his ideas, or why would he have us do so, in this case? I confess I see no reason for it, extension not seeming to me inconsistent with indivisibility, the allowed property of thinking beings. A simple un compounded, therefore indivisible, yet extended substance, carries with it no contradiction, that I can perceive; and if ascribed even to the deity himself, as some have done, I should apprehend no inconvenience in it, provided the properties belonging to compound finite substances, be excluded from the idea.

If the author of the notes should admit of my conjecture, that there must be some being to fill up the vast chasm betwixt body and spirit, for the sake

of that beautiful gradation, which he makes so good use of, to confirm an argument of Bishop King's; I fear he would scarce allow, that *space*, which he treats of as a mere nothing, may possibly be such a being; much less would he admit it for the *place of spirits*; since he, as well as Dr. Watts, contends, that spirits are in *no place*: Nor would either of them, I suppose, allow, of an immaterial being, without the *power of thinking*; for, according to the author of the notes, "the substance of spirit consists in the powers of thinking and acting; the aggregate of the properties of any being is the being itself." But if thinking is the *action* of spirits, as it is acknowledged to be, even by those, who contend, that it is their very substance; how is it possible to conceive, that the actions of a being are the being itself? Dr. Watts likewise maintains, that a *power of thinking is the substance of spirit*; that this is sufficient to support all the properties of spirit, and that therefore there is no need of supposing any other *unknown* subject of them. On this point he is very large; and tho' it does not directly relate to that which I am upon, he has several passages, that incline me to go a little out of my way, to take some notice of them.

This author argues, that if a *power of thinking* be only a mere mode or property, then it may be destroyed, and yet the substance will remain: but destroy *thinking power*, and nothing at all remains; *we have no idea left*. We have *no idea* left indeed of what remains, unless the obscure one of something, to which that power did belong. But does it follow, that therefore nothing can remain? If there is ground, from reason and the nature of things, to conclude, that a power of thinking cannot subsist of itself, but must be the property of some being; our ignorance, or having *no idea* of what the substance

of that being is, will not hinder it from remaining, if God should think fit to take from it the power of thinking. Logical ways of speaking, to which this ingenious author imputes our prejudices against allowing a power of thinking to subsist without a subject, seem, in this case, forms of speaking founded on reason and truth; for what idea can we frame of a *power*, without supposing some being, to which it belongs? What is a *power of thinking in perpetual act*, but an ability or capacity perpetually exerted? And how can this be conceived, but as the property and action of some being, that exerts its ability, and therefore must be distinct from it. I do not find myself so prejudiced by logical or grammatical ways of speaking, but that I could easily agree with this author, that *solid extension* may possibly be the very substance, or only *substratum* of all the properties of *matter*; I see nothing repugnant to reason in this supposition: But I cannot so well reconcile my reason to the notion, that a *power of thinking* may be the substance of spirit: actions and abilities (and I have no other idea of powers) seem unavoidably to imply some subject of them, some being, that exerts its powers in different ways of acting.

I confess myself ignorant indeed of what the substance of that being is, but cannot think *that* a sufficient reason to exclude it from existence, as this new philosophy would do, tacking properties and actions together, without any subject of either; somewhat unphilosophically, as it seems to me. Nor have I found any arguments from the maintainers of this new notion, that oblige me to alter the sentiments I had, when I formerly endeavoured to shew, from what we know of the human soul, that thinking cannot be the substance or essence of it, and that it may continue to *be*, though it should

^c Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay, printed in 1702.

Sometimes cease to *act*. It has long been my opinion, that, from our ignorance of the nature of things, or of their manner of acting, how they cease to act, or how they resume their actions, no other reasonable conclusion can be drawn, but of the narrowness of our understandings. This is a lesson I early learnt from Mr. *Locke's Essay*; and if others would make the same use of a work so adapted to teach us, where to set bounds to our pretences to knowledge, there would be no fear of the dangerous consequences Dr. *Watts* apprehends from admitting, with that great man, an *unknown substratum* of the properties of matter and of spirit. Is it suitable to our limited understandings to conclude, that because we know not what the substance of either is, therefore they may be the same? Is there not at least the same ground for the very contrary conclusion? But if we must argue about the *nature* of things, which we know not, let us form our reasonings from what we do know of them; let us rather conclude, that properties so essentially different as those of matter and spirit are, must certainly belong to substances as essentially different in themselves.

'Tis but too common, I confess, to frame an hypothesis, and even to establish the most important truths, upon the nature of things we are unacquainted with. And this is what Mr. *Locke* seems to me designing to *ridicule*; not the notion of *substance in general*, as Dr. *Watts* supposes, but forming arguments, and drawing conclusions from the *nature* of substance, which we are as ignorant of, as the *Indian* was of his unknown something, that supported the tortoise, &c. A design, which agrees very well with the title of the section, where he introduces that comparison. It is certain, Mr. *Locke* always allows, that there is a real ground in

* Substance and accident of little use in philosophy.

nature for our general notion of substance; as that, which supports all the properties, that we observe in different beings, and which we cannot conceive to subsist of themselves; and therefore I think he could never intend to ridicule that notion. Yet I do not see how his insisting on this *unknown something* should lead his readers (as this author apprehends) into a belief, that there is such a real being as *substance in general*, the common support of all the properties of particular different beings, unless his readers mistake what he says of *our idea* of substance to be meant of the *real nature* of substance; which, perhaps, is often the case, tho' these are very different things. The Bishop of Worcester seems to have fallen into that mistake; and I fear this author has done the same; for what he quotes from Mr. Locke's first letter to the bishop for his notion of a *general substance*, plainly relates to our *general idea* of substance, which is indeed *the same every where*; an abstract idea, in which all substances must agree, though in other respects they may be essentially different. *A real universal* cannot sure be deduced from his principles, who has sufficiently exploded that notion, and expressly maintains, that every real existence is particular: And individuals of all kinds he often speaks of, as particular *distinct substances*. He " treats it as no small absurdity to suppose, that substance, when applied to God, to created spirits, and to material beings, signifies the same thing, that is, the same in its *own nature*; though we are so far from having three distinct meanings of it, that we have but one common, and that a *confused obscure idea*, not of what it *is*, but of what it *does*. Yet, as unknown as he supposes the nature of substance to be, I cannot but think he has sufficiently obviated all the objections to that notion, and secured it from any

" Essay, Book II. Chap. xiii. Sect. 18.

unhappy consequences, by his clear demonstration, that the eternal mind cannot possibly be material; that no system of matter can of its own nature be capable of thinking; and that our certainty of the immortality of the soul does not depend upon our knowledge of what the substance of it is. And I am sorry to find, that the weight of these arguments did not give satisfaction to so candid and judicious a writer. But to return from this digression.

Among many eminent philosophers, Mr. *Locke*, in particular, as I just observed, has demonstrated, that the first cause of all things must be immaterial. He too maintains it to be in the highest degree probable, that the soul of man is also immaterial. grounding the possibility he supposes, that some systems of matter may have a power of perception and thought, tho' we cannot conceive how matter can be capable of it, solely on that omnipotent will, which, in uniting the human soul and body, has given them powers of acting on each other, which we can no more conceive how they can be capable of. Other learned men have professed to demonstrate, that *all thinking beings* must necessarily be immaterial; and we should in reason allow of their demonstrations, as agreeing with our best conception of things, so far as may be without limiting the divine omnipotence. But from the strongest proofs, that *all thinking beings* must be immaterial, it does not follow, that every immaterial being must think; thinking not being a necessary consequence of immateriality, for aught that can appear to us, till the new philosophy is better established than it yet seems to be, which would make a power of thinking and immaterial substance to be the same thing. The author of the *Enquiry into the nature of the human soul*, in diffusing immaterial beings through the whole sensible creation, (though he has much laboured to prove, that every being capable of perception must always actually perceive) has brought

brought them down to so low a degree of sensation or perception, according to the bodies they inform, so very near to none, that it seems but an easy step farther to imagine with me, some *immaterial* beings placed in such circumstances, as to have no perception at all; thus linking the *intelligent* and *material* world together by an easy gradation; into which class I would willingly introduce *space*, the subject from whence I have insensibly wandered.

Of infinite space.

Most of those, who have maintained the real existence of space, (perhaps all of them) have likewise asserted it to be *infinite*; and it may be thought a bold singularity to dispute it. But, as the translator of the *Origin of Evil* judiciously observes, the equivocal use of that word, by jumbling mathematics and metaphysics together, has occasioned a great deal of confusion in subjects of this kind; and, in regard to our ignorance of the extent of space, I think it is more fitly styled *indefinite*.

Some have ascribed a *positive* infinity to space; others only a *negative* one, which are very opposite things. If by the former Dr. *Clarke* meant a metaphysical infinity, *viz.* absolute perfection, to which nothing can be added, I see not how positive infinity, in that sense, can be applied to any thing but the deity and his attributes. The Doctor seems indeed to make infinite space something near a divine attribute, when he calls it "an *abstract idea of immensity*", which I confess I do not understand.

As to that other kind of infinity, which Mr. *Locke* has explained at large, and ascribes to space, that perpetual addibility or encreaseableness without end, it seems utterly inconsistent with being positively or absolutely infinite; and, according to my notions, that kind of negative infinity cannot, without a con-

tradiction be applied to any thing, that has a real actual compleat existence; and therefore I think it should not be ascribed to space, by those, who allow space to be a real particular being, and not a mere *idea*. *Negative infinity* can only be applied to *general abstract ideas*, as number, duration, extension, &c. which have no existence but in the mind. To those *ideas* we can always add indeed, without ever being able to come to an end; and *there is no great mystery in that*, as the author quoted by the translator observes*.

But it is not the power the mind has of enlarging its idea of extension *in infinitum*, that is the ground of ascribing infinity to space, as that author seems to suppose^y; for we have the same power of adding to number, and yet are not apt to think there is any such thing as a number actually infinite. The true reason, that has inclined so many great men to think, that space must be boundless, seems to be, that they cannot conceive what should set bounds to it; as Dr. *Clarke* and others have argued. 'Tis impossible, say they, since that would be to suppose space bounded by something, which itself occupies space, or else nothing, both which are contradictions; and Mr. *Locke* has reasonings, that tend to the same purpose. But these kind of arguments seem to me to prove nothing but the narrowness of our understandings. As I cannot conclude space to be *nothing*, because we know not *what* it is, neither can I conclude it to be *infinite*, because we are ignorant *what can set bounds to it*. May there not be many ways of setting bounds to space, that we know nothing of? It may be bounded by its own nature, or by the will of God, or by some kind of beings, that we are not acquainted with. In short, whatever *contradiction* may be supposed in setting bounds to space,

* Note 3.

^y *ibid.*

nothing can seem a more palpable one to me, than to imagine an actual real compleat being, which implies existing in all its parts together, and yet to be encreaseable without end, or absolutely boundless, an idea, as I think, utterly inconsistent with real existence.

O thou sole infinite being, *whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain!* how art thou hid in impenetrable darkness! or how short-sighted are we! and with what diffidence should we reason upon things, which thou hast placed out of our reach, when *that*, which some have thought to be the divine immensity, nay thy very essence, and to which most have ascribed infinity, is by others pronounced to be a mere *nothing!*

Remarks upon some writers in the controversy concerning the foundation of Moral Virtue, and Moral Obligation, particularly the translator of archbishop King's Origin of Evil, in his notes on that work.

THE translator of archbishop King, when he opposes in his notes those, who maintain the reason, nature, and fitness of things to be the foundation of virtue, and of moral obligation, seems to have forgot that due candour * himself recommends, of not always taking the words of writers on morality in the common acceptation, but in the sense we find they are used by the author we are reading. A little of this candour might have spared his cavilling at the word *fit*; for however it may be commonly applied, it is very evident, that the authors he opposes mean by it, *a suitableness of actions to the relations of things, and by fit or unfit in themselves,*

* Prelim. Dissert.

that this fitness or unfitness depends not on the will of any being, or on any reward or punishment annexed to them. When this is sufficiently explained to be the meaning of those expressions, it seems not very candid to cavil at them as solecisms, or an absurdity of language: and after all, whatever dispute there may be about the truth of their notion, can any words be found more proper to express what they contend for? That there is a moral fitness and unfitness in actions, resulting from the nature of things, antecedent to all positive appointment, and to any consideration of reward and punishment.

The defender of Dr. Clarke, as quoted by this author, in the ^a postscript to his notes, gives for instance on this subject, "that it is absolutely right and fit in itself, antecedent to any command, that a creature should reverence his creator. Where (says he) can be any absurdity in this proposition? Is not reverence from a creature to his creator suitable to the nature of each of them?"

To this the author of the notes answers, "It is suitable to the nature of the *first*, as productive of its happiness, and to that of the *second*, as agreeable to his will, who originally designed the happiness of his creatures, and therefore bound this and the like duties on them." Thus he resolves all moral fitness into *will* on the one hand, and interest on the other. But surely this is reversing the order of things. Should we not rather conclude, that reverence from a creature to his creator is therefore productive of happiness to the one, and agreeable to the will of the other, because suitable to their respective natures? If this were not so, if there was no fitness or suitableness in the thing itself, antecedent to the will of God, or the happiness it produces; then God might *originally* have

annexed the happiness of his creatures to their *irreverence* towards him, and *bound that as a duty upon them*. If this appears an absurd or impossible supposition, to those, who deny any antecedent fitness or unfitness in things, (as Dr. *Waterland*, and some other writers on his side, affirm such suppositions to be) 'tis a plain giving up their cause; for what absurdity can there be in that supposition, if the suitability of reverence from a creature to the creator depends solely on the creator's will, and the happiness he has made consequent upon it? Since, in that case, his willing the direct contrary would make *irreverence* as suitable to the nature of both.

The opposers of Dr. *Clarke*, who have of late introduced the doctrine of founding moral good and evil on the sole will of God, in order to establish *positive duties* on the same ground with *moral*, seem labouring to overthrow the most solid and immutable foundation of moral virtue, and even to take away our only certain criterion of the will of God, the *eternal immutable nature, and necessary relation of things*.

"We cannot (says the author of the notes,)
 "imagine these relations to be *strictly eternal*, or
 "independent of the will of God, because they
 "must necessarily presuppose a determination of
 "that will, and are in truth only consequences of
 "the existence of things proceeding from that de-
 "termination."

To this I answer, the necessary relations of all possible things are *strictly eternal*, as they are eternally perceived by the divine understanding to be unalterably what they are. This depends not on a determination of the will of God, tho' the bringing any possible nature, with its necessary relations, into *actual* existence, proceeds solely from that determination. This distinction the writers on the

† Remark i.

other

other side are very apt either *weakly* or *wilfully* to overlook, though a very obvious and a very important one in this controversy. Whether God will bring into actual existence a particular system of beings, of any determinate nature, depends undeniably on his sole will and pleasure; but whether that system of beings shall have such and such relations, from whence certain fitnesses and unfitnesses must result, depends not on his will, but on the nature of the beings he is determined to create. To suppose, that he may will them to have other relations, &c. is to suppose, that he may will them to be another kind of beings than he determined to create; for if they are the same, the relations and fitnesses resulting from their nature, are necessary and immutable.

This writer further adds, "much less can we apprehend how these relations, &c. *are to be chosen for their own sakes and intrinsic worth, or have a full obligatory power antecedent to any reward or punishment, annexed either by natural consequence, or positive appointment, to the observance or neglect of them; since the natural good or happiness consequent upon, and connected with, the observance of them, is to us their sole criterion, the argument and indication of their worth, the ground of all their obligation.*" And what then? There is nothing in this at all inconsistent with what Dr. Clarke maintains in those words quoted from him: he does not say, that those things are to be chosen, &c. antecedent to any *natural* good or happiness consequent upon them, but antecedent to any *reward or punishment* annexed to the observance or neglect of them, either by natural consequence, or positive appointment; and it sufficiently appears in many places of the Doctor's works, that *natural good* is to him the criterion of *moral good*, as it re-

* These are Dr. Clarke's words.

406 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

spects ourselves, or our fellow creatures; though *reward and punishment* is not. A distinction, which it is strange so penetrating a judgment should have been at a loss to *apprehend*.

But let it here be observed, that though the fitness of moral actions consists in their general tendency to produce natural good to the objects of them, yet there are particular cases, where the fitness remains, though no natural good should be consequent upon it. Respect to parents, gratitude to benefactors, are always fit in themselves, that is, have a rectitude in them, that makes them fit to be chosen, whether any benefit can accrue from them to either side or not. And in whatever regards our duties to the supreme being, *natural good* seems not at all the criterion of them: the object of them we are sure can receive no advantage by them; and I would ask those gentlemen, who assert ^d, that *nothing can be our duty, that is not our interest into the bargain*, whether reverence and gratitude to the creator would not always be the duty of a creature, though we should suppose him unalterably placed in a state of the utmost happiness he was capable of? Whether there is not a rectitude in such a behaviour, a fitness necessarily resulting from the relation he stands in to his maker and benefactor, which a rational mind must be *conscious* is his duty, though (as in the supposed case) there could be *no interest into the bargain*.

The author of the notes allows this conscious approbation and disapprobation, to be of itself both *rule and obligation*; but to make this consistent with his scheme of resolving all obligation into interest or private happiness, he ^e founds the obligation of moral sense upon the *uneasiness* we feel, when we neglect what it approves, or practise what it disap-

^d Turner, quoted by Author of the Notes in Rem. i. ^e *ibid*,

proves,

proves, as it makes our conformity to it necessary to our happiness. But the obligation seems plainly founded on the *approbation* itself: the uneasiness we feel upon the practice of any thing contrary to what moral sense approves, is a *consequence* of the obligation, not the *foundation* of it, and only shews, that we are conscious of being obliged to certain actions, which we cannot neglect without standing self-condemned; self-condemnation manifestly presupposing some *obligation*, that we judge ourselves to have transgressed.

But though Dr. *Clarke* and his followers maintain, that the *fitness of things*, and conscience or the *moral sense* (by which they never understand, nor would I be understood to mean, a blind instinct, but a consciousness consequent upon the perceptions of the rational mind) have in themselves an obligatory power, yet it must be allowed, and they as earnestly maintain, that the *will of God*, with the sanctions of his laws, can only enforce this obligation, so as to extend to all times and all cases. These therefore, as Mr. *Warburton*[†] judiciously observes, make a threefold cord, that ought never to be untwisted. The consideration of the *will of God* must necessarily be taken into all schemes of morality, as the author of the notes justly says; but an endeavour to establish it upon that alone, exclusive of the other principles, seems to me no less a defect in *some*, than the want of that has been in *many* of our modern systems.

Remarks on Note 53, in the second part of the
Origin of Evil, concerning the Foundation of
Virtue, and of Moral Obligation.

THIS large note has suggested some farther reflections on the foregoing subjects. 'Tis

[†] Divine Legation.

strongly urged, both by archbishop King, and in the notes by his translator, that it depended solely on the will of God whether he should create any world, and, among many possible worlds, which he should choose, there being no *best* among created things, that could absolutely determine him. All which, I think, is very justly argued, and solidly refutes Mr. Leibnitz's notion, of there being nothing equal or indifferent in nature. But I do not see how this at all affects the arguments of those, who maintain a fitness in things antecedent to the divine will; though the artful mingling this contest with the other, which has no dependance on it, casts a mist upon the subject that a little perplexes it. The defenders of this antecedent fitness, have no need of supposing, that the present system is *absolutely best*. There may be many possible, nay actually created worlds as good or perhaps better than this: each of these may have different systems producing different relations, and fitnesses resulting from them, which will be as eternal and immutable as those of our system are asserted to be; for the relations of all possible systems must be eternally in the divine mind, as the translator owns; they cannot therefore be dependent on will.

God is indeed perfectly free to choose, which of them he will bring into actual existence; but when he has fixed on any particular system, the relations and fitnesses resulting from it are necessary; and to act suitably to them, must be an immutable rule to that system of beings. To this reason, nature, and fitness of things, the divine will always conforms itself. God cannot, for instance, will, that pain shall be suitable, and pleasure unsuitable, to a sensible being; or that it shall be morally good to give causeless pain to such a being. Nor can he will the existence of innocent creatures on purpose to make them miserable; not because *this would be*

contrary

contrary to what he has willed already, (as this writer argues) or inconsistent with what he supposes to be the sole end of God's acting, viz. a communication of happiness; but because there is an *unfitness* in the thing itself, inconsistent with *rectitude*, and therefore morally evil. If there was no unfitness in this, if making creatures to be happy or miserable was indifferent in the nature of things, antecedent to the will of God, no reason can be given, why he may not change his will concerning them, or make *misery* instead of *happiness* the end of his acting. But let us suppose God to have had some other end in the creation, as the *exercise and manifestation of his power*; this end might be answered by making innocent creatures on purpose to be miserable: but can any one think this would be equally fit, right, and good, as to design them for happiness? And yet this must be the case, if the fitness or goodness of things depends merely on God's willing them, as Dr. Clarke's opposers maintain. But further; if this was so, if there was no essential difference in the nature of good and evil, we could never be certain, either that God would deal with us according to truth, justice, and the reason of things, (if upon that supposition there would be any meaning in those words) or that we ourselves were under any obligation of dealing equitably with our fellow creatures. He might decree us to eternal misery, merely to shew his sovereignty; or have a secret will contrary to his revealed one, as some upon this very principle have taught: So that we could neither know what we might expect from God, or what he required of us, by any kind of declaration, that he could make of his will; since, according to this notion, it would be no more *unfit from the nature of things*, that he should will to break his promise, and to deal de-

410 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

ceitfully with us, than that he should will to act with faithfulness, with equity, and veracity.

When the author of the notes finds himself pressed with the danger of this principle, of founding good and evil, and placing the obligation to virtue, on the mere will of God, he owns, that ^h *mere will* would of itself be no ground of obligation at all, and that *the will of God must not be separated from his other attributes*; which is, I think, giving up all that is contended for. The moral attributes of God, his goodness, justice, truth, and rectitude, are chiefly understood by us with relation to his dealings with his creatures, suitably to the nature he has given them, and to their demeanour in it. To say then, that the will of God *must not be separated* from these attributes, *i. e.* must be considered as determining itself agreeably to, or in conformity with them, is the same thing, in other words, with conforming itself to the reason, nature, and fitness of things.

What ill consequences this author ¹ apprehends, from founding moral obligation on the fitness of things, antecedent to any consideration of reward and punishment, (for which he has taken so much pains to oppose it) he has not been pleased to tell us: but the ill consequences of the contrary notions, of making good and evil depend upon *mere will*, and all obligation to virtue upon *private happiness*, are obvious enough, though he so earnestly contends for them. Upon his scheme, the Heathens, who considered not the law of nature as the will of the supreme being, and knew nothing of a future recompence, could have no obligation to virtue at all; and consequently could not be justly punishable for the neglect of it. The blessed in heaven, as we suppose them confirmed in unalterable bliss, can have no duties to perform; there can be no-

¹ *Ibid.*

¹ *Ibid.*

thing

thing fit or right for them to do, since they can have no advantage by it. But we have good reason to believe, that they are worthily employed in acts of gratitude to their creator, and of benevolence to his creatures, who in a lower or more imperfect state may need their assistance; and therefore we are taught to pray, that the will of God may *be done on earth as it is in heaven*. But what is worst of all, upon this scheme (as I had occasion before to observe) if there is nothing right or fit in itself, but only as it tends to the happiness of the agent, we could never depend upon being equitably dealt with by the deity, since he could receive no addition of happiness from it.

The author of the notes indeed supposes, that "God was always determined to pursue the best end, and by the best means: but why he is so determined, and in what sense this was *better* and *fitter for him*, who could receive no addition of happiness from it, I confess, says he, I do not understand." In truth, upon his principles, this is not only unaccountable, but must be very doubtful. There could indeed be no such thing as *best end*, or *best means*, nor any motive of action, to a perfectly happy being; which sufficiently shews, that the principle itself must be false. Whereas those, who maintain the *essential difference* of good and evil, right and wrong, and the immutable relations of things, as they were eternally in the divine mind, will easily understand, why a perfectly happy being, of infinite knowledge and power, who unerringly sees, what is in its own nature good, right, and fit, and can be under no influence to bias the rectitude of his will, should always determine himself to do what he perceives to have a goodness in it. Nor will they be at a loss to know, in what sense it is *better and fitter*, that such a being should pursue the best ends, should promote order, rectitude, and happiness; these things being necessarily approved, and

412 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

consequently objects of choice, to every rational mind, that is under no wrong influence.

And as the most perfectly happy being has thought it fit, right, and good to communicate happiness to his creatures, tho' himself could have no advantage by it; may it not seem to be a part of that image of God, in which he is said to have created mankind, that he has made us capable of taking delight in doing good to others, without any regard to our own interest? If it be said, that this *delight* is our reward for doing good, and that therefore our own happiness is the real end of our acting; let it be observed, that the delight of doing good is never the end in view. A benevolent agent has no other prospect, but the interest or happiness of another. The delight he finds in having obtained that end, is either the *consequence* of his benevolence, or of the approbation of his own mind, for having done what was right and fit; but in no case the motive of his acting.

Tho' the author of the notes will not allow, that there is any such thing as *disinterested benevolence* in nature, yet he owns*, that it is matter of fact, that there are great variety of instances of mens practising virtue, without knowing, that it tends to their own private happiness; nay even when it appears destructive of it. And he argues very justly against Mr. *Hutchinson*, that this is no proof, that the *moral sense and publick affections* (in his language) are mere *instincts* implanted in us, since they are all resolvable into *reason*, and are undeniably cultivated and improved, by making a right use of our faculties. But when he goes on to say, that "they are resolvable into reason pointing out private happiness; and that whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the association of ideas, and may properly enough be called habits," I

* Prelim. Dissert.

question whether this is reconcileable either to reason or matter of fact. There are many instances of benevolent affections; and a disinterested approbation of virtue, that cannot be accounted for by any supposed *association of ideas*; nor does reason direct a social creature to think, that there is nothing fit for him to aim at, but his own private happiness. On the contrary, right reason will inform him, that it is suitable to the nature of such a being, and worthy of approbation, to do all the good he can for others, whether his own advantage is included in it or not.

Mankind is a system of creatures, that continually need one another's assistance, without which they could not long subsist. It is therefore necessary, that every one, according to his capacity and station, should contribute his part towards the good and preservation of the whole, and avoid whatever may be detrimental to it. For this end they are made capable of acquiring social or benevolent affections, (probably have the seeds of them implanted in their nature) with a moral sense or conscience, that approves of virtuous actions, and disapproves the contrary. This plainly shews them, that virtue is the law of their nature, and that it must be their duty to observe it; from whence arises *moral obligation*, tho' the sanctions of that law are unknown; for the consideration of what the event of an action may be to the agent, alters not at all the rule of his duty, which is fixed in the nature of things. Thus, as St Paul tell us, *those who had not the law* (the revealed law) *were a law unto themselves*: the obligation of living suitably to a rational and social nature was plain; the consequence was to be trusted to the author of that nature.

Thus undeniably stood the cause of moral obligation, where revelation was not known. But our beneficent creator, foreseeing, that many would be drawn by irregular passions, to deviate from the rule of their duty, by which those, who steddily adhered

414 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

to it, would be liable to great disadvantages, determined, agreeably to his goodness and rectitude, to make suitable retributions in a future state; that no one should be finally a loser by obeying the law of his nature, or a gainer by transgressing it. This determination, it is plain, introduces no *new moral obligation*, in the usual sense of that word; and I see not why we should give up to this writer his *arbitrary definition* of it: on the contrary, the very notion of reward and punishment implies an *antecedent* duty or obligation, the conforming or not conforming to which, is the only ground of reward and punishment. These cannot, therefore, be the foundation of the obligation; tho' the translator supposes all obligation to arise solely from a prospect of them.

When God was pleased to declare to the world this his determination, in making known to mankind more explicitly, that the law of their nature was likewise *the will* of their creator, he brought them indeed under an *additional* obligation to observe it, obedience to his will being one of the principal fitnesses resulting from the nature and relations of things. But in declaring, that he would eternally *reward or punish* those, who obeyed or disobeyed, he gave them only a new *motive* to the performance of their duty, but no new *foundation* of it: the rule, and reason, and obligation of virtue remained as before, in the immutable nature and necessary relations of things.

At the end of this long note, the author asks, "What will become of the obligation, in cases where virtue fails to produce happiness, which must often happen in the present state?" for in such cases, according to his explication of the word, there can be no obligation. "To deduce one, continues he, from the prospect of a future reward, is having recourse to the *will of God* to supply defects: It is owning, that the obligation supposed to arise from the relations of things, is not in it-
" self

“ self adequate and indispensable, and seems to be
“ quite giving up that full obligatory power of
“ theirs, antecedent to any reward or punishment.”

But by what has been said above, the inconclusiveness of this reasoning may appear. Having recourse to the *will of God*, and the prospect of a *future reward*, is not to supply the *defects of the obligation*, but the defects of our strength and resolution to comply with it. The *right* of obliging may be full, the obligation indispensable, and yet there may be great need of assistance to our frailty, for the discharge of it in cases of severe trial. The prospect of future rewards and punishments is allowed to be the only motive suited to all capacities and conditions: And therefore, no divines have more strongly pressed the consideration of the will of God, and of future retributions, than those, who maintain a full obligatory power in the relations and fitness of things. Dr. Clarke, in particular, constantly insists on them, throughout all his admirable practical discourses; and very judiciously refutes the notion of those, who would depreciate the principle of practising virtue, with a view to future rewards, as mercenary or selfish.

The assurance of equitable retributions in another life is of too great importance to be neglected in any schemes of morality, where revelation is known: but to place all obligation to virtue solely on that, seems to be confounding the *sanctions* of a law with the *reasons and grounds* of it. To make *private happiness* the only foundation of moral obligation, as the author of the notes does, is, I fear, setting it on a principle, that, in case a future state is not known, or not attended to, would leave men free to every kind of profitable wickedness, that they could commit with impunity. Whilst, on the other hand, I see not how there can be any danger in asserting, that there is an indispensable obligation to virtue, founded on the nature, relations, and fitness of things; since that leads us to conclude, that it must be

416 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

be likewise the will of our creator, who gave us a nature, from whence such relations arise; and that himself will act suitably to those necessary relations; in every dispensation to his creatures through all eternity.

Remarks upon an Essay on Moral Obligation.

THE author of this *Essay*, who writes on Dr. *Waterland's* side, against a reply to his supplement, ¹ pretends, that *moral obligation*, as built upon the supposed fitnesses of things, must resolve at last into conscience, or the *moral sense*; and that the scheme of Dr. *Clarke* and his followers (which this author opposes) is no otherwise intelligible, but upon that supposition. On this account he has taken ^m a great deal of pains to confute the notion of an *innate moral sense*: a labour, that might well have been spared in opposing Dr. *Clarke*, since there cannot easily be imagined two schemes more different, than that of founding virtue and *moral obligation* on a *moral sense*, considered as an *innate instinct*, and that of founding them on the nature, reason, and relations of things. These are the objects of the understanding, and can only be apprehended by reasoning and reflection, not by sense, or a *blind instinct*. On what grounds then can this author be persuaded, that “if Dr. *Clarke* and his followers “had gone *deeper* in their enquiries, they must “have got to this *natural instinct or moral sense*.” This would indeed have been going much *lower*, if he means that by *deeper*. But “some of them, “says he, I know do readily grant it.” What do they grant, that the nature of virtue, or the obligation to practise it, is founded on a *moral sense*? If they grant this, they are no followers of Dr. *Clarke*, having intirely departed from his principles.

¹ P. 43.

^m P. 30.

But

But perhaps they may grant, that there is such a principle or faculty in man; for a *moral sense* or *conscience* (if these mean the same thing) is not inconsistent with their foundation of virtue, and *moral obligation*; nay, they may even maintain, that it has an obliging power; for Dr. *Clarke* has gone so deep in his enquiries as to tell us, that natural conscience is founded on the perception, that every rational mind necessarily has, of the natural and essential difference between good and evil. But 'tis sufficiently plain through all his works, that by conscience he does not mean a *blind sense or instinct*, but some principle or faculty, the operations of which depend on the judgment of the understanding.

That there is such a principle in man, whatever it be called, or whether innate or acquired, something that distinguishes between right and wrong, and condemns or approves of actions accordingly, is undeniable. Whether this is a faculty of the understanding, or any thing distinct, I presume not to determine; but am inclined to think the faculty *innate*, since it operates in some measure on all mankind, whether they will or will not: Though I allow it to be very evident, that the exercise of it, the manner of its exerting itself, depends upon custom, education, or whatever means and opportunities it has had of being informed; and agree with this writer, that "its determinations therefore can be no certain rule to act by, no solid foundation for morality." To which I add, nor can it possibly be admitted for such, by those, who with Dr. *Clarke* found morality on *the immutable nature of things*. But as this faculty is of great use, when duly informed, and rightly set on work, they may allow its proper place in their scheme. Their principle is not of the *excluding* kind; they readily admit whatever

can be of *additional* obligation, or assist to the practice of virtue. The will of God, the sanctions of his laws, benevolent affections, and the *moral sense*, have each their weight and importance with them. They leave to their opposers to exclude from having any thing to do with virtue, every principle, but their favourites, self-love and self-interest.

This author begins chap. iv. (in which he is to shew, that his adversary's scheme must resolve into an innate moral sense) with this preliminary remark: "'Tis very observable, says he, that the maintainers of this natural, necessary, or independent fitness of things and actions, have constantly declined letting us know, what they mean by *moral obligation*, except a synonymous term can be called a definition." But this seems to me a very groundless observation. Dr. Clarke and his followers use that term in the plain well known common acceptation of it: if they have not defined it, 'tis perhaps because they could find no words more clear or intelligible than itself. Nor have I met with any definition of it, that has not rather obscured it. A plain man, of an ordinary capacity, readily understands what is meant, when he is told, that he is *obliged* to do to every one as he would be done by: he apprehends that he *ought*, that it is his *duty* to do so. If these are *synonymous* terms, who can help it, when no other can be found to explain it better?

If it be said, that though a man may know *what* is meant by his being obliged to do a thing, that will not make him understand *why* he is so, or on what grounds he is under such an obligation; this is very true; but then this is not the defect imputed by the author of the *Essay* to the writers he opposes. He cannot pretend, that they have declined to let us know, what they understand by the *foundation* of moral obligation; for it is their plain declaration

clarations of that, which he so strenuously contends against. What is it then, that they have declined to do? Truly nothing, that I know of, unless it be an omission not to have put their *grounds* of moral obligation into a definition of the term, as their opposers do, and they might with as good reason have done. They might have told us, that by moral obligation they mean a necessity of action arising from the nature and relations of things; which would have been as just an explication of the term, as that, which Archbishop King's translator, and after him this author gives us, when they say, that by moral obligation they mean a necessity of action, arising from a prospect of obtaining happiness or avoiding misery. But in a controversy, about what is the true original ground of moral obligation, this would have been in them, as I take it to be in these authors, a plain *begging the question in debate*: An error, which did not fall in my way to take notice of, in my remarks on the translator's notes.

However, our present author gives us the reason, from whence he concludes, that he has hit on the true meaning of moral obligation. "Before it can be determined, says he, what can bring such a necessity upon an agent, as is consistent with perfect liberty, which *moral obligation* is supposed to do, it must first be known, what it is he would chuse or refuse as an intelligent free agent: and as it is self-evident, that to every *sensible* being happiness is preferable to misery, and consequently that happiness must be his choice, and misery his aversion, it is plain, that *moral obligation* can be founded upon this principle *only*."

This may be a true conclusion, if there are any intelligent free agents, that are to be considered as *sensible* beings *only*; but that seems to be a very partial consideration of *man*. He is a *rational* and *social* as well as a *sensible* being, and may, nay must be under some obligations as such. Let man be al-

lowed as a sensible being, to chuse natural or sensible good, and even to be under a *moral obligation* of so doing; but let him likewise be allowed in his other capacities to have other views, and to be under other obligations. A rational being ought to act suitably to the reason and nature of things: a social being ought to promote the good of others: an approbation of these ends is unavoidable, a regard to them implied in the very nature of such beings, which must therefore bring on them the strongest *moral obligations*. To ask, why a rational being should chuse to act according to reason, or why a social being should desire the good of others, is full as absurd, as to ask why a sensible being should chuse pleasure rather than pain. If such a question is to be answered, the answer will be the same in either case, these ends are to be chosen, because suitable to the nature of beings with such and such capacities. To act contrary to the reason, relations, and fitness of things, may not improperly be called the *pain* of rational beings. Vice would naturally be the *miser*, and virtue the *happiness* of such beings, if there was no reward or punishment appointed for them.

But this kind of refined happiness these writers seem to have no notion of. This, I presume, is not the happiness the author of the *Essay* has in view, when he tells us, "that in the case of moral ideas, to say it signifies nothing whether I am to be gainer or loser, seems to me to be *banishing morality* out of the world; as all the relation in moral ideas, that I can possibly discern, is the relation of certain actions to the agents happiness." If this gentleman cannot *possibly discern* the relation or fitness of gratitude to a benefactor, of fidelity to trust, of relief to a miserable object, unless the agent is to be a gainer by these virtues, I believe no

body else can possibly discern, how requiring the practice of such moral virtues, without a regard to self-interest, can seem to be *banishing morality* out of the world. If he had said, it seemed to be *banishing happiness* out of the world, there might have been some more appearance of ground for it; though I dare venture to engage, that neither of them will be in danger by it.

I readily grant, however, in answer to this author's question^p, that the relation of things to our own happiness, as *sensible* beings, is a very material relation, worth examining into; but it does not follow, that there is no other worth considering; which seems to be the judgment of all this class of writers; and very particularly of the author of the *Essay*, as appears by many passages in it, of which the following is not the least worth noting.

"If, says he, we must talk in the language of these advocates for fitnesses, we should call the fitnesses, which they speak of, partial fitnesses, or rather *unfitnesses*, as wanting the most essential part of the fitness of an action, *viz.* Beneficialness to the agent himself. God's command supplies that part of fitness before wanting, and makes it now wise and fitting to chuse what before could not have been *wisely* chosen; for what is not fit upon the whole, is *really unfit*." This writer seems to have had a mind to outdo all, who had gone before him on his side of the controversy; they have contented themselves with maintaining, that man would have been under *no obligation* to practise virtue, if God had not promised a reward for it. None of them, that I have met with, have ventured to affirm, that without such a prospect the practice of virtue would have been *foolish* and *unfit*. This seems to be a peculiarity of the author of the *Essay*. It was indeed sufficiently contrary to our

natural notions of the *essential* difference of good and evil to affirm, that moral virtues are in their own nature *indifferent* till God commanded them, and that he might, if he pleased, have made the direct contrary to have been our duty, as some of the writers, who found virtue solely on the *will of God*, have maintained. But if it was not only *indifferent*, but *unwise* and *really unfit* for a moral agent to be just, to be grateful, faithful to a trust, or any way beneficent to his fellow creatures, before God commanded it, as this adventurous writer asserts; on what grounds can God be supposed to have commanded it at all? Or how can this be made to agree with what himself had before affirmed? *viz.* That God could not have given to man any other rule of action but the law of virtue. “If, says he, “God determined to create man, that is, a rational and social being, ’tis impossible, or rather absurd, that he should give him any other rule of action, than what he has given him: ’tis impossible he should have made it his duty to act unjustly, ungratefully, &c. or to live viciously, intemperately, &c. because this would have destroyed the very end and design of his being, and frustrated that very scheme, which God himself had purposed.” One would think the author was arguing here for the other side of the question, that the fitness of moral virtue, of justice, gratitude, temperance, &c. and the necessity of these to the well-being of mankind, did not depend upon the will or command of God, but upon the nature of the things themselves; (which, by the way, is all the necessity and independence contended for, by Dr. *Clarke* and his followers.) But if it is granted, that the practice of moral virtue was so *necessary*, as is here said, that without it the very end and design of God’s creating man, yea

his whole scheme, had been *frustrated*, how could it have been *unfit* for man to practise it *antecedently* to God's command? It could never be unfit or unwise for man to act with the same views his maker had, to pursue what was *necessary* to the well-being of the creation. This sure must have been right and good, though there had been no command about it. Nor can a wise and good being make a thing, that is *really unfit* in itself, the subject of his command. Virtue therefore does not acquire its fitness from *command*: But God commanded it, because he saw, that it was absolutely right and fit, the indispensable duty of a rational and social being.

Though our author allows this, agreeably to the sentiments of Archbishop King's translator, (whom he closely copies in every thing but his prudence) though I say they both allow, that moral virtue is the necessary consequence of the nature of man, they notwithstanding maintain, not only that *moral obligation*, but that *moral virtue* too, is founded on the will of God. But with such inconsistencies their principles seem to me to abound. The great argument, by which they support their notion, is thus expressed in the *Essay*: "Every thing, every relation, every fitness, is owing to God's will in its first instance: he sees, at one view, through all the causes, effects, and consequences of things; and therefore in that very act of volition, whereby he determines the existence of certain things, he determines their modes, relations, and every thing else belonging to them: and therefore if morality be supposed to flow *immediately* from those relations, yet still it must be *ultimately* resolved into the *will of God*, the author of nature, as its first and true foundation." To this I answer, that if God saw with one view, (as he

424 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

undeniably did from all eternity) the *necessary* relation of moral virtue to a rational and social being, saw, that he *could not possibly* give any other rule of action to such a being (as this writer asserts) if according to that view he determined to create man; then morality may indeed be *ultimately* resolved into the divine *understanding*, (that is the nature of things, as they exist in it) but cannot be resolved into the *will* of God, in any other sense, than that it depended solely on his will, whether any beings should exist, whose nature required the practice of morality, which I believe no body denies.

But the *will* of God must be supposed at any rate to be the foundation of *moral virtue*, by those, who will allow no other ground of *moral obligation* but rewards and punishments; by those, who, with this author, can see no fitness in any action, that brings no advantage to the agent. All concern for the good of others is, with him, unreasonable and unaccountable; every generous benevolent action, would be *madness and folly*, setting aside the consideration of a future reward. "Without that, he says, no single reason can be given why one ought to suffer the *least* degree of pain to remove from another the *greatest*;" and page 64 he puts this question: "What can induce a man to communicate happiness to another rather than not? What is the exciting reason? You must either assign one, or tell me 'tis preferable in itself as an ultimate end, and then the *pleasure of doing it* will be the true reason: now this, says he, is recurring to a moral sense." Not at all. Though pleasure may be generally consequent upon doing a right or morally good action, that is not the true reason of doing it, is not the end the agent has in view; the rectitude or goodness of the action makes it preferable in itself, and is the *exciting reason*. To

ask, why a man should chuse to do good rather than not, or rather than do evil, is to ask, why good is better than evil, and why a man perceives it to be so. That a man should chuse to do what his understanding perceives to be good, worthy of approbation, and consequently of choice, carries its own reason with it. *If no single reason can be given* for such a conduct, it must be upon the same grounds, that no proof can be given, that it is daylight, when the sun shines, if any one should take it in his head to deny it; not on account of the uncertainty or obscurity of the thing, but because no evidence can be stronger than the glare of its own light.

'Tis surprizing to observe, that judicious, and (as I am willing to believe) well-meaning men, can argue against the common sentiments of humanity, contradict the most natural perceptions of their own minds, and admit the greatest inconsistencies into their schemes, to support a favourite hypothesis.

The author of the *Essay*, according to the general scheme or the writers on that side, (who are for taking away every motive to virtue but self-interest) denies; that there are any benevolent or disinterested affections natural to man: but as he cannot deny, that there are some *appearances* of such affections, and that men are apt to think they find them in themselves; he accounts for this, after Archbishop King's translator, from an early *association of ideas*. "The great Mr. Locke, he says, was the first, who gave any hint towards a solution of this phenomenon in human nature; and his scheme has lately been improved upon, in a preliminary dissertation to an *English* version of Archbishop King's *Origin of Evil*." Which *improvement* is adopted by our author.

I dare say, when that great man wrote his very

426. *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

useful chapter *Of the association of ideas*, in which he so rationally accounts for the groundless fears, *unnatural aversions*, whimsical affections, and obstinate adherence to error, observable among men, by an *accidental association of ideas*, not at all united in nature, he little imagined any *hint* could be taken from thence, to account in the same way for the most reasonable affections, the most *suited to our nature*; so general, and even so necessary, that if they were wanting, it might justly be esteemed a defect in the forming of a social being.

But our author can supply this *defect* with his *association of ideas*. 'Tis but to suppose, that "
 " at first a man perceives, or is taught from his in-
 " fancy, that as he lives in a social state, so his
 " happiness is necessarily connected with that of
 " other men; that the esteem of others is useful to
 " him; this esteem only to be procured by bene-
 " ficent actions, and an inward concern manifested
 " by his outward actions for the good of others.
 " Hence he desires the happiness of others, and
 " joins pleasure to that idea: thus the association
 " is formed, thus benevolence is rooted in our
 " minds; and, forgetting how it came there, we
 " are apt to think it *natural*, and act upon it as a
 " principle intirely distinct from self-love."

This detail of an *unnatural* progress of the mind, in acquiring benevolent affections, will scarce satisfy any one, who consults *nature*, or what in fact passes in the world, or in his own mind; however plausible it may seem to a speculative recluse, shut up in his study, only to *imagine* by what means such affections might possibly arise. Our author thinks, they so wholly depend on this *imaginary association*, that he tells us, that "they, who are not sensible
 " how nearly private and public happiness are uni-
 " ted, (as a great part of mankind, 'tis to be feared,

“are not) have no benevolent affections, but are
“indifferent to the happiness or misery, the virtue
“or vice, of every one else.”

I am persuaded this remark was made in the
study, with the above *detail*, without looking into
what really passes in the world; for though it may
be pretty true, that the bulk of mankind have no
distinct notions of the connection of public and pri-
vate happiness, that is, they form no general pro-
positions about it, and perhaps such kind of max-
ims enter into the education of very few, even of the
better sort; yet 'tis far from being true, that for
want of this they have no *benevolent affections*. If
these depended on such notions or instructions, as
this author has imagined, 'tis to be feared they
would be much rarer than we find them. When
we examine the real fact, those, whose understand-
ings are least improved, and who reason least, will
perhaps be often found to have the strongest affec-
tions. Men need not be *taught*, they *feel*, that
their happiness is not independent on that of others;
they find themselves unavoidably involved, or af-
fected with the miseries of others, and can form no
idea of happiness, into which some kind of commu-
nication with others does not enter. The very sup-
position of being happy alone, without regard to
any person in the world, or whilst all about him
were miserable, most appear a contradiction to a
social nature: But this dependence of his happiness
on that of others is the *effect* of his benevolent af-
fections, not the *cause or ground* of them.

Can any one think, that the fondness of a mother,
and her tender concern for the happiness of her child,
is owing to her “having perceived, or been taught
“from her infancy, that her happiness is necessarily
“connected with that of others; that their esteem
“is useful to her, this esteem only to be procured by
“beneficent actions, &c.” How far unequal to such an
effect are reflections of this nature! The connection
of

of her happiness with that of her child must be owing solely to her kind affections, an association of *nature's* forming, quite different from that, which Mr. Locke has observed of ideas *accidentally* united, that have *no connection in nature*. Is it possible, from the hypothesis of these writers, to account for parents sacrificing a great part of their ease and happiness in this world, to provide for the welfare of their children; and sometimes by methods, that allow them no title to a reward for it in the next? What desire of esteem, what secret aim at their own happiness, can lurk at the bottom of this?

But it seems we have not the whole of their scheme at once; the parts of it are not consistent enough to be shewn together: benevolence, in the view, wherein it has hitherto appeared, is nothing but a secret aim at *our own* happiness; but we are now to have a prospect of it as intirely disinterested. "We maintain" (says the author of the *Essay*) that in this "social state benevolence or disinterested affection is a proper *principle of action*; and how it comes to be so, we have shewn before; nay, we farther maintain, that a disinterested benevolence is *rational, commendable*, and indeed the very thing, that gives the name or character to virtuous actions among mankind." This, he pretends, is not in the least inconsistent with what he has said before, of *private happiness* being the *ultimate end and true principle of action*; "for doing good to others, says he, is a necessary means to *that end*; these means are valuable, therefore desired, approved, hence by habit loved; but the object of love is a real end, or desired for its own sake, without an *immediate* view to any thing else. This is what we mean by disinterested benevolence; 'tis not necessary, that the agent should have no *remote* view towards *his own happiness in the main*." All I

can gather of these gentlemen's meaning, in whose name this author speaks, from his account of it here, compared with what has been before quoted from him, is, that men first deceive the world, and then *themselves*, with an *appearance* of disinterested benevolence, to gain esteem, and the character of virtuous, though there is really no such thing in nature. But if this scheme were true, how could it come to pass, that all mankind should expect from one another what none of them has? How did they agree in making the *name and character* of virtuous actions to consist in what they all must know had not a being? Why should they not rather esteem one another, for doing beneficent actions upon an avowed principle of self-interest, if that were really the only *natural and reasonable motive of action*, as these gentlemen professedly maintain?

But it is at last pretended, that upon their principles a disinterested benevolence is *rational and commendable*, which was before said to be "madness, folly, and unfit, as wanting the most essential part of fitness, beneficialness to the agent." Doing good to others is now become, "an object of love, a real end, or desired for its own sake," though but two pages before it was asked, "What can induce a man to communicate happiness to another rather than not?" And his adversaries affirming it to be *preferable in itself as an ultimate end*, is exploded, as *recurring to the moral sense*. These passages seem to me *absolute inconsistencies*; but if our author can find a way to reconcile them in his scheme, it may help to reconcile him, at the same time, to those who, more consistently with their own principles, maintain virtue, rectitude, or the fitness of things, to be *an object of love, and as such, a real end, desirable for its own sake*. And he may come to a better understanding of this *enthusiastic, unintelligible language*, which he finds fault with in them, since himself begins to talk

talk at the same rate, though at the hazard of overthrowing the doctrine he is labouring to support.

Several of the writers in this controversy argue against the followers of Dr. Clark's doctrine, from the *ill use* they pretend has been made of it; tho' nothing can be more fallacious, than to condemn a principle for the *abuse* of it, or for consequences *falsely* drawn from it, which the most sacred and incontestable truths cannot be secure against.

The author of the *Essay*, in particular, reasons thus: " 'Tis easy to see what *pernicious tendency* the scheme of independent fitnesses is of, from what use has been made of it by a late advocate for Deism. His whole book is built upon this principle, that duty and obligation arises from the nature and relation of things, which are so independent, that no command can alter them, or make that fit, which is in itself unfit; and consequently man must always have the same religion." This is a very false consequence, from a very true principle. Our author is so charitable as to believe, that neither of the persons he writes against, were aware of this consequence; but he can't see how they will get off it, if the premises are granted; because what is once fit in itself, must be always *fit in itself*, not having relation to any end, and not being alterable by any change of circumstances whatever.

But who has maintained such independent fitnesses, as these writers have imagined? It is affirmed indeed, that there is a fitness in things independent of any positive institution, and of all consideration of reward and punishment; and on that account they are said to be fit in themselves, or fit without being commanded. But how does it follow, that they are independent of every thing else, or that they have no relation to any end? This is as false a consequence as that of the late advocate for Deism; and

yet

yet the premises, from which both *pretend* to be drawn, are undeniably true, even from these authors own concessions. For though they maintain, that virtue is founded ultimately on the will of God, they yet own (as has been before observed, how consistently need not here be said) that "when God determined to create a rational and social being, it was *impossible* he should give him any other *rule of action* than what he has given him." The moral law then is equally allowed to be *necessary and unalterable* upon either scheme; and if it be a true consequence, that therefore *man must always have the same religion*, it follows as much from the concessions of these authors, as from the principles of those they oppose; and therefore cannot reasonably be urged by them, as an argument of the *pernicious tendency* of their adversaries doctrine, since it would equally involve their own. But in truth it is no just consequence of either.

It is undeniably true, that what was at first a law to man necessarily resulting from his nature, *is still*, and always must continue so to be. But the error of the author of *Christianity as old as the Creation* lay, in not seeing, or being unwilling to see, that notwithstanding this, some change might happen in the circumstances of man, as a free agent, from whence new duties, new wants, might arise, or new assistances be requisite. And the mistake of the author of the *Essay* lies, in supposing, that independent fitnesses (as he affects to call them, though improperly) have no relation to any end, and are not alterable by any change of circumstances. Whereas the fitness of moral actions has always a respect to some end, and is intirely dependent on the nature and relation of things, considered in their various *circumstances*. The same action may be fit and right in some circumstances of things, which would be unfit in others; for an action is then only morally fit, when it is suitable to the agent, and the
object,

object, according to their respective relations and circumstances.

If then any change has happened in man, that introduced new wants, and required new assistances, *revelation* might be necessary to supply them, notwithstanding the false reasoning of that author; and new duties, *new fitnesses*, might arise, notwithstanding the mistakes of this. *Repentance*, for instance, is a fitness introduced among mankind by sin, the sinner standing in a different relation to God from that, which he had as an innocent person: But this does not hinder the moral law from retaining its *immutable nature*, or the fitness of moral actions from being *independent of positive appointment*, or of rewards and punishments; their fitness resulting *necessarily* from the nature, relations, and circumstances of things. Nor would there be any absurdity in saying, that repentance for sin was *eternally fit in itself*.

The opposers of Dr. *Clarke* in general are, I find, greatly prejudiced against the word *fitness*. Let us consider it therefore a little more particularly. Absolute fitness, or *fit in itself*, is an absurdity with them. The term is relative, they say, and must be unintelligible, when used without relation to an *end*; (for it is a mistake, common to all the writers on that side, to suppose, that the words *fit in itself*, are meant to exclude all manner of *end*, or relation to any thing;) and some of them, particularly the author of the *Essay*, complain of "a mist and confusion in the language of the advocates for fitnesses." Perhaps there may be some ambiguity in applying that term indifferently to the foundation of virtue in the *abstract*, and to the practice of it by moral agents, which may have given ground for such a complaint: But as these authors, in whatever respect they speak of the *fitness of things*, have expressed their meaning with great clearness, it seems a needless trifling to cavil so much about words. Those, who speak of the

the abstract idea of virtue in general, as a conformity to the reason of things, and the proper ultimate end of moral agents, use the word *fit*, when so applied, in an *absolute* sense; for, as a * fine writer upon these subjects says, why must this term be confined to a *relative* signification, any more than the *æquum* and *rectum* of the ancients? But when they speak of the practice of particular virtues, tho' every right action may be said to be absolutely fit in itself, yet this cannot be so understood, as to exclude such actions from having any relation to an end: for instance, if it should be said, that to relieve a distressed person is *fit in itself*, could this be reasonably understood to mean, that it is fit, without a relation to any end? Or where would be the difficulty to apprehend, that the goodness of the end made the action right and fit in itself, *i. e.* fit without being commanded, fit without a prospect of advantage to the agent? What is there *unintelligible* in this? The absolute fitness of virtue in general consists in its tendency to promote the order, harmony, and happiness of the world; and every particular virtue, (such at least as respects our fellow-creatures) tends to some good or other, towards the object of it; but the immediate, the proper end of a moral agent, is the rectitude or moral fitness of the action, whatever other ends that action may respect. In this it is the mind finds a complacence: And therefore, the followers of Dr. Clarke, often speak of virtue itself as a real end, amiable and desirable for its own sake; and that sometimes with a rapture, that may seem to favour more of the enthusiasm of poetry, than of the sedateness of philosophy, tho' there is a real and solid foundation for it.

This their opposers call *the error of the Stoics*, and accuse them of falling into the same folly, of mistaking *means for ends*. But these authors mistake the error of the *Stoics*; it did not consist in

* Mr. Balguy, author of several tracts on these subjects.

434 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

taking means for ends, but in a *partial* consideration of human nature: an error, which themselves have fallen into, though in another instance. They consider man only as he is a sensible being, and conclude, that he can have no other views but to his own happiness as such. The *Stoics*, on the other hand, considered man as a rational and social being *only*; and as such, they rightly judged, that virtue must be his *end* and his happiness; but then they neglected to consider, that he was likewise a *sensible* being, liable to many external accidents, to pains and sufferings, under which virtue alone, with all its excellence, could not be sufficient for his happiness. This consideration might have led them to the knowledge of a future state, where virtue would meet with no impediments; but whilst they were ignorant or uncertain of *that*, and yet plainly saw, that virtue had an intrinsic goodness, independent of any external advantages or disadvantages, that might attend it, they were forced into the absurdities of maintaining, that *pain was no evil*, that a wise man was master of his own happiness, and that virtue was itself a sufficient compensation for all the sufferings in the world. This was the real, and, if the expression may be allowed, the *noble* error of the *Stoics*.

But in this Dr. *Clarke*, and those who adhere to his principles, having the advantage of a better light, have been far from following them: they have, with great strength of reason and variety of argument, insisted on the necessity of having recourse to the expectation of rewards and punishments in another life, for the support of virtue under the temptations and calamities of *this*. They tell us indeed, that virtue will be a great part of the happiness of that future state, and if their opposers would a little refine or exalt their notions of happiness, (which surely does not wholly consist in *sensible pleasure*) they might perhaps come to see, that there can be

be no absurdity, in making *that* to be the *end* of rational agents *here*, the perfection of which may probably be in a great measure their *happiness hereafter*.

Some observations on a pamphlet, entitled, The eternal obligation of natural Religion, &c. being an Answer to Dr. Wright's Remarks upon Mr. Mole's Sermon.

THIS author, who styles himself *Phil-orthos*, is an instance, that happening to be on the side of truth, does not secure warm heads from running into extravagancies in the defence of it. His chief design is to maintain, that morality is founded on the eternal truth and the immutable nature of things. But in order to this, instead of considering those eternal truths, and immutable natures, in the view, that some eminent * authors have done, as *proofs* of the existence of an *eternal mind*, there being no other intelligible support of eternal *abstract ideas*, he has fallen into the unintelligible whimsies of those, who assert, that *universal natures*, *abstract ideas*, and the moral *differences* of things, are real entities subsisting of themselves, independent of any mind. But as these visionary gentlemen have not been pleased to tell us the place of their residence, I fear those, who go to look for them, will be at a great loss where to find them.

However, according to this author, their existence is rather more necessary and certain, than the existence of God himself; for he says^b, "Whether there
"were a divinity or not, any creator, creature, or
"not, such moral entities would always subsist, and
"be just the same that they are now." But if these moral entities, the moral natures and differences of things, refer, as this author says they do^c, to pos-

* Dr. Chdworth and Mr. Norris. ^b Page 15. ^c Page 31.

436 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

sible existences, he should have considered, that by supposing there were no divinity, no creator, he supposes away the only ground of *possible existence*; if there was no divinity, there could be no possible existences, and consequently no truths concerning them.

In maintaining these self-existent moral entities, this author has three main arguments^d; first, “That to speak of abstract ideas arising from any mind, is a flat contradiction in terms,—because *we understand* by them such moral entities, as are self-existent, or that do not depend upon any being for their existence, but may be considered abstractly or separately, without the consideration of any subject: and therefore to say, that they must arise from the mind of God, is to destroy *our notion* of them; or to say, that they are both abstract, and not abstract, at the same time; which is absurd.”

Answer. Who can help it, if asserting truth destroys peoples *false notions* of things? Where can ideas exist but in some mind? And whatever this writer *understands* by *abstract ideas*, what *should* be understood by them, but the general natures of things, considered by some mind, separately from particular existencies? For the nature of things is never in *fact* separate, or abstracted from particular existences: that is only done by an act of the mind: The *consideration* of them, separate from any subject, is that, which makes them *abstract ideas*, and their being *in the mind*, that abstracts them from their subject, cannot make them at the same time *not* abstract. To speak of them therefore, as existing *out* of mind, may with much more reason be said to be a *flat contradiction in terms*.

His second argument is, “That whatever ideas did arise in the mind of God, before the creation of the world, must be supposed to have had some moral nature or entity for their object: otherwise

“ they could not be ideas or images of any thing,
“ but mere *reveries*, floating at random, and cor-
“ responding to nothing at all.”

Answer. If God perceives by *ideas*, there is no need of looking out of the *divine understanding* to find objects for them. Abstract ideas are not images of any thing without the mind, as ideas of *sen- sible* things are supposed to be, but are formed by the mind itself: *possible* existencies are real objects to it; and tho' there is nothing in being to represent them, they are no *reveries*, if they correspond to some power adequate to the production of them. Before all creation, God undoubtedly had ideas of all *possible natures*, not by looking out of himself for objects of them, but by contemplating his own infinite power and wisdom; for he must necessarily see all the objects, and the whole extent of his own power. But to imagine, that whilst things were only in *possibility*, their general natures and essential differences had an actual existence, I know not where, out of the divine mind; that they were self-existent objects of the divine ideas, tho' themselves are allowed to be only ideas; seems indeed to be a mere *reverie*, corresponding to nothing at all; and which I doubt if our author can form any *image* of. If he can, I should be glad to be informed, what sort of entities the *differences* of things are. The *essential difference* between a circle and a square, an angel and a man, or between a moral good and evil, I allow to be eternal, immutable, and independent of any will; but cannot comprehend this to mean any thing else, than that it was eternally true, that none of these things are the same with those, from which they essentially differ; or can be made so by any will. But that their differences should be something subsisting distinctly from the things themselves, real self-existent entities, or, in plain English, *real beings*, is, I think, utterly inconceivable.

438 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

Not is there any occasion for such an unintelligible supposition, to support the truth, which this author chiefly designs to maintain. The eternal and immutable nature of things, their necessary relations, and essential differences, unalterable by any will, are sufficiently secured by being in the divine understanding, eternally and unchangeably what they are. If God sees the possible existence of a triangle, he sees, that it must *necessarily* be different from a circle, and that he cannot will it to be the same; for to will a thing to be the same with that, from which it is essentially different, is a contradiction, and therefore no object of power.

His third argument is, "That, if the moral natures and differences of things did primarily arise from the *mind* of God, or if his *mind* were the foundation or support of them; he must as naturally will evil as good, and approve of vice and virtue alike. There is no avoiding this consequence, says he, unless it can be proved, that there may be a difference, without different ideas or objects." In the same paragraph he expresses his argument thus: "If the nature of moral good, or of truth, did wholly *arise* from the divine *will*, then the nature of moral evil and of falshood, by parity of reason, must arise from it, and be equally conformable to it."

Here he quite changes the state of the supposition, and whatever consequences he may draw of *rank Epicurism*, or *downright Manicheism*, from supposing the moral nature and truth of things, to arise from the divine *will*, they no way concern those, who assert these things to have been eternally in the divine *mind*. If this author takes these two suppositions to be the same, he very much mistakes them. But indeed I cannot guess what he understands by the moral nature of things, *arising from or in* the divine

mind, when he draws so absurd a consequence from it. The expression itself I think very exceptionable, as it seems to imply things coming to the mind of God, which were not always there: but if he means by it what sober writers mean, who maintain, that the abstract natures or ideas of all things were eternally in the divine mind, or that God eternally preceived in his own comprehensive understanding, the moral natures of thing to be what they are, I see not how it will follow from thence, that *God must as naturally will evil as good, and approve of vice and virtue alike*. There is no avoiding this, he says, *unless there may be a difference without different ideas or object*. But what ground is there to imagine, that because good and evil are equally perceived by the divine mind, therefore he has not *different ideas* of them, or that they must be equally *conformable to his will*? How wild a consequence is this! Our author sure knows of no distinction, between the divine *understanding* and the divine *will*. Let him consider, that if God saw before the creation the possible existence of an intelligent *free agent*, he must see, that the idea of such a being necessarily implies a power of chusing either to act suitably to the nature of things, and agreeably to his will, which is moral good; or to act unsuitably to both, which is moral evil. These ideas must be essentially different in his mind, and their being equally perceived by him can by no rule of logic or metaphysics infer, that they are equally conformable to his *will*, or equally approved by him. How far this reasoning may affect those, who maintain, that truth and falshood, good and evil, depend on the *mere will* of God, I need not enquire: But it is a sufficient defence against that erroneous notion, to shew, that these things must necessarily be, from all eternity, in the divine *understanding* immutably the same. We need not have recourse to unintelligible self-existent entities, *abstract ideas*, that yet are *objects* of ideas independent of

any *mind*; and which I am persuaded no rational mind can comprehend.

The same author, if I remember right, (for I have not his performance by me at present) has run into another extravagance, tho' in maintaining a solid truth; affecting to talk of God, as under a moral *obligation* of making nature, and the essential difference of things, the *rule* of his actions; with many daring and unusual expressions, which must give great offence to those, who have accustomed themselves to join with the term *obligation*, the idea of a *superior will*, and of reward and punishment: Since it will not only appear to them an absurdity, but the highest irreverence, when applied to the supreme being; and therefore ought in prudence to be avoided.

The truth which this author should, and which perhaps he did mean, has been asserted by the best writers on these subjects; but then they did it with decency and dignity. They did not subject the supreme being to rule his actions, by imaginary self-existences, that have no dependence on him: acting in conformity to moral truth is, with them, acting in conformity to *himself*, in whom all essential truth exists. And I think, it can no way derogate from him to assert, that the perfection of the divine nature *obliges* him to acting conformably to the essential difference of things, because acting contrary to them would be an imperfection: it is the same as acting contrary to goodness, justice, truth, or, in one word, the rectitude, which every one, who allows the immutable nature of these things, readily owns to be inconsistent with absolute perfection.

And if the supreme being may be thus *obliged* by his own essential perfections, to act conformably to the immutable nature of things, on the same grounds it is maintained, that every rational being must be *obliged* to act suitably to his perceptions of those things; because, in doing otherwise, he must fall short of that degree of *perfection*, and consequently
 1 of

of happiness, which belongs to his nature: For the happiness of every being is dependent on, and in proportion to the perfection, which belongs to it.

This consideration leads me to reflect, that the writers on the other side, who maintain, that nothing can induce *moral obligation*, but rewards and punishments annexed to the law of a superior, can only mean, that if there was no such expectation, should men disregard the perfection of their nature, fall from their moral character, and forfeit the happiness of rational beings, by chusing to act contrary to the reason and truth of things, they may do it with impunity. And that indeed is very true. But does it follow, that there is nothing *wrong* in such a choice? Is it not unsuitable to, and unworthy of such a being, and inconsistent with the true happiness of a reasonable nature? And is virtue nothing but mere aiming at reward, or a care to avoid punishment? I do not know what notions the partisans of that doctrine can have of virtue and moral goodness, whilst they talk of it as nothing but a regard of *interest*. Could they think any one a virtuous and truly good man, who would willingly counteract his sense of right and wrong, and all the dictates of his reason, from the nature and fitness of things, if he might do it with impunity? I am persuaded they could not; the *natural* sentiments of their hearts, I doubt not, get the better of their *artificial* schemes; and whilst they contend, that nothing can *oblige* them to do just or kind actions, but the prospect of a reward, they feel the charms of rectitude and benevolence determine them to act independent of other views, with all the force of *moral obligation*.

Eternal truth! instruct us so to learn thy *perfect will*, in the essential difference of good and evil, that aspiring to perfect our nature *here*, by a conformity thereto, we may be qualified for that blessed state *hereafter*, which thou hast promised as the reward, and which is itself *the perfection of virtue*.

*Remarks on some passages of the first book of the
Divine Legation of Moses.*

SINCE I drew up the foregoing remarks, I have met with the second edition of the *Divine Legation*, in which I find a great deal upon the *foundation of morality and of obligation*, which either was not in the first edition, from whence I have quoted a just observation relating to those subjects, or I did not then advert to it. Otherwise the sentiments of so great a writer would not have been the last in my consideration: but I cannot allow myself now to omit taking notice of them, and it may be no improper conclusion of these papers.

This penetrating author with great judgment observes all the extremes, into which the contenders about the true foundation of moral virtue have run, whilst each would advance his own favourite principle upon the ruins of others. But tho' he judiciously avoids all their extravagancies, some of which have been taken notice of in these remarks, I am sorry to find, that, in establishing morality and obligation on the *will of a superior*, he too acts upon the *exterminating model*, will not allow, that a *moral difference* of things, or *obligation* to practice, can be deduced from either of the other two principles, the *moral sense*, or the *eternal relations and essential difference of things*.

If the important point he is proving, required his argument to be carried thus far, I should very unwillingly oppose it: But there is no need of it: he has strongly proved, throughout the course of this learned work, the absolute necessity of religion to society; and particularly, in opposition to Mr. Bayle, the insufficiency of the *moral sense*, and the knowledge of the *essential difference of things*, to influence society to the practice of virtue. Against this I am far from contending. My only purpose

From p. 53, to 58.

this

is to plead, that these principles have so far a *right* of obliging, that whosoever is not influenced by them, deserves blame and punishment, tho' he knows nothing of a superior will with power to inflict it. The contrary notion seems to give the Atheists a greater advantage, than I am persuaded was ever intended them by an adversary, who had attacked them in their strongest holds, and turned their own artillery against them, with abilities equal to his arduous undertaking. I beg leave therefore, to examine the grounds, upon which this great author maintains, "That an Atheist is not under any obligation to act agreeable to right reason," *i. e.* to practise virtue.

And first he urges, that an Atheist cannot arrive at the knowledge of morality properly so called: that tho' he may have a knowledge of the *natural* essential difference of things, this does not induce the knowledge of the *moral difference*: ^b That this

^b In order to judge of this point, let us suppose of a society of Atheists, one fallen into a pit, where he must inevitably perish if unassisted; and another of them happening to travel that way, who could with great ease relieve him. Will these two persons perceive nothing, but the *natural* essential difference between leaving a man to perish in a pit, and helping him out of it? Would not the distressed consider one of these as an inhumanity to be detested, and the other as a good action deserving grateful return? Might not the traveller be too conscious, that one of these actions would be better than the other, have a goodness in it more to be approved? Yet we will suppose some business or pleasure he is intent upon, stifles this consciousness and prevails with him, to leave the distressed to his miserable fate; and that he afterwards relates to the rest of the society, how he had hurried from the melancholly object, in pursuit of his inclinations. Can it be imagined, that they would coldly consider this action, only as not agreeable to reason? Or would they not rather judge it to be wrong, inhuman, and worthy of detestation. It cannot, I think, be doubted, that such a society might be capable of these sentiments. And what is this but to perceive the *moral difference* of things, tho' they have not discovered a *superior will* to enforce the observance of them? Or tho' they may think the guilty secure from that punishment, which they must be conscious so great an immorality deserves.

distinction

444 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

distinction has been much unobserved, the contenders for this principle, as well as their adversaries, being under the same prepossession, that *one* inferred the *other*: But that it is a mistake, for nothing but *will*, or the law of a superior, can constitute the morality of actions. This in short is the sum of what is insisted on in several pages¹. To which, with submission I reply, that which properly constitutes the morality of an action, is the free choice of the agent, judging it to be right or wrong, praise or blame worthy. The law of a superior does not make an action morally good or evil; it only declares what is so, or restrains and incites by the sanctions of punishment and reward, (I speak not of *positive duties*, the morality of which depends solely on the law of a superior.) Neither do I find, that the contenders for the *natural essential difference of things* have^{*} mistaken it for the *moral difference*; they plainly saw, that these were distinct things, but they saw too, that one was so dependent on the other, that when they had clearly demonstrated the former, they needed not give themselves much trouble to prove the latter: For perhaps this great author is the first, who, acknowledging *the natural essential difference*, has denied, that the *moral difference* was deducible from it.

“The natural essential difference of things, he says¹, if we mean any thing by the terms, hath this apparent property, that it creates a *fitness* in the agent to act agreeably thereto: As the moral difference of things creates, besides this fitness, an obligation likewise.” But what is this fitness and unfitness, that results from the natural essential difference? Not indeed the same with that, which creates it, but surely the very same with the *moral difference*; or else I know not what we mean by either. An action fit or unfit, made the object of

¹ See pag. 42, 46, 52.

^{*} See pag. 52.

¹ P. 44.

choice, is morally good or morally evil. And therefore it is maintained, that *fitness* creates an *obligation*, because it implies, or is the same with moral difference, from which our judicious author allows, that *obligation* is inseparable.

He further argues, "that the essential differences of things are the adequate objects of the understanding; and for this reason, the understanding is necessitated in its perceptions, but the will is not necessitated in its determinations: For instance, that three are less than five, the understanding is necessitated to judge; but the will is not necessitated to chuse five before three: Therefore the essential differences of things are not the adequate objects of the will; the law of a superior must be taken in, to constitute obligation in choice, or morality in actions." But if this reasoning holds good, it will prove too, that *the law of a superior* is not the adequate object of the will; for neither does such a law *necessitate* the determinations of the will: if it did, there would be no longer any *choice*, and consequently no morality in actions; *obligation* would then differ nothing from *compulsion*. But all the necessity that a *free-agent* can be laid under, either from the law of a superior, or from the essential differences of things, is that of standing self-condemned, if he chuses to do what he cannot avoid judging, and in the case of another, would pronounce to be unfit, wrong, and deserving punishment. This judgment of his therefore brings him equally under the strongest of *obligations*, upon whatsoever principle it is founded, or how inconsistent soever it may be with the absurd notions of an *atheistic fatalist*.

It is urged in the preceding page, that *obligation* in general necessarily implies an *obliger*. And elsewhere, that, "upon the discovery of a superior

446 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

" will, and not till then, human actions became the
 " subject of *obligation*." To this I answer, that, in
 the common acception of the word, obligation
 implies only a perception of some ground or reason,
 upon which it is founded, but not necessarily a supe-
 rior will. When we say a man is under an obliga-
 tion to be grateful to a benefactor, we mean, that
 the relation interceding between them requires it of
 him; and so that he is obliged to do to others, as
 he would have them do to him, implies an *equity* in
 the thing, that brings him under such an obligation.
 Again it is urged, " That the *obliger* must be diffe-
 " rent from, and not the same with the *obliged*. To
 " found *obligation* upon *reason* is an absurdity, be-
 " cause reason is only an attribute of the person
 " obliged: To make this then the *obliger*, is to
 " make a man oblige himself." Very true, but it
 is just the same, whatever principle we suppose ob-
 ligation to be originally founded on; a free-agent
 must be always the *immediate* obliger of himself:
 Whether he judges, that the will of a superior is to
 be the only rule of his actions; or that he ought to
 act conformably to the necessary relations, and essen-
 tial differences of things, or to his consciousness of
 right and wrong; or that a prospect of rewards and
 punishments should solely influence his actions; in
 either case it is equally the perception and judgment
 of his own mind, or his *reason*, that obliges him to
 act accordingly; and this is so far from being an
 absurdity, that it is essential to *moral choice* and *free*
agency.

But it does not follow, because that a man's own
 reason has a right in this sense to oblige him, that
 therefore *he may relinquish that right*. That maxim,
 which Mr. Warburton * says, " is an unexception-
 " able rule of right reason, that whoever acquires
 " a right to any thing from the the obligation of

"another towards him, may relinquish that right," takes place I suppose in those rights alone, that are acquired by voluntary compact, not in those, which are deduced from the nature of things. But it is the nature of things, the essential differences, which is maintained to be the original ground of obligation; over which reason has no power, tho' by its perception of them it becomes the *immediate obliger* to act suitably thereto.

This great writer farther argues¹, that "from the *nature* of any action morality cannot arise; nor from its *effects*: Not from the *first*, because, being only reasonable, or unreasonable, nothing follows but a fitness in doing one, and an absurdity in doing the other: Not from the *second*, because did the productive good or evil make the action moral, brutes, from whose actions proceed both one and the other, would have morality." To this last I reply, that from the *effects* of an action, where there is no *choice*, or *free-agency*, (of both which brutes are supposed incapable) no morality can arise: But where these are, morality does arise from the *effects* of an action made the objects of choice. To the *first* I reply, that if from the *nature* of an action follows a *fitness*, from *fitness* follows *obligation*, and consequently morality, in actions.

This methinks our judicious author should readily assent to, as agreeable to his own principles; for tho' he founds obligation on the *will of God*, he disclaims the error of those, who place it solely on a view of rewards and punishments. "The true principle of morality², he owns, should have the worthiest motive to enforce it; and the legitimate motive to virtue on that principle is compliance with the will of God. It is a mistake³, he says, that will could not oblige without happiness;

¹ P. 47.

² P. 38.

³ P. 49.

" will

448 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

“ will could not indeed oblige to unhappiness, but
 “ it would oblige to what should produce neither
 “ one nor the other, tho’ all considerations of the
 “ consequences of obeying or disobeying were
 “ away.” Now if this be so, (and one would scarce
 imagine it could be denied) this obligation to obey,
independent of all consequences, which our author
 justly contends for, can be founded on nothing but
 a *fitness* resulting from the relation of a creature to
 his creator and benefactor. To argue from hence,
 that therefore *it is fitness, which obliges, and not will*,
 is indeed a *metaphysical quibble*, and, as ‘ this author
 has represented it, not a little absurd, fit only, as
 he designed it, to *divert* the reader. But I think it
 may with great solidity be concluded, that if the
 will of God obliges from a fitness, that arises on ac-
 count of the relation of a creature to his creator,
 whatever fitnesses arise from other relations, and the
 essential difference of things, will likewise oblige in
 their proportion.

This great writer ‘ urges, indeed, “ that the fit-
 “ ness, that a creature, who depends entirely on his
 “ creator, should obey him, is infinitely different
 “ from any other fitness, that arises to a supposed in-
 “ dependent being, from the comparing and per-
 “ ceiving the relations between his ideas.” But if
 these relations, or our perceptions of the essential
 difference of things, are, as he farther argues, the
 rule, that God hath given his creatures to bring them
 to the knowledge of his will, then it must be a rule
 to all his creatures, whether they consider it as his will
 or not; and therefore, as reasonable beings, the fit-
 ness of obeying the creator’s will must be so far from
 being *infinitely different* from the fitness of comply-
 ing with a man’s perceptions of the necessary rela-
 tions and difference of things, that, supposing all
 consideration of the consequences were away, there

‘ P. 50. ‘ P. 51. ‘ P. 53.

must

must be an equal obligation to either, according to the opportunities of discovering them: Besides that without a regard to the right, and reason, and equity of the case, whatever mens actions may be, there is no virtue or real goodness in the person, that does them: the nature and reason of things therefore should seem to be the genuine principle of true morality.

That the knowledge of the *essential difference of things* would not alone be generally effectual to influence a society of Atheists to the practice of virtue, I readily grant. But that is no more an objection against the truth of the principle, and its *right* to oblige, than it is against the right, which the *will* of God has to oblige, *independent of its consequences*, that the knowledge of it would not be effectual to keep the bulk of mankind to the practice of virtue, without enforcing it by the sanctions of reward and punishment. 'Tis nevertheless true, that there is an indispensable obligation to obey the will of God, *though all consideration of the consequence of obeying and disobeying were away*, as this author justly maintains: And the same obligation there is without consideration of the consequence, to act suitably to that fitness, which results from the essential difference, and relations of things; and to the unavoidable judgment of our own minds, that actions are accordingly right or wrong, worthy of reward or punishment.

Now an Atheist is undeniably capable of these affections of the mind, by which this great author^w accounts for men's being disposed to place morality in the essential difference of things, *viz.* "that
" sense of *right* and *wrong* so strongly impressed, as
" to be attended with a consciousness, that the one
" deserves reward, and the other punishment, *even*
" *though there were no God.*" This consciousness

^w P. 51.

450 *Remarks on some writers on morality.*

therefore, which the Atheist is allowed to be capable of, though he is so blind as not to see, that that very sensation is the plainest indication of *will*; though, from the eternal truths which he perceives, he is so absurd, as not to discern an *eternal mind*, from which they result; yet this consciousness of his brings him under obligation to act suitably to what he *does see*, to do, or to forbear what he, unavoidably judges to be right or wrong; for no stronger obligation can be laid upon a *free-agent*, than that of standing self-approved, or self-condemned.

If this be not so, I should be glad to be informed, whether we are to suppose, that an Atheist is not accountable in a future state for any enormities he may commit here? Or if this be too great a privilege to allow him, upon what principle he can be justly punishable for doing or not doing, what it is maintained he is under *no obligation* to do or to forbear? If the author of the *Divine Legation* is pleased to take occasion of giving an answer to this question, when he publishes the impatiently expected remainder of his valuable work, it will be acknowledged a great instance of goodness and condescension, to overlook the obscurity and low abilities of the enquirer, in regard to the importance of the *difficulty*.

APPENDIX.

There are two arguments relating to the subjects of the foregoing *Remarks*, that seem to be of great weight with the opposers of Dr. *Clarke*, being frequently insisted on, and repeated by the best writers among them; though one of them is a mere *fallacy*, (which perhaps themselves are not aware of) and the other at least a very precarious supposition.

sition. It may therefore be of some service in this controversy to set them both in a true light, which I shall here endeavour to do, having but lately had occasion to observe the importance they are thought to be of.

It is maintained by Dr. *Clarke* and his followers, that there are eternal and immutable relations, essential differences of things, and fitnesses resulting from them, independently of the will of God, which are obligatory to all reasonable beings, *antecedent to any positive appointment or declaration* of the will of God concerning them. In opposition to this, several of their adversaries, in order to establish virtue and moral obligation *solely* on the will of God, have argued in different forms of expression to this purpose: That those relations and fitnesses &c. cannot be eternal, or independent on the will of God, since they are *consequences of the existence of things*, proceeding from the determination of his will. And, for the same reason, they urge, that moral obligation cannot be *antecedent* to the will of God, because it could not commence, till *after the will of God* had exhibited certain relations and fitnesses in the creation, from whence morality arises. Now here is the plain fallacy of substituting a quite different consideration of things in the room of that, which they pretend to oppose, viz. *particular existences*, instead of *general abstract ideas*; and the will of God, *as express'd or implied in the creation*, for the will of God *explicitly declared* by the command of moral virtues. And who is concerned in this argument I know not, for surely Dr. *Clarke* or his followers never pretended, that particular existences were eternal, and independent of the will of God; or that the eternal reason and truth of things were obligatory to reasonable creatures, before the will of God had brought any such into existence. The relations and fitnesses, they speak of, are *truths eternally in the divine understanding*,

standing, which proceed not from any determination of his will, but are the rules, by which his will is itself determined. The *antecedency* they speak of respects only the explicit declaration of the will of God, by the command of moral virtues. And what can be a greater fallacy than to object to this, that *the will of God is expressed in the creation*, exhibiting those relations and fitnesses, from whence morality arises? For the will of God, as expressed, or rather implied in the creation, is the very same with that reason and truth of things, which are said to be obligatory *as such*; that is, antecedently to any explicit declaration of the will of God concerning them. If these writers will allow the will of God in that sense, viz. *as expressed in the creation*, to be obligatory to morality without any positive appointment, or explicit command, the controversy would be at an end. But if they deny this, why do they amuse their readers or themselves, by seeming to oppose their adversaries with an antecedency of the will of God, when they really mean nothing more, than that the *existence* of creatures capable of moral obligation is a consequence of the determination of the will of God? which is indeed very true, but nothing to the purpose in this debate.

The other argument, which I design here to consider, is urged by those, who acknowledge no moral obligation, but what is founded on self-interest, or a prospect of *future rewards and punishments*. First they lay it down as a *postulatum*, that *the sole end of God in the creation was to communicate happiness*, and that he appointed the practice of virtue to be the necessary means of obtaining that end. In consequence of this they argue, that man ought to make *that his end*, which God has made so, that a consideration of the end must be the motive to choosing the means, and therefore virtue should only be chosen with *respect to the recompence of reward*,

ward, without which view it would neither be beautiful nor orderly, nor reasonable, nor fit.

That happiness was the *sole end* the creator had in view, is too precarious a supposition to be taken for granted. Had that been so, probably the utmost possibilities of it would have been produced; which does not seem to be the case. However, *rewards and punishments* have not the least pretence to be the sole end of God in the creation, tho' necessary for the *after* government of degenerate creatures. The very notion of reward and punishment implies merit or demerit arising from a compliance with or neglect of some end, which moral agents were *previously* obliged to have pursued; so that obligation must be founded on some principle *prior* to all consideration of reward and punishment, otherwise there could be no ground for them. And why should God have so over-rated virtue, as to propose inestimable rewards for the practice of it, if it had no self-excellence, or if it had not been one great end of his creating moral agents? If an earthly king should promise some great honours or privileges to such of his subjects as amidst a rebellious people had continued faithful to him, or would timely return to their duty; would any one doubt, that the king's *chief end* was to preserve, or to recover his subjects to their obedience; and that the proposed rewards were intended as *means* the better to secure that end? And if some of his subjects should profess, that they would have persisted in their fidelity, or returned to it, from a sense of the reasonableness of their duty, though his majesty had made them no such gracious promises; would the king think them the worse men, or the worse subjects for this, or that they were the less worthy of the honours he intended them? I

This point is largely insisted on, in *The Case of Dismissal* Chap. xv.

dare say nobody will imagine it. Why then should not the rewards proposed by the king of heaven for the practice of virtue, be esteemed as *means* to promote universal rectitude? And that contributing each his part towards that great end ought to be the *chief view* of all his reasonable creatures?

That *one* design of God in the creation was to communicate *happiness*, so far as was consistent with *order and rectitude*, or as it is a consequence of them, I believe will not be questioned. But since the infinitely *happy* Creator is likewise infinitely *perfect*, I think there is as little reason to question, that *one great end* he had in view was to communicate some degree of all his communicable *perfections*, to produce beings capable of imitating his moral attributes, of conforming to that sacred rule of truth and rectitude, by which his own unerring will is always directed; that they might be *perfect even as he is perfect*. And if this was one design of God in creating mankind, which can scarce be doubted; then certainly they ought to have the same end in view; and if, in order to it, God could give them no other law but that of moral virtue, as these writers allow, then the obligation to practise it must arise, with virtue itself, from the very nature of such a system, not solely from a prospect of rewards and punishments.

I am far from intending to depreciate a proper regard to future retributions, as they are gracious assistances to the frailty of man; but let them not change place with that, which they were appointed to promote; be made *sole ends*, whilst virtue is degraded into *bare means*; tho' if doing right actions purely *because they are right*, is not the proper idea of virtue, it will be hard to say what is; but aiming *solely* at a reward certainly is not. Where the will of God is known, there is an additional obligation, that strongly enforces the practice of virtue, from a desire of being acceptable to the
supreme

supreme being, who wills the perfection of his creatures, in which their chief good consists; and therefore the consideration of the will of God ought never to be omitted in any Christian schemes of morality. But neither ought moral virtue to be established solely on such principles, as would leave men loose from every obligation, who are either not so *wise*, as to discover the will of God in the *nature of things*, or not so *happy*, as to be acquainted with his *revealed will*, and the *sanctions of his laws*.

These Remarks are, with the utmost Deference, inscribed to ALEXANDER POPE, Esq. by an admirer of his Moral Character.

END of the FIRST VOLUME.

A P P E N D I X

...who with the perfection of his
...in which their great conduct and
...the consideration of the will of God
...to be omitted in any Christian's
...of many. It is not a great thing
...is described. It is not a great thing
...leave men to do as they please
...either not to do as they please
...the nature of the will of God in
...omitted with the will of God in



...the will of God in
...the nature of the will of God in
...the nature of the will of God in

END of the First Volume.

+

c

